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Abstract 
This account of Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy takes the form of a critique. It 
attempts to show the ways in which she falls foul of what she criticises. Murdoch is 
concerned about the influence of the romantic tradition upon our contemporary 
(post-war) accounts of morality. She charges contemporaries, such as Sartre and 
R. M. Hare with having n-dstakenly extended freedom in ways that make morality seem 
like a: matter of free choice. Against this, her own most rigorous work (The 
Sovereignty of Good) advances three central claims: (1) an idea of moral perfection 
(an ideal Good) is built into our ways of thinking and speaking; (2) this idea of 
Good/perfection is not an unavoidable fiction but a reality principle, it helps to 
undermine the- egocentricity that prevents us from doing justice to the reality of 
others; (3) this idea of a single, unitary Good pulls us towards Platonic metaphors. 
(We are like pilgrims, trying to move out of dark egocentricity and into the light of 
attention to others. ) My response to this is advanced in the following three parts: 
Part One sets out Murdoch's position, complete with an account of the stylistic 
peculiarities of its exposition. (She believes that value-laden metaphors are 
unavoidable, and in some cases irreducible. ) 
Part Two flags up her similarity to what she attacks. Far from being a moral quietist, 
Murdoch is deeply critical of our everyday lack of moral ambition. (It is as if we are 
content to lurk about in the dark. ) She rejects everyday ('bourgeois') contentment in 
favour of the command 'be ye therefore perfect'. Having flagged up this shared 
rejection of everyday contentment, I explore the way that Murdoch's apparently 
diffuse charge of 'romanticism' is held together by the idea of erotic striving. Such 
romanticism is the general theoretical correlate of the wrong model of love, romantic 
love rather than the slow patient love that she wants us to emulate. On this account, 
avoiding romanticism requires us to meet the following conditions. Firstly, we must 
direct loving attention towards the contingent reality of persons without puritanically 
avoiding attention to messy detail. (We should not just 'tag' people symbolically, as 
one of these or one of those. ) Secondly, our attention to the other should really be 
about them, it should not covertly redirect attention to the self Thirdly, we should 
not allow our fascinating suffering to obscure the reality of death. (The realisation of 
our finitude is a crucial aspect of undermining egocentricity. ) 
Part Three consists of chapter-pairs which examine the central Murdochian 
metaphors of fallenness, eros, and the death of the self in an attempt to show that 
Murdoch falls foul of what she attacks. The respective arguments advanced in Part 
Three as follows: 
Firstly, by shifting over to a form of Platonism, Murdoch strengthens her 
early pre-Platonic account of contingency into an account of fallenness. (We are not 
just finite but incomplete, ontologicaUy flawed in ways which cannot be 
comprehensively overcome. ) This is generative of entrapment in a form of ontological 
guilt. (Guilt about what we are. ) Such entrapment is constitutive of puritanism. 
(Given Murdoch's own understanding of the term. ) 
Secondly, although Murdoch's concept of love tries to fuse together elements 
of Kantian agape in with Platonic eros, it is the latter which serves as the metaphor 
for the fundamental constitution of the self (Continuity of character is continuity of 
erotic orientation i. e. desire. ) The ultimate problems of Murdoch's concept of love 
are, consequently, those of Platonic eros. Having established this, I go on to show the 
applicability of the standing charge that the Platonic preoccupation with a personal 
ascent of eros involves an egocentric preoccupation with one's own moral rectitude 
rather than the well-being of others. The result is what Vlastos calls 'spiritualized 
egocentricity'. 
Thirdly, Murdoch is critical of the romantic cult of suffering, but she avoids 
the anti-Platonic charge of pursuing invulnerability because she embraces a form of 
suffering ('unselfing', after Simone Weil's decreation. ) This requires her to allow for 
at least two different modes of suffering: a good one and a bad one. Her criterion to 
separate them out is that the suffering involved in punitive unselfing is informed by a 
realistic death orientation. Our ultimate human contingency must not be covered 
over. Murdoch's problem here is that her own account of death is arbitrary, it does 
not come to grips with the sheer ordinariness of our mortality. In particular, she 
wants to use mortality to underpin a self-other asymmetry. (Loving attention is to be 
directed thus: I am mortal, hence what is to be valued lies elsewhere. ) However, our 
shared mortality means that if my mortality devalues me, then your mortality will 
devalue you. The ordinary, shared reality of death cannot plausibly be given the sort 
of dramatic significance that Murdoch needs in order to separate out Murdochian 
suffering from romantic suffering. 
Although what is presented is a critique, it is intended not as a debunking 
exercise but as a clarification of where the problems lie when it comes to developing 
Murdoch's insights. That is to say, it may serve as a limited exercise, a propaedeutic 
to the appropriation of what is of value in her approach towards morals and what is 
deep in the way that she pictures human experience. As such, it may be seen as a step 
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) Introduction: Style and Content 
The most systematic account that Iris Murdoch provides of her approach towards 
moral philosophy is given in 7he Sovereignty of Good. The later (and longer) text, 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, elaborates upon the same themes but does so in a 
more discursive manner. Underlying both (and required for the comprehension of 
either) is an approach towards fact, value and metaphor that Murdoch developed in a 
series of articles written during the 1950s. Part One of this thesis will attempt to 
explain Murdoch's position and will draw upon this earlier work in order to address 
concerns about the non-standard way in which she sets out her argument. 
Murdoch is well known as one of the first post-war philosophers to challenge 
the fact/value distinction. Part of what is peculiarly-Murdochian about her challenge 
to the distinction is the way in which it draws in her view of metaphor. In her earliest 
encounters with Gilbert Ryle and behaviouristic attempts to downgrade the metaphor 
of inwardness, Murdoch came to the view that metaphoricity, although introducing 
various dangers, is unavoidable in our attempt to picture humans, Metaphors, on this 
view are not useful but dispensable devices that may be comprehensively reduced to 
literal statements with definite, truth-conditions. This attitude towards metaphor is 
tied into the fact/value question because part of what makes metaphors irreducible is 
their value-ladenness. They cast a favourable or unfavourable light upon matters. The 
attempt to reduce metaphors comprehensively to literal statements is viewed by 
Murdoch as implicated in conceptual loss, an impoverishment of our ability to picture 
humans in a realistic manner. 
It is a consequence of this standpoint (and not a matter of whim or intellectual 
indiscipline) that Murdoch's own account of morality has to rely heavily upon 
metaphor. What adds to concern about the metaphoricity of Murdocws texts is her 
preference for specifically-Platonic metaphors. This may strike some readers as being 
quasi-religious, mystical, or (in brief) unrealistic. Her commitment to Platonism raises 
concerns, that I accept as legitimate, about whether there is anything of general 
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philosophical value going on, and, if so, how this value can be cashed out. To try and 
make sense of the work that Murdoch's metaphors do, I draw upon Davidson's idea 
(not unrelated to Murdoch's own concerns) that the cognitive value of metaphors is 
to be found in the way that they jolt us out of our regular ways of thinking and 
redirect our attention to something that we might otherwise be in danger of missing. 
What Murdoch believes we are constantly in danger of missing is the complex 
reality of others. Because of our normal human egocentricity (sometimes acquisitive 
but sometimes punitive, hence not mere selfishness) we are continually caught up in 
ourselves and fail to see others realistically. We suffer from something akin to aspect 
blindness in our view of others. The work that Murdoch's metaphors do is to redirect 
us towards these failings and possible ways to combat them. She sets out the idea of 
the need for attention. This is a general (visual) metaphor for the various sorts of 
efforts that may be made in order to overcome our aspect blindness with regard to 
others. Morality, for Murdoch, must be rooted in realistic moral vision, it must be 
rooted in the just discernment of the other person. 
Our regular failure to attend (to taken the necessary care and make the 
necessary efforts) provides an overlap with the novels where this everyday, 
moment-to-moment failure is a constant feature. In the novels, anger, jealousy, 
romantic love and complacency involve ordinary, decent, and non-malevolent, 
characters in views of each other that are seriously flawed. This shared concern of the 
novels and the philosophical texts is not taken by Murdoch to justify a collapse of the 
genre distinction between the two. There are limits to the extent to which Murdoch is 
prepared to break with analytic norms of argument presentation. (Philosophical 
novels with an axe to grind, tend, in Murdoch's view, to be not only argumentatively 
weak but also poor novels. ) However, this overlap of concerns still indicates that the 
novels can be used to help cash out Murdoch's view of what humans are like and 
what it is about the normal human condition that she is concerned to combat via her 
heavily-metaphorical Platonized account of morality. 
The contention of this thesis will be that Murdoch's morality ultimately fails 
to combat the human problems that it identifies. Instead, it falls foul of what it is 
seeking to resist. Although this is a critical assessment, I have attempted to encounter 
Murdoch's texts in an appropriately sympathetic (i. e. attentive) manner. This should 
be particularly evident in Part One which accepts that she is directing us towards a 
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real problem and that the stylistic peculiarities, obscurities, ambiguities and difficulties 
that her texts present to the reader are themselves well-rooted in her arguments. 
Chapters One and Two will show the way in which the content and style of her texts 
are intimately related. This, in turn, will allow for the subsequent formulation of an 
approach towards critique. 
3 
Chapter 1: Metaphor and Style 
1. Breaking with the Analytic Style 
It is one of the quirks of Iris Murdoch that she advocates a simplicity of style 
that does not characterize her own texts. 'Philosophy too should attempt to use 
ordinary language and avoid pre-emptive jargon. All right, traditional metaphysics has 
a certain amount of specialised terminology, but it is not for us to presume to add to 
it' [M. 296 paraphrased at M. 172]. This sits uneasily with her earlier view that 'the task 
of moral philosophers has been to extend, as poets may extend, the limits of the 
language'. ' It sits even more uneasily alongside the programmatic statement that 'We 
need more concepts than our philosophies have furnished us with ... We need more 
concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being ... We need a new 
vocabulary of attention. '2 Her attempts to supply such a vocabulary by writing about 
eros and the void are apparently not to be counted as jargon. Perhaps we can make 
sense of them as extensions of ordinary vocabulary or else borrowings from the 
existing 'specialised terminology' of metaphysics. By contrast with the linguistic 
creativity of someone like Heidegger, Murdoch sticks fairly close to ordinary 
language and its established extensions in the belief that 'Meta-languages gain their 
sense from the language they are explaining' [M. 296]. There is no leaping out of, or 
instant semantic ascent from, saying what we mean in ordinary discourse. 
For Murdoch, truthfulness is associated with lucidity and simplicity, a term 
with frankly moral overtones, 'the egoist has a narrow moral world, the better man a 
larger and more complex one; yet ... there 
is a sense in which the good man's world is 
again simple: simple in the sense that he may see what is right without prolonged 
doubt and reflection! [M. 325]. When she thinks of Christ, Socrates and certain saints 
'it is the simplicity and directness of their diction which chiefly colours our conception 
of them as good'. Contemporary candidates for goodness are also 'perhaps most 
convincingly met with in simple people'. 3 Murdochs strictures on simplicity of style 
are moral strictures. 'The great artist, like the great saint, calms us by a kind of 
1 VC, 90. 
2 AD, 293. For Murdoch! s concern with conceptual impoverishment, see Diamond (1988). 
3 GG, 50. 
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unassuming simple lucidity, he speaks with the voice we hear in Homer and in 
Shakespeare and in the Gospels. This is the human language of which, whenever we 
write, as artists or as word-users of any other kind, we should endeavour to be 
worthy. v4 Insofar as Murdoch advocates such simplicity of style and not just a 
restriction ofjargon, she falls foul of her own strictures. Aware of a modern'tendency 
towards mystification and blunting of verbal precision' she introduces her own forms 
of imprecision. Lucidity is compromised by her extensive deployment of metaphors. 5 
Three in particular will figure prominently in the present study: fallenness, eros and 
figurative death (or 'unselfing). 'We may have to use very general and ambiguous 
terms or other images in answer to the question, "How do you mean? "' [M. 329]. In 
extremis, 'Such speculations live near to the edge of nonsense, but are valuable, for 
instance in reflection upon theological pictures' [M. 344]. 
The simplicity she appeals to is also less of a warning about what to expect 
from her texts than a way of attacking deconstruction. 'Technical meta-language 
terminology must be ancillary to basic looking, and not something which (as in 
deconstruction) takes its place' [M. 168]. Her target is abstruse language in 
combination with doctrines which challenge the referentiality of language and where 
obscurity is used to endorse the idea that language is self-enclosed play. (As if there 
were nothing beyond the text. )6 Other, and different, forms of obscure and 
referentially opaque discourse, such as mysticism, are admired and in certain respects 
emulated by Murdoch. She applauds the way that mystics 'have attempted by 
extremities of language to portray the nakedness and aloneness of Good, its absolute 
for-nothingneSS'. 7 These are not the words of someone unduly bound by the stylistic 
norms of the analytic tradition. Insofar as the problematic contrast of analytic and 
continental makes sense, at least in terms of style if not content, Murdoch leans 
towards the continentals. Her culminating text, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals 
(hereafter the Metaphysics) is not written with analytic precision. ' 
4 SW, 242. 
5 SW, 241. 
6 This supposed recursive or self-referential enclosure of language is parodied in A Word Child 
where I-filary Burde finds it difficult to interact, learns languages he will never speak, and likes to 
ride around the circuit of the Underground. He also repeats his mistakes. 
7 SG, 90. 
8 The Metaphysics is a substantially expanded reworking of the 1982 Gifford Lectures. 
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This does not mean that there are no norms of precision at work there or 
elsewhere in MurdocWs texts. She aspires to a different kind of precision which 
relates to content and (metaphorically) to focus, rather than style. Murdoch admires 
the 'chaste self-critical precision! of great art which is bound up with the idea of 
truthfulness. 9 She too is committed to writing with a clear focus upon truths that she 
believed philosophy, as practised in post-war Oxford and Cambridge, was in danger 
of obscuring or loosing sight of 'Both art and philosophy constantly re-create 
themselves by returning to the deep and obvious things of human existence and 
making there a place for cool speech and wit and serious unforced reflection. 
"o Such 
deep and obvious things include the way in which art, emotion and morality are about 
truthfulness. For Murdoch, certain trends within English-language philosophy, while 
technically rigorous, were in danger of loosing this plot. (Specifically: emotivism, 
prescriptivism and analytic behaviourism. )" 
This is a populist attack. Not necessarily false, but it has a certain rhetorical 
quality, it plays upon good common sense while remaining philosophically 
respectable. Views similar to (and occasionally stemming from) Murdoch's approach 
to these trends, have since become well represented within analytic literature where 
article structure is often influenced by the model of logical proof. 
12 This is perhaps 
one reason why MurdocWs work has been less influential that might otherwise have 
been the case. In retrospect, we may be tempted to reflect that Murdoch did not need 
to go down her more experimental road in order to connect at least morality and the 
emotions to truth, or to point out the difficulty of reconciling behaviourism with our 
first-person experience of the world. That she did go down this road seems curiously 
accidental, a drift rather than a conscious break. Her earliest pieces, 'Thinking and 
Language' and Nostalgia for the Particular' may lack strong analytic structure, but we 
should not mistake the tentative nature of these first texts for a commitment to a 
9 SJF, 240. 
10 SW, 242. 
11 Behaviourism has a range of critics, such as Searle; non-cognitivism in morality faces the 
Frege-Geach problem and the fact-value distinction faces both narrowly technical attacks (Searle 
again, and Philippa Foot) and a broader challenge of implausibility (notably by Ililary Putnam). The 
cognitive component of emotions (whcther a belief, construal or seeing-as) is championed by 
Nussbaum, among others. 
12 Murdoch focused upon the following works as problematic exemplars: Ayer, Language, Truth and 
Logic; Ryle The Concept ofMind, R-M. Hare, The Language ofMorals. 
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discursive rather than analytic style. Subsequent attempts at a synthesis, her challenge 
to the fact-value distinction in 'Vision and Choice in Morality' and 'Metaphysics and 
Ethics! (1956 and 1957 respectively) do combine somewhat discursive individual 
sections with clear overall argumentative structures. Stylistically they have similarities 
to Martha Nussbaurn's writings with the notable difference that the reader is left to 
supply the subdivisions. Similarly, in the novels, chapter headings disappear and even 
when Murdoch experiments with textual fragmentation in the Metaphysics, titled 
subdivisions remain an anathema to her. Directions are largely internal to the sea of 
text. This stylistic peculiarity should not be allowed to obscure the comparatively 
strong analytic component of these early articles. 
'Vision and Choice' consists of four substantial sections respectively arguing 
that the inner life has been downgraded; that moral concepts help to structure the 
particularity of this life; that the contemporary focus upon universalizable moral rules 
obscured this; and that the idea of a naturalistic fallacy has been misused to provide 
an apparently neutral logical support for the abandonment of the unique individual. 
The overall structure of the latter and later of the two texts (Metaphysics and Ethics') 
is even more analytic and takes its starting point from opposition to Ayees logical 
positivist programme of the 'elimination of metaphysics'. Murdoch advocates the 
conceptual holist response that a broad metaphysical framework or conceptual 
scheme, must be in place for individual claims to make sense. 13 And that framework 
will lead us to encounter the world in a value-laden manner. The particularity of this 
moral-metaphysical background is bound up with the particularity of persons, we 
don't all see the same facts. The crux of her argument is that we encounter the world 
as always, already, laden with values and the very attempt to separate out facts from 
values is itself embedded in a liberal attempt to extend freedom into the moral sphere 
by treating the latter as something that might be chosen. 14 
13 While she had no hesitation about classifying the prevailing cxistcntialist/analytic vision as our 
Liberal Wcltanschauungen!, she was less eager to apply the terminology to her own philosophical 
view. It was, at best, a matter of 'what I have rather vaguely called conceptual or metaphysical 
frameworks', PB, 504. Her sympathy with the conceptual-scheme terminology peaked in The Idea of 
Perfection' (1962) where it was used without qualification: philosophy of mind was about 'the 
provision of rich and fertile conceptual schemes', IP, 43. Although subsequently cautious about this 
terminology, the equation of metaphysic and Weltanschauung does recur in the Metaphysics, M. 84. 
By contrast with Carnap (and, more ambiguously, Quine) concepts may overflow their linguistic 
expression. 'Such a description will clearly not cover all that we mean by "mental concepts"', TL, 33. 
Hence conceptual schemes cannot be equated with linguistic frameworks. 
14 Here, she may have a point, although it is clearer in Carnap than Ayer. Carnap! s classic paper 
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The success or failure of her argumentative strategy is not, for the moment, 
what I am concerned with. What I view as important is that an analytically normal 
argumentative strategy is there at all. For once, she makes her alignment with the 
tradition of 'linguistic analysis' clear, 'although a lot of what I have to be say will be 
critical of recent developments of that tradition, the criticisms which I make will also, 
I believe, come out of the tradition. 15 However, within this normal structure, the 
germ of a quite different approach is already present, 'it would be a pity if, just 
because we realise that any picture is likely to be half a description and half a 
persuasion, we were to deny ourselves the freedom in the making of pictures and the 
coining of explanatory ideas which our predecessors have used in the past'. 16 This is 
to advance the claim that philosophical writing will -above all- embody a value-laden 
way of seeing or picturing the world. The significance of the collapse of the fact-value 
distinction is that argumentative structures will only ever be part of what is going 
on. 17 
Her early acceptance of analytic norms of writing comes to an end almost by 
accident with her two 1959 articles on the Kantian sublime. Tailored for the more 
literary readerships of the Yale Review and the Chicago Review, the close 
argumentative style of two years previously is dropped. Instead, Murdoch sets up a 
genealogy of decline from older and better ways of picturing humans that are 
embodied in the 19th century novel but which have become swamped by the legacy of 
Symbolism and Romanticism (in which Kant is implicated). 'Against Dryness', two 
years further on, brings together her literary aesthetic and her philosophical claims to 
criticize 'a general loss of concepts, the loss of moral and political vocabulary' that she 
associates with a certain 'dryness' of both 'Anglo-Saxon philosophy' and the novel. 
" 
This supposed desiccation of texts is a general (perhaps epochal) phenomenon. Her 
criticism of Anglo-Saxon philosophy is still primarily in terms of its content while it is 
the contemporary novel that receives a much more direct criticism for its constrained 
'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' advocates 'tolerance' as opposed to 'prejudice' in allowing the 
proliferation of linguistic frameworks between which a pragmatic choice may be made. His 
discussion of the difference between internal (factual) and external (value) questions is thus given an 
explicitly liberal twist. 
15 ME, 59. 
16 ME, 75. 
17 Murdoch's rejection of the distinction is well covered by Diamond (1996) and Mullhall (2000). 
18 AD, 287. 
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language use. Explicit alignment is made with T. S. Eliot (and T. E. Hulme) whose 
claim is precisely that the new sciences of the Renaissance era helped to engender a 
subsequent 'dissociation of sensibility' in modem writing style. I am inclined to believe 
that Murdoch is extending a related charge to cover analytic philosophy. However, 
this is never stated in so many words. 19 
What is clear is that Murdoch is a champion of the parallel between 
philosophy and art rather than the sciences, and that she never again approximates to 
a normalized analytic style. A year after 'Against Dryness', the first of Murdoch's 
seminal Sovereignty of Good articles was delivered as a lecture (appearing in print a 
further two years on, again in the Yale Review). While it is true that a comparatively 
strong argumentative structure reappears in each of these three articles, there is also a 
great deal of metaphor, vagueness and imprecision, coupled with the late inclusion of 
an alarming appeal to mysticism as insightful about the ultimate ineffability of Good. 
Whatever merits the Sovereignty has (by virtue of horning in on matters of most 
substance) they are different from the merits of expressive exactitude and the 
precision aspired to by Ayer, Ryle and Hare. At one point she comments, 'On the 
state of the argument there is perhaps little, or else too much, to say. In so far as 
there is an argument it has already occurred. Philosophical argument is always 
20 inconclusive, and this one is not of the most rigorous kind'. Murdoch's commitment 
to analytic stylistic norms is never again quite as strong as it was in her early years. 
In part, she may be seen as indulging in an affordable luxury. By the time the 
first of the Sovereignty articles had appeared in print she was an established novelist 
and had a number of good, innovative and influential philosophical articles under her 
belt. Coupled with her transition from Cambridge and the day-to-day discipline of 
teaching philosophy to teaching at the Royal College of Art in London, she enjoyed 
the luxury of writing in a more discursive style, with more or less guaranteed 
publication and a reasonable prospect of still reaching a philosophical audience. The 
Metaphysics appeared in print thirty years later and whatever its merits, it is even 
further removed from analytic stylistic norms. However, as well as career and 
circumstance, there are also matters of substance that help to drive MurdocWs writing 
style, not only her view of the significance of the value-ladenness of language but also 




her endorsement of its irreducibile metaphoricity. (Indeed, we shall see that there is a 
sense in which Murdoch considers the latter to be an aspect of the former. ) 
11. Metaphor as Irreducible 
Murdoch made her philosophical breakthrough at the start of the 1950s, 
drawing upon firsthand experience of the Parisian scene and introducing 
existentialism to an analytic audience. She drew out thematic connections between 
the two traditions, in particular identifying a shared and flawed idea of human 
freedom that underestimated pre-formed character. Stylistically, however, the 
traditions were worlds apart. Being and Nothingness employed argumentative 
structures, but worked and reworked them discursively in a variety of different ways. 
Its language was unashamedly emotive, tolerant of vagueness and metaphorical 
throughout. For Murdoch, this was part its attraction. One could see a real 
connection between the richly textured writing and lived experience. Reviewing 
Gabriel Marcel's Gifford lectures in 1951 she wrote 'It is not clear, to me at any rate, 
on what grounds the hygienic and dehydrated analysis of mental concepts which we 
use in this city (Oxford) can claim to be more accurate than the more lush efforts of 
M. Marcel . '21 He appealed to 'mystery' and deployed metaphors of 'availability' and 
'participatioiY. On the question of metaphor, and particularly its use to describe first 
person experience, Murdoch leant towards the continentals, albeit cautiously. 'This 
kind of description cannot escape from metaphor; but unless the metaphors are 
accompanied by a close critical commentary the result is often vague and confusing. '22 
In other words, Marcel went too far. 
The use of metaphor to picture mentality was defended in her first major 
article, 'Thinking and Language' (1951) a contribution to an Aristotelian Society 
symposium with Gilbert Ryle and taking its cue from 77? e Concept of Mind. Ryle 
wanted to dissolve the Cartesian myth of an inner realm containing a ghostly mind 
thing. Murdoch held that 'all general descriptions of the mind must involve 
hypostatisation. 23 It was a problem we had to live with, a price we had to pay. 
21 Bf, 127. 
22 Lkf. 127. 
23 Sartre, 127. 
10 
Metaphors of inwardness were still our best way of picturing experience. "we 
naturally use metaphors to describe those states of mind, or to describe 'thought 
processes', in those cases where a sentence giving the verbal content of the thought is 
felt to be inadequate. In such a context metaphor is not an inexact faute de mieux 
mode of expression, it is the best possible. Here, metaphor is not a peripheral 
excrescence upon the linguistic structure, it is its living centre. 44 This may seem to 
place Murdoch close to the Cartesian tradition and its modem phenomenological (and 
existentialist) representatives. However, in the follow-up article on 'Nostalgia for the 
Particular' Murdoch rejected the phenomenological bracketing of the world, holding 
that a defence of metaphors of inwardness need not collapse into literal description of 
discrete ideas, reified thoughts, pains and emotions or indeed anything identifiable 
independently of the outer context, by simple introspection. (A view that is crucial 
later on in her rejection of moral progress through introspectively gained 
self-knowledge. ) 
Neither the extreme curtailment of metaphor, nor a confusion of metaphor for 
literality is seen by Murdoch as providing an adequate way forward. She is committed 
to the view that ambiguity is something that we have to live with and work with if we 
are not to be unduly reductionist in our account of what it is like to be human. 
Language is 'fundamentally metaphorical'. Consequently, "We do not 'suddenly' have 
to adopt the figurative mode; we are using it all the time. "' What this is in danger of 
doing is broadening the concept of metaphor to the point where it is difficult to tell 
just what it is. Although one might still be guided by certain paradigm cases, a formal 
definition may prove difficult. None is given by Murdoch. Instead she remarks that 'I 
use the words "metaphor" and "image" in the wide sense where one form indicates 
another and where it may be very easy or very difficult to translate into a 
non-figurative mode' [M. 306]. (Such translation would have, in any case, to be 
localized and not general. ) By the mid-1950s, she had already extended the scope of 
metaphor to cover not only mentality, but also the phenomenology of moral 
experience. 'Metaphors often carry a moral charge , which analysis 
in simpler and 
plainer terms is designed to remove. This too seems to me to be misguided. Moral 
philosophy cannot avoid taking sides, and would-be neutral philosophers merely take 
24 TL, 39-40. 
25 TL, 40; see generally 36-40. 
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sides surreptitiouSly. '26 For Murdoch, metaphoricity and value-ladenness go hand in 
hand and the removal of one is likely to involve removal of the other. This is the basis 
of her rejection of determinism: a 'total translation' of value-laden metaphors into 
neutral scientific terms is 'unthinkable'. 27 It is in this sense that her view of the 
irreducible metaphoricity of language is treated as aspect of the value-ladenness of 
langauge. 
But even if the comprehensive removal of metaphor is no longer a 
fundamental desideraturn (or possibility), putting metaphors on the surface of a 
theory remains important to avoid the sorts of confusion particularly associated with 
the continental tradition. Whether or not something is a metaphor 'is of course a 
fundamental question to be asked about metaphysical explanation, about for instance 
what we are told in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Phenomenology of Mind-, 
and indeed such works could not exist without the help of metaphor'. " Murdocws 
Sovereignty, The Fire and the Sun, her Acastos dialogues and ultimately the 
Metaphysics all endorse the ubiquity of metaphor, its partial concealment, and the 
view that Metaphors aren't just ornaments, they're fundamental modes of 
knowledge'. 29 The latter phrase recurs with minor variations: metaphors are 
'fundamental modes of understanding' and 'fundamental forms of our awareness of 
our conditiono. 30 More technically, 'it seems to me impossible to discuss certain kinds 
of concepts without resort to metaphor, since the concepts are themselves deeply 
metaphorical and cannot be analysed into non-metaphorical components without a 
loss of substancc'. 31 
This is a significant departure from analytic approaches which are geared 
towards the removal of ambiguity. Indeed, for Ayer, this is precisely what 
'philosophical analysis' is all about, the removal of ambiguity and clarification of 
definite truth-conditions that is exemplified by Russell's Theory of Descriptions. 32 
26 SG, 75-6. 
27 DPR, 20 1. This is later softened by an 'it can be argued clause GG, 5 1. 
28 FS, 67. See also M. 306. 
29 Acastos, 106-7. 
30 M. 305-6; SG, 75. 
31 SG, 75. 
32 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Chapter 3. 
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Meaningfulness and definite truth-conditions are taken to go hand in hand. This is an 
area where the continuing influence of logical positivism is still strong. Metaphors are 
generally viewed either as paraphrasible into literal statements (i. e. as a kind of 
shorthand with more or less clear truth-conditions) or else as pseudo-propositions 
lacking any real cognitive content. Disambiguation is a prime consideration. The 
disadvantage of the alternative (Murdochian) view of the irreducibility of metaphor, is 
that ambiguity is ineliminable and truth-conditions problematic. As a matter of how 
things are, we might concede that significant metaphysical discussions do happen to 
be ambiguous. But Murdoch is claiming that this is an unavoidable state of affairs, 
that the attempt to make progress by comprehensively disambiguating our theories is 
not going to work. (As well as ambiguity about truth-conditions, we might not even 
be in a position always to separate out meaningful from unintelligible. ) 
There is, however, one notable analytic account that does not agree with 
MurdocWs approach but which can still be used to support the legitimacy of her 
work. I am referring here to the mixed account set out by Donald Davidson and 
appealing to a Murdochian-sounding concept of 'attention' . According to 
Davidson, 
metaphors have no secondary, ineffable, 'metaphorical meaning', but only their 
primary literal one, which is usually false. Someone who writes Ifear we are in rat's 
alley where the dead men lost their bones is unlikely to be telling us a literal truth. 
The obviousness of the falsity, or in the case of metaphors which are literally true, the 
redundancy of stating the truths involved, is part of what makes metaphors 
recognisable as metaphors. (We do not need to be told that No man is an island' any 
more than we need to be told that 'No man is a G-clamp' and so we infer that 
something else must be going on. ) 
What separates this out from cruder non-cognitivist accounts of metaphor is 
that issues of truth and falsity are still at stake because of the way in which metaphors 
redirect our attention. What matters is not what they say but what they accomplish. 
'Metaphor does lead us to notice what might not otherwise be noticed, and there is no 
reason, I suppose, not to say these visions, thoughts, and feelings inspired by the 
metaphor are true or false. "' This is a form of truth-aptness by proxy but it does save 
the appearance of metaphors as both irreducible and meaningful and is well-geared to 
separate out the meaningful from the meaningless in theories such as MurdocHs 
33 Davidson (1984), 257. 
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where intelligibility may sometimes seem strained. When, for example, her 
speculations 'live near to the edge of nonsense' we might try to make sense of where 
and how our attention is being directed. 
This applies across the board to philosophical texts where ambiguity seems 
intractable, or at least deep-rooted. A prominent example is Heidegger's discussion of 
everything as 'nothing! in 'What is Metaphysics? ' Heidegger moves by a series of 
steps from claiming that Being is not itself a thing, to the claim that it is a nothing 
before going on to write about 'the Nothing'. He plays with 'the Nothing' as a 
substantive and is charged by Carnap with an elementary confusion about the logic of 
negation and quantification. 34 Along Davidsonian lines, it can be argued that 
Heidegger is not hopelessly muddled but is directing our attention to a problem of 
metaphysics: how can we to talk truthfWly about everything without reifying it into an 
actual thing? 
Promising though this Davidsonian approach may be as a way to defend the 
intelligibility of problematic texts such as Murdoch's, its promise is not redeemable in 
strictly Murdochian terms. For Murdoch, 'attention' is itself a rather complex 
metaphor. If we stick to her understanding of this concept, Davidson's theory will be 
35 circular because set out in metaphorical terms. This would deprive the theory of its 
own cognitive content. (Possibly turning it into a complex form of redirecting. ) 
Curtailment of the sense of 'attention! to remove its metaphoricity might be a way out 
for Davidson (my point is not to attack his account per se) but it is not a way out for 
Murdoch. Murdochian 'attention! sometimes does work by a kind of redirection, but 
as a conceptual holist, she binds its meaning to a series of other metaphors which are 
not comprehensively reducible to literal terms. 
111. Working within the Limits of Expressibility 
Murdoch's position on metaphor presents literal communication as limited or in some 
way compromized. The puritanical character Hugo in her her first, and most explicitly 
philosophical novel, Under the Net, is drawn towards a Wittgensteinian silence 
because of such limitations. 'The whole language, ' he reflects, 'is a machine for 
34 Camap (1959). 
35 See Chapter 2 below for the metaphor of 'attention' in Murdoch. 
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making falsehoods. " In the novel he is seen to have a point. His ffiend Jake has 
drawn ideas from their conversations and set them down in a book. Jake is worried 
about having stolen Hugo's more original thoughts. Meanwhile, Hugo wonders where 
Jake could have got his quirky ideas from. He does not recognize them as his own. 
Communication between them is imperfect. 
Murdoch refines this idea, she does not abandon it. The first of the 
Sovereignty essays, a decade later, claims that while we initially learn concepts by 
mastering the public criteria for their application, they then undergo a private and 
personal refinement that may be obscured since'words are often stable while concepts 
alter'. 37 We do not have the same concepts of love and courage that we had when we 
were sixteen. Key moral concepts can have a deeply personal resonance that goes 
beyond what we can confidently expect others to readily understand. Ve do not 
simply, through being rational and knowing ordinary language, "know" the meaning 
of all necessary moral words. We may have to learn the meaning; and since we are 
human historical individuals the movement of understanding is onward into increasing 
privacy, in the direction of the ideal limit, and not back towards a genesis in the 
rulings of an impersonal public language. 38 What we tend to underestimate is the 
extent to which 'communication may break down and the same words may occasion 
, 39 different results in different hearers. We may, charitably assume that we do not 
have significantly different conceptual schemes from others, that interlocutors can 
readily make sense of what we say and vice-versa, but 'Language has limitations and 
there are moments when, if it is to serve us, it has to be used creatively, and the effort 
may fail. ' At such moments, Murdoch suggests we rely not upon charity but upon 
'faith and hope. 40 
36 Under the Met, 68. 
37 IP, 28 repeating a point made at VC 95. In both cases her exemplar of shifting concepts are 'love' 
and 'courage'. This meaning variance is one of the mechanisms that Thomas Kuhn later identified 
for the concealment of conceptual change in The Structure ofScientific Revolutions. 
38 IP, 28. 
39 IP, 32. 
40 VC, 90. This position bears some resemblance to early Quinean 'indeterminacy' of translation, the 
view that we are not strongly constrained in our interpretations. Davidsoifs response, his rejection of 
communicative failure across different conceptual schemes ('On the Very Idca of a Conceptual 
Scheme') involves the principle of charity to the cffect that attributions of language-use must involve 
the bclicf that interlocutors arc using language in ways that are broadly similar to our own. However, 
it is formulated in terms that accept Carnap and Quine's equation of conceptual schcmc and 
linguistic framework, hcnce it does not apply to Murdoch's position in its currentform. 
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In effect, Murdoch is presupposing that Frege's strictures on the objectivity of 
sense, and WittgenstehYs strictures on the impossibility of talking meaningfully about 
a certain kind of privacy, have been overextended to bolster a behaviouristic 
downgrading of the idea of inwardness. Neither are tackled directly (at least in the 
Sovereignty). Over-extensions of Wittgenstein come in for criticism rather than 
Wittgenstein himself. 41 In part, this may be due to an understandable reluctance to get 
drawn into the private language argument (Depending upon how it is to be read and 
whether it is correct, it may pose a problem for Murdoch's views on language. ) In 
part it may also be due to an early identification with Wittgenstein as someone who is 
not reduced to silence but who is an original philosophical stylist, someone who 
struggles against the limits of language and, in spite of them, manages to make 
progress. 42 
Murdoch shares a diagnosis of the limitations of language with a series of 
different intellectual currents, but also sees herself as struggling against the puritanical 
response of Hugo, of Tractarian silence, and rather differently of literary symbolism 
which urges us to abandon novelistic prose for the greater expressive adequacy of 
poetry. For Murdoch, 'Words are the most subtle symbols which we possess and our 
human fabric depends on thern' . 
43 Her Platonic study of the mid-1970s, 7he Fire and 
the Sun is, in part, a defence of words, of working with what we have. 'The careful 
responsible skilful use of words is our highest instrument of thought and one of our 
highest modes of being: an idea which might seem obvious but is not now by any 
means universally accepted. There may in theoretical studies, as in art, be so-called 
ultra-verbal insights at any level; but to call ultimate truth ineffable is to utter a 
quasi-religious principle which should not be turned round against the careful 
vcrbalisation of humbler truths. 44 
The idea of struggling against expressive and discursive limits leads Murdoch 
towards a rethink about Plato and his myths. Once his myths are taken as exemplars 
41 This does change in the Metaphysics, Chapter 9. Under the influence of Kripke, she reads the 
private language argument as a End of scepticism and summarily dismisses it for failing to do 
justice to our experience of what we arc able to do. 
42 For a brief but inconclusive account of Murdoch in rclation to the private language argument see 
Currey (1990). 
43 IP, 33. 
44 FS, 87-88. 
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of such a struggle -against those limits which Plato writes about in the Phaednis- the 
deeply problematic Forms of the middle dialogues recede into the background, as one 
45 
more piece of imagery among others. The myths are no longer seen to be accessing 
a transcendent other place, but struggling against discursive limits in order to picture 
this world. In particular, Murdoch sees Plato's dialogues as an exemplary attempt to 
picture the problematic reality of Good. On this view, what Plato understood is that 
Good is in some sense a real force within out lives, something that genuinely helps us 
to transcend or go beyond our default egocentric or deluded condition. What we 
need, therefore, is not the abandonment of a realist conception of Good as 
transcendent, but its demythologisation. 
Such demythologisation is taken by Murdoch to be a progression through 
successive forms of imagery, a metaphorical pilgrimage from appearance to reality. 
MurdocWs favourite images for this progress are the Platonic metaphor of the Cave 
(an interior in which movement is possible), and the PhaedntslSymposillm myths of 
eros, in which love allows us to ascend in a return to perfection. These are lateral and 
vertical metaphors of progress out of fantasy and into the more realistic realm of 
imagination. (The categories of fantasy and imagination are, in a sense, overlaid on 
top of the Platonic imagery of progress, as opposite favoured and unfavoured ends of 
a continuum. ) The focus upon these particular dialogues and myths as the heart of 
Platonism owes more than a little to Plotinus, the Neoplatonic tradition and its 
mystical offshoots. 46 Important discontinuities between Platonism and mysticism 
(such as the association of one with mental balance and the other with risking mental 
instability) are given little consideration. As such, it is a reading which can at times 
seem a little idiosyncratic, or overly-generous. Through Murdoch's familiarity with, 
and admiration for the mystical tradition (especially St John of the Cross and Dame 
Julian of Norwich) Plato is understood in the religious spirit of Pseudo-Dionysius as a 
successive dernythologiser of an ineffable moral absolute (in less mystical terms, an 
47 indefinable Good). This approach is anticipated in her article 'The Sovereignty of 
Good Over Other Concepts', it is extended in 7he Fire and the Sun and dominates the 
45 IP, 3 1. The contemporaneous comments on the Phaedrus in The Unicorn 117-118 may perhaps 
be read as an accompaniment to this. Similarly, see STV, 236; FS, 21-23. 
46 See Chapter 8 below on the ascent oferos. 
47 Of the two cited mystics, St John of the Cross provides the clearer link to Pseudo-Dionysius. 
Murdoch's interest in these particular examples of mysticism owes something to Simone Weil. 
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opening and closing chapters of the Metaphysics. (Thereby strongly suggesting that it 
structures what comes in between. ) Murdoch makes it clear, but only at the end of 
the Metaphysics, that the reality of Good is in some sense that of an Idea [M. 5 08] and 
that the notion of a Good beyond being is 'figurative' [M. 507]. The idea of 
'transcendence' does not ultimately imply 'separation' but concerns 'going beyond' 
one's 'egoistic self [M. 498]. Transcendence is about getting beyond egocentricity, and 
as such it is a never completed task. 
Such candid statements appear only at the end of the Metaphysics. Chapter 
One makes it clear that only at a more advanced stage of the journey can a 
demythologised Good be understood without collapsing into a crudely subjective 
understanding of morality. Prior to this, we have to exercise extreme caution about 
how we challenge and replace old formulations of the idea of the transcendent, just as 
we have to exercise caution in our criticisms of transcendence in art and religion if we 
are to avoid the loss of what is truthful in both [M. 51 1]. The most obvious example 
of such a demythologising Murdochian movement is that from 'God' to 'Good. The 
former is tied up with an idea of moral objectivity that has to be preserved and not 
simply abandoned. 
This approach towards Platonism, first developed in the Sovereignty but 
continued in the Metaphysics, has the convenient consequence that it allows us to 
understand what is going on when Plato, a key influence upon Western art, sets out 
his censorious strictures against it. For Murdoch, these strictures involve a puritanical 
refusal to work with an inadequate medium and so put Plato into conflict with his 
own philosophical output and standpoint. 'Art is about the pilgrimage from 
appearance to reality (the subject of every good play and novel) and exemplifies in 
spite of Plato what his philosophy teaches concerning the therapy of the soul! 48 Like 
the Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus, a mythical being who creates our world and in 
doing so tries to realize perfect form in its darker pre-existent materials, we should 
accept that the medium we work in will be inherently flawed. 7he Fire and the Sun 
not only sets out the idea of a demythologising pilgrimage through successive forms 
of increasingly adequate (but still flawed) imagery, its overall argument is a reductio 
of Plato's puritanical assault upon art. Instead we are given a more cautionary 
warning about the dangers of self-indulgent and fantasising imagery (such as 
48 FS, 80. 
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pornography) and of letting imagery ossify and block further progress (as in 
organized, doctrinaire religion). In a sense, the identification of Platonism as a 
doctrine about Form-things is an example of such an ossification, and does not do 
justice to the transitory role they are taken by Murdoch to play in Plato's dialogues. 
IV. The Genre Distinction between Philosophy and the Novel 
The range of metaphors and imagery that Murdoch deploys might seem to 
point to a blurring of the genre distinctions between philosophy and other kinds of 
literature. (A distinction which impacts upon our view of just what is to count as 
Murdoch's philosophical work. ) With the exception of a couple of years at the starts 
of the 1950s, her lasting position is that such genre distinctions must be respected. 49 
Indeed, 'literature! is contrasted with 'philosophy' and novels are taken to be better 
equipped to deal with some aspects of reality than philosophical texts. (Hence, the 
two cannot be equivalent. ) When outlining human contingency, a philosophical text 
may be overly-systematic, its 'form! can give a misleading impression. " Yet, in her 
attacks on structuralism Murdoch tends to the view that this is a necessary sacrifice if 
a philosophical text is to avoid unnecessary ambiguity and self indulgence. 'I am 
tempted to say that there is an ideal philosophical style which has a special 
unambiguous plainness and hardness about it, an austere unselfish candid style. A 
philosopher must try to explain exactly what he means and avoid rhetoric and idle 
decoration. "' This may seem to come (perilously) close to the claim that there is 
some content-neutral schematic form in which philosophy ought to be written. 
(Precisely the view that characterises the logical positivist style. ) Less alarmingly, it 
may be taken as a return to Murdoch's calls for a simplicity of style in opposition to 
the spectre of structuralism. Philosophical writing is to be characterised by a certain 
49 The view that there is something wrong, from an aesthetic point of view, with the philosophical 
novel, only emerges in a strong form in Sartre (1953). It consolidates several shifts away from her 
earliest essays on existentialism. 'The Novelist as Metaphysician! (1950) is generally sympathetic to 
'the metaphysical novel' and 'The Existentialist Hcro' (1950) treats existentialism as an unromantic 
standpoint, EH. 112,115. This explains the unrepeatcdly philosophical character of Under the Net 
(1954). It predates this commitment and may have helped to convince Murdoch that real characters 
cannot be symbolic exemplars. If so, it sets a precedent for using the novels as a medium for 
philosophical c. Verimcntation. 
50 Antonaccio (1996). 
51 LP, 4. The interview is not off-the-cuff. Murdoch was given the opportunity to carefully rewrite 
her answers. 
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austerity, but how this works out in the practice of Murdoch's own textual 
construction is hardly content-neutral. 
The carefully rewritten interview from which the above quote is taken 
occurred only months after the publication of Yhe Fire and the Sun, a short and dense 
work in which Murdoch allots herself only the closing pages as a clue to the general 
precepts that guided her inquiry. 52 There is an austere self-constraint. But the whole 
point about this heavily-Platonic text is that philosophy and art are legitimate and 
overlapping ways of unifying and making sense of experience. However the ideal 
'austere unselfish candid style' was to be conceived, it was not to the exclusion of this 
important connection. Her follow-up, the first of two Platonic Acastos dialogues, 
leaned back in the direction of literature and Art while still remaining a philosophical 
text. Both dialogues ignore her aesthetic priorities for the novel by adopting the 
Platonic norm of using character to express argument. (The Acastos Plato not only 
espouses' puritanical views about art, he also acts like a puritan. ) With or without 
some ideal stylistic endpoint, Murdoclfs philosophical writing style is continuously 
experimental. 
Her final philosophical text, the Metaphysics, is one more piece of 
experimental writing. In spite of the brevity of the Gifford Lectures on which it is 
based, the Metaphysics is written on an entirely new, grand scale and with serious 
misgivings about its workability. 53 1 am not of the opinion that it may be set apart as 
her final, desired endpoint although it is clearly undertaken as her last chance for a 
grand synthesis. 54 The final substantial chapter is a brief important indication of its 
limits. The whole text moves towards this chapter on the Void, the pace of the text 
increases as the chapter length shortens. It culminates in this image of incompleteness 
and lack. On the way to this uncertain destination, the text deploys the same 
modernist literary devices that had increasingly appeared in her novels during the 
52 Bronzwacr (1988). 
53 Misgivings about a great projected work of synthesis, always detectable in the novels, deepen 
during the writing-up process for the Metapkysics. They colour the plot of The Message to the 
Planet (1989), where a mystical figure cannot write his culminating philosophical work, 'You tried 
to put it all in order as if it were a single argument; but all I can see is old thoughts placed end to 
end. You think there's some great further philosophical step, some ultimate move, some ultimate 
place. But it's no good, we can't get there, human beings can't get there', 340. 
54 The Philosophers Pupil, published a year after Murdoch's Gifford lectures, gives us a character, 
Rozanov, who has left a synthesis of his philosophical work too late. He expresses doubt about the 
idea that a philosophical work is ever really finished as opposed to abandoned. 
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1970s. 55 Like Hegel's PhenomenolqSy, modernist works try to exhibit or in some 
sense to re-enact the character of consciousness, rather than merely describing it. 
Unlike Hegel, they treat consciousness as fluid, messy, idiosyncratic, repetitive, 
irrelevant and mundane, above all, not as structured by universal forms of logical 
progression. The fragmentation of the modernist text tries to exhibit this lack of any 
single logical progression in the stream of consciousness. Although such devices are 
normally associated with modernism, and particularly Joyce, Murdoch preferred to 
appeal to earlier, realistic, precedents such as Henry James. 56 Whatever its source, 
fragmentation is a key and recurring feature of the Metaphysics. Confusion is treated 
as an acceptable risk. 
In spite of her defence of genre distinctions, the crossover in influence 
between her literary and philosophical output can be seen to occur in both directions. 
Whatever its expressive faults (and they may be considerable) I will take it that the 
Metaphysics does not merely heap together a great many rambling or confused 
thoughts interspersed with repetitive outlines of standing Murdochian themes. 57 (it 
does this, but not only this. ) My preferred reading will be one in which Murdoch is 
trying to counter expressive limits by engaging in something akin to, but less extreme 
than, Kierkegaard's 'indirect communication'. Like Kierkegaard, Murdoch is an 
experimental philosophical stylist with a penchant for deliberately holding back from 
systematisation and unification of her texts. (They are also both haunted by the 
spectre of Hegelian systematicity. ) However, unlike the more existentialist 
Kierkegaard, Murdoch makes no attempt to shock and to provoke the reader into a 
more authentic standpoint. She also continues to explicitly endorse a genre distinction 
55 The key innovative novels arc The Black Prince and the stream of consciousness novel, The Sea, 
The Sea. Fragments appear and appendices cut across the main narrative. Actions set in a limited 
time frame are the core, but the dramatic unity is broken by continuing on without apparent 
direction after the main action is over. The division into discrete chapters also vanishes. 
56 M. 169-73 sets out an account of fleeting structures of consciousness typified by The Golden Bowl; 
M. 173 -184 arguably goes on to exemplify the jumbled up way we think. 
57 Milgram (2002) 82, n. 28 suggests what others may have suspected, that Murdoch's Alzhcimees 
Disease, diagnosed five years later, ie. some fifteen years after the core of the text was delivered in 
lectures, may explain why the Metapkysics is 'disorganised in the extreme'. The timescales make this 
claim problematic. However, the somewhat rambling and undisciplined novels of the 1980s may 
well evidence a quite normal weakening of her intellectual powers when she was in her 60s. Stephen 
Mulhall attempts to defuse the charge that the Afelaphysics is 'extremely disorganized, Mulhall 
(1997), 220. 
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between philosophy and other forms of literature which tends to break down more 
completely in Kierkegaard. 58 
This does not mean to say that the novels can or ought to be excluded from 
philosophical consideration. Maria Antonaccio's Picturing the Human, an otherwise 
useful study of Murdochs moral thought, does just this. It can avoid appeal to the 
novels because aspects of Murdoclfs work which the novels might help us to 
understand are also bracketed out: fallenness, the void, death and the interest in 
MyStiCiSM. 59 The category of void can again be used to exemplify the problem. Drawn 
from the vocabulary of mysticism it tells us something about Murdoch's admiration 
for, and ultimate disagreement with the religious mystical tradition. However, while it 
is a concept which figures regularly in the novels, it is underdeveloped in the 
philosophical texts. It is difficult to resist the view that, for Murdoch, it had already 
been dealt with elsewhere. 60 
Justification for taking the novels into consideration can be drawn from 
Murdoch's own commitments, and not just from her treatment of Sartre where novels 
as well as philosophical texts are allowed to figure. Although she denies that her 
novels are 'philosophical' in the narrow sense that applies to the literary output of 
Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre, her aesthetic and philosophical claims, when taken 
together, will not allow us to deny the broader philosophical significance of the 
novels. According to her literary aesthetic, the task of the novel is the realistic 
representation of individual characters. According to her philosophical views on fact 
and value, we can only picture real individuals against a background of metaphysical 
assumptions and values. 7his metaphysic and these values will always shape our view 
of what the facts are. Picturing what people are like in the novels will consequently, 
and unavoidably, embody a broader metaphysic. The novels are formed around 
58 What I have in mind here is Kierkcgaar(Ts Eitherl0r, a work broken into aphorisms, discussions 
of cultural highlights, a diary and a series of lengthy and somewhat dry letters. It is odd that a 
similar structural fragmentation is taken as an indication of Kicrkegaards mental acuity and 
Murdoch's mental decline. I would suggest that such fragmentation indicates not enough to indicate 
anything in the absence of a closer attention to the particularity of MurdocWs writings. Seen in the 
light of these, there is a certain appropriateness about the Metapkysics. 
59 The Fire and the Sun is also more or less ignored in Picturing the Human. Antonaccio's other 
writings on Murdoch present a far less restrictive view. 
60 The idea of a mystical pilgrimage towards God is usually described as passing through discrete 
stages. In Evelyn Underhill's classic study Atysticism the stages arc awakening, purgation, illumination, void and unitive life. By finishing with the void rather than the final move into unity, Murdoch endorses a more unconsoling picture of human limitation. There is no God to save us. 
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philosophical ideas that they do not necessarily expound. They give us an inkling of 
how the world has to be if Murdoch's metaphysic is on the right track. 
What this means is that the novels are philosophically significant. It does not 
mean that we can cull snippets of dialogue or internal monologue as uncritical 
expression of her views. Sometimes she experiments with a theme, and sometime she 
plays with a familiar motif in unfamiliar ways, inverting or altering it to see the result, 
generating plausible imitations of her own ideas albeit subtly corrupted. The term 
'pastiche' springs to mind. Characters are often engaged in writing philosophical texts 
with an uncanny, skewed, resemblance to her own . 
6' Nor can the significance of 
plot-lines be appealed to in anything other than a cautious manner. Nevertheless, with 
these qualifications in mind, the novels do presuppose a world in which consciousness 
is value-laden, love is fundamental to our being, mutual misunderstanding is a normal 
condition and self-obsession is delusional. As such, judiciously used, they can help us 
to tackle the problems of intelligibility with which Murdoch has surrounded her own 
more narrowly philosophical texts. A cautious attentiveness to the continuity between 
the latter and the novels seems to be in order. Having said this, there is no need to 
premise my argument upon any broader collapse of genre distinctions. In what 
follows, the novels will be viewed as supplementary, a way of deepening our 
understanding of her metaphysic and categories such as fallenness, eros, death and 
void. The novels will not be used to take us into areas where the philosophical texts 
simply do not go. Instead, appeal will be made to them in an attempt to disambiguate 
and clarify the approach towards moral philosophy that Murdoch sets out in 7he 
Sovereignty of Good and elaborates upon elsewhere. 
61 In The 771me of the Angels (1966) and A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970) characters work on 
texts akin to the Sovereignty. Works contemporaneous with the Metaphysics pursue the theme of the 
failure of any final synthesis. See above, n. 51 and n. 52. 
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Chapter 2: The Sovereignty of Good 
For Murdoch, philosophy does not collapse into literature but neither does it escape 
from the metaphoricity and value-ladenness of language. We cannot lift ourselves out 
of these constraints to write a value-neutral and purely descriptive meta-ethics. Yet 
the idea of a general characterisation of ethics, or of morality (never a distinction that 
Murdoch employs rigorously) remains an important one, part of the two-way 
movement between 'the building of elaborate theories' and 'the consideration of simple 
and obvious facts' that the Sovereignty tells us about. ' It aims to present a return 
movement to what is obvious and inescapable about our condition. Subsequent 
Murdochian works extend and develop its rudimentary moral psychology (the 
Metaphysics adds on an account of public duty to the idea of private pilgrimage) but 
throughout this steady accretion the core remains the same. I shall focus here upon 
reconstructing it as it appears in the Sovereignty, but with a view to drawing out just 
what it is that Murdoch is directing us towards in her complex interlacing of 
metaphor and argument. This chapter falls into two parts, with the first three sections 
devoted to each of the Sovereignty essays and the last two devoted to clarifying just 
what it is that she is trying to confront. In spite of its unsettling metaphoricity, my 
contention is that there is substance here as well as stylistic novelty. Once her 
principal metaphors are clarified (not removed) Murdoch can be seen to direct us 
towards a genuine problem of moral competence and the effort that is required to 
improve it. At the same time, such clarification may leave her more vulnerable to 
critique. 
1. Philosophical Diagnosis in 'The Idea of Perfection' 
The Sovereignty consists of three independent articles written over the course 
of seven years (1962-69) and reordered so that the final article ('On "God" and 
"Good"') is placed in the middle. (Suggesting that it was produced as a bridge 
between the other two. ) The Platonism of the opening piece, 'The Idea of Perfection', 
is the least explicit of the three. Some of its themes are more commonly associated 
with the argument of Elizabeth Anscombe's 'Modem Moral Philosophy: that there are 
I IP, 1. 
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limits to the dominant (rule-based) Kantian and Utilitarian, views of morality; that 
they lack any deep superiority to traditional, virtue-centred ethics; that the conception 
of the self they support is problematic, leaving us in need of the better moral 
psycholoSy that Murdoch is trying to supply. 
As well as having far greater reservations about the influence of Wittgenstein, 
Murdoch differs from Anscombe in pointing towards a return to Plato rather than 
Aristotle. She focuses not upon the limits of rules but instead argues that moral 
philosophy has become dominated by a flawed understanding of freedom. For 
Murdoch, the autonomy championed by Kant has become attenuated, overextended. 
The problematic idea of moral realism has been displaced by that of free moral 
agency, with the moral agent tending to be conceived of as a pinpoint of will, an 
agent without history, a public individual who chooses now this, and now that. 2 This 
flawed account of freedom is supported by an approach towards the philosophy of 
mind in which public action displaces concern for inwardness. There is a consequent 
slide towards behaviourism in contemporary philosophy, a slide towards ignoring 
what is private in favour of treating the self as a universal, standardised, free public 
agent. What in turn supports this approach towards the philosophy of mind is a 
philosophy of language which accords introspectabilia no role to play (even denies 
their existence) and sets everybody up as equivalent players of the public language 
game. 
This is Murdoch's sweeping diagnosis of the state of philosophy circa 1962. 
The article identifies a convergence of various trends, but it lacks any single 
exemplar. Otherwise dissimilar theories are lumped together. (Behaviourism. and 
Sartre make particularly strange bedfellows. ) It also constitutes what might be 
regarded as a one-dimensional account of multidimensional philosophical trends. As 
such, even if her idea of the reduction of the self to a pinpoint of will can be given 
more detailed content, it remains open to the charge of being a straw man, a 
'phantom' or (somewhat better) a 'caricature' that has 'a positive philosophical point. 3 
2 The source of this idea of the unencumbered self as a pinpoint of will is Wittgenstein's Tractatus 
5.64 and it re-cmergcs at PI. 620. (For this sourcing see M. 270. ) Attempts to fill out this notion 
include Charles Taylor (1989). Harcourt (1998) attempts to make Murdoch and Taylor's imprecise 
notion rather more precise. 
3 Schauber (2001), 479-80; Moran (2002), 89ff. Harcourt (1998), 329 holds that the unencumbered 
self is intelligible but is cautious about whether it can be justly applied to the theories Murdoch 
criticises. 
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For the moment I will content myself with pointing out that just so long as she is 
directing us towards a real and significant moral problem, and doing so in a unique 
and interesting way, this charge is unlikely to be decisive. 
The view of persons as moral agents rather than moral beings is challenged in 
Murdoch's only substantially elaborated hard case. Hereafter, they are consigned to 
the novels where they can be found in great number. 'A mother, whom I shall call M, 
feels hostility to her daughter-in-law, whom I shall call D. M finds D quite a 
good-hearted girl but while not exactly common yet certainly unpolished and lacking 
in dignity and refinement. D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently 
ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile. M does 
not like D's accent or the way D dresses. M feels that her son has married beneath 
him. ' Nevertheless, M behaves 'beautifully throughout', she betrays no sense of her 
disappointment and chagrin. She thinks as follows, 'I am old-fashioned and 
conventional, I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am 
certainly jealous. Let me look againt .4 
Over time she comes to revise her view as a consequence of the 'work of 
attention'. ' She comes to see D as 'not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified 
but spontaneous, not noisy but gay'. M partially overcomes her jealousy and 
selfishness but this change does not issue in any alteration of behaviour. (There need 
be no public behavioural criterion for this inner event. ) M has always acted 
impeccably towards her daughter-in-law who might, in any case, now be dead, 
thereby limiting the scope for altered public demeanour. Whatever change takes place 
'happens entirely in M's mind'. If D is dead, there can also be no question of the real 
alteration having been D's gradual improvement. What is at issue is a change in Ms 
way of seeing, not a change in what is seen. (As in the case of Wittgensteins 'aspect 
dawning', what changes is the viewpoint and not the object. ) 
One might question various features of the example. David Pugmire points to 
a lack of spontaneity in the revised emotional response, charging it with being 
contrived, faked-up, inauthentic. Some people do not like to think ill of the dead, 
even when they were a bad lot. Perhaps M is like this. However, effortful preparation 
need not exclude spontaneity of response. Improvisation in music relies upon just 
4 IP, 16-17. 
5 IP, 36. 
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such preparation and the range within which improvisation and spontaneity is possible 
will be a function of what prior work has been done. (We can only improvise within 
the bounds that we have prepared for. )6 Alternatively, with Peta Bowden, we might 
challenge the idea that we have any criterion for taking M's shift as a move towards a 
more realistic viewpoint rather than, for example, sentimental reminiscence about a 
7 young woman who can now do no harm. A satisfactory reply to this is less obvious. 
It does look as if M is determined to think better of D and not worse. However, one 
central Murdochian point remains. The alteration, reliable or otherwise, is both 
morally significant and cannot obviously be reduced to public action or dispositions 
to behave. Murdoch generalises this point to claim that the refinement of moral 
vocabulary is part of just such a private moral development. We take words with 
public criteria for their application (such as 'love' and 'courage') and then proceed to 
develop them privately and unobtrusively, making sense of them through our own 
8 particular, unique experience. In terms of the vocabulary sometimes associated with 
this view, our concepts start out pretty thin and we thicken them over time. 9 
Such a development of moral concepts and of perception is taken by Murdoch 
to presuppose an idea of perfectibility. (Thence the article's title. ) In an argument that 
is strongly reminiscent of St. Anselds ontological proof in the Monologion, but 
perhaps also owes something to contemporary interest in grading as a key form of 
moral judgement, Murdoch claims that an idea of perfection is implicit in our 
everyday discernment of gradations and in our attempts to improve the quality of our 
moral vision. 10 This is another troubling position. It is not clear that everyday grading 
carries any such presupposition. Consider the game of 'rock-paper-scissors'. In this 
6 David Pugmire (1994), 118-122. The point about improvisation is drawn from the discussion of D 
and M in Oakley (1992), 136-9. The improvisation metaphor is used by Nussbaum (1990), 74,94, 
96-7 with much the same point. 
7 Bowden (1998), 65-6. 
8 Ayees section on 'What can we communicate? in The Problems of Knowledge anticipates a 
Murdochian-type view and is hostile. Suspicion that Murdoch falls foul of the private language 
argument may be a block upon acknowledgement of the importance of the Sovereignty. The praise in 
Platts (1979), 23 842, is a rare exception to this. However, it is tempered by his trenchant opposition 
to MurdocWs extension of the concept of morality Platts (1991), 144-50. See also Chapter 6 of 
Backus (1986) for comments on Platts. 
9 The thick and thin contrast is particularly associated with Bernard Williams'Ethics and the Limits 
ofPhilosophy but it is anticipated in the Sovereignty. 
10 Urmson (1950). 
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game'rocle trumps 'scissors' which trump'papee which in turn trumps'rocle. We may 
play the game and always be in a position to apply criteria of preferability of each to 
the others, yet there is no single linear scale that they all belong to and no implied 
standard of an ultimate move. Qualitative differences preclude evaluation in 
quantitative, hierarchical terms. (More good, less good. ) Murdoch, however, 
presupposes just such a single hierarchy within which goods are ultimately 
commensurable and in which the hierarchy ends in one single and ultimate sovereign 
value. 
She does not claim that her case for such a unitary Good is decisive, she 
simply sets it out. The perfection argument is not to be taken as logically compelling, 
'a reductionist might argue that an increasingly refined ability to compare need not 
imply anything beyond itself The idea of perfection nfight be, as it were, empty'. 11 
Murdoch does not agree with this position but she charges it only with reductionism. 
She does not try to point out some rudimentary logical error in it. Her point is rather 
that perfection is psychologically inescapable, continuously implied by and 
presupposed in our ways of thinking and speaking about the world. To lapse into 
Gricean rather than Murdochian terms, she takes the reality of the Good to be 
conversationally implicated rather than logically entailed. 12 But unlike Grice, who is 
concerned with deliberate moves in the conversation game, she is interested in the 
implications that are still there even though we may be unaware of them or even when 
we explicitly deny them. Another way of making the same point would be to say that, 
for Murdoch, the implication that Good is real forms part of the ongoing background 
to the conversation game. It may periodically resurface within the game but it does 
not constitute merely another move that might be made or on-fitted depending upon 
our personal inclination. It is not something that can be cancelled. (A hallmark of 
Gricean implications. ) Whatever utterances we may make to the contrary, it is much 
harder than we imagine to stop thinking and speaking about goodness as real. 
Murdoch is claiming that any such an attempt to escape from this normal human 
condition cannot be entirely successful. Her treatment of the ontological proof is a 
it GG, 60. 
12 Grice (1989). 
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recognition of this inescapability, although it is 'not exactly a proof but rather a clear 
asscrtion of faith'. 13 
11. The Remedial Moral Psychology of 'On "God" and "Good"' 
Murdoch wants to set up a strong continuity between her moral psychology 
and the religious tradition. She goes directly against Nietzsche's warning in Beyond 
Good and Evil that modem secular morality is a thinly veiled continuation of religious 
morality by arguing that this is just what morality ought to be. 14 For Murdoch, 
religion has traditionally counteracted human selfishness, human egocentricity. 15 (Her 
equivocation between these termswill be dealt with below. For the moment they will 
be used interchangeably. ) Murdoch's good man is less caught up in himself and is 
thereby able to see others more realistically. From this flows a greater ability to act 
appropriately. Moral competence involves being able to counter preoccupation with 
self in order to cultivate a realistic view of the other. 
The moral realism that is involved here is not primarily about assigning 
definite truth-conditions to individual propositions. It is connected to a more 
ambiguous idea of truthfulness that does require appeal to some standards of truth 
but is taken to be more fundamental than any particular theory of truth. 16 There is, for 
example, no need to postulate a special class of natural or non-natural moral 
properties to which individual terms of the discourse can be shown to correspond. 17 
Theorizing about morality is an imaginative exercise that helps us to break 
egocentricity. Alternatively, when it goes wrong, it prevents us from doing so. The 
roblem she identifies with too much contemporary (post-war) moral theory is that it 
13 GG, 61. 
14 See below, Chapter 3, for the Nietzschean connection. 
15 Byrne (1998) explores her continuity with religion. 
16 The formulation of being 'in the truth! is a frequent occurrence in the novels and occurs also in 
the philosophical texts alongside 'truthftilncss', M. 399 cg. M. 139,399. For the limits of coherence, 
see A1194-6; and of pedantic truth-tcllin, - M. 34-5. Rather than a single criterion (eg. coherence), 
truthfulness or being 'in the truth! seems to involve applying the right criterion in the right context. 
17 Murdoch rejects the idea of 'bogus' mind-indepcndent moral facts HT, 179. She does allow that 
the 'moral facts' formulation might be unobjectionable if appropriately qualified 'in the sense of 
moral interpretations of situations', VC, 95. But this is not her own preferred formulation. Bagnoli, 
'Realism as a Moral Achievement', 57-8, is particularly strong on this. Her 'constructivism! is not 
faithfully Murdochian but it is closer to the mark than Denham (2001) who translates Murdoch into 
analytic tenns as an exponent of 'evaluative facts' or 'evaluative aspects' that supervene on non-moral 
properties. Murdoch is quite clear that 'a constructive activity of imagination and attention 
"introduces" value into the world which we confront', DPR, 20 1. 
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does the latter. It tends to equate the person with the will, with a rational chooser 
who is able to exercise a total freedom from the past. For Murdoch this picture is less 
realistic than the view of mankind as fallen traditionally held by the ordinary religious 
believer and still depicted by Freud. 'One may say that what he presents us with is a 
detailed and realistic picture of the fallen man [ ... 
] Objectivity and unselfishness are 
not natural to human beings. '18 However, unlike Freud, who aims to make us into 
commonplace functional neurotics, Murdoch favours a perfectionism to which Freud 
is hostile, reading it as a form of narcissistic love for a future, projected self '9 
Murdoch appeals to Platonic metaphors which portray life as an ongoing 
struggle (or pilgrimage) towards perfection but she reworks the metaphors in a way 
that gives them heavily Freudian overtones. She reads Plato's hydraulic metaphor of 
eros as if it were a kind of energy that we can direct this way or that but which is 
(more or less) a fixed quantity. Something of this sort is to be found in Plato, 
particularly Ae Republic 485d where he writes that 'whenever a man' s desires flow in 
Ul current towards any one object, like a stream that has a channel dug for it, 
towards all other objects they flow the more feebly'. In a rather different form it can 
also be found in the Phae&-us 25 1E where the soul 'channels the stream of desire into 
herself as through an irrigation trench, releasing the pent-up watere. However, this is 
one among many Platonic metaphors, and there is no great or obvious consistency in 
its detail. In the first case the system is enclosed and finite, in the second, energy 
flows into the system and out of it in a less restricted, less economical manner. Once 
read in the light of Freud's concept of the libido (a limited energy that may be 
cathected this way or that) Plato's hydraulic metaphor of eros can seem a useful way 
to make sense of his account of love and displacement, especially as it is set out in the 
Symposium. We shift (indeed ascend) from loving one object to loving another, eros 
is cathected this way at the expense of that way. 
20 The mediating influence here is Simone Weil. Murdoch takes over Weil's 
Freudian-influenced reading of 'the powerful energy system of the self-defensive 
psyche' augmented only occasionally by grace and afterwards covers her tracks, 
18 GG, 50. 
19 For a contrast between Freud and Plato on perfectionism see Santas (1998) 
20 See especially Weil (1952), 280. Murdoch first moots the'Need for a new concept of energy' in 
her review of Weil's notebooks, KV, 158. 
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giving the impression that this is the obvious sense of what Plato means and Freud's 
big idea is far from new. 21 'Mat we really are seems more like an obscure system of 
energy out of which choices and visible acts of will emerge at intervals in ways which 
are often unclear and often dependent on the condition of the system in between the 
moments of choice. 22 If we allow cros to remain in its default condition it will be 
directed towards the self and we will leave the illusions generated by egocentricity 
intact. If we redirect it elsewhere, towards the good, we will partially escape from the 
fantasies generated by egocentricity. This is what Murdoch assumes that religion 
does. It makes us into people capable of seeing the other. 
This is all very metaphorical, too metaphorical for contemporary analytic 
tastes and perhaps too allied to a Freudian psychology that no longer commands the 
respect that it did in the 1950s and 1960s. However, we can allow that there is some 
sense that can be made of the hydraulic-erotic metaphor in terms of the important and 
perhaps philosophically undertheorized notion of displacement. If we are happier with 
this latter notion, then the unsettling nature of the erotic metaphor is perhaps our 
problem and not Murdoch's. Displacement has always relied upon something akin to 
the idea of cathecting a limited, metaphorical, intensional resource. Murdoch is 
advancing an account of degrees of moral competence in which it will be improved by 
coming to grips with this phenomenon. If egocentricity is a source of illusion, then 
what we need to do is not just to try and stop being egocentric by an act of will. 
Instead, we need to displace our concern onto a different object, and one which is 
sufficiently engrossing. 23 
Murdoch asks how this is to be done, 'are there any techniques for the 
purification and reorientation of an energy which is naturally selfish, in such a way 
that when moments of choice arrive we shall be sure of acting rightly?. 24 Two 
21 SG, 8 1. For an example of Murdoch covering her Freudian tracks see 7-he Fire and the Sun where 
she quotes Freuds comment that The enlarged sexuality of psychoanalysis coincides with the Eros 
of the divine Plato! [FS, 371 but omits the rest of the quote in which he equates both with the agape 
of St Paul. Freud can hardly be reproducing Plato when he so seriously fails to understand him. (The 
Freud quote is from the preface to the third edition of Three Essqys on Sexualijýv. ) 
22 GG, 53. 
23 The adcquacy of the alternative object is a concern that emerges with great clarity in Weil's The 
Needfor Roots. She argues that the antidemocratic ideals of fascism need to be combated with a 
political ideal (which turns out to be a modern equivalent to Plato's Republic) rather than a technical 
programme for post-war reconstruction. (Fhe latter is closer to the task she was actually set. ) 
24 GG, 53. 
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established techniques are successively considered and rejected. Firstly, 
psychoanalysis is rejected because, although aware of the flaws of the self, its 
approach is to repay these flaws in their own currency by focusing upon the self and 
thereby remaining trapped in egocentricity. This problem, briefly rehearsed in the 
article 'On "God" and "Good"', figures prominently in her Freudian-themed novels of 
the 1960s and carries over into those of the early-to-mid 1970s. In terms of the 
Platonic metaphor of the Cave, psychoanalysis is preoccupied with the second-rate 
illumination of the fiery self. This brings it close to existentialism and analytic 
accounts of the free agent. In the novels, psychoanalysists routinely provide 
reductive, complacent explanations that are characteristically less deep than those 
sought by religious MyStiCS. 25 
Secondly, there are the traditional techniques of religion: devotional exercises 
directed towards a transcendent moral standard and exemplified by prayer, not as a 
form of petition, but as attention to God. (A formulation drawn from Weil . )26 The 
great virtue of this, from a Murdochian point of view, is that it directs our limited 
erotic resources elsewhere. God, and not self becomes the object of love, 
egocentricity is thereby broken. The great weakness of the technique is that a 
transcendent God-thing is neither extant nor believable. Murdoch holds that as 
religion (with the possible exception of mysticism) has become dangerously ossified 
in its focus upon a fictional God-thing. Instead, she holds that we need a concept of 
Good that will take over the job that God used to perform and direct us away from 
the self We need a single, perfect, transcendent, non-representable, indefinable and 
necessarily-real object of attention. 
111. The Ambiguity of Good 
The Sovereignty essays considered so far have set out the follovAng positions. 
Firstly, an insistence that we cannot get away from the concept of an ultimate Good 
(i. e. perfection). The concept of Good is an inescapable part of being human, it is 
bound up with language and thinking. (It is part of what Charles Taylor calls our 
25 The late novel, 7he Message to the Planet is rather unusual because its chief psychotherapist has 
mystical tendencies and its principal mystic is mentally unbalanced. Earlier mystics and 
psychoanalysts are contrasting. 
26 GG, 53. This is a key theme of Weil (195 1) and seems to have wider currency in the mid-ccntury 
e. g. Ortega y Gassct uses it in his study On Love. 
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necessary framework, not so much the picture but the canvas. ý7 This inescapability is 
rather nicely depicted in 7he Time of the Angels (published in 1966 in the midst of the 
Sovereignty essays). 'The girls prided themselves on being theoretical immoralists of 
some degree of refinement. Being high-minded and superior and tough made them by 
a natural development non-moral and free. They were not themselves tempted by 
excesses. They lived indeed the strictly ordered life which Muriel imposed and 
Elizabeth accepted. But they took it for granted that all was permitted. They despised 
a self-abnegation which called convention duty, and neurosis virtue. They had 
disposed of such self-styled morality long ago in their discussions, just as they had at 
an early age convinced each other that there was no God, and then dropped the 
subject forever. 28 The point, I take it, is that their lives belie their exciting doctrine. 
Secondly, the Sovereignty sets out an insistence that being subject to a 
necessary idea of Good is not a matter of unavoidable fantasy. Good is a reality 
principle. Attending to it redirects our energies away from the self, hence away from 
egocentric fantasy. However, even were this a realistic moral psychology (with the 
concept of realism being understood in a sufficiently broad sense) it seems to demand 
a high price. One might still wonder about the idea of Good itself as an end-point or 
goal. Gilbert Harman (whose reservations about Aristotelianism might seem to place 
him in proximity to Murdoch) claims that we have a tendency to posit end goals 
which give order (coherence) to our lives. A person may aim for and take up an 
academic post not because this will allow them to lead a contented life, but because 
of the distress involved in thinking that all their years of education have just been a 
waste. In such a case, an end-goal is posited in order to give sense to a way of life 
that can now be considered not as wasted time, but as an important means to this 
end. 29 This is similar to Murdochs charge that we tend to impose form upon 
contingency. There may, however, be a suspicion that Murdochian Good is just such 
a form-inducing end-point, posited in order to make sense of a self-sacrificial way of 
living that might otherwise seem utterly pointless. Once posited, whatever else it 
does, Good may also be liable to supplant attention to the other just as readily as 
27 Charles Taylor (1996), Chapter 1. 
28 The Time of the Angels, 45-46. 
29 Harman (1976), 457-463. 
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egocentricity does. If Good is our necessary detour to the other, is there not also a 
danger that the detour n-ýght displace the destination? 
If we chart MurdocWs progress between the 1950s and the Sovereignty we 
might be forgiven for thinking that this is precisely what has happened, that she has 
moved on from an interest in secularising or rationalising religious themes, and has 
Igone native. A series of suspect shifts does take place. From embracing a fact-value 
fusion she now embraces the symptomatic importance of the ontological proof From 
rejecting Kantian universalisability, she now advocates something called 'unselfing'. 
From favouring an ambiguous visual metaphor for morality she now favours the idea 
of a transcendent and unitary Good. From defending inwardness against dissolution 
into public criteria, she now defends private moral pilgrimage. From adopting a view 
of the emotions as in some sense cognitive, she now places love at the centre of moral 
being. Finally, from prioritising the reality of others, she now introduces the 
ambiguous reality of Good. These shifts mark a general transition, a metaphysical 
move into Platonism with a distinctly Freudian accent. 
This transition is acknowledged more openly in 'The Sovereignty of Good 
over Other Concepts'(1967) than in the previous two Sovereignty articles. The article 
opens with a restatement of Murdoch's defence of metaphoricity, but the point of the 
article is that the idea of a unitary, sovereign good draws us towards 
specifically-Platonic metaphors, with all the sense of ontological ambiguity that they 
carry. Metaphors such as the Cave and the Sun are taken as necessary to make even 
partial sense of the Good as unitary. 'Note the metaphor of "thing" here. Good is a 
concept about which, and not only in philosophical language, we naturally use a 
Platonic tenninology. "O This does not, however, imply some actual good 'thing! in 
some real beyond place (an interpretation of Murdoch that sometimes seems implied 
31 in Elizabeth Dipple's Workfor the Spirit). Good is not a thing among other things, 
its transcendence is only metaphorical, its distance only an image. 32 When she writes 
that 'Good is a transcendent reality this 'means that virtue is the attempt to pierce the 
veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is. It is an empirical fact 
30 SG, 90. 
31 Dipple (1982), 7,65,101,110,244,251,291,297,309,327 associates the good with externality but 
this is not given adequately textual support to clarify (demythologize) the sense. 
32 SG, 96 For the metaphor of distance. 
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about human nature that the attempt cannot be entirely successfill,. 33Transcendence 
is transcendence of egocentriCity. 34 Murdochs Good nevertheless has 
ontologically-ambiguous overtones. She uses the language of particularity as a device 
to convey a sense of the unitariness of Good although she is clearly committed to 
rejecting the view that Good is a thing among other things. 35 In the deeply ambiguous 
Platonic terminology, it is 'beyond being' [Rep. 509b-c] or above the gods. This also 
makes it beyond full comprehension, beyond description, and ontologically suspect. 36 
Such ontologically-ambiguous overtones introduce an element of messiness 
that is not necessarily to be resisted or undone in an exposition of Murdoch's moral 
psychology. Clarification need not result in the wholesale bracketing-off of 
37 troublesome ambiguities. Tempting though such bracketing is, Murdochian Good 
cannot be viewed as simply an instrumental device or reality principle. For the 
psychological trick of displacement to work, we must be good 'for nothing (a point 
Murdoch repeatedly makes) and not for any reward, not even for the reward of clarity 
or privileged insight . 
3' Here, Murdoch really does border on mysticism. As someone 
who holds it to be at the heart of religion she must to some degree commit to 
continuing its insights, whatever they may be. She alludes to 'true mysticism'. 39 There 
is, perhaps, a genuine tension here between her instrumental justification for Good 
and her more mystical substitution of a sovereign unitary Good for God. Perhaps the 
necessary strong sense of the reality of Good can best be appreciated by someone 
approaching the problem through a demythologising of their everyday sense of a 
33 SG, 9 1. 
34 This aspect of transcendence, which is stressed in the closing pages of the Sovereignty is 
particularly emphasiscd in Conradi (1994) on Murdoch! s Platonism. 
35 Her Gifford lecture on the ontological proof treats this as the true significance of Anselm's second 
version of the ontological proof. not the argument that perfection requires existence, but that it 
requires necessary existence. This places it above all mere contingent realities (things). A thing-like 
absolute would be idolatrous, 'The Ontological Proof, The Iris Murdoch Newsletter, 11, (1998); 
Metaphysics, Chapter 13. 
36 There is a curious moment of perhaps contrived doubt in the Sovereignty when she adirdts to 
some sympathies with this view, and with the idea that Good is faked-up and incapable of playing 
the old role of the fictional God, GG, 70-1. 
37 Here I am thinking the bracketing out of mystical influences in Antonaccio (2000). 
38 The 'for-nothingness' of morality (SG, 90) connects Murdoch with Kant's Groundwork where the 
idea of motivation by reward is also rejected, albeit in favour of duty. (A shopkeeper should not be 
honest because it pays but because it is the right thing to do. ) 
39 SG, 99. 
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moral reality that goes beyond arbitrary choice. Someone from an analytic 
background, interested only in the instrumental argument, may experience difficulties 
in making sense of the concept, they may suspect that this particular sovereign is 
insufficiently clothed. The suspicion may be well founded, but I do not adopt it as my 
line of attack. It is all too easy for a Murdochian to mount a difficult-to-challenge 
defence by appeal to conceptual holism. They might, plausibly, point out that Good is 
indefinable just because it is the sovereign concept, the one that holds everything else 
together. 40 This is Murdochs own response and it partially insulates her theory from 
direct criticism. My approach will play instead upon this theme of self-enclosure. 
IV. Attention and Seeing As 
The Sovereignty presents us with the view that morality is necessary in the 
sense of unavoidable or inescapable and that it is not a necessary fiction but a reality 
principle. Also, it is held together by a sovereign concept of a unitary Good, so that 
perfecting one virtue involves acquiring others. They all pull together in the same 
direction. The text has a certain precision of focus rather than exposition. If we are 
inclined towards the charitable view that her metaphors are meaningful then perhaps 
this is because she directs us exceptionally well towards a genuine problem, the 
difficulty in coming to grips with the reality of others. There are phenomenological 
and Wittgensteinian accounts of this difficulty to the effect that solipsism and doubt 
about other minds may be st rictly indefensible (unintelligible even) but they are 
symptomatic of an everyday moral problem of making sense of the other. (Ilharn 
Dilman uses that rather nice expression 'affective SolipSiSm. 41) The phenomenological 
formulations of the problem stem from Hegel's claim that our relations with others are 
characterised by a struggle for recognition. Murdoch is only interested in one side of 
this opposition, the struggle to recognize others and not the struggle to be 
recognised. Shom of such theory-specific ornamentation, the problem is that in our 
40 We may compare this with Quine's comment at the end of 7wo Dogmas of Empiricism! to the 
effect that, qua lay-physicist, he happens to believe in physical objects and not the gods of Homer, 
but both are ultimately on the same epistemological footing as posits of the conceptual schemes in 
which they are embedded, Quine (1980), 44. A holism comparable to this should be able to 
accommodate an ontologically ambiguous Murdochian Good while distinguishing it from God 
because of the latter's associations with personhood. 
41 This is an abiding problem according to Dilman (1987) 
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thoughts and deeds, in emotional response and through our actions, we betray an 
inability to engage with (to 'see') others as complex, unique, private individuals. Our 
moral competence is thereby compromised. 
A visual metaphor plays an important r6le here and does so through a thesis 
about priority. The point is that prior to reasoning about situations and others we see 
them in particular ways, our representational experiences of the world have 
conceptual content that does not fall apart from their representational content. 42 In 
less elegant terms, a process of construal precedes inference. Indeed we might want 
to define this sort of seeing in just these terms, as the non-inferential making sense of 
(conceptualising) what we encounter. (Rather than defining vision in terms of 
action. )43 MurdocWs understanding of the visual metaphor as it is deployed in the 
Sovereignty is set up beforehand, in 'Vision and Choice, in terms of this priority 
thesis: we can only choose within the world that we can see, and our vision of that 
world is always already value-laden. Moral differences are generally differences of 
vision and not of choice. Pro and anti-abortionists will not see the same neutral set of 
facts. 44 If our representational experiences have conceptual content, then they can be 
altered, restructured, developed, in a word, improved, by an alteration in our 
concepts. 
This allows Murdoch to equate flawed moral vision with a lack of moral 
competence, part of the treatment for which will rely upon working with (developing) 
appropriately rich concepts to make sense of persons. Hannah Arendt provides a 
particularly good example of the failure of moral vision when writing about Adolf 
Eichman's inversion of the r6les of perpetrator and victim. When someone like 
Eichman remarks what horrihIe things I had to do, they are presenting themselves in 
the position of victims. When the torturer remarks finally the prisoner hetrays 
42 My formulation here owes something to John McDowell's Mind and World. 
43 Of the two best-known alternative accounts of moral vision, Nussbaum (1990), 93, accepts the 
significance of D and K that vision need not be defined in relation to action. McDowell (1979), 33 
continues to view (even define) moral vision in relation to action. The Murdoch-Nussbaum approach 
is better able to treat moral vision as significantý praise or blame worthy in its own fight. 
44 Blum (1991) cmphasises priority in his Murdochian-influenced account of 'moral perception, 
treating it as prior also to judgement (the bringing of particular situations under general rules), 
714-8. This helps to ensure that moral perception is not seen as a unitary 'faculty' but it is also 
informed by the Aristotelian position of Nussbaum (1990) that perception is informed by a 
multiplicity of potcmially-conflicting goods. Hence developing sensitivities to one good may block 
out sensitivities to other goods. 
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themselves, they are shifting ultimate culpability onto the victim. 45 This way of seeing 
matters is blinkcrcd to the most obvious features of these situations as ones in which 
horrors are perpetrated upon the defenceless. The Eichmann scenario is extreme but 
so too is the one in the Sovereignty when Murdoch asks what would make someone 
act without selfishness even in a concentration camp? If we reverse this question we 
return to Arendt's point that something very basic must go wrong for someone to 
behave monstrously in such a situation. Are we to think of concentration camp guards 
as individuals who see the inmates as fully human? Surely we are to allow that there is 
an important sense in which they are blind to the full humanity of the inmates, that 
they are caught up in a brutalised way of seeing them. Inferential doctrines to the 
effect that others are subhuman need to tie into this way of seeing to do their worst. 
As an effective nazi in a camp situation I would have to see this particular Jew before 
me as less than human. It would not be enough to hold a view about Jews in general. 
As in the case of D and M, seeing here involves, and is not something separate from, 
emotional response. " 
This sort of formulation, and emphasis upon the standpoint of the viewer 
(rather than the viewed) moves us away from the phenomenological tradition with its 
struggle for recognition and closer to Wittgenstein! s discussion of 'seeing aspects' and 
adopting 'an attitude towards a soul' in the Philosophical Investigations. 47 In 
Wittgenstein's account of seeing aspects he works around a number of illustrative 
figures (picture-objects) such as the Jastrow duck-rabbit figure which may be seen 
either as a duck or as a rabbit. If asked to draw what we see (and able to do so with 
tolerable accuracy) we would, when seeing it as a duck and as a rabbit, draw exactly 
the same thing. As in the case of D and NL what shifts is our perception and not the 
object. (Although we may be inclined to describe matters rather differently: now it is 
a duck_. naw it is a rabbit. ) Such shifts are also eliminative, we cannot see the figure 
45 Hannah Arendt, Eichman in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York, 1965), 
106. The point that this dovetails with the 'inversion of suffering! by torturers is made in Farley 
(1996), 34, a more 'continental' exploration of knowing the other. 
46 For an Aristotelian formulation of the same idea, see Nussbaum (1990), 79, The emotions 
themselves arc modes of vision, or recognition! 
47 Philosophical Investigations, ll. iv and xi especially. I make no claim of originality for pointing 
out this influence. For example, Denham (2001) 609-13 and Moran (2002), 93-4 emphasis the 
importance of seeing aspects in Murdoch. I do maintain that the possibilities this opens up for 
clarifying the effortfid side of Murdochian attention have not been fully developed. 
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in both ways at the same time. Ways of seeing block each other out. Applied to 
everyday moral contexts, we can develop this idea that ways of seeing the other are 
laden with construals (as opposed to explicit beliefs or propositional attitudes) which 
may also be mutually exclusive. For convenience, I will say that seeing the other is 
laden with interpretation, 'seeing, thinking and "interpreting" are mixed' [M. 278]. 48 
Murdoch holds that "'seeing as" is everywhere' [M. 306]. Vision is always 
laden with construal or interpretation, i. e. with a way of seeing things that excludes 
alternative ways of seeing. My representational experience has a conceptual content 
that might differ from that of some other viewer and by working to improve my 
concepts I may improve the quality of my moral vision. Where she may depart from 
Wittgenstein is not merely over the fine-point of terminology but over an important 
matter of substance. In line with her visual metaphor, she extends interpretation-laden 
vision beyond instances of actual perception to cover various different sorts of 
attempts to make sense of the other (for example: imagining, thinking about, or, as in 
the case of D and M, remembering). To make this move is, admittedly, open to the 
qualification that what Murdoch has in mind is only an analogue of seeing aspects. 
She may be open to the charge of extending it beyond the more restricted bounds that 
Wittgenstein seems to set OUt. 49 Seeing aspects can, for example, occur only where 
there are multiple possibilities for construal, and this is not obviously the case with 
other persons. 50 That multiple, and eliminative construals of others are continuously 
available is just MurdoclYs point. It is also a plausible enough position. Lawrence 
Blum has developed it through the following example of seeing an incident as an 
instance of racism. Suppose that I am at the airport. A cab passes a black man and 
stops in front of me. It requires sensitivity that is built up over time to see this as a 
48 Mulhall (1990), 22 ff. points out that Wittgcnstein uses 'interpretation! for something inferential. 
Murdoch departs a little more from ordinary useage by using it for something non-inferential: 'we 
"interpret" our surroundings all the time, enjoying as it were a multiple grasp of their texture and 
significance' M. 279. However, this need not obscure the main point. For both, seeingIvision is 
non-infcrcntial. 
49 She lines up with Strawson's view that all seeing is 'seeing as'. This approach that may be 
contrasted with Scruton! s curtailment of the concept to only those situations where efforts of will 
may be made, i. e. only where it makes sense to try and see something differently. See Strawson 
(1974); Scruton (1974). 
so Here I am following Stephen Mulliall who defends Cavell against this same anticipated objection 
of overextending aspect perception in Mulhall (1994), 129 and generally 126 ff. Mulliall's point, 
here and elsewhere, is that Wittgcnsteires discussion of our paradoxical experience of certain picture 
objects is intended to be of general significance. 
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possible case of racism. It might be that the driver's view was physically obscured, or 
he might habitually pick people up from just where I am standing. What I have to 
construe is not a piece of neutral behaviour (driving until he arrives at a particular 
point and then stopping). What is to be made sense of is the driver's action -an action 
and not just an event- and this involves attributions of intention and purpose. 51 
To see the incident as an instance of racism I have to construe the situation as 
one in which the driver intentionally bypassed the black man. I must see matters in 
this way at the expense of the other alternatives. I may subsequently decide that I was 
mistaken, that appearances were deceptive, but not that I made a wrong choice about 
how to piece the information together, like someone who had misread a blueprint or 
schematic diagram. We do not see the lines of the schematic Jastrow figure on the 
paper and only then decide whether it is one thing or the other. This is a point about 
the immediacy and non-inferential character of what we call vision. 52 These 
alternatives only strike me as possible afterwards, upon reflection. 
Making sense of someone as acting in one way rather than another involves 
seeing some features of situations as the salient ones. Blum's example takes us to the 
heart of Murdoch's idea of moral vision. It is not about the perception of strange 
mind-independent moral properties or facts, but about the inescapability of salience 
perception and seeing as. " The possibility of construing other features as the ones 
that matter most is there but however we see them, our normal condition is one in 
which we see others as engaged in various ways (intending, wanting, trying and so 
51 Blum (1991) 706-7. Making sense of persons in this way is continuous with the Wittgensteinian 
approach towards intentions developed by Elizabeth Anscombe. What matters is not some public, 
ncutrally-observable behavioural event, but construing and understanding actions whose identity is 
bound up with answering 'why? '-questions that fit into the language game of appealing to reasons 
rather than to causes. 
52 1 am drawing here upon the discussion of PI xi. in the first chapter of Mulhall (1990). 
53 Antonaccio's concern with mind-independence and passivity leads her to downgrade vision in 
favour of imagination. 'In contrast to the language of vision, which suggests that right action is a 
matter of conforming the self to the order of objective reality (i. e. the Good) by divesting it of selfish 
desire, imagination suggests the active participation of the self in the building up of the moral world 
in which desire and will operate. ' Imagination suggests 'a more active and constructive activity than 
the metaphor of vision implies', Antonaccio (1996b), 236.1 will take it that neither concern is 
decisive. Firstly, the concept of attention is developed as a specifically-visual metaphor for effort. 
Murdoch is also inclined to treat the active-obedient boundary as blurred, not clear cut, 'sharp 
distinctions of active and passive' break down, DPR, 201. Secondly, Murdoch does not shun 
ontological ambiguity. Given that part of what Murdochian attention/imagination involves is akin to 
Keats 'negative capability' i. e. toleration for messiness, Antonaccio's move is itself a failure of 
attention. For 'negative capability', see SBR, 284 and Murdoch's short piece the following year, NC. 
For toleration of ambiguity as an aspect of attention, see Adamson (1998), 100-105. 
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on). It is only in specialised contexts that we come close to seeing them just as 
objects caught up in events, moved about from here to there, like unconscious 
patients on a hospital trolley. (Here Wittgenstein is at his least behaviouristic. ) 
Murdoch claims that choice is constrained by moral vision, not because we 
are automatically motivated by a strange sort of moral fact but because morally-laden 
vision forecloses possibilities for decision and action. We encounter the world always 
as a value-laden reality and our possibilities for action are circumscribed by those 
aspects of reality that we can see and see as important. What this idea of seeing as 
opens up is a particular diagnosis of the failure of moral vision. We are subject to an 
analogue of what Wittgenstein is concerned with when he writes about aspect 
blindness, an inability to construe something or someone in a particular way. In the 
case of the Jastrow figure, this might be an inability to shift between seeing the duck 
and seeing the rabbit. (Wittgenstein also gives the more everyday example of an 
inability to see the similarity between two faces. )54 This is just the problem that 
Murdoch is directing us towards, a certain aspect-blindness when it comes to others. 
Of course, there are aspects of their humanity that we do readily notice, and it is just 
this that makes it seem peculiar to remark that we do not see others as real. What we 
are directed towards is the realisation that there are also aspects that we fail to see, 
aspects that we are perhaps uninterested in or simply blind to. (Like the complacent 
husband who is not indifferent to his wife's unhappiness but is unable to see it. ) 
In A Fairly Honourable Defeat, Murdoch gives an example of this kind of 
blindness. Morgan is an estranged wife who sees only her husband's weaknesses. She 
needs 'A change of gestalt. Her friends lament this situation. One of them remarks 'if 
only the picture could change a bit, if only Tallis could surprise her in some way, if 
only she could suddenly see him in a different light' . 
55 This understanding of the 
failure of moral vision is drawn directly from the idea of aspect blindness. However, 
while Murdoch is indebted to Wittgenstein, she prefers a grander and more extended 
ancestry than either Wittgenstein or the phenomenological tradition can supply. Her 
novels give aspect blindness a pedigree in Homeric a-M, blindness that is associated 
with the passing on of suffering. However, this is not quite right. Symbolic blindness 
in Homer (and after him in Sophocles, Euripides, and Shakespheare's Lear) is an 
54 Philosophical Investigations, IIA 
55 A Fairly Honourable Defeat, Chapter 14, p. 168. 
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exceptional, even divinely-induced, state. For Murdoch it is closer to the default 
human condition. 56 
This default condition of partial blindness to the other is the key to 
understanding Murdoch's concept of attention. It is not the same concept as moral 
vision. Attention plays a much more specialised r6le. Consider again the case of D 
and M: 'psychic energy flows, and more readily flows, into building up convincingly 
coherent but false pictures of the world, complete with systematic vocabulary. (M 
seeing D as pert-common-juvinile, etc. ) Attention is the effort to counteract such 
states'. 57 Attention is not to be equated with vision, not even when it is seeing as, 
although it is tempting to assimilate the two because both are eliminative, both are 
tied into the phenomenon of displacement. (Murdochian attention to what is other 
operates at the expense of attention to self). Barbara Holland is particularly strong on 
this point and suggests that some early interpretations of Murdoch, such as Blum's, 
failed to separate out attention and vision clearly enough. 58 Attending is what M does 
in relation to D, she makes the various efforts involved in improving the quality of her 
vision and comes to see D as 'not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but 
spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful'. 59 
Attention as such is not vision, it is a general, visual metaphor for the various ongoing 
efforts involved in improving the quality of our moral vision. 
But if it is a matter of effort, does this not simply return us to a concept of the 
free Kantian 'will' by another name? This is just the charge levied by Nancy Schauber, 
that the example of D and M surreptitiously falls back upon the volitional concept 
which Murdoch claims to have abandoned. 60 Schauber's strength here is her 
56 For &T-q and moral blindness see the chapter on suffering below. 
57 IP, 36. 
58 Holland (1988). Where I diverge from Holland is in emphasising a second Murdochian contrast 
between attention and will. 
59 IP, 17. 
60 Nancy Schauber (1999), 122; (2001), 484. Much the same charge is levelled in a slightly different 
form by Moran (2002), 95,99. He suggesting that Murdoch claims hostility to agcnt-centred morality 
but actually presents an account of morality that ccntres upon an extended account of agency (to 
include inner effort) rather than an alternative to it. Against Moran, the Sovereignty clearly restricts 
the concept of agency that is under attack, 'Actions are, roughly, instances of moving things about in 
the public world!, IP, 5. Millgram (2002), 77 grasps how alien such an extended conception of 
agency would be to Murdoch. This is part of her way of blurring the clean-cut distinction between 
active and passive. 
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recognition that effort is just what is at stake. Where she goes wrong is in failing to 
draw out MurdocWs distinction between attention and will as different kinds of effort. 
This distinction goes back to Weil and its crux is that attention is gradualist and will is 
not. That is to say, 'attention! is effort in line with the existing grain of our character 
whereas 'will' involve going against the grain. (We may think here of the special 
effort that may be required to allow a loved one to give up their life rather than 
helping them to cling on to it. ) Will in the latter sense is associated by Murdoch with 
the metaphor of 'stepping bacle, with trying to set aside characteristic inclinations in 
order to make a choice that goes against the grain . 
61 She does uses the idea of 'willed 
attention' for a brief period during the 1960s to convey the notion of effort and shake 
off any excessively-Weilian connotations of passivity. 62 However, this use is only 
brief Once the concept has been purged of any suggestion of a comprehensive 
passivity, the contrast of attention and will is reasserted. In the Metaphysics this is 
done in a way which allows her critique of the Will to sit alongside her approach 
towards attention. 'It may be better, as I suggested earlier, to restrict the term will, as 
"willing" or "exercise of will", to cases where there is an immediate straining, for 
instance occasioned by a perceived duty or principle, against a large part of 
preconceived duty or principle' [M. 300]. Similarly, 'Our busy minds are (for better or 
worse) not often empty or idle. Such activity constitutes, in my picture of the matter, 
a large part of our fundamental moral dispositions ... 
I do not want to use the word 
"Will" to describe this deep level, because of its Kantian and existentialist 
connections ... I would (as I said earlier) see 
"will", or to be clearer, "effort of will", in 
a narrower use, as when an act, good or bad, is consciously forced into being against 
the general tenor of the personality. Obedience to duty may involve force of will' 
[M. 330]. Attention, by contrast, is that kind of steady, ongoing effort which is more 
in line with the grain of our character. In the case of D and M, an effort is made by M 
to overcome her jealousy because M is fair minded enough to realize that her initial 
impressions may not be entirely just. Her effort is in line with, and builds upon, her 
basic fair-mindedness. 
61 Murdoch is concerned with this metaphor as it is used by Stuart Hampshire, DPR, 194-5 the tone 
for which is set shortly beforehand in their discussion on the BBC third Programme in 1963, Pears 
(1964), 80-105. 
62 See section H of the Romanticism chapter below for this brief episode. 
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Because the effort of attention can be made in different ways (including really 
looking, focusing, concentrating, waiting patiently, resisting convenient answers and 
holding jealousy in check) we do not need to identify separate episodes of attending 
and seeing, with the former occurring prior to the latter, any more than the 
non-Murdochian model of will (where it is allowed to swallow up all efforts) needs to 
identify volitions that are separate from (and prior to) voluntary actions. A footballer 
who makes an effort to try and score a goal does not need to do two things, firstly 
make the effort and then an associated action. The effort just is part of what make the 
action the kind of action it is. Similarly, we do not need the phantom duplicates of 
attentive effort and visual episode in order to distinguish between attention and vision 
63 at the conceptual level. Attention is the effort to improve the quality of our vision 
even when such efforts take the form of really looking. (The metaphor of the artist is 
an appropriate one here, he really looks and this too is an effort of attention. ) 
We are, at last, in a position to translate these distinctions into the more 
recognisable terms of seeing-as, and thereby relate them to the real moral problem of 
seeing others. We can clarify matters thus: attention is the general term covering the 
various different sorts of efforts that we engage in to overcome aspect blindness. On 
its own this is quite an attractive concept. What complicates matters is that Murdoch 
holds that such efforts are not only continuous with the grain of character, but are 
also best executed in the context of an ongoing pilgrimage towards absolute 
goodness. There is nothing in the concept of attention, as it has so far been 
considered, that requires us to make this move. The concept of attention need not be 
embedded in a perfectionist doctrine of the sort set out in the Sovereignty, indeed it 
might be developed in a quite different and Aristotelian manner, but this perfectionist 
64 direction is the one in which Murdoch goes. 
V. Egocentricity and Selfishness 
Murdoch only gives grounds for treating our end-goal as indefinable. She 
gives no reason for treating the problem that underlies our partial blindness to others 
63 The formulation here owes something to Ryle's account of volitions in Chapter 3 of Ae Concept 
ofMind and ultimately to Wittgcnstein, for example, PT 615. 
64 We might, for example develop 'atwntion' in the manncr of Nussbaum, using it to gauge the 
difference between the cnds we claim to value and those we actually attend to, see Bowden (1998), 
66-68. 
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as similarly ineffable. There is no obvious reason why some disambiguation of the 
underlying human condition may not be carried out. That to be human is to be flawed 
may be taken as basic here. We are to engage in unselfing and as the name suggests, 
this is self-sacrificial. The self is to be overcome. But Murdoch provides no explicit 
statement that might lead us to identify her approach as self-sacrificial in the strong 
sense of Kierkegaard (who urges us in Works of Love to abandon the Hegelian quest 
for personal recognition). More minimally, we may say that her approach embodies at 
least the weaker self-sacrifice of what Blum identifies as a self-other asymmetry. The 
other is given priority over the self. (In Blunfs terms, it is, for example, permissible, 
even laudable, to sacrifice a greater personal good for a lesser good for someone else, 
but not to sacrifice their greater good for our lesser good. ) Murdochian morality is 
not geared to promote self-interest. She is concerned with others, with loving and not 
with being loved. (Even if treating the two in this way as separable is already 
something of an assumption. ) Concern for the other is taken to require and constitute 
65 'a suppression of self. However, Murdoch's formulations equivocate over just what 
is to be sacrificed. She equivocates between directing her moral psychology against 
egocentricity and directing it against selfishness. These two are not at all the same. 
Egocentricity can be self-punitive just so long as it is self-preoccupied. Selfishness is 
more concerned with perceived well-being and reward, we might want to say that it is 
a particular form of egocentricity, but not the only form. 
Although some commentators are sensitive to this point (such as Nussbaum, 
who always writes consistently about Murdoch on egocentricity) Guy Backus is the 
only commentator who has made an attempt to draw it out in more detail. Murdoch 
does not make clear if this pervasive selfishness is (i) a propensity to act in one's own 
interest or (ii) a propensity to be obsessed with the workings of one's own "psychical 
66 machinery" at the expense of thinking about others'. Backus opts for (ii) as the more 
consistent with her overall concerns and I am inclined to view this as the right way to 
go. 
Murdoch's equivocates on the point. At one moment we read 'I assume that 
human beings are naturally selfiSht. 67 At others we read of the 'cloud', the 'falsifying 
65 GG, 64. 
66 Backus (1986), 76. 
67 SG, 76 
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veil, the 'dark veil' and the fog, all images of a miasma which separates us from the 
real and leaves us trapped in the self . 
68 The latter sort of metaphor goes along with an 
emphasis upon being preoccupied with oneself rather than narrowly selfish but 
Murdoch does repeatedly use 'selfishness' and 'egocentricity' with no attempt to 
differentiate between the two. 69 On one page of the Sovereignty we can read about 
'mechanical energy of an egocentric kind', turn the page and we can read about an 
'energy which is naturally selfish! and the need to counter 'a powerful egocentric 
mechaniSnf. 70 This represents a conceptual imprecision about what we are trying to 
overcome. However, the very idea of resisting our default condition makes clear that 
neither reading involves attributing psychological egoism (or some hedonistic variant 
thereof) to Murdoch. Self-interest is not the only possible motivation, a condition 
inside which we must remain comprehensively trapped. For Murdoch, we may be 
motivated by the Good. 
Although neither reading collapses MurdocWs view in this way, I will take it 
that egocentricity is both further removed from psychological egoism and is also a 
more defensible diagnosis of a ubiquitous human problem than selfishness. Ubiquitous 
selfishness is descriptively implausible. We do seem to act in lots of ways that are 
geared to help others at our own expense and we do so without any special effort. 
(Perhaps we might want to appeal here to the regular social practices which we are 
born into and which constrain our individualism. We help people in these conditions 
but not in those. ) Suggesting that Murdoch may be read as identifying a deeper 
problem is part and parcel of my contention that she ought not to be summarily 
dismissed for overestimating our default selfishness. She is far removed from any 
such thesis. 
As Murdoch's dominant metaphors are orientational and concern a 
transcendence of self, a pursuit of what lies outside, egocentricity is (as Backus 
suggests) the better candidate for what ultimately concerns Murdoch, 'the direction of 
attention should properly be outward, away from self . 
71 The rejection of an 
egocentric moral therapy is, after all, the crux of her critique of Freudianism, and -in 
68 SG, 77,82; Acastos, 101. 
69 SG, 82. 
70 GG, 51,53. 
71 GG, 58. 
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the only substantial and separate philosophical text written during the Sovereignty 
period- the pursuit of freedom through self-knowledge advocated by Stuart 
Hampshire. For Murdoch, both Freud and Hampshire try to tackle egocentricity by 
really focusing upon the mechanisms of the self in the belief that such a focus 
somehow allows us to escape (or 'step-bacle) from the initial problem rather than 
merely reproducing it. 72 As such, Freudian-inspired self-analysis is assimilated to the 
existentialist emphasis upon sincerity. Both rely upon an introspective interrogation 
that Murdoch believes is always already compromised. Far from having privileged 
access to our own motives, 'Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent 
motive'. 73 Systematic self-knowledge (i. e. self-knowledge beyond that rudimentary 
level that M has of her tendency to be jealous) is more of a by-product than a directly 
attainable goal. The point is worth emphasising because the argument that follows 
will place some weight upon a reading in which attention is the effort to overcome 
egocentricity. 
'In such a picture sincerity and self-knowledge, those popular merits seem less 
important. It is an attachment to what lies outside the fantasy mechanism, and not a 
scrutiny of the mechanism itself, that liberates. Close scrutiny of the mechanism often 
merely strengthens its power (for example, through sadomasochistic self-awareness). 
"Self-Knowledge", in the sense of a minute understanding of one's own machinery, 
seems to me, except at a fairly simple level, usually a delusion. A sense of such 
self-knowledge may of course be induced in analysis for therapeutic reasons, but 'the 
cure! does not prove the alleged knowledge genuine. 74 Direct self-analysis fails to 
yield what it promises. What matters here is not whether Murdoch is right about this 
but that it requires us not to seek self-knowledge unselfishly, but to pursue an 
altogether less egocentric approach, accepting whatever incidental insights about the 
self may come to us along the way. 
This egocentricity/selfishness distinction is an important one, Murdoch's 
failure to make it may insulate her from being charged with her own strictures by 
72 For her rejection of Hampshire's pursuit of freedom through self knowledge see DPR. John Kekes 
(1995), 152-58, treats both positions as contrasting errors and insights. However, the suggestion has 
also been made that MurdocWs reading of Hampshire is problematic, Backus (1986), 75-83. 
73 GG, 50. There is some agreement with Ryle here about the limits of self-knowledge, see 7he 
Concept qfMind, Chapter VI. 
74 GG, 65-6. 
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introducing an unnecessary ambiguity about what those strictures are directed 
against. Once the ambiguity is removed, she may be more vulnerable to a reductio. In 
particular, she will be more vulnerable to the charge that by contextualizing individual 
episodes of attention within the overall project of a pilgrimage in the direction of 
perfection, she produces a secular version of the spiritualized egocentricity of the 
religious life. This is an intuition which I will try to develop, defend and render in a 
more precise manner. 
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Part Two 
Introduction: An Approach Towards Critique 
Having set out the substance of Murdoch's position and accounted for her 
stylistic peculiarities I will now try to develop an account of what she must avoid if 
she is to escape the charge of inconsistency. This attempt to evaluate Murdoch in her 
own terms is motivated by the following difficulty. Let us consider two basic 
Murdochian claims. (1) Because consciousness and language are continuously 
value-laden we must reject the fact-value distinction. (At least in the form set up by 
Logical Positivism. She does not rule out the possibility or usefulness of making any 
such a distinction but it will have to be done in a value-laden manner as a normative 
exercise. ) (2), This value-ladenness of language and consciousness is not a matter of 
inescapable illusion, it is a matter of being truthful or realistic. ' This claim is 
substantiated by her rudimentary moral psychology which is continuous with religion 
but which gives explicit normative priority to disclosing the reality of others and not 
self Understanding the reality of others is about truthful belief, vision and emotional 
response. It is about a way of being i. e. being in the inith, and is not just concerned 
with propositional attitudes. 
A certain vagueness and ambiguity creeps into Murdochs writings, but this is 
underpinned by her views about metaphor so that at least a plausible defence can be 
made. Real engagement with Murdoch, trying to make sense of her theory as it is, in 
all its particularity and peculiarity, will involve trying to work with this ambiguity in 
order to clarify it gradually. The concepts so far examined will be developed further 
as we go along. In a sense, and to lapse into more analytic terms, real engagement 
with Murdoch will involve determining just what an application of the principle of 
charity will involve in this non-standard context. Once we have accepted that 
something significant is being said (and I have already made this concession) a degree 
of effort is justified in making further sense of it. I will suggest that the most plausible 
approach towards a critique, the one least likely to miss the target, will be to provide 
a reductio. That is to say, it will involve an attempt to expose the internal tensions 
1 For Murdoch, these two concepts are 'blended in the Platonic concept of aletheia, FS, 12,4 1. 
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within her approach and to do so in a manner which genuinely comes to grips with 
her ideas and does not merely cull isolated propositions or formulations from her 
texts. 
Beyond the idea that this is what a principle of charity will involve as a 
response to her ambiguities, there is a further reason for preferring such an approach. 
Any critique of Murdoch will face difficulties which are not only concerned with the 
peculiarities of her philosophical style. Her plausible (defensible) rejection of the 
fact-value distinction (1) will make any critique directed against the more problematic 
and metaphorical moral psychology that substantiates (2) vulnerable to the charge of 
being a mere value judgement. I am, for example, inclined to believe that Murdoch 
has an overly-generous view of what religion has traditionally done and hence the 
value of emulating it. This, however, is a claim that might appeal to someone who is 
already dubious about a Murdochian standpoint, but it is unlikely to have any impact 
upon a what I will call a 'faithful Murdochiarf. (Someone genuinely, and in detail, 
committed to what Murdoch is trying to set out. ) I intend to raise problems for the 
latter sort of reader and not just the former. An internal critique fits this bill because it 
will not be subject to the charge of question begging by working on the basis of 
non-Murdochian assumptions. Our best, or maximal critique, will be an internal one. 
It will attempt to show that Murdoch is in some sense inconsistent (and not just 
descriptively implausible). 
This does not quite solve the problem of how to critique Murdoch. How 
consistent should we be? is itself a moral question, and one whose normativity 
Murdoch is keenly aware of (In this she is not alone . )2 'The achievement of 
coherence is itself ambiguous. Coherence is not necessarily good, and one must 
question its cost' [M, 146-7]. This does not automatically collapse Murdoch into a 
fully-blown mysticism. Coherence, as an intellectual virtue, is not the only virtue. 
2 In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Rorty questions absolute coherence, suggesting that 
conflicting conceptual tools may be used in different tasks or language games. Williams' Ethics and 
the Limits ofPhilosophy points out that conflicting moral commitments are too often confused with 
logical inconsistency. Both of these may be seen as entirely rational ways to limit the r6lc of 
coherence. Murdoch's views on coherence, by contrast, do show the influence of the mystical use of 
conflicting formulations as a communicative strategy, but, on the analytic side, they may also be 
connected to the sort of claim (made by Putnam (1990), 157) that coherence is a value-laden concept 
that may be set up in different ways. Whereas she formulates this as a questioning of the value of 
coherence, Putnam formulates it as a questioning of the univocity of 'coherence', an approach that 
conveys a more obvious continuing commitment to rational standards. 
Here we might want to note that there is often a connection between liberality and 
resistance of morally-intolerable implications. A prominent example of this is 
Kierkegaard's Abraham. God sets him on a journey, gives him time to mull over a 
terrible deed. Finally he arrives at the designated place and leads his son Isaac up a 
mountain to be sacrificed. If he is entirely consistent in his beliefs then he should 
make the sacrifice. The point, I take it, is that the price of absolute coherence may be 
moral fanaticism. Absolute consistency is not always what is most important from a 
moral point of view. 3 
Murdoch applies a similar restriction. The concept of pilgrimage, to which she 
is committed, is one which privileges the idea of progress over that of coherence. 
What matters above all is that we should advance in the direction of the Good, and 
not that we should be in every conceivable respect, consistent. Indeed she identifies 
the latter pursuit with egocentric self-enclosure, with the temptation to build 
'convincingly coherent but false pictures of the world, complete with systematic 
4 vocabular, V. In some sense, pilgrimage leads us in the direction of an increasing 
discernment of the unitariness of Good, but there is also an abiding Murdochian 
concern with the limitations of coherence, reservations that may be set alongside 
those about the notion of truth as correspondence. 5 Murdoch rejects any idea of a 
single criterion for truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic 'as if) posing instead 
the idea of truthfulness, of being 'in the truth' as a complex moral achievement which 
involves effort and not just the following of rules. We have to apply the right criterion 
in any given context and what criterion we apply will be a matter of how we see the 
world. (It will depend upon the quality of our moral vision. )6 
What we can draw from this is not that we must abandon the idea of a 
reductio because when it comes to Murdochian standards of coherence, anything 
goes. Rather, an effective critique will be one which respects Murdochs strictures on 
3 This is, I take it, part of what Kicrkcgaard is trying to convey in Fear and Trembling. 
4 SG, 37. 
5 Her 1987 libretto, The One Alone, is rather unusual as an operatic piece in tackling the relation 
between the reduction of truth to coherence and the idea of human isolation and sclf-cnclosure 
symbolised by imprisonment. Unusually, for an interrogation scenario, the interrogator appears to be 
a sort of Hegelian who insists upon conformity to the system. 
6 For an attempt to provide a critique of Murdoch through a reductionist account of her criteria for 
truth, see Gamwcll (1996). His point is that abandonment of God is moral loss crgo it is a loss of 
truth. 
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coherence by allowing that not all demonstrated inconsistencies will count as a 
reductio of her approach as a whole. On the other hand, Murdoch remains 
philosophically interesting precisely because, when it comes to coherence, anything 
does not go. (This is also an implication of the idea of a pilgrimage towards a unitary 
good. ) Some inconsistencies will conflict with her core normative priorities. Some 
inconsistencies are tolerable, others are not. We may distinguish weak or tolerable 
inconsistency, which a faithful Murdochian may put up with as the price of progress, 
from strong inconsistency which they must avoid. Toleration of strong inconsistency 
may justly be treated as a fundamental violation of the truthfulness to which Murdoch 
aspires. 
My task here, in this middle section of the thesis, will be to establish some 
criteria for strong inconsistency. I will do this in two stages. Firstly, in the next 
chapter, on Displacing Contentment' I will be removing an obstacle to a clear vision 
of what Murdoch is and is not against. In spite of her appeals to what we are all 
aware of, what we cannot get away from, she is not presenting a form of moral 
quietism. Quite the reverse. Murdoch aligns herself with hostility towards our 
everyday moral under-achievement.. 
Secondly, in the chapter entitled 7he Concept of Romanticism!, I wHI shift the 
discussion away from those individual philosophers (Hampshire, Hare, Ryle, and so 
on) who are charged by Murdoch with complicity in developing a false view of the 
unencumbered self (free in the sense of being without a history or inner complexity). 
Instead I will try to examine that view of the self (and its moral task) in its own right 
and in the terms that Murdoch herself sets out in the Sovereignty. Her general charge, 
both there and elsewhere, is that this flawed view of the unencumbered self is guilty 
of a kind of romanticism. I will show that what Murdoch calls romanticism is takcn 
by her to be generative of precisely those egocentric problems that her moral 
psychology is designed to tackle. What will give cause for concern here is that 
MurdocWs rejection of everyday contentment is something that she shares with 
romanticism and this may (should) lead us to question what else her position shares 
with it. Murdoch has a case to answer. If her approach towards morality and the self 
reproduces the same core problems of romanticism then it may be judged not only to 
be tolerably inconsistent, but strongly inconsistent. 
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This would be an important result in terms of what we can draw from 
Murdoch, but it would still not invalidate the more localised insights that she 
generates, nor would it make her any less important as an exemplar of a post-analytic, 
or at least non-analytic, way of doing philosophy. Evaluation of these insights and this 
exemplary status would take me beyond the limited bounds of this thesis. Even while 
remaining within its scope, Part Two has a limited r6le to play. It will be concerned 
only with setting out the criteria for strong inconsistency. Part Three will then 
evaluate Murdoch in the light of these criteria. Parts One and Two will together 
fimction as a framework within which Part Three can operate as the real engine that 
powers my argument. It does so by showing the ways in which Murdoch falls foul of 
what she criticises in others. Setting up this framework is a necessary business, 
without connecting up to it, the argumentative engine simply revs and revs but fails to 
go anywhere. 
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Chapter 3: Displacing Contentment 
1. Rejecting Moral Quietism 
Murdoch defends moral continuity. She holds that we need a concept of Good that 
will take the place of the no-longer-believable concept of God. 'I shall suggest that 
God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real 
object of attention; and I shall go on to suggest that moral philosophy should attempt 
to retain a central concept which has all these characteristics. " This position, the 
dominant theme of "On 'God' and "Good"', remains in place even at the end of the 
Metaphysics: The image of good here takes the place of God in its connection with a 
whole being! [M. 492]. More poetically, 'Good represents the reality of which God is 
the dream' [M. 496]. While there is a shift here from the conventional Judeo-Christian 
moral absolute, the overall tone of her position is one of contentment with traditional 
morality, perhaps even nostalgia for it. 
What Murdoch criticises is a dangerous position (an end-point) which she 
believes we are led towards by a variety of different theories. (From Sartre, 
Hampshire, Hare, Ryle, and so on. ) Nietzsche often seems to be closest to the ideal 
viewpoint that she has in mind. He holds a diametrically opposed view on the relation 
between 'God' and 'Good', namely, that we have abandoned God but timidly 
instantiated a pale imitation that mimics the departed God's commanding role. 
Utilitarianism and Kantianism, guilty of this moral half-heartedness, are ruled out as 
non-starters in favour of a more dramatic break of the sort symbolised by Nietzsche's 
madman in the village square, someone who shakes people and asks them don't Jou 
realize that God is dead? His Zarathustra re-enacts the same scene and tells the 
crowd that it is not our sin but our moderation that cries to heaven. 2 Nietzsche may 
well be in the background of Murdoch's texts but direct reference to Nietzsche is 
conspicuous by its scarcity. 3 In part, this may be for diplomatic reasons, the early 
I GG, 54. 
2 The allusions to Nietzsche arc to Beyvnd Good and Evil (on Good as an imitation of God), The 
Gqv Science (for the madman in the village square) and the speech at the end of the Prologue in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
3 There arc exceptions. The Existentialist Hcro' places the cxistcntialist hcro after the Nictzschcan 
deluge, Ell, 109. Similarly, 'It is not such a very long step from Kant to Nietzsche, and from 
Nietzsche to existentialism and the Anglo-Saxon allied doctrines which in some imays closely 
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texts were aimed at an analytic audience for whom Sartre was perhaps interesting but 
Niezsche was too avant-garde or at least unfashionable and had come too soon or too 
late or both. Besides which, his political credentials were all wrong, or at least 
questionable. In setting out her argument, Murdoch's concern has always been with 
critiquing an approach which has tempting liberal credentials as a defence of 
freedom. She rejects the attempt to democratize morality into a matter of choice, but 
such a democratic preoccupation is not notably Nietzschean. 
Because of her sympathy with what religion has traditionally (and allegedly) 
done, there is a danger that we may assimHate Murdoch's position to other defences 
of 'Good' (such as intuitionism), 'the Good life' (of virtue ethicists like Alasdair 
MacIntyre) and even 'God' (in the case of Charles Taylor and, more popularly, the 
Wittgensteinian Don Cupitt). We might be inclined to place her within a genealogy of 
figures making a last desperate, anti-modernist or quietist stand in defence of moral 
convention against the Nietzschean barbarians (the graphic scenario of MacIntyre's 
After Virtue). I am going to accept that there is a strong element of continuity 
between Murdoch and such moral traditionalism. She is trying to affirm and (pace 
Charles Taylor) to begin from an articulation of everyday moral common sense, and 
(more ambiguously) everyday 'intuitione. She does attempt to enrich the theoretical 
background to what is already believed by what she calls the 'virtuous peasant' (a 
rather infelicitous expression) .4 'The virtuous peasant 
knows, and I believe he will go 
on knowing, in spite of the removal or modification of the theological apparatus, 
although what he knows he might be at a loss to say. This view is of course not 
amenable even to a persuasive philosophical proof and can easily be challenged on all 
sorts of empirical grounds. " 
It would, however, be quite wrong to situate Murdoch unequivwcally in this 
way simply on the basis of her faithful attachment to a traditional-style moral 
absolute. 6 What I will be concerned to show here is that her conception of morality, 
as well as sharing a good deal with accounts of Good, God and the good life also 
resemble it'SG, 78. 
4 The virtuous peasant is first mentioned at IP, 2, and reappears at SG, 98. We may allow that the 
idea of the pcasant was more favourably viewcd in the 1960s. 
5 GG, 72. 
6 One of the strengths of Antonaccio (2000) is her separation of Murdoch from communitarian and 
Natural lzw cthics. 
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leads her towards a quite different and disturbing element of continuity with the moral 
radicalism that she criticises. Taylor, for example, writes of the affirmation of 
everyday life .7 But when Murdoch writes thatA mediocre man who achieves what 
he 
intends is not the ideal of a free matf, or Ethics should not be merely an analysis of 
ordinary mediocre conduct', she shares in the devaluation of what (for lack of a better 
expression) I will call everjday bourgeois contentment. 8 By this I mean the kind of 
life that could be led by any one of us pretty much as we already are and that many of 
us would be quite pleased to lead. For ease of expression I will use 'contentment' and 
'happiness' as cognate and untheorized terms, happiness is not a concept that 
Murdoch spends time analysing. 
Hostility towards morally-unambitious contentment is shared by Murdoch and 
by Milton's Satan who would rather rule in hell than live an easy life in heaven. For 
Nietzsche too, ordinary contentment is a miserable ease and for Sartre it is the 
lifestyle of les salauds. Murdoch is critical of this 'special anti-bourgeois flavour of 
Sartre! s philosophy' and his view that 'the bourgeois social world' conceals an 
'unnerving solitude!. 9 She is also 'not sure how seriously to take this anti-bourgeois 
attitude! when she encounters it in structuralist aesthetics. 10 Nevertheless, she tries to 
value humans without endorsing their actually existing, default, condition. She is also 
intrigued, appalled and somewhat repelled by 'the abysmal sinfWness of humane 
irrespective of whether this is conceived of naturalistically or in more socially specific 
terms [M. 483]. Her view, like that of what I will call, (provisionally and in a 
non-rigorous sense) the romantics, is that we must try to rise above the norm. 
This introduces a danger of lapsing into a refined elitism that is at odds with 
her other commitments. She 'would say no to the term "61ite"', it is one she would 
reserve for heroic existentialism and for structuralism (deconstruction) where the 
critic stands apart from or above relativism in order to describe it. " This hostility 
towards elitism is reinforced by Murdoch's rhetorical alignment with the virtuous 
7 Taylor (1989) associates this with Marxism. 
DPR, 20 1; SG, 76. 
AD, 289, EW, 136. 
10 SN, 100. See also The Sacred and Profane Love Machine where romanticism is repeatedly at odds 
mith'a bourgeois'drcam worlcr, 80; Sartre, 13,77; A057. 
II GG. 72. This is the core of her argument against dcconstruction in Afetaphysics Chapter 7. 
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peasant and by a key claim that she shares with intuitionism: awareness of Good is 
experiential, non-inferential, we do not need to be able to demonstrate the correctness 
or defensibility of morality. Common-sense, intuition, or 'a non-dogmatic essentially 
un-formulated faith in the reality of the Good' may be relied upon. 12 On 
H. A. Pritchard's early version of this argument, moral philosophy may rest upon a 
mistake precisely because morality is not justified by reasons but by intuitions. 13 
Closer to Murdoch's time it was associated with W. D. Ross and theprimafacie duties 
that the plain man intuits to be right, where 'plain mad is one not altered by 
philosophy or perversity. 'The main moral convictions of the plain man seem to me to 
be, not opinions which it is for philosophy to prove or disprove, but knowledge from 
the start'. 14 If MurdocWs 'virtuous peasant' is not exactly this 'plain mad he is at least 
a close relation. He is part of Murdoch's appeal to 'the level of serious common sense 
and of ordinary non-philosophical reflection about the nature of morals'. What the 
'movement of return' executed by the Sovereignty seems to returns us to is something 
'the ordinary person' will find perfectly familiar. 15 
Murdoch's belief in the reality of good draws upon what we might call 
everyday moral phenomenology yet she is concerned that this is not enough, that we 
must rise above our default moral condition, above the moral norm and move closer 
to perfection. Moral competence is variable. This cuts across her populist appeal to 
what is commonly accessible, 'if morality is essentially connected with change and 
progress, we cannot be as democratic about it as some philosophers would like to 
thiW. 16 The tension here may give cause for concern. Commitment to continuity with 
moral tradition is coupled with a hostility towards moral quietism. She shares a 
12 GG, 72. Keff (1997) classifies Murdoch as an intuitionist but relies rather too much upon the 
importance of Platonic anamnesis in the Meno as an influence upon Murdoch. (Intuitive certainty 
comes from the depths of our being. ) This focus upon the Meno would set up a connection to an 
analogy with geometry exploited by some intuitionists but it is textually unsupportable. He also 
overstates the proximity of her position to Moore, a problematic point given her refusal to ground 
her realism in strange moral facts or properties. (See above, Chapter 2. ) For the differences between 
Murdoch and Moore (whose intuitionism is, admittedly, not the only Idnd) see Antonaccio (2000), 
116-123, 
13 Prichard (1912). 
14 Ross (1930), 20-21. 
15 IP, 1,37,39. 
16 IP, 28. This embraces the 'non-liberal' and 'undemocratic' aspect of Weil's Plato that Murdoch 
acknowledges in KV, 159 but suggests that the fault may lie with our political categories and not 
with Weil. 
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rejection of commonplace moral condition with anti-bourgeois romantics such as 
Nietzsche and Sartre. Like the concept of Bildung associated with the Romantic 
Movement, Murdoch's perfectionist concept of pilgrimage rejects the pre-extant self 
We are just not good enough as we are. 
Here I am concerned only to set up this connection of 'similarity to' or 
fcontinuity with' anti-bourgeois romanticism in a weak sense. The criteria for the kind 
of similarity I have in mind are accordingly weak ones: firstly, a simple rejection of 
the adequacy of ordinary contentment as an orientation and secondly, a hostility 
towards it or lack of commensurate regret for its sacrifice. (This may involve 
something more akin to indifference than outright hostility, as we shall see below. ) 
Murdoch is shown to meet these conditions in sections III and IV respectively. To 
begin with, section II will focus upon outlining those central features of Murdochian 
morality which lead her into this continuity with the anti-bourgeois theme. My overall 
argument is that this continuity does not emerge in spite of her commitment to Good 
at the expense of choice, but emerges because of it. 
11. Moving Towards an Elimination of Choice 
Murdoch holds that moral phenomenology is best understood not as an 
experience of choice but as a matter of seeing things in ways that oblige us to respond 
accordingly or obediently. Motivation is internal to our picturing of the world. The 
extreme and opposite image of freedom as terroristic, as the capacity to write new 
tables of morality in the morning before tearing them up in the evening, is treated by 
Murdoch as deeply flawed. Firstly, it ignores the background against which choices 
are made, 'I can only choose within the world I can see' where the quality of personal 
vision will vary and depend upon prior, sustained patterns of effort to discern justly. " 
This is not an unequivocal denial of choice, it is the somewhat weaker thesis that 
choice is significantly constrained. We do continually have to make choices - but 
why should we blot out as irrelevant the different background of these choices, 
whether they are made confidently on the basis of a clear specification of the 
situation, or tentatively, with no confidence of having sufficiently explored the 
details? '" 
17 IP, 3 5. 
18 VC, 88. 
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Carla Bagnoli uses this limited critique to claim that Murdoch adheres to a 
'continuity thesis whereby vision does not eliminate choice but helps to shape it. 19 
This is where Murdoch's argument overlaps with non-Murdochian concerns about the 
attenuated equation of freedom with choice. For example, Onora ONeill has 
suggested that the notion of informed consent (based upon Kantian ideas of rational 
autonomy) has come to be overemphasised in medical ethics. It is often a fiction 
because it requires belief about what is consented to, and this opens up the problem 
of referential opacity. Agreement to a procedure under one description is not 
obviously agreement to the same procedure when described in a different way. We 
tend to be asked for consent at the wrong time (when we are least able to make an 
informed choice) and in the wrong way (when we don't really know what we are 
giving our consent to). " 
Secondly, Murdoch's work generates a theory of freedom not as unimpeded 
choice but as a matter of the right constitution of character, a state of being that is 
constructed by 'the prior work of attention! and one which admits of degrees. 21 'It is 
what lies behind and in between actions or choices and prompts them that is 
important, and it is this area which should be purified. By the time the moment of 
choice has arrived the quality of attention has probably determined the nature of the 
act. '22 The upshot is that 'moral freedom looks more like a mode of reflection which 
we may have to achieve, and less like a capacity to vary our choices ... 
I hardly think 
this a disadvantage'. 23 Having located freedom elsewhere than in immediate choice, 
Murdoch's Sovereignty strengthens her earlier weak claim about vision merely 
hounding choice into the stronger one that vision tends to determine it. This goes 
beyond Bagnoli's continuity thesis and strays into more mystical territory. 'One is 
often compelled almost automatically by what one can see. '2' The locus of freedom is 
removed from choice and pushed back into the prior effort of attention that, in turn, 
shapes moral vision. 'In a way, explicit choice seems now less important: less decisive 
19 Bagnoli (2002), 55-6. 










(since much of the "decision" lies elsewhere) and less obviously something to be 
"cultivated". If I attend properly I will have no choices and this is the ultimate 
condition to be aimed at. 25 
This is direct paraphrase of Simone Weil and it is here that the crossover into 
the Platonism of the Sovereignty occurs, with an assertion of the non-optional, 
magnetic pull of morality. 26 The elimination of choice is not a source of regret. 'The 
ideal situation, on the contrary, is rather to be represented as a kind of "necessity". 
This is something of which saints speak and which any artist will readily 
understand. X We end up with'something very much more like "obedience"'. 21t This 
view is mystically-inclined in the sense that it reproduces a central element of the 
idealised mystical experience. It is not only transitory, ineffable and 
knowledge-transmitting, but also passive . 
29 The desired condition of Murdoch, like 
30 that of the mystic is construed as 'obedience to reality'. (This introduces a slight 
conceptual problem: if there is no possibility of disobedience then in what sense is 
obedience possible? ) On the way to this 'ideal situation' where necessity prevails, 
facile choice and the possibility of 'easy unimportant choice' are not ruled our any 
more than'difficult and painful choices'are. 31 We have no advanced guarantees about 
the adequacy or quality of our moral perception of situations. However, we may not 
be able to evade confusion or conflicts between low-level options where the pull of 
one may be as great as that of another. It is only in some ultimate sense that choice is 
ruled out in favour of obedience. 
This tendency towards the elimination of choice is taken by Murdoch to 
provide grounds for believing that moral phenomenology ultimately presupposes 'a 
single object for all mere, a unitary sovereign standard of Good. 32 (Here capitalised to 
25 IP, 3 8. 
26 Weil's position is that 'We should pay attention to such a point that we no longer have the choice, 
cited at KV, 159. See Metaphysics, 330 for an example of the metaphor of the magnetic pull of love 
objects. 
27 IP, 39. 
28 IP, 39. 
29 Passivity, being held or at least motionless is a key characteristic of the mystical state as detailed 
by William James in The Vafieties ofReligious Expefience. 
30 IP, 4 1. 
31 IP, 34. 
32 IP, 37. 
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avoid confusion. ) If morality is about truth and reality, then differently articulated 
moral visions (the way I think about things and the way people in Spain, The Old 
Kent Road and Chelsea think about things) should ultimately converge as the result of 
appropriate moral effort. Like Plato's unfortunate troglodytes, we are all heading 
towards a single Good. Here, Murdochs similarity to intuitionism re-emerges, the 
attempt to provide some more fundamental explanatory bedrock to morality is 
eschewed. There is instead a reliance upon our experience of goodness as more 
convincingly real than any conceivable sceptical arguments against it. 
However, unlike some forms of intuitionism (exemplified by W. D. Ross, for 
whom there was a plurality of principles, incompletely ordered) Murdoch sets up a 
specifically unitary Good. In both the Sovereignty and the Metaphysics this is 
supported by appeal to the apparent unity of the virtues, 'if we reflect upon courage 
and ask ... what 
distinguishes courage from rashness, ferocity, self-assertion, and so 
on, we are bound, in our explanation, to use the names of other virtues'. 33 This 
formulation is a bit elliptical but the main point is, I think, clear: Eichmards 
thoroughness was not a virtue. Only in the presence of other character traits would it 
have deserved this title. 'A "list of virtues" must establish not only a hierarchy, but 
also a sense of interpenetration, otherwise it may mislead us ... Being 
dutiful involves 
being just, justice makes a pact with mercy ... Plato's moral 
forms cohere and 
interweave, making a koinonia or communion ... 
One point of certainty supports 
another' [M. 295]. My concern is not with the plausibility of this claim but only with 
the way in which this unitariness and obedience to a transcendent Good impact upon 
the lesser, non-transcendent goods that are involved in ordinary contentment. 
111. Contentment 
The idea of God has historically tended to be linked to the promise of 
happiness (even bliss) to be enjoyed if not here then elsewhere. Murdoch's 
transcendent Good has no such connection as we can see by developing the following 
three key points will help to separate out Murdochian commitment from any cohesive 
or systematic orientation towards contentment. Firstly, she is not a virtue ethiCiSt. 34 
33 GG, 56. 
34 1 will bracket-off the controversies about the very idea of 'virtue ethics' and use the term as a 
convenient shorthand for an approach centring upon character formation as the means to human 
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Murdoch focuses upon character or moral being rather than rules, hence criticisms 
which are levelled at this priority may be levelled at both. She also offers resources 
for understanding how moral being or virtuous character can be built up by the work 
of attention, and this too may be used by virtue ethicists to support their position. 
But, insofar as we think of virtue ethics eudaimonistically, as committed to the 
pursuit of the good life, Murdoch is not engaged in the same task. Whereas the good 
life, if lived at all, is lived here, the Murdochian Good is transcendent. Although she 
uses the former term in 7he Bell during her transition to Platonism and during (very) 
occasional lapses afterwards, when she arrives at a fully-blown version of Platonism 
in the Sovereignty, her commitment is to a perfectionist concept that is remote from 
any conceivable human existence. 35 
It might be objected that (i) being good and being contented are legitimate but 
distinct projects. (Following Bernard Williams, it might be claimed that there are 
legitimate limits to the moral domain). More Platonically, it might be objected that (ii) 
the Good and contentment are inseparable, pursuit of the one guarantees possession 
of the other. The first of these objections is ruled out more or less automatically 
because it is fundamental to Murdoch's view of the self that we are continuously 
moral beings. We are what Cora Diamond calls 'perpetual moralistSo. 36 AlIforms of 
care, concerti and desire are to be treated as moral phenomena. 'Morality is and 
ought to be connected with the whole of our being. I want here to restate in summary 
form what I have said earlier in discussing "consciousness". The moral life is not 
intermittent or specialised, it is not a peculiar separate area of our existence' 
37 [M. 495]. Therefore, contentment has to be built into the pursuit of the Good or else 
it will be marginalized by this pursuit. 
The second objection -that contentment and the Good do not fall apart- poses 
a rather more complex problem because it does seem to appeal to a genuinely 
Platonic claim. The Platonic ideal of moral balance is one in which psychological 
well-being depends upon virtue. We should not of course just be good for what we 
flourishing. 
35 For 'the good life' see The Bell Chapters 9 and 16, and for a lapse into this terminology GG, 63 
and SG, 86. 
36 Cora Diamond, (1996). The partitioning off of the moral domain by Williams, and more 
particularly by Nagel, is replied to from a Murdochian standpoint by Blum (1986). 
37 It is here that Murdoch is very clearly separate from intuitionism insofar as the latter involves the 
pairing of specialised moral faculty and special mind-indcpcndent moral property 
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can get out of it (as a kind of profitable penance) and we should sometimes go, 
against our inclinations, back into the dim Cave to help others. But there are rewards, 
pleasures and sources of contentment that come unsought to the virtuous man, albeit 
they are only rewards and pleasures of the best sort. In an uncharacteristically precise 
and tenuous Pythagorean argument Plato suggests that the most just man will live 
seven hundred and twenty-nine times (squared) more pleasantly than the least just 
[Republic, 587]. Shorn of the dubious quantification, what becomes of this Platonic 
nexus between morality and contentment in Murdoch? 
I want to suggest that beyond an association between rudimentary levels of 
virtue and ordinary psychological health, this connection is no longer in place. 
Obsessive neurotic conditions are (I think rather plausibly) related by Murdoch to an 
extreme preoccupation with self that ordinary unambitious morality (such as 
38 organised religion) can help to relieve. However, what this sets up is a relation 
between ordinary levels of virtue and ordinary psychological well-being. It does not 
set up the Platonic relationship between ideal or perfectionist standards of virtue and 
ideal contentment. It is exceptionally difficult to do the latter because of the sacrifices 
that may be involved in securing or maintaining anything like ideal standards of virtue. 
The sacrifice of one's life is particularly difficult to reconcile with contentment. (It 
may of course, be better for vicious individuals not to live but that is a quite different 
matter concerning fife at the opposite end of the moral scale. ) Plato's ultimate move 
to maintain the connection between virtue and contentment is a denial of death that 
ensures everything will come out fine at the end of the day. We will still always be 
around to enjoy rewards. This is not an option that is open to Murdoch. 
She also has a stronger theme of being good 'for nothing', of separating out 
the idea of morality from any kind of motivation by rewards and this is more Kantian 
than PlatoniC. 39 (We are like the shopkeeper of Kant's Groundwork who is moral only 
if he is honest from a sense of duty and not because he thinks that honesty pays . )40 It 
has to remain intelligible that we might do what is good and thereby come to real 
38 This is what happens to the disturbed character Tamar in The Book and the Brotherhood. She 
uses religion as a temporary crutch and then refocuses her attention back upon herself. 
39 SG, 90,96. This pointlessness or disregard for utility, is a crossover between morality and art 
[M. 81. For a meditation on this theme in the novels see The 7-Ime ofthe Angels, 10 1-2,187. 
40 One might argue that there is a covert motivation by reward in Kanfs Groundwork whereby 
freedom is the reward for being moral. This would qualify the comparison here but not alter the 
main point. 
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harm and even when this is the case we should always still be good rather than 
looking to save our own skins. The sacrifice of a life exemplifies a broader class of 
responses. Murdoch poses the same problem in the Sovereignty by appealing to the 
idea of a morality that would lead us to do the right thing even in a concentration 
camp where the price of goodness could be final. Murdoch's imagery for moral 
pilgrimage is ascetic, it is an imagery of loss and the abandonment of self-concern. 
We are not to think of ourselves in the Platonic manner as trading off lesser forms of 
satisfaction for greater ones. 
This helps to make sense of a second key point concerning MurdoclYs attitude 
towards contentment. Her textual treatment of it has a 'tagged-on' character. I think 
we can see that an idea of happiness is still there and not just in the novels but in the 
philosophical texts also. Art, hence aesthetic pleasure, is given a r6le and so too is 
personal love, hence the pleasures and contentments it affords. But such sources of 
contentment appear to be mere by-products of the moral pilgrim's progress. 
Contentment is not in any sense their ultimate goal or something to be valued highly 
in its own right. This is the reason why Susan Wolf s critique of perfectionism makes 
the point that moral saints set a bad example, their morality 'unduly dominates' other 
parts of a well-rounded life, other interests and skills are reduced to the level of 
'happy accidents' and not something to be pursued in their own right (and because of 
this a certain downgrading of their value occurs) . 
41 This is borne out in Murdoch's 
deployment of the concept of 'happiness' in her philosophical texts. It makes its 
appearance only at the end of texts and almost as an afterthought. Both of the 
Acastos dialogues end in this way: at the close ofArt andEros Plato is 'so happyand 
Socrates is 'so glad'; at the conclusion of Above the Gods the serious-minded Acastos 
42 resolves 'Anyway, let's be happy. Apart from this, it is in contrast to duty that the 
pursuit of happiness reappears, in the penultimate substantial chapter of the 
Metaphysics as one of the two'most evident'facts of human life [M. 493]. 
My point is that the pursuit of contentment is not theorised as a goal, it is not 
valued in its own right. It is, at best, presumed as a background feature of humans 
that needs to accommodate itself to the important business of moral pilgrimage. 
'Human beings love each other, in sex, in ffiendship, and love and cherish other 
41 Wolf (1982) 423-5. Her point is about downgrading, notjust well-roundedness. 
42 A castos, 66,12 1. 
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beings, humans, animals, plants, stones. Imagination and art are in all of this, and the 
quest for happiness and the promotion of happinessý [M. 4971. In the novels, lives 
which include contentment and pleasure form the background against which the effort 
is made to move from being egocentric and sinful (but perhaps 'nice) towards being 
'good'. (Although there are also intermittent attacks upon happiness as 'a poor 
guide' . 
)43 In the philosophical texts, the above sparse comments are just about as 
much as we get on the subject. For Murdoch, it is simply a great deal more important 
to be good than to be happy. Her attention is directed accordingly. 
To summarize the two points about contentment made so far: firstly, 
Murdoch must be separated out from eudaimonistic virtue ethics, her Good is a 
transcendent reality, it is not embedded in a worldly form of life (the good life); 
secondly, her treatment of contentment has a tagged-on quality. My third, and final, 
key point about contentment in Murdoch is that there is just no way for it to rival the 
Good. The sovereign Good will brook no rivals. The high regard in which it is held by 
Murdoch comes at the price of loosing the possibility of real and intractable (as 
opposed to merely apparent) moral conflict. My concern here is not with conflicts of 
duties (which I will allow that Murdoch can accommodate) or between duties and the 
cultivation of virtue which, again, she can cope with. Murdoch can and does allow for 
conflicting requirements 'wherein one seems to have to choose between being two 
different kinds of person. Such legitimate moral conflict is not about the goal, but 
only about what is subordinate to it. This may be a choice between two different 
paths in life, or it may be some everyday matter demanding an instant response' 
[M. 483]. 
To set this off in relief, consider the idea of a good life that contains both a 
multiplicity of goods and the potential for real, intractable, moral conflicts. We may 
think about this as the Aristotelian position but with the licensing of significantly 
different kinds of good life. 44 Because of the multiplicity of goods involved in any 
particular form of the good life, there will always be the possibility that desires for 
goods will be at cross-purposes. For example, if I identify political success and 
friendship as indispensable parts of the good life, I may, through nofault of my own, 
43 The Sandcastle, Chapter 13. 
44 For the Aristotelian rejection of a single metric for moral value I have in mind Aristotle EN, 
1096b and Politics, 1283. 
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happen to find myself in situations where one has to be sacrificed for the other. Or, if 
I am a contented parent and a Jehova's Witness, I will probably (and reasonably) 
associate both as necessary or indispensable parts of my good life but I might have to 
sacrifice my religious ideals or my child if the latter has an accident and urgently 
requires a blood transfusion. 
In both cases, some part of my ideal of the good life will have to be sacrificed, 
but because both conflicting components are deemed necessary to its realisation I will 
have no automatic way of deciding which to sacrifice. There will be no higher 
standard than the good life (of which both are necessary parts) by which I might 
weigh and measure these goods against each other. They not only conflict, they are 
incommensurable. For the Murdochian, there can be no such incommensurability. 
Everything is to be seen in the light of a single ultimate standard. It is this which 
makes sense of her claim that choice declines and vanishes as one approaches towards 
a better vision of the Good. Choice can only conceivably apply at the lower levels, in 
the context of conflicts between lesser, subordinate or secondary goods. Because of 
this, contentment is not only separable from the Good, it is unable to rival it. The 
tagged-on quality of Murdochs treatment of happiness is appropriate (symptomatic 
even). She could perhaps refer to it more often but she could not place it more 
centrally without changing her moral theory. 
IV. Limited Regret 
This downgrading of ordinary contentment only means that Murdoch meets 
one of the two conditions I initially set out for weak 'continuity with! or 'similarity to' 
the romantic rejection of bourgeois contentment. Downgrading such ordinary 
contentment need not imply outright hostility towards it. However, I will not be 
concerned with anything quite so strong. This does not mean that I hold there to be 
no indications of such hostility in Murdoch. Indeed as a perfectionist she rejects our 
ordinary, default condition and urges us to become something quite different from 
what we already are. She is hostile to 'the abysmal sinfulness of humans' [M. 483]. I 
view hostility as too strong a requirement not because it is a condition that Murdoch 
palpably fails to meet, but because it is liable to exclude those romantic exemplars and 
texts with which I wish to draw a parallel. I want to allow for a greater degree of 
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romantic ambivalence towards everyday moral standards. Schiller's romantic hero 
Karl Moor looses his chance for contentment, he does not throw it away; Milton's 
Satan (a more obviously Murdochian exemplar of romanticism) has a complex 
relation to what he has abandoned, and indeed to man. Although nominally separate 
from mankind, and bent upon our corruption, he is one of two models of what 
45 humans can be like, the other being Christ. We can in-ýtate the one or the other. For 
this to appear possible in Paradise Lost, his kinship with man and with ordinary 
human aspirations must periodically emerge, as they do rather well. Satan is quite 
clear about the reality of his loss when he bids 'Farewell happy fields Where joy for 
ever dwells'. 46 His fall mirrors our fallenness, our exile from a land of lost content, 
and it creates a moral ambiguity about his status: is he the hero or villain of the piece, 
or a bit of both? 
I would like to allow for a similar ambivalence in Murdoch's texts, apparent 
hostility towards ordinary contentment may mask deeper levels of attraction. The 
tension outlined in section I is at least consistent with this possibility: there are push 
and pull factors, on the one hand our apparent sinfulness, on the other, the central 
role allotted to everyday moral phenomenology. Given this possibility, I shall be 
concerned to show nothing stronger than Murdoch's lack of commensvrate regret for 
sacrifices of ordinary contentment. (Where both 'regret' and 'commensurate' will stand 
in need of some clarification. ) We may consider such sacrifice in the much-discussed 
context of Agamemnon. He is called upon by his troops and ultimately by the Gods, 
to sacrifice his daughter for a fair wind. We might straightforwardly criticize him for 
being more concerned with transcendent ideals than with tangible human goods. (This 
is the sort of preoccupation with abstractions that Vlastos worries about in the case 
of Platonic perfectionism. )47 A rather different criticism is levelled by Martha 
Nussbaum. It is not that he makes the wrong choice, it is, rather that he lacks 
commensurate regret for what must be done. 48 
45 , Imitate' is used here in the Kempis'imitatio Christi sense, and not in the sense of 'fake up!. 
46 Paradise Lost, 1.249-50. 
47 Vlastos (1973). For an evaluation of this charge, see below, chapter 8. 
48 Here I will abide by the terms in which Nussbaum (1986) discuses the Agamemnon without 
endorsing her reading of Aeschylus which focuses upon Agamemnon's utterances. I am rather 
inclined to the view that Agamemnon's rcgrct goes deeper and is an integral part of his downfall. He 
is forever looldng for substitutes for lphigenia, and ultimately trying to go back, to return to the 
home he has destroyed. 
67 
Marcus Verhaegh extends Nussbauds argument to directly cover Murdoch, 
'if one is forced to sacrifice goods, one cannot do so callously; this would be to 
destroy one's responsiveness to such goods, so that one may fail to see the possibility 
or desirability of attaining them in cases even where they do not come into tragic 
conflict with other goodsý. 49 1 will take it that Verhaegh is right that the following is 
Nussbaurn's underlying claim in her principal article on Murdoch: when casting aside 
the pleasures of fantasy, pleasures intimately bound up with the goods of actual 
human sexuality, Murdoch shows a lack of adequate regret about this abandonment. 
The charge is that there is a certain callousness in Murdoch's rejection of ordinary 
human pleasures. By contrast, Nussbaums version of Aristotelianism has a plausible 
machinery of conflicting goods and regret when one good is sacrificed for another. 
Because she values multiple goods, all of which are necessary for the good life, the 
sacrifice of one cannot be made in a callous manner by an agent who knows what 
they are doing. The non-selected or neglected good continues to be recognised as a 
requirement and hence will continue to be valued, but now through regret. 
Agamemnon goes wrong because he aligns himself with fate and fails to regret what 
has seemed necessary. Granted that this is an inappropriately Aristotelian account, 
why can a Murdochian not produce a modified version? After all, it is far from 
obvious that the sacrifices of the Murdochian pilgrim will ahrays be made with quite 
such a glaring lack of regret as the one detected by Nussbaum. Murdoch's attitude, 
like that of Miltons hero, is more ambivalent, more sensitive to loss. Can it not be 
accepted that in a rival Murdochian model of valuing and regret it will be known in 
advance that contentment is always liable to be sacrificed in favour of the Good, but 
the sacrifice will generally produce regret on a commensurate scale? 
My point is that this cannot be the case. Displacement plays a central role in 
Murdochian moral psychology, we have a quantum of desire (eros) that we may 
generally assume to be fixed and which we redirect or reorient this way or that. Our 
task is to reorient it away from selfish concerns and towards the Good. Concern for 
self is to be displaced. What the Aristotelian model outlines instead -and what makes 
it inappropriate for Murdochian reformulation- is not a form of displacement but a 
sublimation of desire into regret. Because the goods desired remain necessary parts of 
the good life, they are still valued in a more or less commensurate manner. On the 
49 Verhaegh (2002). 
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Aristotelian account, desire is not really being redirected at all it is merely changing 
its form. On the Murdochian account, real abandonment of old desires must take 
place in the ascent towards a unitary Good. Real displacement occurs. While there 
can and will be regret (in a sense spelled out below) there can be no commensurate 
regret for the loss of ordinary contentment. A corollary of this is a need to exercise 
care to avoid making premature choices and setting out life-plans, rather than 
waiting, because we may be liable to devalue that which is not chosen. 50 
What regret there is for the road not taken, for the ordinary human goods 
abandoned in the pursuit of the Good, cannot be a sublimated form of the old desire 
but may rather be understood as its residue. This is to say that matters are slightly 
more complex than Verhaegh allows and that we should draw back closer to 
Nussbaum's own criticism rather than Verhaegh's strident extension of it. For 
Nussbaum, Murdoch is, at a defacto level, multiply-oriented in spite of her claimed 
monism. She suspects that a hidden level of pleasure-loving Aristotelianism is present 
in MurdoclYs texts. 51 Without discounting this possibility (which is one way of 
formulating the ambivalence indicated above), I will note that a more straightforward 
and clearly Murdochian explanation is available to us. A Murdochian moral pilgrim 
must, as a central part of their pilgrimage, continue to have at least some residual 
regard for contentment because of the personal inertia and the gradualism of moral 
change. Murdoch is not in a position to endorse any more radical standpoint to the 
effect that opposing principles are, more or less suddenly silenced by the perception 
of the Good. 52 
Verhaegh suggests that Murdoch's account'demands that we leave behind our 
cozy narcissistic fog for reality, and the more so, the bettee. " But for a Murdochian 
we cannot suddenly adopt what Plato calls negative attitudes (kataphronesanta) 
towards the previous objects of our desire [Symposium, 210b]. In contrast with 
50 This favouring of waiting over choice, so curiously reminiscent of Weil, is also advanced by Slote 
(1989), esp. 41-2. It is premised upon something that is also set out in Susan Wolfs critique of 
perfectionism, that non-selection tends to involve devaluation, Wolf (1982), 423-4. 
51 Nussbaum (1996), 52-3. 
52 McDowell (1979) considers that perception of Good silencing all rival considerations. A 
Murdochian might attribute the unnecessarily clear-cut character of McDowell's position to his 
treatment of moral vision as important but still defined by its relation to action (a point picked up on 
by Blum (1991), 713-4). 
53 Verhaegh, (2002). 
69 
complete indifference or hostility towards abandoned goods, Murdoch pictures moral 
advance negatively, as real loss (loss of self and of self-oriented desires) and this 
suggests that the pilgrim will continue to feel the pull of that which has been 
abandoned. Murdoch is calling upon us to aspire to an effectively non-human 
condition, but to do so in line with the constraints of actually being human. Aspiration 
is towards something more than human but moral practice is bound by all-too-human 
limitations. 
It is this gradualism which gives us some purchase upon one significant 
contrast between the Murdochian pilgrim and the anti-bourgeois romantic. Murdoch 
works with the personal inertia that the latter tries to deny. 54 Metaphors of being 
'terroristic' that Murdoch applies to romanticism, will not, because of this, rebound 
55 against her. She favours a more patient approach. Gradualism in the sense of 
operating within bounds set by our personal inertia, will henceforth be treated as a 
basic, background condition that a faithfiA Murdochian must not violate. 
Nevertheless, in respect of their shared rejection of the moral quietism of 
everyday contentment, there is an element of similarity between Murdoch and the 
romantic viewpoint that she is engaged against. To summarize, choice is eliminated in 
favour of a unitary transcendent Good which supplants ordinary contentment as a 
goal; Murdoch's moral psychology of displacement means that there is a lack of 
commensurate regret for this abandonment, there can be only a residual attachment 
due to our personal inertia. The resultant similarity to, or continuity with, the 
romantic anti-bourgeois theme thus emerges out of key Murdochian commitments 
and not in spite of them. While this may be somewhat surprising, there is at least one 
consideration which should lead us to expect just this sort of similarity. Murdoch 
adheres to, and develops the Platonic idea [Republic, 586] that there are shadowy 
in-fitations of what is good, 'false doubles ... invented by human selfishness to make the 
difficult task of virtue look easier and more attractive'. 56 The mistaken orientations 
which she criticises would not, after all, be so tempting if this were not the case. What 
will not be tolerable is any deeper identity. 
54 Especially Sartre: There is no inertia in consciousness', EN, 6 1. 
55 See below, Chapter 4 for Murdoch's strictures on terroristic freedom. 
56 SG, 90 and 98 for the power of the self 'to cast shadowe. 
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Chapter 4: The Charge of Romanticism 
I have sought to draw attention to Murdoch's rejection of moral quietism, 
something that she shares with the anti-bourgeois theme advanced by various sorts of 
'romantic' theories. The classification of 'romantic', used so far in a non-rigorous 
sense, is Murdoch's own. She is one of a number of contemporary philosophers for 
whom genealogical questions are inescapable and who highlight the continuing legacy 
of the Romantic Movement. ' Murdoch's concern is with Romanticisrifs negative 
influence, or at least excesses. It has for some time now been the fashion to say that 
we are in a morass, and to attempt to get out of the morass by attacking 
Romanticism; and I am going to do this too'. 2 She writes 'against what I have roughly 
13 labelled as "romanticisrW'. (Here I will use uncapitalised'romanticisrrf for Murdochs 
charge, and capitalised 'RomanticisnY to denote the related but not identical 
historico-cultural phenomenon. ) 
These two statements, drawn respectively from 1959 and 1967, from the 
articles on the sublime and from the Sovereignty, frame the crucial period during 
which Murdoclfs core philosophical commitments were settled. Concern about 
rationalism is an element of continuity between her earliest sizeable work, Sartre, 
Romantic Rationalist and her subsequent and Platonist moral psychology in the 
Sovereignty, The Fire and the Sun and the Acastos dialogues. The latter two tend to 
focus upon Plato's lapse into puritanism over the issue of art and its limits, but for 
Murdoch puritanism is an example of romanticism. It may be objected that the 
Metaphysics, at least, is more diffuse, less structured by any single opposition 
between Murdochian moral psychology and a general and cohesive rival (romantic or 
otherwise). To this I would reply that the diffuse character of the Metaphysics is an 
attempt to avoid imposing too much form upon contingency and this is something 
which (we will discover) emerges out of her criticism of romanticism and puritanical 
intolerance for the uncodiflable messiness of our world. It is not a radical break from 
her previous critiques and we cannot make sense of it without them. 
1 Notably Taylor (1989) and Rorty (1989). 
2 SBR, 26 1. 
3 SG, 82. 
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Furthennore, the Metaphysics may not be structured by any single binary 
opposition, but it does continue to set out the view that there are false imitations of 
the Good and of its demythologisation. It warns that too sudden or precipitate a shift 
in moral demythologisation may undermine our idea of transcendence. This is part of 
the argument of Metaphysics, Chapter I and applies to Art as well as morals. The 
Metaphysics picks up where Murdoch' s Platonic studies of the 1970s left offi It also 
continues to deploy 'romanticism! as a recurring charge. What is less clear is that all of 
her instances of romanticism have any common core or significant family 
resemblance. In what follows, Section 1. will outline the problem of viewing 
Murdoch's charge of romanticism as both general and cohesive. 11. will set out what it 
is that gives the charge both of these characteristics, namely a correlation with the 
problems of romantic love. 111. will set out the way in which romanticism reproduces 
the problems of romantic love. And finally, IV. will examine an attempt to accept that 
romanticism is a problem and that Murdoch lapses into it, while undermining the 
significance of the charge. 
I. The Apparent Incohesion of the Charge 
What Murdoch caUs romanticism seems to gain generality at the expense of 
cohesion. Murdoch levels the charge of owing 'a debt to the romantic tradition' 
against figures whose theories are in important respects dissimilar. 4 It is levelled at 
Hegel and at Kierkcgaard whose 'exciting suffering freedorn! is 'romantic 
self-indulgence' albeit of a 'distinguished! sort. 5 A similar charge is levelled at 
Schopenhauer, he 'may indeed be said to romanticise asceticism, gratifying himself by 
speaking grandly of it' [M. 176]. It is also levelled at Sartre, at St Paul who is 
'romantic' but again, only 'Roughly' and she cites Adorno favourably when he charges 
Stravinsky with being 'a sentimental romantic' [M. 129,3 71]. (She may have in mind 
his continuity with the cult of nature. ) A trace of 'great Romantic ideas' is similarly 
detected in both Nietzsche and Simone Weil whose asceticism is taken to be 
excessive, romanticising suffering and ultimately death. 6 On a rather different note, 
4 NM, 101. 
5 SG, 80. 
6 Murdoch once remarked that'it is hard not to believe that she in some way'willed her own early 
death' KV 160. There have been suggestions of anorexia but the precise circumstances are difficult to 
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we are told that Turitanism. and romanticism are natural partners and we are still 
living with their partnership" ;7 that 'puritanism has its own strong magic, its own form 
of degeneration into a sexually charged romanticisrif; 8 that 'romanticism tended to 
transform the idea of death into the idea of suffering'. 9 that 'what I have roughly 
labelled "romanticisrif" is implicated in 'A self-directed enjoyment of nature'; 10 and 
that symbolism 'is what is left of the other-worldliness of Romanticism when the 
"messy" humanitarian and revolutionary elements have spent their force'. " It is not 
always clear what unites St Paul, Hegel, Sartre, and the enjoyment of nature. Nor is it 
obvious that puritanism and symbolism, the Kantian sublime, and the evasion of death 
are thematically linked in any important way. The charge of romanticism is placed 
centrally in the articles on the sublime, in the synthesis effected in the Sovereignty and 
does keep recurring afterwards, but nowhere is Murdoch systematic in her account of 
it. 
It is tempting to dispel this apparent incohesion by appeal to Murdochs own 
(perhaps flawed or over-sirnplistic) view of the essence of Romanticism influenced as 
it is by the post-war rehabilitation of the movement. (The focus upon Romantic 
freedom as a precursor of liberal democratic ideals by Northrop Frye and 
M. H. Abrams. ) 12 However, while this may help us to identify her view of its 
genealogical position as the standard one, Murdoch's concern is not primarily 
historical. She does not supply the detailed historical analysis that would allow us to 
take this tack, even if there are some indications that she is particularly concerned 
with 'late Romanticism! and 'lesser ones' rather than 'the great romantics'. 13 Nor can 
discern. 
7 SG, 79. 
8 M. 129. 
9 SG, 80. 
10 SG, 82-3. 
11 AD, 292. 
12 Frye! s Blake biography, Fearful Symmetry (1947) and Abrams! general study, The Mirror and the 
Lamp (1953) consolidated a shift already begun during the war in Jacques Barzun's 1941 essay'To 
the Rescue of Romanticism' and his 'Romanticism and the Modern Ego! (1944). Prior to this, 
Romanticism had been identified as an important precursor of Nazism and the revolt against 
Enlightenment reason. This favourable shift paved the way for the postmodernist identification of 
Nazism as the culmination not of romanticism but of the Enlightenment. Murdoch insists upon both 
the disturbing daemonic element of Romanticism and its democratic inspiration. 
13 Sartre, 12 (Murdoch's Introduction to the 1987 reissue); SG, 83. 
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we fall back upon some standard view of romanticism that may be distilled out of 
analyses of the Romantic Movement. While the latter may help to give some initial 
purchase upon Murdoch's concerns, we cannot pursue this approach systematically 
because Romanticism has far too many ambiguities of its own to provide a 
non-controversial definition. It is notoriously difficult to pin it down to anything 
shared and positive. Goethe, Schiller and Kant all rejected the label yet who would 
make sense of Romanticism without their contribution? Appeal to a combination of 
doctrine and political alignment is also likely to fail because so many important 
Romantics shifted their views over time without ceasing to be classified as Romantics. 
(Notably, Wordsworth and Coleridge shifting from radicalism during the French 
revolution to their respective positions during the Napoleonic wars. ) 
Negative defnition fares no better. We may treat Romanticism as a movement 
emphasising the passions as opposed to Enlightentnent reason, however these two 
great movements overlapped and shared personnel: we may think of Rousseau, again 
Kant and, in his own peculiar way, De Sade. (Her own classification of Sartre as a 
romantic rationalist also casts doubt upon the relevance of any such fixed distinction. ) 
We may, finally, appeal to Romanticisrifs apparently modernist opposition to 
Neoclassicism, however, Romantics also appealed to antiquity, albeit they were more 
likely to appeal to Republican Rome and its echoes in Ovid rather than the subdued 
Rome of Augustus and the compliance of Virgil. This generates a distinction of sorts 
but one that is far narrower than the contrast between innovative modernist and 
entrenched anti-modernist. Disagreements in this area provide too many ways for 
Murdochians to insulate themselves from criticism. The option would always remain 
open of their redefining Romanticism in such a way that Murdochian themes (e. g. the 
imagination) are downplayed and non-Murdochian themes (e. g. the cult of nature) 
emphasized. 
11. One Charge Among Many? 
(a) The Generality of the Charge 
We are thrown back upon working with MurdoclYs charge as it occurs in her 
own texts, in all its initial vagueness. A first step towards dispelling this vagueness is 
to accept the generality of the charge and not to narrow it down in the interests of 
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greater cohesion. This generality is occluded by treating it as merely one charge 
among many, an approach exemplified by Maria Antonaccio's Picturing the Human. 
Antonaccio reconstructs Murdoch's realism around her passing (and early) contrast 
between Liberal and Natural Law conceptions of the self 14 Murdoch articulates a 
mediating position between various alternatives in current moral enquiry, especially 
between options influenced by Kant and Hegel. '15 This framework is a useful way to 
integrate Murdoch into the contemporary liberal-communitarian debate and does 
highlight the important point that while Murdoch is critical of the notion of choice she 
is not abandoning human freedom per se. Nor is she prepared to collapse the 
individual into traditionalist, communitarian structures. (She does not share the strong 
communitarianism of moral traditionalists such as Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre. ) 
On the negative side, Murdoch's own texts are not directly concerned with 
contemporary liberal-communitarian debates. In and of itself this is not a fundamental 
problem. Exposition is often (perhaps always) appropriation. However, the 
attenuation of MurdoclYs passing contrast between Liberal and Natural Law can 
detract from the generality of the charge of romanticism by encouraging us to localize 
it to one or other side of this binary opposition. Antonaccio prefers to deposit it on 
the Natural Law side, a position that can be given some textual support. Murdoch 
does charge Hegel with romanticism. 16 What is awkward about this tidy solution is 
that it sets romanticism and liberalism against each other and this cannot be quite 
right. MurdoclYs own way of formulating matters is instead to claim that 'liberal 
political thinking' and romanticism have become promiscuously entangled and that 'it 
is desirable to purge the Liberal theory of many of its Romantic elements' . 
17 After 
some initial hesitations about Sartre's relation to the romantic tradition in 1950 
(because he finds nature 'absurd' and not enthralling) she quickly came to the view 
that the cult of nature is not decisive and that what lies at the heart of Sartrean 
liberal-inspired account of freedom is still, ultimately, a variant of romanticism. 
14 This passing contrast is made in ME, an essay that Antonaccio particularly focuses upon. The 
distinction between 'convention' and 'neurosis' is a different way of putting the same point, but its 
use is restricted to the earlier essays on the sublime. 
15 Antonaccio (2000), 23. 
16 Antonaccio (2000) 8,28,202, n. 46. For Hegel's romanticism see SBR, 264. 
17 M. 487; SBR, 262. 
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Sartre, as her 1953 book informs us, is a 'Romantic Rationalist'. 18 My point is that 
romanticism spans the Liberal/Natural Law divide. 
This is not, I think, a minor quibble. It impinges upon how we understand the 
target of Murdochs criticisms, particularly as they occur in the Sovereignty (which in 
turn is the key to unravelling the Metaphysics). She does not represent herself in an 
Aristotelian manner, as someone attacking rival errors and steering a middle-course 
through them. I think it is fair to say that she tries to pull different sorts of problems 
together into a single unified and mistaken position, a position sometimes, rather 
plausibly, regarded as a straw man. 19 The dominant binary opposition that she does 
set up in the Sovereignty is between different options for replacing the concept of 
God. On the one hand there is the favoured ideal of Good, and on the other there is 
'what I have roughly labelled romanticism! and specifically the ideal of Kantian man. 
'Kant abolished God and made man God in His stead. We are still living in the age of 
the Kantian man, or Kantian man-god. 120 
This daemonic, free and unconstrained individual whose freedom extends to 
the choice of his own morality, is directly related to the Romantic hero. YCant's man 
had already received a glorious incarnation nearly a century earlier in the work of 
Milton: his proper name is Lucifer. '21 The image of the free individual is taken to be a 
good political image but 'as Hume once wisely observed, good political philosophy is 
not necessarily good moral philosophy'. 22 The point is that a laudable political 
commitment to a defence of the free individual has misled us into acceptance of a 
flawed ontology of the self When we picture others as free in a negative sense, acting 
this way, willing that, but against no inner background that necessarily constrains 
their outward actions, it undermines our ability to encounter them realistically. 'When 
Kant wanted to find something clean and pure outside of the mess of the selfish 
empirical psyche he followed a sound instinct but, in my view, looked in the wrong 
18 Murdoch's 1950 position is that existentialism owes'a debt to the romantic traditioW but also has 
'highly unromantic characteristics, NM, 10 1. 'The existentialist tends to find nature absurcr, and this 
is part of the reason why she initially thinks of the existentialist novel as 'unpoetic and unromantic, 
EH, 112,115. An exemplar of the absurdist encounter with nature would be Roquentin's 
contemplation of the roots of a tree in La Nausie. 
19 See above, Chapter 2. 
20 SG, 82,78. 
21 SG, 78 
22 SG, 79. 
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place. His inquiry led him back again into the self, now pictured as angelic, and inside 
0 this angel-self his followers have tended to remain. Freedom as autonomy has led 
towards a daernonic picture of the individual as irresponsible. 24 
As a genealogical claim about contemporary philosophy, MurdoclYs account 
is problematic. We might just about make sense of it in the case of existentialism by 
playing upon its fondness for Nietzsche, but even here there is a danger of stretching 
the point. To go Rirther and suggest that Hare, Hampshire and Ryle have adopted a 
daernonic conception of the self is probably going to be difficult to establish. But 
Murdoch is suggesting no such thing. It may be that no one individual completely 
adheres to this position, but I think that it will sound familiar and may pass as a 
summary of what has quite lately been maintained and not authoritatively or as a 
whole displaced . '25 Her claim is that the romantic ideal of Kantian man is an 
end-point towards which various contemporary positions have, sometimes 
unwittingly, and in different ways, been drawn. 26 Existentialism is specifically charged 
with inspiring 'by a sort of romantic provocation rather than by its truth; and its 
pointers are often pointing in the wrong direction! . 
27 
What is at work here is a directional metaphor, there is a focus upon the 
direction of development. MurdoclYs charge against Hare, Hampshire and Ryle is that 
they follow or reinforce a flawed trajectory towards a shared end-point. In so doing 
they abandon or at least neglect the truthful pilgrinfs path which aims at something 
quite different. " Non-controversially, we can say that the Sovereignty posits an ideal 
end-point the pursuit of which is modelled upon love in the sense that Plato's 
Symposium and Phaedrus are modelled upon love. All three are about the redirection 
of our desire. 'Loving is an orientation, a direction of energy, not just a state of mind' 
[M. 503]. But Murdoch does not model moral progress upon just any model of love. 
23 SG, 8 1. 
24 Parallels may be drawn here with Goethe's much-quoted praise of action in Faust, especially Bk 1, 
Scene 3. 
25 VC, 77. 
26 An'end-poinf formulation of this sort is used at SG, 98. 
27 GG, 46. 
28 Schauber (2001), 480, suggests that Murdoch does not realize how unfair her picture is but 
defends it for identifying 'certain tendencies in modem moral philosophy'. 
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If we get our model of love wrong, we are liable to be drawn towards the wrong 
end-point. 
(b) The Model of Romantic Love 
There is no difficulty in identifying Murdoclfs paradigm of the wrong sort of 
love. It is romantic love. When we look and see just what is wrong with romantic 
love from the standpoint of Murdochian moral psychology we will then be in a 
position to recognize that romanticism reproduces these same problems. Romantic 
love is all about the sudden, dramatic and often hopeless experience of the lover being 
projected out onto a love-object and thereby occluding its reality. Whatever our 
preferred formulation, the love object is overestimated or misconstrued into whatever 
the lover desires. The romantic lover is prone, like Don Quixote, to see 
washerwomen in whatever way makes them worthy of a knight's true love. Stendhal 
calls this crystallization, the image of the other becomes encrusted with wonderful 
jewel-Eke features. Freud is more prosaic and writes about overestimation. 29 Either 
might count as an instance of occluded vision. Terminology apart, romantic love 
allows disillusionment to be evaded in various ways, by the love being unrequited, 
impossible, or, better sta by death. 
In the Romantic Movement's depiction of this sort of love, in Liebestod, love 
seems to be preserved forever in its pristine condition, uncorrupted. The death of the 
romantic lover, such as Goethe's Young Werther, is their highest accomplishment, the 
final stamp on the sincerity of their extreme emotions. Schiller, who had an 
ambivalent attitude towards these ideas, beautifully summed up this sentiment in The 
Robbers, 'sweet, sweet, as heaven it is, to be lulled into the sleep of death by a lover's 
30 song'. What is missed by the romantic drama of Debestod is the obvious sense in 
which death destroys love as it destroys everything else. In the end we loose 
everything. Moreover, the beloved becomes incidental, at best a secondary character 
who may obligingly get caught up in the lover's stormy passions. Nominally directed 
towards another, it is a drama played out within the self One may be inclined to 
29 For Freud, see Santas, (1998), 120-22; 172-6. 
30 The Robbers, (New York: Penguin, 1979), Act 2, Scene 2. Murdoch thinks that Shakespeare is 
sometime guilty of this, when he treats death-scenes as love scenes [M. 117], but it is alien to the 
Greeks. This is an exclusion that will be difficult to reconcile with the Antigone. 
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forget the name of Young Werther's beloved, but this Will not interfere unduly with 
the storyline. Romantic love fails to do justice to the real contingency of the beloved. 
Although influenced by the historical experience of the Romantic Movement, 
and texts such as Goethe's Werther (charged at the time with making suicide 
fashionable all over Europe) critical accounts of this sudden, self-dramatising and 
impetuous love have a relation to Plato's account of the lower sorts of love in the 
Symposium. We might, for example, draw out its comparable theme of impetuous, 
childish, suddenness. Alcibiades wants to seduce the knowledge out of Socrates. He 
would have wisdom inserted into himself in a manner that is more direct than 
Socrates approves of or believes to be possible. 31 Murdoch picks up on this Platonic 
connection to the critique of romantic love. Like Plato she favours the model of a 
slow patient love that has to be worked at. For Murdoch, this is the love that involves 
true discernment of the character of the other, i. e. the kind of love that Romeo and 
Juliet would have needed to continue loving if they had not been conveniently killed 
off but allowed to stay together until he had become fat and she had lost her teeth. 
This association with the account of love in the Symposium also brings out the danger 
of love. Socrates describes it as a mischevous daemon caught between the gods and 
man, a strange and sudden empowerment that may be turned to good or to evil and 
which needs to be therapeutically cultivated, qualitatively improved, steadily 
redirected towards appropriate objectS. 32 
For a characteristic example of Murdoch's strong reservations about romantic 
love I will cite Nuns and Soldiers. Any other Murdoch novel would have served, but 
this one is particularly convenient because it pivots on the relationship of an unlikely 
couple rather than turning on the influence of particular events. The bereaved 
Gertrude and the bohemian artist Tim Reade escape suddenly from their respective 
conditions, Tim from poverty, Gertrude from bereavement. They fall romantically for 
one another. How handsome she is, ' thinks Tim, 'an Arthurian girl, a heroic girl out of 
a romantic picture'. 33 This is an abrupt and shared break-out from dark and 
depressing places and into a good clean world. Subsequently, and just as quickly, 
Gertrude finds out a minor deception which Tim allows her to exaggerate through his 
31 Symposium 217-219. 
32 Symposium 202d-e. 
33 Nuns and Soldiers, 180. 
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own sense of guilt. The couple, already radically mismatched in point of age and 
informed by onlookers that it won! t last, are separated. The magic spell of an 
apparently-necessary bond is broken. When they get back together, it is on stronger 
and different terms, a mutual recognition that love like art is something to be worked 
at and not just a liberating dance in a blue-flower meadow on a beautiful day, nor a 
dance of life that escapes from the pain of bereavement. I will take it that Nuns and 
Soldiers epitomises the characteristic Murdochian attitude towards romantic love: it 
is an opportunity to progress, but one that can be realised only by going beyond 
romantic love into something more truthful and stronger. In more Platonic terms, one 
tries to ascend the ladder of love but the romantic lover remains stuck on the lower 
rungs in a state of delusion. 
Like Plato, Murdoch is trying to articulate a theory of moral progress on this 
basis of a model of the experience of love. (We are pulled magnetically towards what 
is Good when we recognize it as Good. ) She draws upon not just any model of love 
but one of a slow patient love that is not evaded by convenient, glorious, youthful 
death, and does not dramatize the sincerity and passion of the lover. The very concept 
of attention, which Murdoch places centrally within this account of progress, is about 
patience, effort, even 'waiting', not suddenness. 34 Having said this, we are now in a 
position to advance the claim that any general theoretical correlate of romantic love 
will tend to misdirect the moral pilgrim. My contention is that, for Murdoch, this is 
just what happens in the case of romanticism. It is the general theoretical correlate of 
romantic love in the sense that both are concerned with (1) a failure to do justice to 
the contingency/particularity of persons; (2) apparent attention to what is other 
functions as a guise for a return to egocentric preoccupation; and (3) both are 
implicated in a failure to do justice to the finality of death. 
34 Rush Rhees suggests that 'patientia! is a plausible construal of 'attention' as it occurs in Weil 
[Rhces (2000), 147-8]. The contrast between attention and will (to which Rhees is again sensitive) is 
drawn from Weil. 'We have to try and cure our faults by attention and not by will' [Weil (1963), 
105)]. This contrast is Murdoch's general position with the brief exception of JP, 39 and DPR, 201. 
This temporary breakdown of the contrast in the early-to-mid 1960s allows her to write of 'willed 
attention' in an effort to break from Weilian connotations of passivity. Murdoch's reticence about the 
terminology of Will is subsequently restored in Metaphysics 300,330 where the introduction of 
imagination counters any suggestions that attention is passivity. Attention thus carries overtones that 
are remarkably close to dynamic stasis in Milton, the suffering active obedience of Christ, or even of 
Satan when he is most insightful, transfixed, 'still in gaze! at the wonder of creation, Paradise Lost, 
IV, 11.356. 
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111. The Problems of Romanticism 
These three problems pull Murdoch's romanticism charge together. I will consider 
each in turn, drawing upon their relation to both the Romantic Movement and the 
direction of attention (the preoccupation of Murdoclys moral psychology). My 
concern here will remain with the cohesion of the different elements of the charge and 
the way in which they combine to reproduce the same problems as romantic love. 
(a) Puritanism, Suddenness and Contingency 
In the case of romantic love, we fail to do justice to the reality of the other, seeing 
them as whatever we desire. We overestimate them and their ability to complete us. 
In Nuns and Soldiers, Tim is suddenly lifted out of the bohemian mess of his poverty, 
Gertrude is rescued from an intolerable bereavement. They see each other in ways 
that offer a sudden escape, one that subsequently turns out not to be available. It is a 
kind of fantasy. 'A love relationship can occasion extreme selfishness and possessive 
violence, the attempt to dominate that other place so that it be no longer separate; or 
it can prompt a process of unselfing wherein the lover learns to see, and cherish and 
respect, what is not himself [M. 17]. More generally, 'Love- is the perception of 
individuals, Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than 
oneself is rear. 35 Murdoch generalises the same problem of the occlusion of the other 
that is encountered in romantic love by suggesting that there is a systematic 
downgrading of inwardness in romantically-influenced philosophical writings that 
focus upon action and public criteria. There is an occlusion of real persons, but this 
time not just a specific other. This occlusion is a general problem of moral 
psychology. Romanticism generates just what a Murdochian moral psychology seems 
geared to avoid. 
Upon reflection, it does however seem rather odd to call the neglect of 
inwardness in favour of action 'romantic'. After all, the Romantic Movement was 
closely associated with the concept of the imagination, and with the inward turn away 
from a disillusioning world. We may think here of pre-Enlightenment pietism in 
Germany; post-Revolution reaction in France and across elsewhere in Europe. 
Emphasis upon the inward turn is part of the post-war liberal re-evaluation of 
35 Sub. G, 215. 
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Romanticism that Murdoch draws upon. (It is present in both Frye and Abrams and 
culminates in Harold Bloonfs argument that British Romanticism internalizes 
Quest-Romance . )36 There 
is a case to be made for her continuity with this aspect of 
RomantiCiSM. 37 Murdoch is drawing our attention not to early but late Romanticism 
with its emphasis upon'symbolism! and the inadequacy of prose. (The sickness of the 
language' that is used to justify 'the Romantic attack on wordS'. )38 Symbolism 
embodies what Murdoch views as a puritanical attitude towards contingency, an 
intolerance for the messiness of real persons, 'The pure, clean, self-contained 
"symbol", the exemplar incidentally of what Kant, ancestor of both Liberalism and 
Romanticism, required art to be, is the analogue of the lonely self-contained 
individual. It is what is left of the other-worldliness of Romanticism when the "messy" 
, 39 humanitarian and revolutionary elements have spent their force. 
One does not need to agree with this diagnosis to make some sense of it. 
Murdoch is concerned with a shift which owes something to Fichte's theory of 
knowledge: the Ego is ineffable, it cannot be described directly but only in symbols, 
what is other must be taken up not in its own right, but as a symbolic repository in 
order to understand the self '0 1 am not suggesting that she directly traces this view to 
Fichte, but only that it is this shift that concerns her. It is at the core of her criticism 
of Sartre. She suggests that in spite of all his supposed concern for contingency, 
Sartre's novels show a disregard for the particularity and the contingency of 
individuals. They reduce characters to symbolic stereotypes. Sartre's Roads to 
Freedom trilogy examines 'three main types of consciousness, that of the ineffective 
intellectual (Mathieu), the pervert (Daniel), and the Communist (Brunet) - and 
introduces a host of minor characters who are also analysed and "placed"'. 41 This 
symbolist reduction of character is a romantic attempt to rationalize human 
36 Like the second of Murdoch's sublime articles and the first of her Sovereignty articles, Harold 
Bloom's 'rhe Internalization of Quest-Romana was originally published in 77te Yale Review (in 
1969). 
37 Her contrast between imagination and fantasy in the Metaphysics is at least reminiscent of the 
Coleridge distinction between imagination and fancy in Biographia Literaria, Vol 1, Ch. V. 
38 SRB, 285. 
39 AD, 292. 
40 Berlin (1999), 99. 
41 Sartre, 52. 
82 
experience. Their reflexions, instead of deepening our sense of their concreteness and 
complexity, strip them to the base structure of the particular problem which they 
embody. 42 
Murdoch is repeating a long-standing criticism of the Romantic favouring of 
symbolic over real character, a criticism with some substance. 43 Even the earliest of 
Romantic heroes, such as Schiller's brutal robber Karl Moor are not real characters, 
they are embodiments of a great deal that we fear and are drawn towards, symbols of 
human freedom who encounter other symbols of authority, submission, indecision and 
so on. By going down this road, and by emptying out his conception of consciousness 
into a nothing, Murdoch suggests that Sartre situates himself in the same camp as the 
Hegelian system in which everything that is real and actual turns out to be rational. 
Contingency is squeezed out. 'Sartre at several points makes appeal to Kierkegaard 
against Hegel. The individual person demands recognition as this person, and not as 
-part of something suprapersonal. Yet Sartre's own picture of the individual strikes 
one as curiously depersonalised and mechanical. It is as if the Hegelian Absolute had 
become a person and were striving for self-awareness in what it suspected to be 
complete solitude. " Intolerancefor the messiness of the contingent person is viewed 
by Murdoch as characteristically romantic. Her own tolerance initially for the 
messiness of metaphors and, in the Metaphysics, for a carefully-deployed fragmented 
writing style, turns out to be a stylistic virtue that is inscribed within her critique of 
romanticism. 
What she is rejecting is to be understood as a kind of puritanical intolerance 
for the contingent. She endorses T. S. Eliot's assimilation of puritanism and 
romanticism. (With the rider that, as a symbolist, Eliot is guilty of botIL)45 Puritanism 
characteristically involves intolerance for half-measures and the desire to leap 
suddenly into a realm where everything is clear cut (indeed crystaline) and free from 
46 confusion. Symbols have this character, real people do not. We first encounter 
42 Sartre, 59. 
43 In 7"he Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche attacks Euripides' use of characters to embody an abstract 
contrast between rationality and irrationality. 
44 HMD, 149. 
45 INAM, 166,170. 
46 In Mary Shelley's Frankenstein we first encounter the new prometheus out in the ice plains. (She 
is criticising a certain aspect of the isolated, Romantic hero. ) The imagery of icy crystaline purity is 
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Murdoch roundly criticising puritanism in Under the Net where it is the suspicion of 
language that is at issue and where there is a sudden, explosive, symbolic blowing up 
of barriers between the inside and the outside. (Between what is publicly observable 
and what is hidden. )47 Her position, even as early as 1954 is that even if words are 
tainted and inadequate, we must still use them in patience and hope rather than reduce 
ourselves to a puritanical silence. Subsequently, in the novels we become familiar 
with puritanical characters such as Axel in A Fairly Honourable Defeat who 
associates truth with a pedantic truth-telling in which clarity, sincerity and intolerance 
are all at work . 
48 Axers attitude is strongly reminiscent of Kant's rejection of lying 
and characteristic of his desire 'to find something clean and pure outside of the mess 
of the selfish empirical psyche' . 
49 Axel, Kant and literary symbolism exemplify a 
general human failing that even Plato falls into. (The central argument of The Fire 
and the Sun is that Plato's 'puritanism! about art, his 'puritanical aesthetic' is at odds 
with the general tenor of his thinking. )50 A more realistic understanding ofpersons 
requires a non-puritanical tolerancefor the contingent. 
(b) Nature and the Redirection of Attention to Self 
Consider now a second problem. Romantic love involves a surreptitious redirection 
of attention back to the self. We need to go beyond it to truly see the other. Yet, 
while failing to do justice to the particularity or contingency of the other, there is a 
semblance of being preoccupied with then-L This strongly parallels what Murdoch 
sees as taking place in the romantic cult of nature. What she tackles again skips over 
the early stages of the Romantic Movement (Rousseau and tmile) and relates more 
directly to the 19th century appropriation of Kant's version of the sublime. In his third 
critique reason is architectonic, it demands the unification of experience. In the 
not at all alien to Romanticism, consider Nietzsche! s closing appeal in Beyond Good and Evil, the 
verses delivered 'From the Heights' where our task is to unlearn man and god and curse and prayer, 
and become a ghost, flitting across the glaciers. 
47 In both Under the Net and Sartre there is an association between radical (revolutionary) socialism 
and the immediate availability of clarity and precision, exemplified by Lefty Todd. Marxism, 
especially Trotskyist 'permanent revolution!, are forms of 'romanticism' in Sartre, 72,77,78. 
48 The saintly Tallis is Axel's opposite. He is almost pathologically tolerant of mess. 'Hilda thought, 
wherever Tallis is therds always a muddle! Then she thought, this is unjust. Wherever there is a 
muddle, there Tallis is. 'A Fairly Honourable Defeat, Chapter 14, p. 169. 
49 SG, 8 1; similarly, M. 171-2. 
50 FS, 12-13 for the classification of Plato as a puritan. 
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experience of the sublime our imagination cannot meet this demand. It is an encounter 
with that which goes beyond the bounds of our imagination: namely storms, the Alps, 
the starry-skies above, and generally that whose immensity of force or whose 
mathematical scale defies reduction to neat Uttle pictures. It defies reduction to the 
beautifiA Instead, we experience first a sense of awe and then the thriffing sensation 
of pitting our free selves against impossible odds. In The Fire and the Sun we are told 
that 'the Romantic movement shockingly cheated him in taking over the sublime'. 51 
Previously, in the Sovereignty, the appropriation was viewed -as legitimate, 'Kant's 
notion of the sublime, though extremely interesting, possibly even more interesting 
than Kant realised, is a kind of romanticiSny. 52 
This apparent inconsistency over the Romantic appropriation of the sublime 
is, rather, a varying emphasis upon its successive stages. Insofar as it concerns the 
initial humbling experience of human limits, it is unromantic, indeed anti-romantic. 
Insofar as it proceeds to redirect attention to the self it is thoroughly romantic and in 
tune with the idea of the hero pitting his freedom against all odds. The more 
impossible the odds the better, the more sublime his unconstrained, passionate 
defiance, like that of Miltods rebellious Satan, or Don Giovanni (a non-Murdochian 
example) who refuses to repent even as he is dragged down to Hell. This places the 
hero outwith the ordinary, run-of-the-mill bourgeois existence. (In the Dorfs situation 
I might gladly be inclined to repent my sins and several others if it offered a way out. 
He is made of sterner stuff. ) Murdoclfs criticism has a thematic unity provided by the 
way in which an apparently-outward focus of attention conceals a return to 
preoccupation with self The outer stonn is a symbol of inner turmoil and passion, it 
leads back into self-concern, and in this respect the sublime is unlike the comparable 
and more favoured experience that Murdoch believes King Lear to have on the heath. 
Lear's passion is spent in an exercise that humbles and leads to a new concern for 
others. (For the poor wretch who needs shelter in a hovel and who must enter first; 
and for his daughter whose words he refused to understand and whose lips he now 
studies for any sign of movement. ) Murdoch's point could perhaps have been 
formulated in terms of a revised account of the sublime. (Emmanuel Levinas provides 
something of this sort and her early sublime articles together with her gothic novels 
51 FS, 20. 
52 SQ, p. 7 1. 
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suggest that she considered a sftnilar path. ) 53 But this is conjectural, a Murdochian 
road not taken, perhaps because of her strengthening conviction that it is romanticism 
per se that is at the root of the problem. Murdoch writes of the lessons of tragedy. 
She does not directly appropriate the sublime. 54 
What is never at issue here is the question of nature as such but only of the 
55 'self-directed enjoyment of nature'. Her realism ispersonar but she is not hostile to 
the contemplation of the impersonal and the (non-human) natural, 'fantasy (self) can 
prevent us from seeing a blade of grass just as it can prevent us from seeing another 
persod. 56 Attention to the beauty and to the unframed immensity of nature is an 
exercise which can release us from this preoccupation with self 'I am looking out of 
my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, 
brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a 
hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt 
vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but the kestrel. '57 We may legitimately 
'give attention to nature in order to clear our minds of selfish care' and we may 'take a 
self-forgetting pleasure in the sheer alien pointless independent existence of animals, 
birds stones and trees'. 58 Murdoch! s concern that attention to nature is problematic 
has a narrower target. 'It may seem odd to start the argument against what I have 
roughly labelled as "romanticism! ' by using the case of attention to nature. In fact I do 
not think that any of the great romantics really believed that we receive but what we 
give and in our life alone does nature live, although the lesser ones tended to follow 
Kant's lead and use nature as an occasion for exalted self-feeling. '59 Shnilarly, in An 
53 Alford (2002), the dominant focus of which is Levinas. 
54 This is not to reject a more indirect influence. Murdoch's first-person male narrators in the novels 
do seem to go astray in a very l8th century, Burkean manner, seeing women in terms of the 
beautiful and frameable rather than the elusive and sublime. 
55 SG, 83. In both FS and the Metaphysics, Plato! s concern for nature in the Phae&w is viewed as 
quite different from the Romantic treatment, M. 16-17. 
56 GG, 68. 
57 SG, 82. See also her contrast between Plato and the Romantics on nature in FS, 43. 
58 SG, 82. In the Metaphysics, the list of appropriate objects is 'other beings, humans, animals, 
plants, stones', M. 497. Children in her novels, such as The Nice and the Good, are also pleasantly 
fascinated with stones. 
59 SG. 83. Murdoch's allusion here is to Coleridge! s Dejection: an Ode, where he challenges 
Wordsworth's idea that there is a consistent harmony between what the individual consciousness 
contributes to perception and the way the world actually is. For Coleridge it is only an elite of 'the 
pure who can sustain this imaginative transaction. Murdoch also connects Eliofs romanticism with 
Unofficial Rose, contrived varieties of rose are second rate; and in The Sacred and 
Profane Love Machine there is unease about zealous motorway building 
programmes. (They are juxtaposed to terroristic destruction. ) The Metaphysics does 
not concern itself closely with nature but it does contain the occasional glimmer of 
environmental concern, It is a new blessing in our modem age that we are learning to 
love the planet and care for its natural ways. This too teaches something' [M. 109]. 
It is not concern for nature as such that Murdoch attacks, but a particular 
approach towards it where the encounter with what is other is transformed into a 
mode of attention to self This is the crux of why her two articles on the sublime do 
not lead to an appropriation of the concept, it is seen as too implicated in a romantic 
redirection of attention back towards the self This position is anticipated in The Bell. 
(The outgrowth of an earlier Murdoch typescript focusing upon a guild socialist 
group with all of the craft opposition to mechanisation that this implies. ) Within the 
lay religious community at Imber, there are two factions over the question of the 
introduction of a mechanical cultivator. James Tayper Pace is a puritan and is against 
it. He has an apparent concern for nature. Michael Meades is in favour. 'Michael 
regarded this view as an absurd piece of romanticism and said so ... He was answered 
that they had all of them withdrawn from the world to live a life which was, by 
ordinary standards, not a "natural" one in any case. They had to determine their own 
conception of the "natural". 160 Real nature is lost sight of by James who, as a country 
gentleman is particularly keen on shooting birds and squirrels. Michael who is 
disturbed by this, is revealed as someone with more respect not just for nature but for 
what is other and not mingled with the self 61 
It is important that we isolate-off the problem in terms of the redirection of 
attention to self rather than leaving it formulated in terms of a redirection away-from 
nature. Murdoch is not ultimately concerned with nature per se but she is concerned 
with the problem of the surreptitious redirection of attention to self In doing this we 
will follow her own lead. In 1950 she had reservations about classifying Sartre as a 
romantic because of his abhorrence of nature. By the time of Sartre, Romantic 
his elitist views on'the moV, YSAM, 167. 
60 The Bell, Chapter 6, p. 9 1. 
61 This is slightly different from her focus in the sublime articles in the sense that Tayper Pace! s 
position has a close parallel with Rousseau! s Emile where a natural upbringing has to be 
constructed. 
87 
Rationalist this reservation had disappeared. The key theme of Murdoch's rejection 
of the romanticization of nature is that an apparent concern for what is other 
functions as a guise for egocentric preoccupation. I shall take it that this, together 
with an avoidance of a puritanical account of contingency, is a second problem that 
she must avoid on pain of a charge of strong inconsistency. 
(c) The Cult of Suffering and Occlusion of Death 
The third and final core problem with romantic love is the way in which it is 
associated with the occlusion of death. (Itself an aspect of contingency, we are not 
necessary beings. ) Romantic love seems to be for ever and ever, an eternal fire. 
Perhaps I have no difficulty in owning up that I will die, but it seems almost a 
sacrilege to suggest that my love will die with me, that it too has limits and cannot be 
preserved in all its purity. In Nuns and Soldiers Gertrude seems, in a rather different 
way to have escaped from the task of facing up to the reality of death when she falls 
in love with Tim. Either way, Murdoch associates our inability to realistically 
encounter others with this inability to face up to the ultimate limits of the self. This is 
part of the reason why Murdoch was, for a long time, so fascinated by the sublime. At 
least in its initial stage, it concerns the realisation of personal limits. If we think of 
others not along the lines of the beautifill (as self-contained symbols) but along the 
lines of the sublime (as unimaginably complex) we may profit by a sense of humility, 
of not being able to 'place'them and override their contingency. Subsequently she was 
able to point to a less equivocal way of coming to grips with human limitedness by 
attending to the reality of death. This seems much harder to represent in a 
self-magnifying way, but romanticism still accomplishes the task. Liebestod, death as 
it is so often related to the ideal of romantic love, is a veiled form of self-assertion. 
Don Giovanni is never so great, so true to himselfý so sincere or authentically the 
Don, as when he is being dragged down into the flames. In this he outdoes even 
Faust, who gets off on a technicality. Sincerity in the form of heroic suffering in order 
to remain true to oneself, can operate as a way to turn death into a form of 
self-glorification. Romantic suffering eclipses the reality of death. 
Murdoch believes that the idealised concealment of Liebestod has a bearing 
on 'our ubiquitous (romantic) sadomasochism! [M. 121]. This is an everyday kind of 
deception, a normal egocentric neurosis. While we may not all see ourselves as 
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romantic heroes, we do all evade thinking realistically about death. We would rather 
think of it as a special kind of suffering, hence as non-amihilative. The suffering of 
the romantically-conceived self, the suffering of the free and angst-ridden self that is 
glorified in existentialist theory, exemplifies just such a commonplace concealment. 
Personal alienation and the burden of freedom are represented as the worst that we 
have to face, worse even than death. (Sartre generalises this, Being is more 
fundamentally terrifying than Nothingness, death is a convenient hiding place bound 
up with bad faith, a guarantee that we need never be found out. 62 ) For Murdoch, a 
sadomasochistic occlusion of mortality is taken to be operative not just in everyday 
life but also in religion, particularly Christianity with its notable penitential structures. 
(Hence, it does make sense to charge St Paul and religious figures who predate the 
Romantic Movement, with romanticism. ) However dubious we may be about this 
claim there is nothing unintelligible about it. I will take it that Murdoch must avoid 
generating a sadomasochistic cult of suffering that occludes the reality of death. 
If a consistent Murdochian is to avoid double standards they Will need to meet these 
three basic criteria. Firstly, they will need to come to grips with the contingency of 
persons in a non-puritanical way. Secondly, they will need to avoid an apparent 
concern for what is other from functioning as a guise for, or route into, egocentric 
preoccupation. Thirdly, They will need to avoid approaching suffering in a 
sadomasochistic manner because this will occlude the reality of death. Each of these 
will be examined in turn in Part Three of this thesis. 
IV. Organic Emergence out of Romanticism? 
Before moving on to the detailed ways in which Murdoch faUs foul of her 
own criteria, we may anticipate an important objection which threatens to undermine 
the relevance of the charge. MurdoclYs criticism of romantic love is in line with her 
Platonisrn. In the Symposium, Plato charts out an erotic progression in which we 
move from an understanding of love which is less adequate to one which is more 
adequate. We ascend the ladder of love. In line with this view, we might treat 
62 Sartre (1995), 34-38. Sartre rejects Heidegger's position that death-evasion is inextricably bound 
up with inauthentic being, a position to which Murdoch's approach bears some similarities, see 
below, Chapter 10. 
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romantic love as a lower but unavoidable form of eroticism through which we must 
pass on the way to something better. The best kind of love only emerges out of lower 
kinds, including, to begin with, carnality. This is not only good Platonism but it is one 
of the key themes that separates it off from Christianity (where love is modelled upon 
divine love and hence does not emerge out of base desires). Perhaps we might want 
to say that Murdoch too is emerging organically out of romanticism. This is a 
standard response to the charge of romanticism that has emerged in Murdochian 
literary analysis. It might be carried over to defend the philosophical texts against a 
similar charge. 
Consider this response, briefly, in its original context. It is a familiar charge 
that double standards are at work in MurdocWs aesthetic and her novels. She is, for 
example, highly critical of the romantic device of symbolism but she also relies upon 
it. The forging of a new bell, from which she draws the title of one of her most 
successful novels, is a symbol of personal change. (It is a symbol particularly 
associated with Schiller . 
63 ) Her Freudian-themed novels of the 1960s are unavoidably 
symbolic and she also attacks romantic fantasy while writing novels in the Gothic 
genre. Shakespeare is praised for his rejection of Arthurian magic, but her late novels 
are full of Arthurian imagery and (compared to those of the 1970s) assume an 
increasingly fantastic character [M. 141]. In one late novel, a Buddhist postpones 
death in order to re-enact an updated version of The Green Knight; in a second, The 
Message to the Planet, a man is brought back from the brink of death by a daernonic, 
and perhaps mad, prophet; in a third, Nuns and Soldiers, Jesus puts in a personal 
appearance to a lapsed nun. 
Symbolism can admittedly be used in lots of different ways, and the Gothic 
genre can be deployed 'ironically' to show its flaws. Such uses of irony might 
themselves be situated within the tradition of the Romantic Movement, but here we 
need to remind ourselves that it is Murdoch's own concept of romanticism with which 
we are concerned. 64 By deploying such themes and techniques Murdoch has 
nevertheless opened herself up to the charge of reproducing what she criticises. This 
charge emerged in the early 1960s in an article by Gabriel Pearson and has recurred 
63 Schiller's Song ofthe Bell is the key source, recast by Goethe in an Epilogue. 
64 Irony features strongly in H61derlin, Novalis, Schlegel, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Richard Rorty. 
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ever since. " Outright denial being deemed implausible, her literary defenders have 
deployed variants of the following reply. In attending to Romanticism, she finds that 
she must reject much of what it has created, but she has absorbed much of its vision 
as well and uses it to look to the future. t66 There is a rhetorical flourish here, but also 
the important claim that Murdoch is looking to the future, emerging out of the 
romantic background. (To write about this as organic emergence would be ýo drawn 
upon a piece of Romantic terminology that is, for once, appropriately gradualist. ) 
This image of emergence (organic or otherwise) is set out in the early editions 
of Peter ConradPs The Saint and the Artist and fits nicely with the Platonic imagery of 
a steady ascent of eros. We emerge out of less truthful levels of being rather than 
bypassing them. However, the revised edition of Conradi shifts towards a firmer 
location of Murdoch within the milieu of romanticism. I would argue that Murdoch 
is, in the best and most positive sense of the word, a romantic writer. 67 What stands 
between these earlier and later editions is not just a re-evaluation of an unchanging 
object. (A shift of the seeing as type. ) The earlier edition was written against the 
backdrop of the comparatively realistic novels of the 1970s while the later edition was 
able to draw upon the novels of Murdoch's last decade. The earlier work is 
re-evaluated in the light of later work which shows no signs of an emergence, organic 
or otherwise, out of her romantic background. Instead, there is a marked return to 
fantasy, or alternatively, a drift into a more 'magicaT kind of realism with fantastic 
qualities. 68 
It is not my primary concern to argue about the charge as it relates to the 
novels. It is my concern to see whether a parallel charge holds in the case of the 
philosophical texts. The reason why it is unlikely to work in the latter context is the 
comparative constancy of MurdocWs position. The moral psychology of the 
Sovereignty is elaborated finther rather than substantially revised in the Metaphysics. 
The most notable shift is one of style rather than substance. The faults of 
romanticism, if they appear at the core of MurdoclYs moral psychology, are liable to 
65 Pearson (1962). 
66 Majdiak, (1972), 375. 
67 Conradi, (2001a), 59. 
68 An appreciation that the realism has, all along, had a magical quality can be seen in Murdoch's 
autobiographical allusions to Prospero in Jackson's Dilemma, her final novel. Prospero is a magician 
who, like Shakespeare at the end of his life, finally has to abdure his rough magic. 
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be a continuing presence. There is no indication of a radical change of thematic 
direction at all. This leaves only the option of viewing Murdoch's text as an 
emergence out of romanticism when taken in conjunction with other non-Murdochian 
philosophical texts that are more comprehensively mired in it. (Sartre's for example. ) I 
would suggest that this would only make sense if Murdochs lapses into what she 
criticises were occasional or in some sense marginal. (Hence this romanticism would 
be pushed into more peripheral areas. ) However, the identified key problems of 
romanticism are ones which I am going to suggest, are far from peripheral. They 
impact upon the core of Murdoch's moral psychology: our understanding of the 
contingency of persons; our avoidance of redirecting attention to self; and our basic 
attitude towards suffering and death. If these core themes of Murdochian moral 
psychology are executed in terms which reproduce the problems of romanticism, then 
there is a fundamental flaw at the heart of Murdochian morality: she is reproducing 
what she criticises, albeit in a different form. 
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Part Three 
Introduction: Philosophical Depth and Surface 
Tensions 
Having set out criteria that Murdoch must meet in order to avoid strong 
inconsistency, Part III will examine the ways in which she fails to do so. It may be as 
well, here, to anticipate that Part III may be misread as an attempt to chase Murdoch 
down the intricate maze of her own categories until she reaches a dead-end, a 
position from which there is no escape. However, it forms no part of my intention to 
promote a marginalization of Iris Murdoch's philosophical work, but merely to argue 
that its significance cannot be cashed out in its own terms. In its own terms, 
Murdochian morality does not work. 
Consider two different sorts of critique that might be made of Murdoch. On the 
one hand we might proceed by fell-swoop, questioning the legitimacy of her way of 
doing philosophy by claiming that it is too imprecise, too incohesive, not formal 
enough. We might suggest that it is more like the thought process that we all go 
through rather than the finished product. Such a critique might not rule out the 
p 'bility that various insights may be gleaned from a study of Murdoc s te s, but it ossi If xt 
might also allow that similar insights could be gained by settling down for an 
afternoon with a book of aphorisms. That is to say, the value would be situated in the 
fine detail, and not at all in MurdocWs way of proceeding. 
I have opted for a quite different sort of critique, and not just because of 
sympathy with at least some of MurdoclYs strictures against our predilection for 
tidiness as a puritanism that can be taken too far, to the point where it threatens to 
obscure the messiness of experience. My approach has, more generally, and from the 
first, presupposed that Murdoch has philosophical depth as well as localised insight. 
Something has gone badly wrong if the text, to this point, appears to be merely an 
exercise in debunking. At the risk of trying to leap out of my text in order to describe 
what an appropriate interpretation of it should look like, I will make some general 
comments about why I hold that Murdochs approach towards the practice of 
93 
philosophy is instructive. I am tempted here to write that she may be appropriated 
although such terminology is at odds with her hostility to all that smacks of 
acquisition. 
Beyond the detail, what I hold to be of especial value in Murdo&s texts is 
their commitment to a certain kind of philosophical depth. Here, the concept of depth 
is itself (deeply) ambiguous, imprecise and (in characteristically Murdochian terms) 
requires some development. Two tasks follow from this claim. Firstly, some 
characterisation of Murdoch's depth must be given and, secondly, some story must be 
told about why I am still proceeding with a critique. 
To carry out the first task I wiH begin by pointing out a certain minimal 
condition for depth. "Deep' here invokes the sense in which any serious pursuit and 
expression of truth moves towards fundamental questions' [M. 321]. But one can deal 
with such fundamental questions in a shallow manner, even the consideration of death 
can be approached as a sort of logical puzzle. (Why are we afraid of it when we wodt 
be there when it happens? )' Depth is not simply a function of the subject matter, it 
depends also upon the manner in which it is treated. 2 To give some content to this, 
and to the claim that Murdoch has depth of a particular sort, I will draw upon a 
charge that Rairnond Gaita levels, fairly or unfairly, at a great deal of moral 
philosophy. (My point is that the charge will make no impact upon Murdoch. ) Here, 
we may need to make allowances for a populist, anti-intellectual framing of the 
charge in order to accept that there is a point of substance being made. Gaita follows 
Rush Rhees in claiming that we have neglected the personal in morality, our sense of 
personal struggle, engagement, effort to find answers to the problems that we 
encounter. 3 Part of the way in which he delineates the bounds of the moral is by 
appeal to the idea that there are some problems that we cannot pass over to others in 
the way that we might hand in a car at a garage to get it fixed over the course of a 
weekend. Moral problems are problems of a sort that might lead us to seek advice or 
guidance, but ultimately we have to work our own way through them. 
1 This is often taken to be the crux of the Epicurean position on this matter, although it rather misses 
his point that a certain future-directed emotional response can corrupt the quality of our life. 
2 See the treatment of the concept of depth in Kekes (1995), Chapter 8. 
3 Rhees (1969), 94-6. 
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By contrast, some of the standard philosophical literature poses moral 
problems as intellectual puzzles that anyone in particular might solve for us and then 
deliver a conclusive verdict on sometime on Monday morning. Gaita gives the nice 
example of Kierkegaard parodying Hegel by saying that word had passed around, 
4 
even in Copenhagen, that 'the System will be finished next Sunday. Such an 
approach is deeply at odds with MurdocWs treatment of morality as a matter of 
continuous effort to discern, and not a discrete set of puzzles that punctuate our 
existence. The demands of morality are ongoing and they are not to be shirked or in 
any other way diminished. Murdoch does not rely on examples of the sort where we 
are invited to imagine ourselves in the middle of a laboratory at one end of which is a 
5 fully loaded and timed baby-squasher, and, at the other end, a timed embryo-flusher. 
In Murdoch's texts we are not invited to consider how to respond to the 
circumstances that we do face by considering circumstances that we are never in. 
6 
Her most extreme recurring scenario is that of life in a concentration camp, an 
unusual circumstance but one which remains within the bounds of lived experience, 
albeit of a sort that we can perhaps never do justice to, yet are morally required to 
take into account. People have faced such problems. 
This does not mean to say that MurdocWs moral depth is constituted by her 
refusal to engage in a certain kind of puzzling, nor does it mean that such puzzles are 
always without a point. (Some unreal scenarios are of recurring fascination in a way 
that may lead us to suggest that they run deep within a particular culture, such as 
tales from the Gospels or the Faust legend. ) Given the way that she works with 
Platonic myths and metaphors, Murdoch could not plausibly commit to any wholesale 
rejection of unreal scenarios. If myths and metaphors can redirect our attention to 
something that might otherwise be missed, there is no reason in principle why unreal 
puzzles cannot, on occasion, do the same. (They are just not a good, default, 
all-purpose, tool. ) From a Murdochian point of view, the usefulness of such puzzles 
4 Gaita (1991), 293. 
51 have in mind the sorts of Lockean problems that arise during arguments about abortion e. g. 
protecting a house against people-seeds; being umbilically connected to a talented musician; making 
life and death decisions about a cat that has been injected with a personhood-inducing drug. We are 
asked to think of many things but rarely what is it like to be pregnant? i. e. what constitutes a 
truthful attitude in this situation? 
6 There is a rare exception to this is M. 427 concerning how we would respond to an assertion by 
aliens that they had no value on their planet. 
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will depend, in part, upon whether they help us to articulate our moral intuitions or 
whether they obscure these intuitions, by encouraging us to think of that which we 
are prone to value in terms of that which we are unlikely to value. Murdoch's 
avoidance of such puzzles is symptomatic of her picturing of morality as something 
that we are deeply Le. continuously, effortfully engaged with and engaged with in a 
personal manner. This is one of the reasons why Murdoch is so insistent upon 
stressing the continuity between morality and religion. She is concerned to preserve 
the depth of commitment that is associated with the latter. In the Metaphysics she 
concedes at several points that her position may be, in some sense, religious, 'in the 
continuity which (as I see it) exists between morality and religion, we might feet that 
we had crossed the border. The absolute demand remains! [M. 506]. Some forms of 
religious adherence might be taken as exemplars of a depth of (personal) moral 
commitment that Murdoch is seeking to retain in the face of a diminution of the 
significance of morality by an emphasis upon lifestyle and upon more or less arbitrary 
choice. 7 This is metaphysics, which sets up a picture which it then offers as an appeal 
to us all to see if we cannot find just this in our deepest experience. The word "deep", 
or some such metaphor, will come in here as part of the essence of the appeal. In this 
respect metaphysical and religious pictures resemble each other! [M. 507]. 
Although Murdoch does seem to cross over at times into a religious 
metaphysic, the idea of moral depth itself need be given no special theological 
significance. We may see Murdoch's commitment to the depth of morality just as 
much in her attitude towards metaphysical questions that might tempt us into system 
building of a sort that is remote from human experience. A case in point is her 
attitude towards philosophical discussions of time: 'philosophers might be wise to 
deal with time-problems as aspects of particular contexts. An example would be: can 
we properly condemn a man of seventy for crimes he committed when he was 
twenty? We can attempt to clarify this. A general philosophical theory of time is likely 
to be unbearably abstract' [M. 3 05]. 1 take it that she is alluding to the same point wich 
she used to open the Sovereignty: 'McTaggart says that time is unreal, Moore replies 
that he has just had his breakfast. 8 The point is that lots of interesting things can no 
7 Antmaccio (2004) develops the theme that Murdoch! s commitment to the 'depth! of morality is 
recognisably theological. 
8 IP, 1. 
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doubt be said about time but unless we consider it in the moral context of lived 
experience, of how we experience others as valuable (i. e. how we are emotionally or 
erotically engaged), we will go astray. We cannot construct a value-free metaphysic 
of time and then use it to answer questions about morality. (As if metaphysics were a 
guide to morals in the sense of being prior to morals. ) Instead, Murdoch insists that 
morality is deep, it goes all the way down. Having said this, it is characteristic of 
MurdoclYs way of writing that she makes this observation about time and then passes 
on. She does not develop the insight in any detail and this may leave her account of 
emotions (such as guilt) which temporalise our experience, dangerously one-sided. 
What the above amounts to is less than a demonstration that Murdoch meets 
some formal specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral depth but 
perhaps the very idea of such a specification is out of place. It is a more restricted 
case for saying that Murdoch has concerns that are in some respects similar to Gaita! s 
and that she does not fall foul of Gaita! s charge. 9 This leaves me with the second task 
of providing an account of why I think that a critique is nevertheless still in order. The 
crux of my case depends upon the absence in Murdoch of a quite dfferent sort of 
depth from the kind explored above, that is to say, depth in analytic detail. Here, I 
draw upon the sense in which we might say that someone explores a question 'in 
depth! or looks several moves deep, and considers all of the appropriate possibilities. 
Quite apart from the absence of contrived, puzzle-type exemplars, what one does not 
find in Murdoch is a standard call and response of argument-reply-rejoinder (possibly 
followed by consideration of objections number I to 5). 
Instead, she often prioritises those aspects of rational persuasion which are not 
about formal argumentative structures, such as getting someone to notice what has 
been overlooked or helping the reader to see things in a different way. 10 (The 
distinction here is not hard and fast. Drawing attention to the shortcomings of a 
particular background picture will affect the assumptions from which we proceed. )" 
Her philosophical style, and the content of her critique of puritanical tidiness, are 
9 Gaita happens to hold that Murdoch falls foul of a quite different problem, not a lack of depth but 
ethical other-worldliness. Gaita (1991), Chapter 12, esp. 216 ffi 
10 This is a feature of MurdocWs way of proceeding that Cora Diamond treats as related to her 
rejection of rejection of a ridgid fact/value distinction, Diamond (1991), 373-80. 
11 John McDowell is a prominent example of someone who works with a grasp of philosophical 
problems as problems of moral vision that lead us to plug the wrong sorts of assumptions into our 
arguments. 
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geared to help us appreciate the price that has to be paid for an excessive insistence 
upon analytic precision. Our world may be diced up until we no longer recognise it or 
see how the descriptions fit into a way of living. However, acceptance of this need 
not blind us to the price that is also to be paid for imprecision and ambiguity. In 
particular, I will suggest that there is a danger in assuming that tensions between 
Murdoch's multiple accumulated commitments will necessarily dissolve upon closer 
examination or at some further stage of development. It is my contention that some of 
the tensions in Murdoch's philosophical texts are of this more-apparent-than-real 
sort. But others are not. They are more stubbornly resistant. 
The tensions which I am interested in, and which sit close to the surface of 
MurdoclYs commitments are the following. Firstly, a tension between her hostility 
towards puritanism and her commitment to a Platonic conception of humans as fallen, 
as (in every case) moral failures of some sort. This arises, in part, because of 
Murdoch! s moral depth. She views morality as impossibly demanding. The 
demandingness of morality outstrips our abilities. We are all, at some level or another, 
defeated by the scale of the task. 'We are ineluctably imperfect ... However good a life 
is, it includes moral failure ... When, in ordinary life, we are rescued or changed 
by a 
meeting with a very good person, we do not assume that he is sinless. With or 
without avatars, we are perpetually reminded of our natural selfishness' [M. 509]. This 
is variously described by Murdoch as a synthetic a priori truth and as a 'metaphysical 
conjecture'. My claim is that, as Murdock formulates it, this 'perpetual reminder' of 
'moral failure'is generative of an entrapment in guilt about the nature of our being. 
Secondly, there is a tension between her Kantian and Platonic influences. 
Murdoch is concerned that love should draw us towards perfection. How can she 
then find room for the sort of unconditional i. e. property-independent care for the 
other that we associate instead with the love of flawed persons, where the 
discernment of perfection is not at all obvious? This is a tension that I believe 
Murdoch manages to resolve satisfactorily and without abandoning either 
commitment. I am not suggesting that her problem is any sort of direct failure to 
combine eros and agape and certainly not that she fails to realise that two 
significantly different senses of 'love' are present in her texts. She rarely makes the 
distinction explicit, but there are moments when she does. ""Love" can be used to 
mean any desire or tendency. In a more solemn sense we speak of love for people. ' 
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[M. 342]. My point is precisely that she does combine Platonic erotic and Kantian 
agapaic elements in her account of love, contextualising love (respect, compassion, 
care) for the individual person inside a Platonic perfectionist project (unselfing) and 
thereby she closes off the escape route of reading her in a more straightforwardly 
Kantian manner. If we could make sense of Murdochian love in Kantian or agapaic 
terms alone, without contextualising the latter inside an account of erotic ascent, we 
would have an escape route out of at least some of the standard charges that are 
levelled at Platonic accounts of love (that they involve preoccupation either with an 
abstract ideal or else with one's own moral rectitude). My point is that Murdoch deals 
with the Kantian/Platonic tension, but does so in a way which closes off any such 
escape route. 
Thirdly, there is a tension between Murdochs commitment to radical personal 
transformation, i. e. to unselfing and her hostility towards our self-punitive tendencies, 
'our ubiquitous (romantic) sadomasochism! [M. 121]. Here, again, she is concerned 
with matters that run deeper than anything akin to lifestyle choice. She says 
something which can help us to understand one of the self-other asymmetries that 
Derek Parfitt has drawn attention to: that we are indifferent to our own past suffering 
in a way that we are not indifferent to that of cherished others. (Particularly when the 
temptation to adopt their present standpoint has been removed by their death. ) 12 If 
Murdoch is right about our ubiquitous sadomasochism, our response to past suffering 
may well be more of a pro-attitude than one of indfference. We are nostalgic for our 
past hardships, we are inclined to think that suffering per se builds character, gives us 
depth, that others who have suffered less do not really know what life is Eke. I win 
take it that such an overly-zealous attraction to suffering is a real phenomenon, 
however, I find Murdoch's response less convincing. Our best response may, perhaps, 
be one which tries to defuse this danger not by promoting a different self/other 
asymmetry, but by stressing our ordinariness and thereby promoting a more forgiving 
response to self It is sometimes the ordinariness of ourselves that is the hardest thing 
to see and it is precisely this which is lost sight of in our enthusiasm for self 
punishment. Murdoch provides a quite different response. She does not ask us to 
treat the self as we would treat any other. Instead, we are asked to lose sight of 
ourselves in the demands and needs of others. For Murdoch, it is not persons but 
12 Parfitt (1984), 1814. 
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others that matter. My charge is that this reproduces the problem of complicity in a 
dangerously self-punitive drama. Murdoch is, to some degree, sensitive to this charge 
and does try to separate out the right kind of suffering from the Urong sort. 
However, this is done by appeal to an untenable account of what is involved in a 
truthful orientation towards death. 
Finally, while hostile towards elitism, Murdoclfs Platonism introduces a 
hierarchical theme. (Elitism and hierarchy are not at all the same for her. ) She wants 
the best of both approaches, the democratic commitment reinforced by an emphasis 
upon humility and personal mortality and the recognition of a hierarchy of moral 
competence. There may be good sense here, hierarchy is inimical to universalizability 
(which surely has its Emits). We might hold that Murdoch's approach compares 
favourably with the mimetic formula according to which the right thing to do is 
whatever the (ideally) virtuous agent would do in the same circumstances. ' 3 Quite 
apart from there being circumstances which the virtuous person will never be in (what 
do you do having just mugged an old lady solely for fi=cial gain? ), the problem with 
such a formulaic concession to universalizability is that it may leave us liable to 
undertake commitments that we cannot carry through or sustain. There is such a 
thing as moral hubris and Murdoch's novels explore it. 14 However, I do want to 
suggest that her attitude towards humility creates a tension when combined with the 
view that moral progress involves a progressive improvement of moral vision. 
Murdochian humility is both far reaching and an accomplishment. I will try to give 
(admittedly inconclusive) grounds for holding that her advanced and humble moral 
pilgrim will end up with a form of self-blindness, and that the nexus between moral 
progress and moral vision is thereby brought under strain. My intention in ending on 
this tension, rather than any strong inconsistency, is to help the reader to see that I am 
not attempting to close-off the discourse on Murdochs texts. 
Here, I have identified a number of tensions which sit fairly close to the surface 
of her texts, close enough to the surface for them to involve her major themes rather 
than their remote implications. The identification of what I hold to be intractable 
13 Here, I have in mind Hursthouse (1999) which draws upon what McDowell (1979) calls an 
'inside-out' approach of taking the virtuous person as our key to right action rather than the other 
way around. 
14 The attempt to act above our moral level is one of the key themes of Conradi (2001 a). See also 
below, Chapter 6 for the case of Michael Meade drawn from Yhe Bell. 
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tensions quite so close to the surface might be seen as itself a problem. It could be 
charged that there is no plausible story which can be told which will allow for both an 
acceptance of Murdochs depth and for her toleration of such tensions. " My response 
is that part of what is lost sight of here is that MurdoclYs depth is not depth of 
analytic detail. She does have standards of precision, but they are about focus and not 
about multiply-tiered argumentative structures. 16 Part of the story to be told about 
MurdoclYs omission of a detailed response to particular problems is ajust-so story 
about the resulting philosophical style. It provides ample scope for omissions of detail 
and for localised weaknesses (such as her failure to distinguish between egocentricity 
and mere selfishness). Murdoch specialises in what we might call the big picture 
rather than the finely-grained argumentative detail. The result is something that she 
notes in the texts of others, 'a metaphysic or Weltanschauung may be felt to omit 
something which then peripherally and disturbingly haunts it, or else disappears to be 
rediscovered latee [M. 84]. Murdoch! s texts omit a great deal of this sort. 
These omissions do not, in any comprehensive way, undermine the 
philosophical significance of her work. They leave scope for others to produce more 
detailed and tighter arguments in the context of specific debates. An example of this is 
the way in which a Murdoch-type critique of the thin 'liberal theory of personality' 
(which collapses freedom into an absence of constraint) forms the acknowledged 
basis of prominent critiques of prioritising the right over the good within political 
philosophy. (Particularly by Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel. ) 17 The same critique 
of the idea of persons as empty units of free agency also informs Onora ONeirs case 
for mod4ing our preoccupation with choice within bioethics. " In citing these cases, 
it is also not my intention to suggest that Murdochs contribution is purely negative, 
the debunking of a problematic tendency within liberalism. I cite them only because of 
the work that has been done in these areas. 
We might nevertheless feel inclined to think that if Murdoch has such a high 
level view of matters then surely this is likely to make any high-level or surface 
problems stand out in greater detail. On this I am quite happy to concede that an 
15 A suggestion made by David Cockburn in response to an earlier version of Part III. 
16 See Chapter I above. 
17 Taylor (1989); Sandel (1982). 
18 ONeil (2002). 
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appeal to Murdoch's philosophical style is not enough to make sense of what creates 
a problem here. The just-so story is not the whole story. There are a pair of 
substantive commitments that must also be drawn upon to explain her dismissive 
attitude towards apparent anomalies. On the one hand, Murdoch models moral 
progress (including that of her own moral theory) on mystical progression towards an 
ideal end point of perfection. On the other hand, she has what Peter ConradL and 
after him Maria Antonaccio, have called a 'dualistic imagination!. 19 Binary contrasts 
abound: contrasts between the nice and the good; the sacred and the profane; 
existentialists and mystics; the fire and the sun. The latter contrast, drawn from the 
Cave metaphor and concerning true illumination and inferior or fake illumination, 
structures the significance of such contrasts in general. There is the real thing and 
various faked-up versions. The latter are all too readily accessible, the former is 
almost impossibly difficult to obtain. The source is mystically beyond discursive 
limits, noetic, standing in need of the partial insights gained through 
dernythologisation rather than formal definition. 20 'Plato says that higher realities 
appear at lower levels as images or shadows... But the shadow is not the reality and 
the reality is unimaginably different, its nature cannot be guessed from below. The 
"mode of projection" cannot be understood from beloW` [M. 124]. 21 
What this all-embracing metaphor of fake and real, not only allows but 
positively encourages once it is combined with an ideal of progress that is modelled 
on mystical advance, is a certain attitude towards anomalies. They are liable to be 
treated either as instances of the fake version or else as partial views of the greater 
truth and hence liable to disappear as progress is made. Suppose that I have a 
commitment to a process of unselfing of Murdoch's sort. Repeatedly I come across 
examples of what looks like similar commitment but which turn out, upon closer 
examination, to be flawed in some way (perhaps they are guilt-inducing, or conceal a 
level of spiritualized egocentricity, or embrace suffering in a dangerous manner). I do 
not need to treat these flawed unselfings as having any devastating implications for 
my own approach. Instead, especially if I am more concerned with exposition and 
19 Conradi (200 1 a), 92; Antonaccio (2000), 22. 
20 S. 98; Metaphysics, Chapter 1. 
21 The 'mode of projection! metaphor used here is Wittgensteinian. Where there is a mode of 
projection it makes sense to talk of picturing, of comparing an image and reality e. g. PI. 139. 
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articulation than defence, I may dismiss them as examples of the faked-up version of 
unselfing. I might even, treat them as confirmation instances of the presence of a dual 
structure of real moral progress and imitation progress. (A structure that I might feel 
needs no further elaboration than that I may have given elsewhere. ) The second part 
of the story to be told about why Murdoch fails to respond to the anomalies that her 
position generates concerns an ultimate level of commitment. At least some of the 
time, Murdoch sees the anomalies but holds to what I am inclined to call a mystical 
commitment to the idea that somehow all of this must fit together and it is only 
human weakness that makes matters seem otherwise. It is not just that she is 
dismissive, it is rather that she has something akin to faith operating in the 
background. Perhaps the term 'mystical commitment' may be less unsettling, but 
either way I can see no good reason for ignoring the way in which she blurs the 
boundaries between philosophy and a religious or spiritual commitment both to the 
reality of good and to her preferred mode of its discernment. 
She adheres to a notion of original sin yet in various comments on Augustine, 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Norman Malcolm she is clearly aware that this sort 
of view can lead to entrapment in gUnt. 22 Yet neither in the Sovereignty nor in the 
Metaphysics nor anywhere else in the philosophical texts does she deal with this 
danger in a systematic manner. This is not blindness to an obvious difficulty, it is 
rather commitment to (faith in) the view that somehow it must work itsetr out. 
Similarly, she is aware that a focus upon unselfing rather than directly upon others 
may be subject to a charge of spiritualized egocentricity. Such a charge periodically 
surfaces in the Metaphysics but again it is never taken up in any detail. 23 It makes 
little sense to think that she does not see the problem, and a great deal more to hold 
that she sees it as, in principle, solvable but not because she has any specific solution 
in mind. Finally, she does make an attempt to separate out her sort of suffering from a 
different, inferior, romantic sort of suffering. In this particular case I am not 
suggesting either that she fails to see the problem or that she gives no specific 
response, but rather that her way out that does not work. In each case, Murdocws 
attempt to partition fitked-up moral pilgrimage from the real thing is done without 
22 For example Murdoch sees a form of motivation by guilt at work in Malcolm's Kierkegaardian 
influenced account of the ontological proofý M. 486-7 and M. 500. 
23 For example at MAN Murdoch notes that a 'cult of personal goodness' may be 'merely selfish 
pleasure in disguise. 
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providing a defensible and detailed account of how, in the good person, the real thing 
escapes the limitations of its inferior version. 
This leads me to the third and final part of the story of why Murdoch fails to 
deal adequately with the apparent anomalies or surface tensions to which her position 
gives rise. It concerns the ineffability of the good person and the role of the novels. 
Murdoch holds that the good person partakes of the ineffability of the Good or is at 
least descriptively too problematic for any simple account to be given through a mere 
'enumeration! of various goods and virtues [M. 492]. 'Formal philosophy can come 
only so far, and after that can only point; Plato's Seventh Letter suggests something 
like this' [M. 236]. The upshot is that 'if we consider contemporary candidates for 
goodness, if we know any, we are likely to find them obscure or else on closer 
inspection fiffl of fimilty. Goodness appears to be both rare and hard to picture. #24 
Christ, Socrates and 'certain saints! are alluded to, but unselfish mothers of large 
families are initially taken as a better guide. When, on closer inspection, they are 
found to be full of frailty, or at least prone to 'egoistic satisfactions' it is aunts who 
'stand to us in the guise of a demonstration (to show it can be done)' [M. 429] 
Instead of providing a systematic treatment of the faked-up versions of moral 
progress and what separates them out from the real thing, what happens is that a 
good deal of the exploration of what goes wrong in faked-up or flawed unselfing is 
shunted out into the novels where troublesome questions can be illuminated but not 
ultimately solved. An example of this is MurdoclYs treatment of guilt. She sets out her 
hostility towards it in the philosophical texts but does not give any account of how 
her own position will avoid generating it. Most of her treatment of guilt ends up in 
the novels and not in the philosophical texts. But in the novels we do not see the 
manner in which the good, advanced pilgrim combines truthful vision and culpability 
with an avoidance of entrapment in guilt. MurdoclYs novelistic pilgrims nev6r get very 
far. There are some pointers, but that is all. 
Perhaps symptomatically, her novelistic pilgrims go astray, but it is never quite 
as a result of their adherence to MurdoclYs own position. (The novels cannot, in that 
sense, be treated generally as ironic self-criticism. ) There are pilgrims who think 
deeply about the same matters that concern Murdoch, but their views represent at 
best a pastiche of her own approach. The upshot is that MurdoclYs position in the 
24 GG, 51-2. 
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philosophical texts is not in any sense vindicated by the novels, nor does she think of 
this as the task of the novel. What is relied upon instead is her ultimate commitment 
to the view that anomalies are not grounds for abandoning her kind of moral 
pilgrimage but are, instead, grounds for seeing that the attempt to five the best sort of 
fife is subject to a great deal of temptation and uncertainty. (A rather more defensible 
claim. ) 
What I will do in Part 111, is what Murdoch does not do in any systematic way. 
I will provide an exposition of her approach which explores the case for saying that 
the surface tensions are simply too great, and that her pilgrimage is not a coherent 
moral project. If I am right and a plausible case can be made for this charge, it still 
does not at all follow that MurdocWs texts may be dismissed or otherwise 
marginalised. It may, instead, be held that our engagement with them must be more 
problematic than any simple articulation and defence of her position. That is to say, 
MurdoclYs philosophical significance, the value of what is deep in her texts and in her 
approach towards morality, must be sought, but it must be sought elsewhere than in 
their provision of a consistent overall metaphysical approach towards morals. 
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Chapter 5: Two Concepts of Contingency 
It is my contention that MurdocWs account of contingency reproduces what 
she calls puritanism. I will establish this in two stages. In the present chapter I will 
clarify her treatment of the concept. In the next chapter I will show that her view is 
inseparable from entrapment in a form of ontological guilt and that this is sufficient to 
justify a Murdochian classification of puritanism. 
Previously, I have emphasized the continuity of Murdocws thought after her 
transition to Platonism. Here, I will highlight the impact of this initial shift upon her 
concept of contingency. In her early critique of Sartre, Murdoch develops an account 
of contingency which centres upon what is particular, idiosyncratic and unique about 
humans, i. e. those features of human character which are emphasized (and respected) 
in the liberal tradition. She rejects the primacy of rule-based morality in favour of an 
emphasis upon discernment of the particular, unique (in a word contingent) individual 
in definite, particular circumstances. Her subsequent shift towards Platonism impacts 
upon how the contingency of humans is to be understood. It introduces a concept of 
ontological flaw or fallenness that is a shared feature of being human. This Platonic 
account does not efface the earlier liberal one, but continues alongside it, giving 
Murdoch two concepts of contingency in tension with each other. Her continuing 
commitment to the liberal concept does not, however, ultimately lessen the sense that 
humans are ontologically flawed. A concept of fallenness remains at the heart of 
Murdoch's mature view. 
1. Contingency as Diversity 
To draw out Murdochs early account of contingency I will consider three 
questions: "at are the conceptual connections that give 'contingency' its sense? To 
what is the term applicable? and How should we respond truthfully to the 
contingency of the world? To begin with, Murdoch uses the term in two important 
contrasts. Firstly, she echoes Aristotle and Leibniz by contrasting contingency with 
necessity. For Aristotle, what is contingent canbe or not be!. ' For Leibniz, everything 
I De Interpretatione, 2 lb makes the modal point that the possibility of being and of non-being imply 
each other. 
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must posses a 'sufficient reasod why it should be thus and not otherwise; what is 
contingent lacks any such reason in its own right and so must be traceable back to 
something other and necessary, i. e. God. 2 Murdoch makes Jake Donaghue express 
the same concern in Under the Net. 'I hate contingency, ' he says. 'I want everything in 
my life to have a sufficient reason. ' 3 The absence of necessity can be alarming. 
Secondly, she contrasts contingency with aesthetic form. Form is the significant 
structuring that we give to our experience. Narrative form is one example. Murdoch 
holds that form conveys a sense of necessity and writes of 'a fear of contingency, a 
yearning to pierce through the messy phenomenal world to some perfect and 
4 necessary form and ordee. She detects a 'tendency to conceal death and chance by 
the invention of forms. Any story which we tell about ourselves consoles us since it 
imposes pattern upon something which might otherwise seem intolerably chancy and 
incomplete'. 5 A metaphysic runs the risk of covering over contingency by virtue of its 
structured exposition and systematicity. Hegel exemplifies this danger but is also 
acutely aware of the virtues of aligning the form of exposition with the content of 
what is to be said .6 From a Murdochian standpoint, any regularly-organized 
philosophical text can only do limited justice to the contingent. The novel is taken to 
be a better way to convey some aspects of contingency but it too has (different) 
limitS. 7 Tragedy is better at dealing with mortality and this also is an aspect of 
contingency. (We are mortal hence not necessary. ) Tragedy in turn is unlike life 
because it is tightly structured but attempts to use compactness of form to convey 
contingency. We see the contingency of characters because their death is inevitable. 
The trick is only partially successful. No text can comprehensively escape from the 
constraints of form, hence they can never do full justice to all aspects of the 
contingent! All art (all text) is a compromise. We do the best we can. 
2 Leibniz, Monadology, § 32. 
3 Under the Net, 26. 
4 SBR, 2734. 
5 SG, 85. 
6 She is concerned with what Hegel identified as the conflict of form and content. For Hegel, such 
oppositions were not absolute, see, for example the Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. 
7 Antonaccio (1996a). 
8 These limits are explored in Metaphysics, chapter 5. 
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To what is the term applicable? Murdoch agrees with Sartre that we live 
amidst 'the brute nameless there-ness of material existence', we encounter the 'brute 
confusion of the contingent world'. 9 Nor is there some strictly social determining 
dialectic. History is not a necessary process of inescapable transformations of the sort 
envisaged by Hegel and Marx. 10 Yet the key Murdochian focus is not on the 
contingency of nature or society, but upon the contingency of the individual. 
'Contingency must be defended for it is the essence of personality. "' Priority must be 
given to 'the whole human being, the contingent eccentric fellow whom John Stuart 
Mill lovingly envisaged but whom he was unable philosophically to protect'. 12 This 
charge extends into a literary aesthetic. MurdocWS view in Sartre, Romantic 
Rationalist is that the characters in Sartre's novels are symbols for his ideas, they are 
not realistic individuals. Sartre claims to be doing justice to, even championing, 
contingency but all the while his approach covers it over. 
This emphasis upon the contingency of individuals rescues Murdoch from a 
serious performative contradiction. There are aspects of contingency which she 
clearly neglects. Brian Nicol points out that 'While Murdoch's rhetoric in her 
non-fiction unfailingly is about the necessity of preserving a sense of real, contingent, 
experience away from the totalising impulse of systems, the fact is that her philosophy 
performs quite the opposite. 13 She tries to lump philosophers together as 
representatives of broader trends that can be captured in genealogies, usually of 
decline. Thus, post-war analytic philosophy and existentialism are assimilated and so 
too are Derrida and the structuralism which he criticizes. Murdoch plays fast and 
loose with textual detail but by virtue of prioritising the contingency of the individual, 
and not that of theories or texts, she defuses the destructive implications of this 
criticism. Disclosure of human contingency comes at a price, other forms of 
9 EPM, I. 
10 This is the point of the earlier chapters of Sartre's Nausea. His central character faces the problem 
of writing a history of the Marquis de Rollebon without imposing an artificial sense of necessity. 
During her late attempt to clarify her attitude towards Marxism in the 1980s Murdoch enthuses 
about Adorno, as a champion of contingency undermining Marxism from within. (1987 Introduction 
to Sartre and Metaphysics Chapter 12. ) 
11 SBR, 285. 
12 SBR, 284. 
13 Nicol (2001), 589. 
108 
contingency are covered over in the process. One aspect of contingency is seen at the 
expense of others but this is a price that Murdoch can afford to pay. 
"at is to count as a truthful response to contingency? Murdoch frames her 
early attitude in reply to Sartre's novel La Nausie. The central character, Roquentin, 
is an unhappy consciousness in the following, Hegelian, sense: 'a personality confined 
to its own self and its own petty actions, a personality brooding over itself, as 
wretched as it is impoverished'. 14 The Hegelian unhappy consciousness is cursed with 
an ideal of perfection beyond reach and aspired to vaguely in 'a musical thinking!. 
Hegel's broader metaphor for this condition is one of exile: like the Jews, the unhappy 
consciousness is exiled from its promised land. 15 For Hegel, Christian self-doubt and 
conscience follow historically and conceptually from this exile, this awareness of flaw. 
Consider now the Sartrean instantiation in La Naus& As in Hegel, music symbolizes 
perfectionist longing. Sartre's Roquentin listens to a record, scratched and imperfect, 
but playing a song which has (seemingly) escaped from temporality. So too has the 
Negress who sings it and the Jew who wrote it. 'For me they are a little like dead 
people, a little like heroes of novels; they have cleansed themselves of the sin of 
existing. Not completely, of course - but as much as any man can., 
16 Murdoch's 
reading states that 'These two are saved, washed of the sin of existing. Why should he 
not be saved too? d7 
Roquentin encounters the contingent diversity of the world as fallenness and 
not as glorious particularity and difference. The latter is an alternative suggested by 
Gabriel Marcel, and explored by Murdoch later in her novels. " For Murdoch, 
Roquentin is a characteristic existentialist, 'this rather bitter view of reality as "fallen" 
is a persistent feature of existentialist thinking'. '9 Roquentin is a characteristic doubter 
who 'sees the world of everyday reality as a fallen and bedraggled place - fallen out of 
14 Hegel, Phenomenology, sections 217,225. 
15 Hcgcl, Phil. 11ist., 322-3. 
16 Sartre, Nausea, 25 1. 
17 Sartre, 4 1. 
18 Sartre, 49; Metaphysics, 266. In Chapter 15,180 of A Fairly Honourable Defeat the vacillating 
character Morgan encounters an overgrown disused railway-cutting first with 'nausea' and then as 
infinitely beautiftil. Her neurotic young companion, Peter encounters it as 'just stufr commenting 
that 'nothing in the world... is intact and precious and absolutely beautiful. Everything is 
contaminated and muddled and nasty and slimed over and cracked. ' 
19 EPM, 135-6. 
109 
the realm of being into the realm of existence. "' Her early reservations about this 
approach are continuous with Merleau-Ponty's critique of Sartre which places humans 
more at home in the world . 
21 For Sartre, the world is alien and threatening, we are 
continually tempted to lapse into bad-faith by refusing to encounter it as it really is. 
This tendency towards concealment is something that Murdoch can agree with. 
Although she leaves open the possibility of encountering contingency as diversity, she 
does not dissent from Sartre's view that we tend to conceal it behind consoling 
narratives (aesthetic form). What she disagrees with is his diagnosis of why this is the 
case. For Sartre, covering over contingency is primarily a matter of insincerity. For 
Murdoch it is a matter of egocentricity and poor vision, occlusion rather than a 
purposive chosen concealment. 22 
In Murdoch's early novelistic response to Sartre, Under the Net, our quality of 
vision is not improved by the guilt-ridden attitude towards being that characterizes 
the unhappy consciousness. Guilt is treated as suspect, a concealing emotion. The 
hero, Jake, is most guilt ridden when he is most deluded. He avoids his friend Hugo 
because he has purloined and published ideas from their conversations. They are 
finally reunited when Hugo is taken to the hospital where Jake works as a porter. 'A 
conflict of emotions filled me. My immediate feeling was one of guilt ... I had the 
curious sense that it was because of some neglect of mine that Hugo had been struck 
down. ' 23 Jake would rather feel guilty than uninvolved. His guilt is bound up with his 
egocentricity. (A recurring theme in MurdocWs subsequent novels . )24 The 
existentialist self is dramatized by this move, by this overestimation of responsibility, 
as if one were to say everything depends upon me. This does not help to disclose the 
contingency of persons, it helps to conceal it. 
Under the Net treats (responds to) reality not as fallen but as rich in 
particularity and uniqueness. In its beginning, Jake visits Dave Gellman, a Jewish 
character 'with a contingent address' (there being 'some parts of London which are 
necessary and others which are contingent'). It is then that he tells the reader'l hate 
20 Sartre, 43,42. 
21 Notably in The Phenomenology ofPerception (1945). 
22 This contrast between Murdoch and Sartre owes a debt to Diogcnes Allen (1974), 186-7. 
23 Under the Net, 236. 
24 See Chapter 6 below for more on guilt. 
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contingency. I want everything in my life to have a sufficient reason'. He does have 
his moments ot insight too, his moments of truthful response to contingency. He is 
repelled by the one character who does provide a theory of everything (a socialist 
called Lefty Todd). Instead, Jake is drawn towards Hugo who is to be found in a part 
of South Londonwhere contingency reaches the point of nausea!. Hugo tells him that 
language is inadequate to the task of capturing contingency and that we must restrict 
its use. (He has pronounced Wittgensteinian tendencies, a penchant for passing things 
over in silence. ) Jake, as a journeyman writer recognizes that we must make the most 
of what we've got and not withdraw from either the word or the world. (There is a 
curious connection between Hugo and Lefty, neither is quite right. ) In the novel's 
closing scene, Jake responds to fantasy-generating music not with the otherworldly 
reverie of Roquentin, instead he says'Turn it off. As in Sartre's La Nausie, the novel 
ends hopefully but not with the possibility of escaping contingency, rather with the 
possibility of embracing it. Jake shuns the other-worldly and embraces diversity in the 
shape of newborn and differently-coloured kittens. They are one of 'the wonders of 
the world' . 
25 The concluding imagery is homely, kitsch even. 
11. Contingency as Fallenness 
So far I have considered MurdocWs approach as it is set up in response to 
Sartre, and briefly alluded to its similarity to contemporary French critiques, notably 
Merleau-Ponty's rejection of the otherworldly motif of fallenness in Sartre: his self is 
not at home in the world, it is a disembodied capacity for choice and ignores the real 
'sedimentation! of character . 
26 These critical themes are shared. With Merleau-Ponty, 
Murdoch also emphasises the enigmatic nature of objects and the importance of 
perception, rather than unencumbered choice. Consider now what happens when 
Murdoch shifts over to Platonism and introduces her own account of fallenness. A 
significant similarity to Sartre rather than his critics, now appears. A clarification of 
this requires us to separate out the two key concepts (of contingency and fallenness) 
that are involved. The term 'contingency' derives from the Aristotelian tradition and 
concerns whatever lacks necessity. This may pertain to propositions (there are 
25 Under the Net, 26,156,275,286. 
26 The metaphor of sedimentation in Merleau-Ponty (1962), 441, may be contrasted with Sartre's 
insistence in Being and Nothingness that consciousness is without incrtia, 
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contingent truths as well as necessary ones) or to things in the world (things that 
might not have been in the past or might cease to be in the future). The term 
Tallenness', by contrast, is embedded in the Platonic tradition but it can be seen as a 
strengthening of contingency. It suggests, firstly, a contrast between what is 
contingent and something else that is extant, necessary and better. Secondly, it 
suggests a specific relation of striving or desire between the contingent being and 
necessary existence. This is often set out via the metaphor of exile, notably, in Plato's 
Phaedrus where humans have tumbled to earth and need to regrow their wings in 
order to ascend and get a glimpse of home. 27 Insofar as we are fallen, we are always 
going home. I will take it that this contrast with and relation to necessity give us the 
minimal criteria for fallenness. Hegel's unhappy consciousness and Sartre's Roquentin 
would both qualify as types of fallen man. 
Whereas Murdoch connects contingency with what is ideosyncratic and 
particular, fallenness refers to a shared human predicament. When she endorses the 
latter, it creates a tension between universal predicament and particularity of 
character. It also occasions a reversal of her earlier critique of Sartre. In 1952 
fallenness is treated as 'sometimes Platonic' a 'bitter view of objective reality and 'a 
persistent feature of existentialiSnf. 28 By the time of the Sovereignty, she has moved 
to the opposite charge that Sartre, and existentialism as a whole, deny 'what might be 
called a doctrine of original Sid. 29 (Where the latter is the the same as fallenness. ) 
What separates these two (incompatible) readings of existentialism, is Murdocws 
adoption of Platonism and her encounter with T. S. Eliot. She drops her own charge 
and adopts Eliot's claim that Romanticism in general is caught up in a 'denial' of 
original sin . 
30 Endorsing this position comes at the expense of ignoring certain 
features of Sartre and indeed Camus, Heidegger and Kierkegaard, all of whom 
endorse some version of original sin or fallenness. In point of textual detail, the earlier 
reading of Sartre is the more defensible of the two. Sartrean maWs impossible 
27 Consider the commentary on the Phaedrus and 'Our fallen nature' provided by the Platonist Max 
in The Unicom, 100. 
28 EPM, 136. 
29 GG, 50. 
30 TSAM, 162. This claim has a pedigree in literary criticism that stretches beyond Eliot. T. E. Hulme 
viewed the denial of original sin as the central feature of romanticism, albeit basing this upon a 
skewed view of Rousseau as a champion of human pcrfectability. 
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aspiration is strongly reminiscent of an impossible pursuit of perfection. (A desire for 
equality or unity with God as Murdoch had previously emphasized . 
)3 1 The closest she 
comes to a justification for her sacrifice of textual detail is in her suggestion that 
32 existentialist 'gloorn' is 'superficial' (and not bitter after all). The shift does, however, 
make some sense once we realize that the earlier position was also under strain, 
combining reticence about fallenness with a sympathetic attitude towards a 
Christianity that is bound up with it. 
Her encounter with T. S. Eliot during her transition to Platonism is noteworthy 
because it is concerned with fallenness as an integral part of a religious conception of 
being. She initially conflates Platonic and Christian traditions and even as late as the 
Metaphysics she writes of 'Our incomplete and Tallen! state, and our bitter awareness 
of it ... 
independently portrayed in Plato and the biblical tradition. ' [M. 228]. In both 
her Eliot article of 1958 and in the Sovereignty, fallenness and 'original sin' are used 
interchangeably. 33 This adds a further layer to the concept. By assimilating Christian 
'original sin! to fallenness, Murdoch seems to be embracing overtones of culpability 
that are less obvious in Platonism. (Am I to blame if I have been chained since birth at 
the back of a cave? ) 
These overtones of culpahility for heing create a problem of intelligibility. 
Does it make sense to think of ourselves as being at fault, not for anything that we 
have done but for what we are. Perhaps, as Bernard Willaims suggests, our reluctance 
here is merely cultural, an attachment to the liberal ideal that individuals should be 
free from legal sanctions unless they place themselves in jeopardy by their actions. 34 
This is not the only norm that has been historically operative, nor is it the. sole 
standard that is still at work, even in liberal societieS. 35 It also leans upon a 
preoccupation with agency that Murdoch does not share. Nevertheless, a nagging 
doubt about intelligibility may remain. Even if, as one of her characters has it, 'The 
language of sin may be more appropriate than that of science and as likely to "cure"' 
31 This theme of impossible aspiration, of desiring to be an absolute subject and absolute object 
provides the title for Chapter V of Sartre. 
32 GG, 49. 
33 YSAM, 162 and 163. Freud is credited with a doctrine of 'original sin! that is a 'realistic and 
detailed picture of the fallen man' at GG, 50. 
34 Williams (1993), 65. 
35 We might think here about blood-feud in feudal society. 
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we still have not actually tumbled from the skies, nor are we in possession of 
soul-things with indelible black marks upon them. 36 Yet we cannot, I think, deny that 
these concepts are being used descriptively by Murdoch, and not just as normative 
pointers or devices. Value-commmýittment and factual description do not come apart 
in her writings. But when she uses these seemingly antiquated terms just what is being 
described? 
A tempting suggestion, made by David Gordon and taken up by Maria 
Antonaccio, is that the terminology of original sin in Murdoch 'has been 
misunderstood'. It describes nothing more sinister than the flawed character of our 
moral vision. 37 What is amiss here is that both Gordon and Antonaccio focus only 
upon the Christian concept of 'original sin! and neglect its Platonic counterpart of 
Tallenness'. 38 This is misleading. Important though vision is, fallenness creates a 
different network of conceptual interconnections. Not only is it consistent with 
culpability, it also sets up the idea of our moral vision and being as 'fallen and 
incomplete', and with it a relation of striving a desire for completeness [M. 293]. By 
contrasting our imperfection and incompleteness with the ontological necessity and 
unity of the Good, and by positing a relation of pilgrimage towards it, Murdoch 
meets the two minimal criteria given above for fallenness. 'Our home is elsewhere, ' 
remarks Plato in the Acastos dialogues, and for once Socrates concurs. This account 
of ontological endeid or lack that grounds our desire for progress goes well beyond 
the idea of flawed vision. (An account of attention, the effort to improve the quality 
of moral vision, need not be placed in such a Platonic context . 
39) 
Acceptance of Murdoclfs commitment to fallenness is bound up with 
acceptance that she is describing humans in teleological terms. Perhaps we might 
regard it as a weak form of teleology, one that is built into ourselves rather than 
inhering in the fundamental structures of the universe, but it is teleology nonetheless. 
Two problems arise from this observation. Firstly, some theological commentators, 
such as Peter Byrne, treat Murdoch as an opponent of teleology on the basis of the 
following assertion in the Sovereignty: 'That human life has no external point or 
36 The Philosopher's Pupil, 8 1. 
37 Gordon (1995), 6111, Antonaccio (2000), 130-2,149. 
38 For Platonic fallenness see The Fire and Sun, 48,52,57,80 and 81. And forworthlessness', 20. 
39 See the account of attention above in Chapter 2. 
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, rc?, og is a view as difficult to argue as its opposite, and I shall simply assert it. I can 
see no evidence to suggest that human life is not something self-contained. 00 
Although perhaps misleading, even geared to mislead, this formulation denies only an 
external telos. (I will take it that 'external' is used here in response to religious ideas 
of a God who is out there in a more-or-less non-figurative sense. ) 
Secondly, Gordon (but not Antonaccio, who favours a downgrading of 
vision) is concerned that a concept of 'original sin' which does not reduce to flawed 
vision may compromise its importance. I would suggest, instead, that it helps to 
develop the conceptual content of flawed vision. Consider the pilgrim Garth in An 
Accidental Man. He encounters suffering, necessity and death and feels that a more 
innocent contentment is now lost. 'Was this his fallen state? Was this every mans 
fallen state? Experience was impure and inextricably mingled with delusion. '41 The 
suggestion here is that moral phenomenology involves intermittent awareness of fault 
42 that goes beyond awareness of particular moral failures. This claim is endorsed in 
the philosophical texts 'To speak here of an inevitable imperfection ... may 
be taken as 
a reference to ourTallen' human condition, but this need be given no special dogmatic 
sense' It may be 'regarded as an empirical fact' or 'as a synthetic a priori truth'. 43 
Awareness of imperfection is a real event, an event that tells us about the a priori 
structure of how we experience (see) the world. This passage is paraphrased in the 
Metaphysics and reinforced by the assertion that 'A picture of humanity must portray 
its fallen nature' [M. 509]. Fallenness imposes limits upon vision, its perfection lies 
always in the future. 
Over time, MurdocHs own awareness of imperfection is strengthened with 
the increasingly Platonic tenor of her writings. In 7he Fire and the Sun she finally 
separates out the Christian and Platonic accounts of human imperfection, favouring 
the creation myth of Plato's Timaeus over the Christian alternative of creation ex 
40 SG, 77; Byrne (1998), Chapter 5, especially, 111-12. 
41 An Accidental Man, 187; see also The Philosopher's Pupil, 81-2, for awareness of a deep wound 
'so deep that one wants to call it "original", whatever that means'. 
42 In The Green Knight Murdoch toys with the Freudian idea that awareness of fallenness may be 
bound up with the traumatic end of childhood. The Middle English Green Knight is part of a cluster 
of manuscripts concerned with patience, purity (cleanness) and the first fall from grace. 
43 JP, 27.1 will take it that Murdoch's use of 'synthetic a priori' is not intended to be strict, 
otherwise she would be committed to the problematic view that facts and values arc fused but 
synthetic and analytic truths are not, see Putnam (2002), Chapters 1-2. 
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nihilo. 44 A cosmic artisan (the Demiurge) mediates between us and perfection, 
copying perfect forms that only he sees into the imperfect and resistant medium that is 
our natural element. On this picture, perfection is more distant than ever . 
45 'In the 
early dialogues the spiritual world is so close that we seem to be God's children. In 
the Timaeus we are his grandchildren. In the Laws we are his toys. 'What separates us 
from Good is now an 'astronomical distance'. 46 In the Acastos dialogues, MurdoclYs 
concern shifts to response rather than diagnosis. Imperfect existence is the lot we 
must come to terms with. 'Our home may be elsewhere, ' comments Socrates, 'but we 
are condemned to exile, to live here with our fellow exiles. " Ontological lack is 
ineradicable. 
By the time of the Metaphysics, a growing worry is that this rather 'bittee 
picture of the human (a picture of the human as in some sense ontologically flawed) 
should not lapse into fatalism, as if our inability to comprehensively overcome our 
condition makes any degree of mitigation pointless. Murdoch tackles this in her 
examination of Schopenhauer's endorsement of original sin. His belief in culpability 
for 'what we are' is viewed as 'a reasonable generalisation about the natural sinfulness 
of humane, but what is rejected is his Tantasising' and 'deterministic' resignation and 
tendency to undermine our sense of culpability. We must, instead, respond to 
sinfulness by working to improve our condition [M. 66-7; M 103 -4]. What also serves 
Schopenhauer well, as a mitigation of the dark overtones of 'the fallen scene, 
everywhere visible! is his 'irrepressible empiricist gaiety'. Murdoch holds these two to 
be 'in tension! [M. 70]. She believes that his appreciation of contingency softens his 
account of fallenness. Below I will consider whether the same is true for her own 
commitment to contingency simpliciter alongside contingency as fallenness. 
111. The Self as Unique and Fallen 
Murdoch's commitment to simple contingency is a liberal standpoint. Her 
view is that we should try to understand the other. By contrast, her commitment to 
44 The contrast between creation ex nihilo and worldng from preformed flawed materials is 
emphasized in Hauerwass (1996). 
45 TS, 6 1. 
46 ES, 60-61. 
47 A castos, 6 1. 
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fallenness is an aspect of her Platonism. This combination is surprising. Platonism is 
not notoriously liberal. (The Laws has a particularly bad reputation. ) The later 
commitment does not supersede the earlier but continues alongside it. Murdoch was a 
liberal before she was a Platonist and continued to be one afterwards. Her Platonism 
emerged not in opposition to her liberalism, but as an unusual way of solving some of 
its problems. In particular, Platonism' s account of inner transformation and character 
offered a way to value 'the contingent eccentric fellow whom John Stuart Mill 
lovingly envisaged but whom he was unable philosophically to protect, unable 
because he promoted choice at the expense of character. 48 
In line with this concern there are two related questions that I want to raise. 
Firstly, what are the implications offallennessfor Murdoch's own conception of the 
sey? My concern here is that fallenness implies different things about the self in 
different theories. In Dante's Christianized Platonic account, he and Virgil travel all 
the way through Hell and then Purgatory with Virgil continually addressing Dante as 
'thou' and 'thee. 49 It is only when purged of his sins, at the very end of Purgatory that 
he is finally addressed as Dante'. 50 His truest self is the redeemed part, the part which 
remains when everything else is burned away. This is consistent with Christian and 
Pauline notions: our truest self is not the flesh, it is not that which is to be purged but 
that which remains after purgation. Plato is equivocal on this matter. He gives a 
similar impression in the Phaedo where the body stands as a symbol for what is 
perishable, hence inessential. (Even as late as the Republic he writes of the soul as an 
original purity which is encrusted with all manner of inessential stuff, like the 
Sea-God, encrusted with debris at [Republic, 61 1]. ) By the time of the Phaedrus, his 
self is more composite in character; we don't ascend by cutting horses loose from the 
soul's chariot, we constrain them and they stay with us. 51 These are two different 
versions of the fallen self Murdoch may be aligned one way or the other. I will 
return to this question of her alignment below. 
48 SBR, 284. 
49 FS, 34-5 approvingly cites Cornforcrs comment that Dante provides the best commentary on the 
Symposium. For Dante's general influence on Murdoch see Nussbaum (1996). 
50 Dante, Purgatory, XXX, 55. 
51 1 draw here from Nussbaum, without endorsing all aspects of her reading of the Phaedrus in 7he 
Fragility of Good, particularly the view that it marks a major shift in his attitude towards the 
emotions. In line with her Plato reading, Nussbaum tends to locate Murdoch in relation to the 
Phaedrus rather than the Symposium. 
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My second question is this: given the persistence of both contingency and 
fallenness, how are Murdoch's liberal and Platonic commitments combined? Maria 
Antonaccio (although not specifically concerned with the fallenness/contingency 
contrast) proposes the tempting option of allotting Murdoch's Platonism to the 
private sphere and her Liberalism to the public sphere. On this view, Platonic 
unselfing helps us to see the other realistically thereby psychologically equipping us to 
meet our public liberal commitments. 52 My objection to any such approach is that 
these contrasts do not line up in the desired manner. Murdoch does use contingency 
primarily in contexts where she considers others, and fallenness in contexts where she 
considers the self However, these categories pertain to the fundamental ontology 
which is shared by both. They concern the substantial or thick self that is the object of 
unselfing and not just the thin, minimal self that is a political convenience for 
according public status. 53 Contingency and fallenness somehow have to coexist within 
the same sphere. 
The most straightforward way of representing this coexistence is by saying 
that each constrains the contribution of the other. We can see that fallenness must 
constrain the contingency of the self by briefly comparing her views with those of 
Richard Rorty. Like Murdoch, Rorty has an identifiably liberal commitment to 
contingency. There is also enough proximity in their general philosophical inclinations 
about philosophical writing and its limits for a comparison to be instructive, although 
perhaps we might want to allow that Murdoch has more of a cohesive and restrictive 
54 view of what is to count as a philosophical text. Whatever their other differences, 
both make a great play on the theme of contingency and allow that literature is 
sometimes (often) a more adequate way of conveying it. For Rorty, the contingency 
of the self is bound up with individuality. That which makes my self mine is what 
makes it unique. The genius is the paradigm of the individual. Both admire Freud, but 
for Rorty, what Freud grasps is that human life involves coming to grips with (and 
breaking from) past contingencies, rather than living up to some idealized notion of 
52 Antonaccio (2002). 
53 As Antonaccio (2002) points out, Murdoch! s shifts from claiming that a thick account of the self 
is a political necessity (in 'A House of Theory') to the (more Rawlsian) claim that it is a political 
liability. 
54 Although embracing a romantic project that Murdoch rejects, Rorty (1979), 280-281; 306ff; 
334;. 374-375, favors her argument against the fact-value distinction. (She provides one of his 
exemplars of a discursive style that reconfigures the relation between rcdescription and argument. ) 
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perfection. There is no Rortian felos. Rortian life is simply rewoven, reworked and 
then interrupted by death. Liberal society is not the end of history, but a contingent 
and perhaps temporary configuration. Language too is viewed as a contingent, 
15 makeshift toolkit with items periodically added and removed. 
Of these three aspects of contingency (society, language and the self) 
Murdoch is only in a position to agree about the contingency of the first. This is 
because fallenness is an inescapably teleological concept. It requires what Rorty 
denies, i. e. aspiration towards perfection. (The metaphorical return home of the 
fallen. ) For Murdoch, language and the self have built-in moral structures woven 
around an idea of perfection. This compromises the extent to which language and the 
self can be contingent jumble. It must also have necessary, invariant moral features. 
The Murdochian self is, consequently, less contingent than the Rortian one. We might 
be tempted to imagine that if fallenness constrains contingency in this way, it might in 
turn be constrained by it, and constrained in a way which mitigates or waters-down its 
unwelcome 'bitter' overtones. This is the same claim that she makes in the case of 
Schopenhauer's treatment of existence as our original sin: that it is in tension with his 
'irrepressible empiricist gaiety' and fascination with the detail of the world. My 
contention is that rather than mitigating fallenness, the mutual constraint of these two 
categories rules out the close identification of the self with its 'better' part. She cannot 
take the line of Dante that the true self is the self without the flaws. The Murdochian 
self is to be portrayed in a more warts-and-all manner. 
Before showing why this is the case, I want to suggest that there is a good 
liberal reasons for ruling out any identification of the self with the better self, ie. there 
is a good reasons why a Murdochian would want to understand the fallen self in 
precisely the way that she does. It is bound up with a problem identified in Isaiah 
Berlids 'Two Concepts of Liberty. Berlin divides accounts of freedom into positive 
and negative theories. Negative freedom isfreedomfrom of the sort defended by Mill 
and exemplified by his harm principle. (Roughly: we should be free to harm ourselves 
but not others. 56 ) This is the sort of liberal freedom which -within bounds that Mill 
might not have accepted- Murdoch wants for the public sphere. However, she holds 
55 Rorty (1989), Chapter 2. 
56 For the harm principle, Chapter I of On Liberty. I am not claiming that M11 advances only this 
negative account of freedom. 
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that part of our contemporary philosophical mistake (exemplified by Sartre) has been 
to treat this commitment as the basis for a theory of personality. Murdoch treats 
freedom as something that has to be worked at, constructed, earned by developing 
one's imagination and one's ability to attend. It is not about the sheer absence of 
constraint. 57 She advocates a variant of what Berlin calls positive freedom, a freedom 
that he sees as more problematic from a liberal point of view. " 
Whereas negative freedom involves having all the doors left open, and none 
barred, positive freedom involves having the competences required to go through 
them. The problem Berlin highlights is that such an account of positive freedom is 
vulnerable to illiberal misuse. The moral psychology of a higher and lower self opens 
up the way for coercive political measures against individuals' stated wishes to be 
justified as somehow endorsed by their own higher, truest selves against the vocal 
opposition engendered by their lower, inessential selves. Democracy might then be 
argued to require ignoring what unpurged, unregenerate, people want in the name of 
what their idealized, better or reformed selves would more appropriately desire if 
freed from the detritus and rubble of their imperfections. (They might, in Rousseau's 
terms, be forced to be free. )" 
Murdoch's commitment to contingency constrains fallenness by ruling out 
precisely this Dantean better setf is truest setf model. The trouble with Dante, from a 
Murdochian point of view, is that his truest self is the bit that desires the same as 
everyone else. Although an element of personal idiosyncrasy is retained because his 
love of God is mediated through his love of Beatrice, true selves are all pretty much 
60 
alike in their aspirations. Contingency, as afundamental feature of the self, becomes 
dangerously compromised. Respect for contingency requires respect for difference, 
57 For an account of the freedom of the self which is heavily influenced by Murdoch's hostility to the 
'unencumbered self but which is more directly concerned with Bcrlin! s contrast between 
positive/negativc freedom, see Charles Taylor Sources ofthe Self. That Murdoch's account of the self 
is an account of its freedom is convincingly shown in Chapter 6 of Antonaccio's Picturing the 
Human. 
58 Here we should note that Bcrlin! s own attitude towards positive freedom is unclear rather than 
hostile. 'Two Concepts' has been plausibly read as straightforwardly rejecting a positive conception 
of freedom but Berlin has denied any such general hostility. 
59 Berlin (1969), Section V. 
60 Nussbaum (1993) treats Dante as more respcctftd of particularity than Plato. For Nussbaum, this 
aligns Murdoch closer to Dante than to Plato. Murdoch's own view of Dante is, perhaps, rather 
influenced by T. S. Eliot's contrast: Shakcspheare is messy and contingent, Dante favours order. 
TSAM, 167-8. 
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and this requires a more inclusive understanding of the self, an understanding that is 
closer to the self of the Phaedrus than it is to the limited self of the Phaedo. 
That Murdoch endorses just such an inclusive view can be seen in her 
pronouncements: from the novels, the self is primarily constituted by 'rough 
contingent rubble'; and from the philosophical texts, We are, as real people, 
unfinished and full of blankness and jumble; only in our illusioning fantasy are we 
61 complete'. More generally, her endorsement of the inclusive self can be seen in the 
way that she formulates her views as an attack upon the self What Dante regards as 
the inessential residue is regarded by Murdoch as an integral part of what we are. 62 
His souls leap into the purgative flames because what suffers is not their truest selves. 
The Murdochian self is not so detached from its physicality and rubble. If I am to be 
transformed into a perfect being, my default self which is bound up with contingent, 
sinful egocentric projects, will, in a figurative sense, be destroyed and not preserved. 
The advantage of this standpoint is that once the self is no longer identified 
with the 'better self, but with what is wrong with us, no defensible authoritarian 
appeal can be made to its implicit, unstated, or presumed endorsements of enlightened 
coercive political measures. The disadvantage is that it reconciles fallenness and 
contingency in terms that do not weaken, dilute or mitigate the 'bittee significance of 
fallenness. What we are is mostly imperfect rubble, flawed, unable to see others justly, 
or at least preoccupied and only partly aspiring toward what is good. What this also 
strengthens is the sense of our culpability for what we are. What sins is really us. To 
see this, consider again the phenomenology of moral disappointment, our experience 
of moral failures great and small. It is difficult to see ordinary moral failure as really 
our fault if we have so little to go on in our choices and if goods happen to conflict. 
'English philosophy and popular existentialism are on the same side, with their urgent 
cry of "we have to choose! " -a doctrine which is, after all, consoling for us sinners 
who blunder on through a life of continual mistakes. 63 For Murdoch, the 
disappointment of our best aspirations is ultimately linked to our all too human 
61 The Philosopher's Pupil, 8 1; Metaphysics, 97. 
62 Murdoch's imagery of Apollo's flaying of Marsyas, central to 7he Black Pfince, but not exclusive 
to it, is more appropriate to this than the joyful leaping of Dante's souls into the flames. They know 
that they will come out mostly intact, Marsyas, by contrast is tornfirom himsetf. (This latter is the 
formulation of his punishment-as-transformation in Ovid's Metamorphoses. ) 
63 KV, 159. 
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limitations, to 'the abysmal sinfidness of humans' [M. 483]. This aspect of our 
humanity is not disowned as lying outside our true selfbood. It is treated as an 
integral part of what we are and part of what we are aware of in moral 
disappointment. 'A picture of humanity must portray its fallen nature' [M. 5 09]. 
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Chapter 6: Fallenness and Guilt 
For anyone promoting an exacting moral discipline, puritanism is liable to be a 
concern. Murdoch not only promotes such a discipline, she also takes a stance against 
puritanism. The latter is a concept that she associates, on the one hand, with the 
attempt to suddenly escape from the messiness of the human condition and, on the 
other, with entrapment in guilt. (An emotion to which Murdoch is hostile). Section I 
below will set out the concept and danger of puritanism; section 11 will set out 
Murdoch's sustained hostility towards guilt, and section III will show that 
Murdochian awareness of fallenness involves entrapment in guilt. 
1. The Dangers of Puritanism 
In 77ie Bellthe troubled pilgrim Michael Meade and the no-nonsense puritan 
James Tayper Pace, provide contrasting commentaries upon the text 'be ye therefore 
perfect'. ' James reads it as an exhortation to embrace the good without delay and not 
to get bogged down with introspective muddle. 'A belief in Original Sin should not 
lead us to probe the filth of our minds or regard ourselves as unique and interesting 
sinners. As sinners we are much the same and our sin is essentially something tedious, 
something to be shunned and not something to be investigated. '2 Michael Meade is a 
more sympathetically drawn character. He sees that perfection cannot be suddenly 
attained and that one rule will not fit all. 'As spiritual beings, in our imperfection and 
also in the possibility of our perfection, we differ profoundly one from another. ' Our 
moral level must be taken into account. 'To live in innocence, or having fallen to 
return to the way, we need all the strength that we can muster - and to use our 
strength we must know where it lies ... Self-knowledge will lead us to avoid occasions 
of temptation rather than to rely on naked strength to overcome them. We must not 
arrogate to ourselves actions which belong to those whose spiritual vision is higher or 
other than ours. From this attempt only disaster will come. 3 
I The Bell, Chapters 9 and 16, picking up on the commentary in Wcil (1952), 208, and citing the 
biblical text Matthew, 5: 48, see also IP, 29; GG, 60. 
2 The Bell, Ch 9,131-2. 
3 The Bell, Ch 16,2034. The idea of moral levels show the influence of Simone Weil, KV. 158 
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Although Murdoch's depiction of Meade is generous, it would be a mistake to 
think of him as her mouthpiece. He too is flawed, a preoccupation with his own 
interesting guilt clouds his vision. Following a path of self-knowledge he ends up 
entangled in the machinery of his own guilt. His warning about gradualism and 
respect for the particularity of humans is to be heeded, but so too is the warning of 
Tayper Pace about the lure of neurotic self-absorption, the 'excitement of a spiritual 
drama! conducted within the self .4 
(Where "'Neurosis" is characterised, almost in a 
popular sense defined, by a mechanical repetitive imprisoning of the mind' [M-1391. ) 
Michael is aware of this danger but still falls into it. His commentary is, in part, self 
commentary, a response to what has come immediately before. He is the one who has 
strayed, he has kissed young Toby (scarce more than a boy) and afterwards felt 'a 
sheer desire to be hidden' and an intense 'regret'. 5 His sinfulness is of a very particular 
(and absorbing) sort and he keeps rerninders of his fault close at hand. 
I will take it that Murdoch holds both of these problems to be implicated in 
puritanism. She is driving at a familiar type of claim, that two apparently disparate 
phenomena, the attempt to suddenly change character and neurotic awareness of 
fault, are two sides of the same coin. What joins them together, and joins Michael 
Meade with Tayper Pace (and indeed the whole lay religious community) is a certain 
intolerance for the messiness (or contingency) of normal human life, a desire to step 
out of the ordinary mechanism of being that is related to a sense that the mechanism 
is overwhelming. Moral suddenness (as opposed to gradualism) involves the attempt 
to escape into a guilt-free purity that neurotic awareness of fault diagnoses as 
painfially absent or metaphorically lost. " This is a plausible enough connection to 
make. An exemplary form of puritanism in the novels is the substitution of pedantic 
truth-telling for truthfulness. This puritanical intolerance for the grey areas of human 
communication is based upon an awareness of personal weakness. It is as if the 
pedantic truth teller were saying I know what I'm like. If I go down that road at all, I 
4 The Bell, 205. 'Neurotic' is used here in Murdoclfs own sense, of compulsively attentive to sclf, the 
sense established in her contrast between convention and neurosis, Sub. G, 217 and SBR, 268-70 
which is the primary source for the contrast. 
5 The Bell, Ch 12,163. 
6 We can see this contrast in Murdochs classification of Sartre and Marx as 'high-minded puritans' 
in M. 154. A noteworthy instance of 'childish puritanism! associated with a desire for the purity of 
'violence and pain, not muddle' occurs in The Red and the Green, 242-4. 
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shan't be able to stop myset(7 Neurotic awareness of fault underlies a need to be 
strictly hemmed in by convention so that one's natural tendency to stray is held safely 
in check. 
By associating these two themes Murdoch is connecting up her own, 
particular emphasis upon puritanical suddenness with a more standard idea of 
puritanism as a guilt-ridden outlook. Unlike 'romanticisnf, her 'puritanism' is not a 
term of Murdochian artifice, its normal sense is not strained. She is acutely aware of 
the connections between the puritan radical tradition, its dissenting, liberal and 
socialist heirs and the Godly community of Ae Bell. 8 In addressing whether she too 
falls foul of her own strictures on this matter I will focus only upon the core themes 
of suddenness and entrapment in introspective guilt rather than dwelling upon other, 
arguably puritanical features of Murdoclfs outlook (her repeated denunciations of 
pornography, the exclusion of actual sex from depictions of life in the novels, her 
praise of simplicity, and her strong reservations about television, so reminiscent of 
earlier puritan arguments about theatre and dancing). 9 
Suddenness and entrapment in guilt are the core themes that are developed in 
the T. S. Elliot essay which appeared contemporaneously with Me Bell (in 1958) and 
is thematically linked to it by a concern with puritanism. One of the two themes also 
helps to structure The Fire and the Sun (on the subject of Plato's puritanism); and 
both figure in the Sovereignty. There we are told that 'Puritanism and romanticism are 
natural partners and we are still living with their partnership'. What is at stake is, on 
the one hand, overestimation of unconstrained freedom to engage in rational choice 
7 Puritanism of the sort we will be concerned with is notably represented in the novels in the form of 
puritanical silence as a response to the limits of language (Hugo in Under the Net); a similar 
hostility towards art (Bledyard in Vie Sandcastle); and an insistence upon pedantic truth-telling 
(Axel in A Fairly Honourable Defeat). The latter creates a link between puritanism and Kant's 
inflexible position on lying. 
8 Her contemporaneous HT makes clear that her preoccupations in 7he Bell arc specifically with 
what she sees as guild socialism, something of a spent force. It is noteworthy that she tries to extend 
her metaphor of energy to political goals, diagnosing the socialist movement in England as suffering 
from 'a loss of energy' and the dissipation of a 'great accumulation of energy. 11T, 172. As Maria 
Antonaccio (2002) points out, this call for a inctaphysic to underpin politics is later abandoned. 
9 For example, pornography is attacked in the dialogue 'Art and Eros, ' A castos, and generally, 
television is associated by her with image ridden, eikasia, the lowest condition inside Plato's Cave. 
'Here we should reflect upon the deep effects of television, for instance upon the fact that so many 
citizens go to bed at night with their heads full of overwhelmingly clear and powerful imagcs of 
horror and violence ... (Television) can also commit terrible crimes against the visible world' [M. 330]. For her praise of simplicity see above, Chapter 1. 
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irrespective of the prior formation of character (Tayper Pace's fault). And, on the 
other, a 'philosophy of puritanical origin and apparent austerity' (Michael Meade's 
fault). 10 The T. S. Eliot essay is particularly interesting not only because it is 
contemporaneous with Ae Bell, but also because it introduces the claim that 
opposition to puritanism can itself take a puritanical form. For Murdoch, T. S. Eliot is 
an 'anti-Puritan Puritan'. 11 Like Michael Meade, his consciousness of evil and of 
'original sin' is taken to reproduce important aspects of what he criticises, albeit in a 
more convention-bound form. This is a problem for Murdoch. Like Eliot, she too 
comes to hold a doctrine of original sin, or rather, fallenness, and she is more than a 
little critical of the human condition. Martha Nussbaum is sensitive to this when she 
writes that Murdoch is 'impatient with characters who live immersed in such messy 
and uneducated fantasies and even seem to like them. And this makes me feel, as 
reader, that Murdoch does not altogether like me, that she would have me be quite 
other than I am. '12 Over time, as she moves away from the fun-loving world of Under 
the Net, Murdoch becomes every bit as critical of the ordinary human condition as 
early Sartre. Where he castigated self-deception, she now attacks our egocentricity. 
This places Murdoch at risk of generating her own form of neurotic awareness of 
fault. 
This censorious aspect of her work is highlighted in Elizabeth Dipple's study 
Work for the Spirit where the ontological flaws of humans ensure that moral 
pilgrimage ends, at best, in a fairly honourable defeat, a collapse into 'the mediocre 
life' of circularity and repetition rather than progress. 13 In response to this kind of 
reading, Peter Conradi has developed an approach which acknowledges a puritanical 
danger but claims that Murdoch manages to keep it under control. On this view she 
still fits her own classification of 'anti-Puritan Puritan! but with the emphasis now 
placed on the 'anti' side. Conradi achieves this by remaining faithful to Murdoch's 
repeated insistence that the novels and philosophical texts be viewed differently. The 
ethic of the philosophical texts posits Good as an ideal end-point to be pursued 
10 SG, 79. Conradi (2001b), pp. 520-523 refers to a note in her papers to the cffect that 
? uritanism--Romanticism!. 
11 TSAM, 166. 
12 Nussbaum (1996), 49. 
13 Dipple (1982), Chapters VI, VII, and VIII. 
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gradually. Conradi ingeniously claims that this philosophical ethic is itse6r'an ideal 
limit in the direction of which the artist or moral agent is to be pulled, though neither 
can reach it'. 14 It is not to be suddenly embraced but successively approximated to. 
This allows the philosophical ethic to be tempered by the novels, giving us a more 
everyday picture of the difficulties of being good. In the novels, contentment and 
life-affirming hedonism are given their due while puritanism and moral overreaching is 
almost invariably chastised, 'it is the point about Murdocws philosophy that no one 
can adequately inhabit it'. 15 We can, however, move closer to the ethic by living an 
effortful but imperfect life that is informed by it. What we must not do is attempt any 
sudden leap into the life of the good Murdochian pilgrim. 
Although mitigating the claims of Dipple, there is a sense in which this 
argument still concedes what I am concerned to show, i. e. that taken on its own, the 
ethic is puritanical, only the novels are compassionate, finding a place for everyday 
amour propre, pleasure and contentment. 16 However, Conradi's argument opens up 
an interesting possibility. We expect most philosophical positions to be ready for 
immediate adoption (like a propositional attitude rather than an emotional 
orientation). In Murdochs case, the ethic may plausibly be understood in Conradi's 
manner, as endorsing its own adoption only in a piecemeal, gradualist and 
necessarily-incomplete manner, leaving the pilgrim in pursuit of a particular kind of 
imperfection rather than'competing with the divine'. 17 
There is some textual support for this position in Murdoch's Platonic writings 
of the 1970s. In the Acastos dialogues, the patience of her Socrates contrasts with 
the impatient 'puritanism' of her Plato. This is done both through the content of what 
is said and through characterisation. Socrates is allowed to suggest that in 'all our 
highest speculations, the highest achievements of our spirit are second best. ' In other 
14 Conradi (2001a), 374. 
15 Conradi (200 1 a), 206. 
16 Conradi (2001a) 328-9, for the legitimacy of self-love. 
17 Conradi (2001a) 238,379. Conradi is particularly influenced by Loma Sage's 1977 article on 
Murdoch, 'The Pursuit of Imperfection' .A reading of Plato which would fit nicely with this 
is given 
by Raymond Gaita. He distinguishes between the more mystical idea of pursuit of perfection and his 
preferred claim that Good is the absolute standard in the light of which we live. Inconveniently, this 
is not Murdoch's Platonism. She does try to make sense of the command "be yc therefore perfect', 
and, as Gaita rccognises, her reading of Plato is influenced by the mystical tradition, Gaita (1991), 
202-3,213. 
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words, 'second-best is our best'. 18 What this means is that our only reasonable de 
facto goal will be a form of imperfection. Conradi identifies this as a key admission, 
'Both Plato and Socrates here are aspects of a single truth... They may also be said to 
represent two aspects of Iris Murdoch herself. 19 We must live in the light of the 
saintly vision of the reality of Good, but work with imperfection like the artist. This is i 
an anti-puritan moral compromise, as indeed all moral compromises are. 
We may reconsider the master theme of 77ze Fire and the Sun in the light of 
the proposed compromise. It argues that Plato's 'puritanism', exemplified by his 
attitude towards art, is at odds with his overall metaphysic because of the latter's 
emphasis upon mediation and intermediate gradations between the perfect realm of 
being and what has fallen into the imperfect realm of becoming, our world of 
temporality and death. The world-creating Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus, is an image 
of mediation. He exists between mankind and perfection. 'In the early dialogues the 
spiritual world is so close that we seem to be God's children. In the Timaeus we are 
his grandchildren! What separates us from perfection is now an 'astronomical 
distance'. 20 There can be no sudden leap from here to there. Our distance from Good 
becomes so great that tolerance for and compromise with imperfection becomes 
inevitable, a practical necessity. Even the Demiurge has to work with imperfect 
materials. We, who are less exalted, must do so as well. 
There is, however, a narrowness about the account of puritanism in The Fire 
and the Sun. It is concerned primarily with the question of suddenness. It focuses 
upon MurdocWs view that the gap between imperfection and perfection is lessened, if 
at all, only by a gradualist pilgrimage. The question of entrapment in a neurotic 
awareness of fault, in abitter' awareness of being flawed that promotes a desire for 
character-rectifying conventions, (for adherence to the rules, to the laws) is not 
directly addressed. 21 Yet this too is a real and difficult problem with the Platonic 
picture. If both are seen as opposite sides of the same coin then they should also be 
accepted as providing independent grounds for classifying someone as a puritan. And 
if this is so, then a Murdochian ethic that offers a gradualist move into a neurotic 
18 Acastos, 61-2. 
19 Conradi (1994), 337, and (2001a), 347-8. 
20 FS, 61,62. 
21 For the mctaphorical'bittcmcss'of being fallen, see EPM, 136. 
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(inescapable, entrapping) awareness of fault offers only a gradualist move into the 
other side of puritan intolerance for what we humans happen to be. 
11. Guilt as a deceptive emotion 
Part of the rationale for MurdocWs retention of the idea of fallenness is that it 
helps to secure continuity with the religious moral tradition which she is attempting to 
demythologize and secularize. This attempt to secure continuity is in line with her 
gradualist strictures on puritanism but it also generates problems. In particular, such 
close proximity to the traditional Judeo-Christian idea of original sin might seem to 
expose her to the charge of promoting shame (Nietzsche) or guilt (Freud) or both, by 
secular means. 22 Murdoch takes an early step that seems to defuse this charge when 
she adopts a hostile stance towards guilt in the philosophical texts. 'The Sovereignty 
of Good over Other Concepts' warns of times when 'feelings of guilt keep attracting 
the gaze back towards the self; 'On "God" and "Good"' claims that 'the ideas of guilt 
and punishment can be the most subtle tool of the ingenious self; the Metaphysics 
accepts the charge that Christianity has an element of sadomasochism about it and 
charges religion as such with generating 'an invigorating sense of guilt'. 23 She 
provides no rigorous account of the fine gradations between guilt shame, remorse, 
regret and anxiety but what there is on guilt is uniformly hostile. 
MurdoclYs hostility first emerges as a secondary theme of Under the Net but is 
then carried over into novels of all periodS. 24 In Ae Bell (1958), Michael Meade's 
problem is that he cannot escape from his past. The unconsummated entanglement 
with a pupil, the indiscretion which lost him his teaching post, comes back to haunt 
him now that he leads a lay religious community. The boy, now a young man, turns to 
the community for help. Instead of assisting him or (as Tayper-Pace sensibly advises) 
sending him away to avoid muddle, Michael becomes preoccupied with his own guilty 
conscience. Hilary Burde in A Word Child (1975) is similarly trapped. Guilt over a 
youthful misadventure which led to the death of his best friend's wife leads to a 
22 1 am thinldng here of Freud' s Society and its Discontents and the second essay in The Genealogy 
ofMorals. There are some strildng similarities between the dominant preoccupations of Nietzsche's 
three essays and the three comprising the Sovereignty, both progress from the concept of 'good, 
constraint of the self, the virtues of the humble. 
23 SG, 99; GG, 66; Metaphysics, 80-82. 
24 For guilt in Under the Net see 'Two Concepts of Contingency' chapter. 
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repetition of his initial fault. IFElary likes riding on the inner circle of the London 
Underground, a symbol, as Elizabeth Dipple notes, of repetition rather than 
progress. 25 
This predicament of guilty entrapment and self-enclosure becomes a repetitive 
feature of Murdoch's novels, even a favoured mechanism of egocentricity. To say I 
am atfault is to say it depends on me and this slips all too easily into a preference for 
feeling guilty rather than unimportant. 26 In the novels, Murdoch tends to depict the 
emergence of guilt in contexts where there is real, if only partial culpability. Murdoch 
shows no interest in trying to disentangle guilt either from a sense of culpability or 
(on a rather more Freudian note) the desire for punishment. Indeed she makes great 
play about our sadomasochistic tendencies as normal. 27 Guilt and a punitive 
overestimation of self go hand-in-hand. In An Accidental Man, a slightly drunk 
character knocks down a child who has run carelessly onto the road; in The Good 
Apprentice, a prank goes wrong when a surreptitiously drugged student leaps out of a 
window to his death. In both cases, culpability gives guilt a foothold and 
overestimation of culpability follows, the relevant characters are able to place 
themselves at the centre of a punitive drama. 
This shared hostility towards guilt in the novels and in the philosophical texts 
is not an arbitrary intrusion. It does make sense in Murdochian terms. She holds that 
the cognitive value of emotions need not be purely situational (truthful in this context, 
deceptive in another but without any overall tendency). At least some emotions have 
cognitive tendencies which can be separated out from any particular situation. 
(Romantic love is a problematic example of a deceptive emotion. ) This tendential 
character of emotions arises from their involvement in the direction of attention. They 
have aboutness, intentionality, and for Murdoch there is an appropriate direction of 
28 attention, it 'should properly be outward away from self. One of the reasons why 
the guilt-ridden Michael Meade should not be viewed as a Murdochian mouthpiece is 
that he extols the virtues of self-knowledge. (This is more akin to Stuart Hampshire 
25 Dipple (1982) Chapter VII for her reading of A Word Child and Chapter VIII for the theme of 
circularity versus progress. 
26 This aspect of the guilt theme in An Accidental Man is dealt with rather well in Todd (1979). 
27 See below, chapter on suffering. 
28 GG, 58. 
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and Freud than Murdoch. )29 I-Iis response to how original sinfulness works its way 
out in particular cases is similar to that of psychotherapy. By contrast, Murdoch holds 
that 'It is an attachment to what lies outside the fantasy mechanism, and not a scrutiny 
of the mechanism itself, that liberates'. Therapy produces new fantasies for old, 
'Close scrutiny of the mechanism often merely strengthens its power. 
"Self-knowledge", in the sense of a minute understanding of one's own machinery, 
seems to me, except at a fairly simple level, usually a delusion' . 
30 Because guilt directs 
attention towards the self, it tends to be a deceptive emotion and not an ally. 
This does not mean that the darker side of emotional life is to be shunned. It is 
just not productive to encounter it through guilt. In both the novels and the 
Metaphysics, guilt is contrasted with 'a tract of experience' called 'Void' [M. 500]. 
This covers 'a lot of different states' in which we experience loss, absence or lack 
[M. 498]. The terminology is drawn from Simone Weil who, in turn, draws it from 
standard descriptions of the stages of the mystic's progress through 
awakening-purgation-illumination-void, and finally, unitive life .31 
This progression is 
partly derived from Plato's metaphor of the Cave and when overlaid back onto it, 
void corresponds to the darkness that follows the illumination of the fire (a symbol of 
32 the ego according to Murdoch). Void is an experience of loss that results from a 
(sometimes) necessary move into uncertainty and away from an inferior 
illumination. 33 We move from the fire, through the darkness towards the sun. 
Alternatively, we can move in the other direction. A crisis of faith can lead us away 
from Good, back to a preoccupation with self The Metaphysics takes bereavement as 
an exemplar of void, a confrontation with death that temporarily deflates our high 
estimation of self. It pains us but cannot be voluntaristically cast off. It must be 
endured, gone through. But it is gone through, we are not entrapped as we tend to be 
by guilt [M. 503]. The focus upon bereavement is symptomatic of Murdoch's concern 
29 See Chapter 2 above. 
30 GG, 66 
31 Part H of Evelyn Underhill's Mysticism (London: 1911 is structured by this progression. 
32 SG, 98; FS, 69,88. 
33 Loss is necessary within Murdoch's scheme of things. Franklin Gamwell's artftd argument that 
moral value is the criterion of truth; and that loss of God is loss of something morally valuable ergo 
Murdoch cannot consistently abandon God, relies upon a reductionist view of Murdoch's multiple 
criteria for truth. Gamwcll (1996). 
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to avoid setting this tract of experience exclusively in the context of the mystic or 
clerics progress. Bereavement is ordinary, everyday, involuntary. (By contrast, in 
Weil void is regarded as a spiritual achievement. ) Nevertheless, the connection to the 
dedicated religious life is maintained, at least in the novels. The experience of void is 
characteristic both of clerics who are loosing their faith and finding themselves caught 
up in worldly preoccupation (filling the void with our ordinary fantasies and 
deceptions) and of clerics who are passing beyond idolatry and abandoning the desire 
to be admired for saintliness or rewarded for it by the evasion of death. They 
experience ontological uncertainty about God and/or Good. 34 As in Simone Weil, 
'During our apprenticeship good appears negative and empty'. 35 By contrast, guilt is 
guaranteed at least one secure object: the fiery self 
Given this general hostility towards guilt, a number of problems arise. Firstly, 
Murdoch appears to be attacking an important mode of attending to what is other. 
Guilt is notjust about ourselves, its intentionality is mixed, it is about ourselves and 
something else that is to be valued (and has not been given its due). Raimond Gaita 
(whose work bears a family resemblance to Murdoch's through their shared interest in 
Simone Weil) considers guilt in a similar context to Murdoch but takes up the 
opposite position: 'remorse is not self-absorption. It is, amongst other things, a form 
36 of the recognition of the reality of others - those we have wronged'. Similar 
considerations are applied to shame and the intermediate emotional sense of being in 
some way 'polluted' by the actions of our parents or forefathers. The use of this 
antiquated term is Gaita! s, but I think one can see what he means. Can the 
descendants of Australian emigrants justly face Aborigines without some sense of 
personal connection to wrongdoing? The contentment of one may seem closely 
related to the misfortunes of the other. Similarly with the children of Germany's war 
generation, how could they face the Holocaust survivors without a sense of 
connection to radical evil? Anything else would seem dismissive, a failure to accept 
disturbing realities. 37 
34 This is the case with Anne Cavidge in Nuns and Soldiers and Brendan Craddock in Henry and 
Cato. 
35 KV. 158. 
36 Gaita (1991), 48. 
37 Gaita (2000), pursues these more concrete cases of guilt and shame 
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The other-orientedness of such partially-introspective emotions opens up 
alternative possibilities for making sense them. Indeed, Carla Bagnoli has extended 
Murdoch's idea of attention by incorporating it into an account of practical reason 
whereby we experience regret not when brooding on the past but when engaging in 
38 the piecemeal construction of new, action-guiding values. If I regret not having 
done x, it does not necessarily mean that I have done something wrong, it may just 
mean that x is the road not taken. Through the constructive work of regret, I may 
become be more likely to do x if another opportunity arises. Murdoch may be passing 
up an important way of giving content to the ambiguous concept of attention. 
However, this approach, while it is about valuing what is other, may also be 
problematic from a Murdochian point of view because it leads us back into a model of 
practical reason where considerable emphasis is placed upon choice (albeit 
counterfactually: I did this but I wish I had done that). 39 
Secondly, what is at stake in the above observation that guilt is 
other-attending, is only one version of a broader claim that there are good and bad 
variants of guilt. According to Gaita, Murdoch is only right about 'corruptions' of this 
emotion and not the emotion as such. 40 What stands in the way of Murdoch's 
applying this approach is the following: (i) if guilt is associated with culpability then it 
is still necessarily indexed to the self Gaita writes of remorse where Murdoch writes 
of guilt, but only because he treats guilt as an objective condition of the being that is 
recognised in remorse. Hence remorse, even if partly other-oriented, is also 
by-definition indexed to the self. Moreover, and this is point (ii), Murdoch already has 
a candidate emotion to contrast with bad guilt. Not a better form of the same 
emotion, but the different emotion of void. Murdoch favours void over guilt. In An 
Accidental Man, Mavis compares her years of religious faith with what has come 
after. 'During the wild years she had woken every morning to some guilty problem. 
Above any pain except that of guilt one can hope to climb by seeing what is above, by 
seeing that there is something above. Guilt and remorse had trapped her during those 
38 Bagnoli (2000). It should be noted that Bagnoli is drawing creatively upon Murdoch but is not a 
Murdochian. 
39 This connects to Bagnoli (2002), 55-6 which underestimates Murdoch's downgrading of choice. 
See above, Chapter 4. Bagnoli is a constructivist who posits multiple goods and conflicts between 
them, Murdoch is a realist who holds that there is a single, unitary Good without rivals. Their views 
on choice diverge. 
40 Gaita (1991), 50. 
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years. Now she woke to clarity, to an emptiness full of the urgent needs of others. ' 
This emptiness, felt upon the loss of God, is later clarified as that of 'void'. 41 She 
writes as if she has no need for a good kind of guilt. 
This leads me to a third and still broader problem with Murdoch's account. 
Coping with the requirements of commonplace moral phenomenology must surely be 
an adequacy condition for any moral theory. Emotions such as remorse and guilt, 
even where they are (in part) self-attending, also seem to be, as Gaita suggests in his 
pollution cases, necessary (not in the sense of unavoidable, but in the sense of it being 
42 a good thing to have even at the risk of an imagined culpability). Consider Bernard 
Williams' idea of agent-regret. (He sees this as a form of guilt but the term 'regret' 
plays down any overtones of actual culpability. ) Suppose a driver runs over a child 
through no fault of his own, he must feel a different (more intense) kind of regret than 
a spectator. Otherwise he does not fully realize what he has done. A truthful reaction 
must be indexed to his causal involvement in harm to the other, 'that there is room in 
the area for irrational and self-punitive excess, no one is likely to deny. But equally it 
would be a kind of insanity never to experience sentiments of this kind towards 
anyone'. 43 MurdocWs focus is instead upon the dangers of guilt as a personal 
indulgence. This places her in danger of trying to get away from a necessary 
(desirable) feature of moral phenomenology. 
Without broadening the point into an anti-theory critique of Murdoch (for 
evading real experience) she may indeed be begging an important question about how 
far we can go without in some sustained (not brief or fleeting) manner directing 
attention towards ourselves. I will take it that while this is a genuine problem 
concerning the workability of a Murdochian moral psychology (let alone its 
advisability) it is her problem and not mine. In her defence it may be pointed out that 
she does seem to allow, at least in the novels, that in extreme cases of personal 
collapse, systematic egocentric 'magic' such as conventional religion or 
psychoanalysis, may be appealed to. 44 After all, functioning egocentric humans are a 
41 An Accidental Man, 46-7,125-6. 
42 For Gaita, this may be less of a risk than for Murdoch by severing the nexus between guilt and 
culpability. 
43 Williams (1981), 29. 
44 For example, Georgie Hands in A Severed Head and young Peter in A Fairly Honourahle Defeat 
fall so far that they do need the 'magic' of psychotherapy. 
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minimal starting point for unselfing. This does not, however, substantiate the 
truthfulness of whatever egocentric deliberations take place. 'A sense of such 
self-knowledge may of course be induced in analysis for therapeutic reasons, but "the 
cure" does not prove the alleged knowledge genuine. A5 Ae Book and the 
Brotherhood explores this scenario rather nicely, with a young woman, Tamar, going 
through the morally ambiguous experience of abortion, and with it a degree of 
personal disintegration before finally discovering religious repentance as a disposable 
tool to restore functioning egocentricity. 
Murdoch's acceptance of therapeutic introspection to establish normal 
egocentricity does not require any fundamental revision of her hostility towards 
self-attending in more normal circumstances, and certainly not at more advanced 
levels of moral being. Nor can this hostility plausibly require those of average or 
normal egocentricity to evade guilt in its entirety. Guilt avoidance, especially if we are 
the imperfect creatures that Murdoch claims we are, cannot plausibly be entirely 
successful. To make sense of where this leaves us, what we now need is perhaps not 
any new argument that goes beyond the above, but only the right kind of formulation 
of Murdochian hostility towards guilt. Here, the Murdochian metaphor of movement 
and moral progress may be helpful. Guilt is something that we cannot perhaps get 
away from, but we should not be moving towards it. We move truthfully into the 
void, not into guilt. 
111. Fallenness as Productive of Ontological Guilt 
What places Murdoch in difficulties here is her tendency to accumulate new 
philosophical arguments without paring back her old ones. The hostility towards guilt 
which is a subordinate theme of Under the Net (a response to the transcendent, 
quasi-Platonist musings of Sartre's Roquentin concerning his fallenness) is carried 
over and built into her subsequent writings of both sorts, novels and philosophical 
texts. However, when Murdoch turns towards Platonism, in the later 1950s, she 
commits to perfectionist standards (grasped via metaphors of distance and fallenness) 
and the legacy of her earlier critique is not adjusted to make it consistent with the 
new position. The result is that successive, guilt-opposing and guilt-generating 
45 GG, 66 
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commitments are piled on top of each other. This is exacerbated by the heavily 
Platonic works of the 1970s which strengthen her views on our fallenness and stretch 
out our distance from perfection. The upshot is that the moral pilgrim who advances 
into greater clarity of vision will have greater awareness of fallenness and so will be 
advancing, gradually or otherwise, into a guilty mode of being. 
Once it is accepted that Murdoch is thoroughly committed to an account of 
fallenness, there are two broad ways that a Murdochian can respond to the problem 
of guilt-generation: an argumentfrom separation, denying that there is any necessary 
connection between fallenness and guilt, and an argument from containment 
accepting that there is such a connection but that the guilt involved is non-threatening 
or otherwise limited. The problem that any argument from separation will face is 
MurdocWs accumulated commitment to a holistic approach towards meaning, such 
that individual terms are embedded in networks of value-laden interconnections. This 
is basic to getting her more analytic early arguments about fact and value off the 
ground, but now it comes back to haunt her. Why can we not acknowledge, attend to 
or regard our fallenness and then simply pass on without any entanglement in guilt? 
Why can we not (as Peter Conradi suggests) take the standpoint of Father Zossima in 
7he Brothers Karamazov that 'although guilt may unite all of humanity, it must be 
embraced with a fundamental joy and lightness of heart'? 46 The reason why this 
cannot be done is that it involves a particular view of the relation between culpability 
and the experience of guilt such that our moral crimes are causally related to 
psychological self-punishment. (We might call it the Dostoevskian view. ) However, 
the connection between fallenness and guilt is not of this sort. It is not causal but 
conceptual. Experienced guilt is part of grasping our objective guiltiness, it does not 
follow on from it as an experiential postscript that might somehow be sliced off 1 
47 
Murdoch shows some awareness that this is a problem in the Metaphysics 
when she contrasts the tension between Schopenhauer's dark commitment to original 
46 Zossima is speaking of objective guilt ic. sinfulness and not the subjective experience. This option 
is suggested by Conradi (2001a), 379. In fairness to Conradi, it should be noted that he does not 
believe that this light hearted acknowledgement of fallenness is cf[ectcd in the philosophical ethic, 
but only in the novels. 
47 We n-dght think here of Raskolnikov in Dostoevsky's CtIme and Punishment. He theorises about 
two sorts of men, but fails to pull off the trick that the novels amoral realist (Svidrigailov) manages, 
of being the kind of man who is untroubled by conscience and convention. (His torments are of a 
different sort. ) 
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sin and his cheerful love of existence (evidenced in his love for animals and for the 
particular). Perhaps she believes that these tensions are not so great in her own work 
because Schopenhauer is a determinist and she is not. (Original sin and determinism 
are a particularly bleak combination. ) Murdoch's account of human flaw is situated in 
a context of being that is less fixed, it can to some degree be mitigated [M. 103-4]. 
Yet, in spite of moral progress, there remains no sense in which an actual escape from 
fallenness is possible. Even the best of us remain all too human. Once it is accepted 
that we are effectively entrapped in a fallen condition, Murdoclfs problem is that guilt 
does not just ensue from a sense of such fallenness or original sin, (like so much 
fallout in the aftermath) it is part of their full recognition. Murdoch is committed to 
the view that part of being aware of anything in the fullest sense is having the right 
emotional response to it. Emotional response is a component of moral vision. If we 
do not have this, we have a diminished awareness. For example, knowing the reality 
of the other involves not just adopting a particular propositional attitude but 
something closer to what Wittgenstein calls'an attitude towards a SOU19.48 If we do 
not have the right emotional response then we do not construe reality correctly and 
we are not (in the fullest sense) aware of what confronts us. In the case of culpability, 
where our culpability is nothing more than having authoritative moral claims upon us 
that we fail to meet, the appropriate emotion is some form of guilt. (Or, alternatively, 
shame, an option dealt with below. ) If we regard andpass on without experiencing 
the call of conscience, we have not seen what there is to see. 
There is more to understanding a concept, according to Murdoch, than 
labelling the world in some preferred (chosen) way or conforming to public rules for 
correct usage. The very idea of a concept is of a term whose meaning is given by a 
complex (thick) network of interrelations and metaphors rather than a thin set of 
Tarskian truth-conditions, 'what philosophical concepts we use will be a function of 
what we regard as real and important'. 49 Murdoch cannot make sense of fallenness in 
just any way that she likes, unencumbered by the prior values that are built into 
language and consciousness any more than she can appropriate the concept of God 
rather than Good... it has too many connotations of a supernatural being. She cannot, 
by either specification or an effort of will, make a thin picture of fallenness that has 
48 Wittgenstein, PI, Iliv. 
49 PB, 517. 
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just any significance she wants it to have. This would involve leaping out of the prior 
value-ladenness of our thinking, imagery and language. Nor can she plausibly expect 
the reader to do this, any more than she can plausibly ask them to treat 'vermin' as the 
generic name for humble pilgrims. 
Her commitment to making sense of picturing the world as a comprehensive 
emotional engagement is crucial to making sense of moral progress. Because 
emotions are more responsive to ways of seeing than they are to formal 
demonstration, Murdoch is tied to accepting responsibility for the imagery that she 
produces and the concepts that she uses. With our concepts and picturings we partly 
fabricate the world we confront, 'and we must admit moral responsibility for this 
"fabricated" world, however difficult it may be to control the process of fabricatiod. 50 
A Murdochian can only escape from guilt as an awareness of fallenness if the latter 
happens to be separable from the language and imagery of culpability. Her problem is 
that this is not the case. Murdoch is one of those who associate Platonic fallenness 
with original sin, baptising the former in the light of the latter and entailing a clear 
sense of culpability or blameworthiness. She refers to Plato's 'hierarchy of subjects 
and their objects'but for Murdoch such hierarchy is linked to culpability [M. 454]. For 
example, she refers to Plato's 'imagery of different levels of awareness wherein each 
subject has the object he deserves, repeating the same formula elsewhere, e. g. 'Plato's 
Cave where subjects have the objects they deserve' [M. 282]. 51 The chained men in a 
state of eikasia are no longer innocent dupes, they (and they are characteristic of 
human everydayness) are at fault. We each have the quality of vision that we deserve. 
Similarly in the Acastos dialogues Socrates is made to say 'a religious attitude seese 
our life as an interconnected whole and a religious man would feel responsible for the 
quality of all his thoughts and experiences, even his perceptions'. 52 More crudely, for 
the Plato of the Acastos dialogues, lacking as he is in the finesse of Socrates, 'We're 
50 DPR, 201. 
51 For this view of Platonic fallenness as proximate to original sin and carrying notions of 
culpability, see E. R-Dobbs, another of Murdoclfs old lecturers. Dobbs (1951), 155-6 highlights 
passages such as the Pindar quotation in the Afeno which refers to 'the requital for ancient doom! 
[Meno, 8 lb] and the passage in the Laws which refers to 'old misdeeds unpurgeable by man' [Laws, 
854b]. Murdoch is not simply following Dobbs because the latter sees this view of original sinfulness 
as already puritanical and is concerned to outline a progressivist shift from shame to guilt. 
52 Acastos, 89. 
138 
bad, we have to become good, its a long way. 53 Not only does culpability enter into 
the picture (as in original sin) but so too does a metaphor of contamination. Quality 
of consciousness is not just to be improved, but purified. This is a recurring 
Murdochian image, she has, on a single page, not only three occurrences of'purified' 
but also 'purificatioW, 'pure', 'purgation' and 'purged' [M . 
109]. 54 
There may be a certain ambiguity here, a characteristic absence of any clear 
distinction between a shameful condition and a more straightforwardly culpable one, 
but there is nothing particularly odd about her reading of Plato's Cave metaphor. It 
may well imply blameworthiness. Nevertheless, Murdoch does not always give due 
attention to the way in which her central preoccupations often diverge from those of 
Plato. She is, aware of the danger of 'inventing my own Plato' but doesdt not always 
take adequate steps to avoid it [M. 5 10-11 ]. Plato is concerned with epistemology as 
such while she is concerned only with moral psychology and interpersonal-realism. 
Although, here, she is not so much in danger of inventing her own Plato as she is of 
adopting the Plato of the mystics and Neoplatonic Christianity. 
Once her priorities are set, and her views about meaning holism and 
value-ladenness are put in place, she must abide by the value-ladenness of her terms. 
'Our speech is moral speech, a constant use of the innumerable subtle normative 
words whereby (for better or worse) we texture the detail of our moral surround and 
steer our life of action. We cannot over-estimate the importance of the 
concept-forming words we utter to ourselves and others. ' [M. 260]. To see what this 
means in the case of'fallenness', consider its use in Heidegger. Murdoch is generally 
critical of Heidegger (with some cause) for trying to set aside the value-implications 
of his imagery. He wants Being and Time to be all ontology with no ethical 
intrusions. When he writes about human fallenness he tries to specify that 'This term 
does not express any negative evaluation. 55 For a Murdochian, or indeed anyone who 
places a great deal of weight upon the normativity and value-ladenness of language 
and imagery, this qualification must ring hollow. The connotations of a bad condition 
53 Acastos, 99. 
54 Purification imagery is the crux of her section on consciousness, comparing Husserl with the 
Buddhist ScIdda, 239 ff. But this is no specialised image. Our task, right from the beginning of her 
use of the eros metaphor in the Metaphysics is to 'purify our energy' [M. 25]. Void is to be regarded 
as bound up with this process, 'Here our purification takes place as exposure to a pure source. Void. ' 
[At 1091. 
55 Heidegger SZ, H. 175. 
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and responsibility for it are too firn-Ay entrenched to be plausibly set aside. In his 
favour, it may be noted that Heidegger is insistent that the nexus between fallenness 
and guilt is a solid one. 56 
The failure of the argument from separation throws us back upon the option 
of localising or minimising guilt via an argument from containment. It may appear to 
be only an exercise in damage-limitation, but even in this limited capacity, I will 
suggest that it is none-too-successful. It may be further divided into two sorts of 
claim: that containment will be due to the character of the guilt or else due to the 
extent of the guilt (a qualitative and a quantitative option). I will take it that a 
quantitative limitation of the extent of guilt must rely upon directing attention away 
from self in some way, either (i) by focusing upon a concern with guilt only in others 
or (ii) by emphasising the collective nature of fallenness and guilt. 
Version (i), a concern with guilt and fallenness only in others isjust about 
conceivable given a framework where attention is to be directed towards others but I 
am not suggesting that any actual Murdochian would hold to such a view. It must be 
ruled out on the grounds that awareness of others as fallen coupled with a lack of 
awareness that we are also fallen would constitute a sense of their inferiority. Version 
(ii) is tempting because fallenness and original sin are doctrines of collective guilt, 
and consequently do seem to hold out some possibility of diluting the sense in which 
guilt is indexed to the self. Gaita refers to this as the situation in which 'all are guilty 
and so none are' but he views this as a 'consoling corruption' and it hardly seems 
57 consistent with MurdocWs approach. There is an inbuilt self-other asymmetry in 
Murdoch. While we are to see others as appropriate objects of love we are each to 
see ourselves as badly flawed and in need of remedial unselfing. An awareness of our 
own fallenness is an important motivation to unself Its significance cannot be diluted 
without marginalizing the motivating personal impact of fallenness itself We have to, 
more or less continuously, see ourselves as needing to unself 
Consider now the rather more interesting qualitative option for containing the 
significance of guilt as part of the recognition of fallenness. The problem here may be 
clarified by examining the claim that the emotion bound up with fallenness is not 
56 Hcidcggcr, SZ, H. 280, '"l3cing-guilty", in the sense last mentioned, the breach of 'moral 
requirement', is a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein. ' 
57 Gaita (1991), 47. 
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really guilt at all but shame, a response which would preserve the appropriate 
negative connotations without perhaps falling into the dangers of guilt. At a 
rudimentary level we may separate the two out as an awareness of culpability and an 
awareness of exposure to view in a discreditable manner. I am rather inclined to think 
that Murdoch ought to give more weight to shame than she does. In particular, it may 
make sense, from a Murdochian standpoint to understand awareness of fallenness in 
just this manner. Once we have disposed of the idea that shame is merely about 
vanity, about how one appears to others (after all one can be ashamed on one! s own, 
before one's own gaze and when there is no-one else around) the substantial 
difference between shame and guilt may turn upon the way that they are indexed on 
the one hand to actions, omissions and outcomes (about which we are guilty) and 
failure to live up to an internalized moral standard of character (about which we feel 
shame). In both cases some form of reparation and amendment may be due. 
58 
Murdoch's emphasis upon character rather than agency should perhaps lead 
her to lean more upon an analysis of shame rather than guilt because it is more 
concerned with character and its corruption than it is with individual acts. There may, 
however, be a problem in the way that shame is indexed to an internalised standard of 
actually-attainable (worldly) goodness that the shamed person fails to achieve. 
Sophocles' Ajax kills himself because he cannot bear to stand before his father as a 
shamed man. His intemalised standards are tangible, parental, and this-worldly. 9 His 
shame relates to a special failure, not a generic human condition, it is not about 
measuring himself against a non-transcendent possibility exemplified by others. It is 
difficult to make a judgement about how much sense it would make to feel shame as 
an awareness of fallenness, partly because of the multiplicity of stories that we can tell 
about the concept of shame and partly because Murdoch says nothing significant on 
this theme in the philosophical textS. 60 (The rehabilitation of shame postdates her 
classical education. ) While this may seem a plausible extension of the Murdochian 
position, it is not obvious that it helps her case in the present context. 
58 For a response to the treatment of shame as a Idnd of vanity before others, see Williams (1993), 
81 ff. 
59 See the discussion in Williams (1993). 
60 Whereas guilt is a recurring theme of earlier novels, she does make shame a central feature of the 
plot in her final novel Jackson's Dilemma, but this is too late to influence the philosophical writings. 
141 
What is ultimately implausible about the qualitative claim that guilt, shame, or 
both may have a favourable character is that it takes us down a road where Murdoch 
does not go, and does not go for a very good reason, i. e. 'feelings of guilt keep 
61 attracting the gaze back towards the self. Shame and guilt involve attention to the 
self but Murdochian attention is not set up in terms of good and bad forms of 
attention to self but attention to self as such, i. e. egocentricity and not selfishness. 
While it is intelligible that we might (indeed do) experience guilt or shame that is 
unselfish, it is unintelligible that we might experience either in a way which is not 
strongly indexed to the self Irrespective of whatever other favourable characteristics 
they may have, guilt and shame are self-directed emotions. The great strength of 
picturing the ordinary human condition in terms of fallenness is that (once removed 
from a deterministic context of the sort supplied by Schopenhauer) it can be strongly 
motivating. It has normative force, it promotes unselfing, a move towards a higher 
state of moral being. The great weakness is that it is a form of motivation by guilt. 
Even if we allow, with Conradi, that Murdoch's ethic is only to be gradually 
approximated to, and not suddenly adopted, the question arises: towards what will 
we be moving? Any move into this way of picturing, gradual or otherwise, will still be 
a move into an inescapable sense of fault, a guilt about the character of our being, an 
awareness that we will never match up to our internalised standards of Good and that 
our life will be at best an honourable defeat. 
As MurdocWs picture is developmental, concerned with the direction of 
progress. The precise point at which one becomes a puritan will be unimportant if 
progress in this direction is, in any case, a move towards puritanism. This will render 
the position of the advanced pilgrim -the one who has done something to mitigate 
fallenness- unintelligible. Given the greater clarity of vision at the more elevated (but 
still human, hence fallen) levels of moral being, the higher we go, the better our grasp 
of our fallenness and the more an ongoing, inescapable sense of ontological guilt will 
be brought into play. (Together, perhaps, with the desire to punish the self that must 
surely go with such an awareness. ) If Murdoch wants to hold onto her hostility to the 
puritanism of a religious-type guilt (and it appears that she does) then she will need to 
compromise her continuity with religious morality by abandoning the idea of 
fallenness that generates this puritanism. 
61 SG, 99. 
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Chapter 7: Respect and Love 
One of the problems that Murdoch has to avoid is the covert redirection of 
attention back towards the self. A difficulty here is that Platonic accounts of love 
seem to make just this move. They are about a certain kind of self-improvement, a 
preoccupation with personal rectitude or moral well-being. In the next chapter I will 
try to give content to this charge and to show that Murdoch falls foul of it. Here, I am 
only concerned to establish that the problem cannot be avoided or evaded by 
highlighting the non-Platonic component of Murdochian love, that element which 
might be called agapaic, or otherwise comparable to Kantian respect. The crux of 
what follows is that Kantian respect can help us to understand the sorts of low level 
responses that go to make up loving Murdochian attention. Nevertheless, Murdoch's 
account remains primarily Platonic, its ultimate problems are those of Platonic eros. 
In what follows below, Section I will outline the contrast between Murdochian love 
and Kantian respect (classifying approaches towards them as compatibilist and 
incompatibilist). Section 11 will set out the untenability of the incompatibilist position. 
Section III will separate out two different senses of 'love! in Murdoch (personal love 
and eros) and together with Section IV on the self, it wll show why we should 
continue to accord primacy to the Platonic component of love even within a 
compatibilist account. 
1. Compatibilism and Incompatibilism 
Murdoch writes about love and Kant about respect There is a prima facie 
opposition between the two. Kant suggests that respect preserves what love 
eliminates, our distance from the other, their independent existence as a self in their 
own right with all the dignity of personhood that implies. This reluctance to embrace 
love does not mean that Kant collapses the distinction between loving care and 
pathological sexual desire. He treats the right kind of (benevolent/beneficent) love as 
a bolster to morality. There are, consequently, duties of love, such as those of charity 
towards the poor but 'no one is wronged' when we neglect them'. ' By contrast, 
1 Kant, DV, 134.1 am also drawing Kant's Lectures on Ethics rather than the sparse comments in 
the Groundwork where he tries to equate duty with agapaic practical love rather than pathological 
love. 
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Murdoch's wise old Abbess in 7"he Bell warns that 'all our failures are ultimately 
failures in love'. ' This extremely un-Kantian sentiment runs through MurdocWs 
work. 3 
What stands in the way of any simple separation of Kantian respect and 
Murdochian love is the ambiguity of both. Understood in her own terms, Murdoch is 
engaged in a project to 'deepen our concept of love' and does not possess the finished 
article. 4 Our concept of love progresses as life and our experience of loving 
progress. 5 The result is a lack of analytic precision which makes it tempting to try and 
appropriate at least some of the content of Kantian respect in order to render 
Murdochian love more intelligible. One difficulty here is that Kantian respect has 
ambiguities of its own. It is one of a pair of related emotional experiences. The other 
is awe (achtung), a sense of our limits in the face of that which outstrips the 
imagination, part of the experience of the sublime. By contrast, respect (also achtung, 
but in a different context) is connected to a sense of our own worth. What I am called 
upon to respect in the other is precisely what is worthy of respect in myself. 
I will classify approaches towards Murdochian love and Kantian respect as 
compatibilist and incompatibilist. Lawrence Blum is the most prominent exponent of 
an incompatibilist approach, emphasising that a commitment to universalisability is 
built into Kantian respect as opposed to the concern for particularity, for the 
contingent unique character of persons, that is the hallmark of Murdochian love. 6 On 
the compatibilist side we have Robin Dillon, who wants to improve upon Kantian 
respect by effecting a fusion with Murdoch; David Velleman, who merely wants to 
soften some of the more abstract formulations of Kant's Groundwork in the light of 
Murdochian arguments; and finally, Carla Bagnoli and Maria Antonaccio, whose 
2 The Bell, 235. 
3 Concern for the moral dimension of love predates 7he Bell, e. g. VC, 87. 
4 VC, 95n. 
5 IP, 28,4 1, where love is likened to an cnd-point or Kantian Idea of Reason. 
6 Murdoch's concern with particularity focuses upon persons rather that situations. (Different agents 
should act only in line with their particular moral levels, and not in line with universal rules. ) She 
does not advance the 'polarizing argument' whereby a reason for doing x can generally become a 
reason for not doing x if some other feature of the situation changes. She is not, in that sense, a 
'moral particularist'. 
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concern is not to vindicate or rethink Kant but to use him to make better sense of 
Murdoch. 7 
What Blum's incompatibilism draws upon is the convenient genealogy set up 
by Anscombe and given a gendered edge by Carol Gilligan. This divides modem 
philosophical ethics into two great campS. 8 On the one hand there is the traditional, 
care or virtue-centered and particularistic ethics of Aristotle (and Plato). On the 
other, there is the modem impartialism of the justice and rule-based approach of Kant 
and Utilitarianism. For Anscombe,, it is modernity's failing that it favours abstract 
rules over human flourishing. For Gilligan, such rule-base morality is masculine 
(chappish even) as opposed to care which is a characteristically feminine concern. 
Blum situates Murdoch prestigiously at the origins of the renewal of interest in the 
care perspective. This can be given general support by appeal to Murdoch's nostaligic 
reservations about the modem world and more detailed textual support by appeal to 
her criticisms of Kantian universalisability and its culpability in downgrading, indeed 
loosing concepts essential to the adequate portrayal of individual character. 9 
The compatibilist position also has its advantages. Maria Antonaccio, in a 
broadly Kantian account of Murdoch, has argued that the conception of freedom 
involved in Murdoch's theory of the imagination vindicates a sense of human dignity 
that may be extended into appropriate standards of individual recognition in the face 
of anonymous bureaucratic structures. 10 Antonaccio's point is that Murdoch's critique 
of our default egocentricity must be seen as working in combination with her liberal 
concern for the dignity of the free individual as such. Antonaccio may be cautious 
about having recourse to the language of 'respect' but the Kantian overtones of her 
approach are clear. There is good sense in this emphasis upon Murdoch's Kantian 
leanings. Platonic love on its own does not offer adequate resources for concern 
7 Antonaccio (2000); Blum (1986), (1991) and for the Gilligan connection, (1994); Dillon (1992); 
Bagnoli (1999); Velleman (1999), which is commented on with some reference to Murdoch in 
Swanton (2003) 108-115. 
8 Anscombe (1981); Gilligan (1982). 
9 Conceptual loss in Murdoch involves both proceeding as if we lacked a complex conceptual 
background to our idea of freedom and the danger of consolidating this as if impoverishment into 
real impoverishment by going on to theorize freedom without an adequate account of the inner life, 
Diamond (1988). 
10 This is the master theme of Antonaccio (2000) with the extension to bureaucratic cncounters 
advanced in the final chapter as a possible application of Murdoch. 
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about the individual. It holds that we love what we lack, i. e. perfection, and that 
which carries intimations of what we lack. Platonic love is the striving of the 
imperfect for the perfect. It is not, ultimately a mode of concern for what is flawed 
and fallen. 'One cannot feel unmixed love for a mediocre moral standard, ' writes 
Murdoch, 'any more than one can for the work of a mediocre artist. "' This sort of 
Platonic claim is Murdochian but it is problematic because Murdoch also views 
humans as intrinsically flawed or imperfect. Perfection is not here, it is 
(metaphorically) elsewhere. Kantian respect, by contrast, secularizes Christian agape, 
loving caritas for the other which is modelled upon God's love for us, the love of the 
perfect for the imperfect. Like agape, Kantian respect is due to the other irrespective 
of who they are or what they have done, irrespective of fallenness and flaw. By 
including something like Kantian respect within our account of Murdochian love we 
might better equip it to cope with the dual requirements of loving perfection and 
loving fallen, flawed individuals, irrespective of their peculiar properties or character. 
11. The Trouble with Incompatibilism 
What gives the incompatibilist reading its initial plausibility is (i) its 
ready-made way of assimilating Murdoch into the major trends in moral theory by 
placing her within the two great camps picture; and (ii) her early, and sometimes 
strident, criticism of Kant and theories that 'enter through a back door left open by 
Kant'. 12 1 will consider these two points in turn. Concerning (i) it should be pointed 
out that Murdoch fits awkwardly into the two great camps picture. Blum's 
path-breaking articles situating Murdoch as a champion of particularity and an 
opponent of Kant predate the much more overtly compatibilist Metaphysics where it 
is made clear that she is pursuing a 'dialogue between Plato and Kant' rather than 
writing footnotes to only one of them [M. 298]. Her long-standing Kantian emphasis 
upon inescapable moral structures built into language and consciousness; her 
long-standing commitment (since the mid-1960s) to developing an account of the 
'good constructive imagination! 13 ; and the new emphasis on duty in the Metaphysics 
11 GG, 60. 
12 SG, 79. 
13 DPR 199. 
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(to which I will return) have prompted a rediscovery of the Kantian influence that was 
temporarily eclipsed by the Platonic element of her writings in the 1970s. (These are 
the themes on which Antonaccio makes great play. )14 
Against the backdrop of this attempt to fuse elements of Kant and Plato, we 
can make sense of Murdoch's repeated lapses into the language of respect: 'love 
should be inseparable from justice, and clear vision from respect for the real. "5; 'Love 
is the imaginative recognition of, that is respect for, this othemess. '16 ; 'a love which, 
still loving, comes to respect the beloved and (in Kantian language again) treat him as 
an end not as a means, may be the most enlightening love of all. '17 ; and latterly, 
'Aesthetic insight connects with moral insight, respect for things connects with 
respect for persons' [M. 495]. Murdochian love, if it excludes Kantian respect, may 
fall foul of a deconstructionist charge of drawing its meaning from a repressed idea of 
the latter that is continually returning, insinuating its way back into the warp and weft 
of the text. 
This leaves us with point (ii), and a focus upon the important and specific 
charges against Kant that she makes in her earlier writings (up to and including the 
Sovereignty). 18 These are not always directed against respect but they do impinge 
upon it. The charges are as follows. Firstly, a marginalization of emotion in Kant's 
account of human relations. Secondly, a related preference for overt behaviour over 
messy inwardness. Thirdly, a neglect of contingency or particularity in favour of 
universal humanity. Finally, a preoccupation with the self in the emotion of respect 
and in the related experience of the sublime. In short, 'Kant does not tell us to respect 
whole particular tangled-up individuals, but to respect the universal reason in their 
breasts. In so far as we are rational and moral we are all the same, and in some 
mysterious sense transcendent to history. 19 Individually or together, these points 
seem to imply that Kantian respect is incapable of providing an adequate form of 
14 Antonaccio (2000). 
15 SG, 88. 
16 Sub. G, 216. 
17 FS, 36. 
18 Particularly SG, 79. 
19 Sub. G, 215. 
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attention to others. Let us consider the first three of these charges in turn (I will 
reserve the fourth and return to it in the next section). 
Given that both respect and the experience of the sublime are emotional 
responses, the charge of a neglect of the emotions per se is hardly applicable. A 
reformulation of the charge into one of a lack of emotional intensity, does however, 
seem to be implicit in MurdocWs articles on the sublime. Love is 'very like' the 
sublime. 20 The latter fascinates and impresses Murdoch in a way that respect never 
does, partly because it includes a revelatory moment of personal humility in the face 
of what is other and goes beyond the bounds of the imagination. Compared to the 
emotional intensity of personal love or the experience of the sublime, respect seems 
to be bloodless, anodyne. But drawing the distinction between love and respect in 
these terms is problematic given that Murdochian love is an orientation of universal 
applicability, it is attention to the other, any other and not just some intimate 
companion. Attention can involve all manner of things from waiting, coming to 
someone's assistance, thinking about, remembering faithfully, really trying, and so on. 
Intense personal relations may provide the exemplar of attention, and an exemplar 
that is similar to the impressive sublime, but not all forms of attention are dramatic or 
intense. Praying is intense, waiting may be less so. 
Connected to the charge of a lack of emotional intensity is the idea that 
respect is bound up with the behaviourist drift of post-war analytic philosophy, a 
preference for the cleanness of willed action over the messiness of the inner life. 
Against this, Murdoch posited a form of private moral effort (loving attention) that 
need not register at the level of publicly observable action. Attention is an inner effort 
that stands in need of no outer criterion. A Mother-in-law (M), through laudable 
effort, might revise her view of her daughter-in-law (D) and yet not change her 
(already impeccable) behaviour. Following Bagnoli, among others, I maintain that this 
emphasis upon inward struggle is not, as Murdoch believed, a significant difference 
between her and Kant. 21 
20 Sub. G, 216. 
21 Bagnoli (1999) presents the most detailed case for this widely held criticism; see also Nancy 
Schauber (1999), (200 1). 
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What Murdoch fails to give adequate attention to is the mixed formation of 
Kant's Will, its emergence out of an account of inner struggle. 22 His position is that 
natural, biologically given, selfish inclinations vie with our capacity to act in 
accordance with universal rational standards. Even when agreeing about what is to be 
done, these two motivations compete. (Am I helping the other because of their need 
or because of a sense that I alone am capable of sorting things out? ) On this model, 
respect is not primarily a block on actions but a block on inner motivations. Like the 
loving attention of the Murdochian mother-in-law, it may be active without any 
discernible change in overt behaviour. Where we have rational grounds for doing x as 
well as selfish ones, a shift in motive will not generate a public criterion for the inner 
process, but it will still involve a (morally important) triumph of respect over 
selfishness. 
Bagnoli goes too far in identifying Murdochian and Kantian models of moral 
agency (for reasons that will emerge at the end of this chapter) but the basic point, 
that they are not differentiated in the way that Murdoch claims is well made. We can 
see this more clearly when we consider the resultant view of evil that they share. Both 
are concerned to show that evil should not be seen as radical freedom. 
23 (In the 
manner of Milton's heroic Satan. ) For a Kantian, someone like Eichman does not 
exercise radical freedom. Their moral failure is a cognitive failure, a loss of the inner 
battle between rational freedom and the determinism of natural inclinations. (I rather 
think that this is Milton's point too, his Satan admires mankind but looses an inner 
struggle before he loses the other one. ) This equation of transgression with cognitive 
failure is the same concern that Murdoch is pursuing in her critique of existentialist 
heroic freedom. She is trying to present freedom as more than do whatever thou will. 
Instead it is something that must be constructed, fought for inwardly and imperfectly 
realised, but on this, she and Kant are in agreement. 
This leads us into the third Murdochian charge against Kant: respect is what is 
due to all persons simply by virtue of their being persons. Even an Eichman is due the 
22 Bagnoli (1999). 
23 Their proximity on the question of evil as cognitive failure becomes clear once discussion is not 
limited to the Groundwork (Murdoch's principal source) and the Third Critique but takes in Kant's 
treatment of evil in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Murodoch does not devote enough 
attention to the particularity of Kant's texts to produce an entirely just account of his position. Then 
again, this is not her priority. 
respect involved in trying, judging, and condemning him as a human and not as 
vermin. Love, by contrast, seems to be concerned less with generic humanity than 
with particularity, with the way you wear your hat and sip your tea (in David 
24 Velleman' s pleasing formulation). Kant's troublesome comment in the Groundwork 
to the effect that all respect for persons is properly only respect for the moral law that 
their rationality instantiates, threatens to radically disassociate him from concern for 
25 the concrete individual. Here we need to proceed with some caution. Taken on face 
value, this formulation posits something quite bizarre, a direct encounter with an 
abstraction. Dillon and Velleman have (respectively) suggested that (a) this ought not 
to be, and (b) this is not, Kant's understanding of respect. 
Dillon revises the Kantian account to allow for a form of respect that he calls 
Icare respect'. (He is concerned to bridge the gap between the two great camps. ) Care 
respect is a form of recognition of the other's humanity rather than an appraisal of 
particular accomplishments. 26 It involves having our agency constrained in such a 
way that we are disposed to promote the other's well-being. But given that the other's 
well-being is tied up not with our projects but with theirs, and that (for Dillon) 'we 
are essentially fully specific and concretely particular individuals', we need to he able 
to think ourselves into their situation in order to promote their projects. 27 Hence care 
respect, because it involves promoting the other's well-being, will necessarily require 
attention to their particularity, to what it is like to be that person. For Dillon, this 
form of respect, which is not about the appraisal of particular accomplishments, can 
be a form of Murdochian attention to particularity. 
For Velleman, no revision of Kant is needed to bring the two into line. Nor 
need we appeal to Dillods potentially intrusive disposition to help others. (This loses 
the metaphorical distance that Kant sees as the hallmark of respect. ) Sheer 
recognition of the selfhood of the other, their status as an end in themselves, although 
it is recognition of what everybody has, can proceed only via their particularity 
because we do not encounter disembodied personhoods. In love and in respect 
24 Velleman, (1999), 371. 
25 Kant, Groundwork, 4.400. 
26 Dillon (1992) is drawing upon the distinction in Darwcll (1977) between recognition respect (due 
to all) and appraisal respect (which registers particular accomplishment). 
27 Dillon (1992), 116. 
150 
(which for Velleman are analogous, mutually-informing but not identical forms of 
attention) we recognize the other as an end in themselves, but we do so only through 
their particularity. (The quirk that makes us realize that here too is another human. ) It 
is because of this that we can mistakenly imagine that what we love is the 
particularity, the quirk, the fetishized body-part and not the person. We do not 
(normally) love or respect someone because of the way they sip their tea; we do not 
love someone warts and all because of their warts. Idiosyncrasy functions as a 
pointer to a unique instantiation of personhood. Because we work better with some 
pointers than with others, we are better able to value one person than another. We 
need these pointers, these contingent peculiarities. 
This is a view that does have its roots in the philosophical genealogy to which 
Murdoch belongs. It is precisely the argument that Weil uses to link what is due to all 
humans with attention to particularity. What is sacred in the other is 'impersonal' in 
the sense that all humans have it, but this humanity is expressed in their contingent 
detaiL 28 The point is well made. Consider, for example, the rather mundane 
circumstance of attending to a succession of papers presented by different speakers in 
a series of seminars. If our efforts go into a mechanical (rule-governed) 
deconstruction (or some similar response that fits all arguments) it is not clear at all 
that we are showing an appropriate respect for the speakers. (Even if we are quiet at 
the appropriate moments and smile pleasantly. ) Only by attending to the particularity 
of their arguments are we showing to each the respect that is due to all. However 
faithful this treatment of respect is to Kant's intentions (and however consistent the 
later were) it seems to be just the sort of familiar emotional response that Murdoch 
appeals to when she writes about loving attention to particularity. A disturbing 
example of this is given in the Metaphysics: Dr and Mrs Goebbels are hustling their 
children up to bed, about to given them poison when one of the children says to a 
guard 'Misch, Misch, du bist ein Fisch' [M. 95]. It is the detail that makes us think of a 
real person who deserved better. Murdoch is making no inappropriate move when she 
slips or lapses into the (Kantian sounding) terminology of respect in order to give 
content to what she calls loving attention. 
28 Wcil (1986), 51. 
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111. The Emotions are Contextualized by Eros 
Working with this understanding that respect can be sensitive to particularity, 
and hence is compatible with Murdochian love, Dillon wants to subsume the latter 
under the former. Velleman and Bagnoli want to sit the two alongside each other as 
complementary but different emotions. While I am more sympathetic to the latter 
position (it preserves a fuller range of emotional distinctions) I want to suggest that 
both approaches involve a conceptual loss, a confusing elision of different roles 
played by the concept of 'love' in Murdoch. There is a sense in which Murdoch 
preserves the distinctions between love, respect, compassion, and other 
morally-desirable emotions, but there is also a sense in which love subsumes them all. 
29 'Love is the general name of the quality of attachment'. In this second sense of the 
term, "'Love" can be used to mean any desire or tendency' [M. 342]. 
To set out how this is done, I will turn to the final Murdochian criticism of 
Kant that was set aside earlier: his account of respect (and of the sublime) redirects 
attention back towards the self This is a charge that sticks. Love, as Murdoch 
understands it from Plato, is other-directed. Kantian respect is person-directed and, 
as such, it is tied up with a sense of our own value as a dignity and not a price. (We 
are not replaceable tokens of the human type. ) This is a core difference in their 
grounding of good relations with others. Kant grounds good interpersonal relations 
on a sense of one's own value, Murdoch grounds them on a sense of one's 
unimportance. As Blum puts it, Murdoch endorses a self-other asymmetry, what is 
primarily valued is the other. " Murdochian love is a metaphorical death of the self 
Her idea of moral pilgrimage is aligned with (problematic) Renaissance Neoplatonist 
readings of the Phaedo and the Orphic symbolism of Ihe Symposium: love draws 
Orpheus into the underworld on a quest that fails because he cannot grasp that death 
is the price of love. 31 This Neoplatonic conceptual linkage between love and death is 
29 SG, 100. 
30 Blum (1986), 27-8. 
31 MurdocWs understanding of this (and her grasp of the connection of art to Platonism) owes a 
good deal to Edward Winds Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance and Titian as an interpreter of 
Ovid. A reworking of the Orphic elements of Plato's Symposium structures The Sacred and Profane 
Love Machine (1974). Attempts at katabasis, descent into the underworld as symboliscd by subways, 
tunnels, downward-sloping caves, basements and bomb shelters. 
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reproduced in both Freud and Murdoch. Love and death, eros and thanatos, are 
conceptually related in a way that death and respect are not. 32 
In one sense of the term, love is just another familiar emotion, like jealousy, 
anger, pity and shame. It is something that we all experience, a complex phenomenon 
which may have an affective component (a racing pulse, increased perspiration, and 
so on) but most importantly, it will have a cognitive component: we will see the 
world in a particular way. In line with her visual metaphor, I will take it that the 
cognitive component of emotion (as Murdoch understands it) is best understood in 
the non-inferential terms of seeing as rather than belief These sorts of particular 
emotional experiences, episodic and protracted, are described frequently and well in 
her novels. This is also what she seems to have in mind when she gives her 
Sovereignty example of the love of a mother for her son and her shifting attitude 
towards her daughter in law, whom she may take pains to see 'lovingly' . 
33 The limits 
of our precision here are the limits of her exposition. 34 Her view of the emotions is 
broadly cognitive but it is also imprecise, ambiguous, metaphorical. In the Acastos 
dialogues, she writes of 'feeling-thought' . 
35 In Jackson's Dilemma, she explores 
shame but neither there, nor in the philosophical texts does she give any definition of 
the form 'shame is x!. Love, in the sense of personal love, 'love in its everyday 
manifestatione, is one emotion among others. 36 
However, some disambiguation is possible, although care is needed to avoid 
producing an extension of Murdoch's account rather than a clarification of it. I will 
take it that within the Murdochian scheme of things, personal love can sit alongside 
respect and both can sit alongside compassion, the sympathetic Schopenhauerian 
32 1 have in mind the death trieb in Freuds Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Murdoclfs thanatology 
is detailed in the closing chapter. 
33 IP, 22. 
34 It is not obvious whether Murdoch wants us to identify particular emotions as examples of moral 
vision or as examples of attention. The latter is the inner cffort that shapes the former. Alternatively, 
emotions might be treated as covering both, depending upon how 'effortfal' they arc. Her treatment 
of emotions is not detailed enough to provide a definitive answer to this question but there is no 
reason in principle why it should be couched exclusively in terms of one to the exclusion of the 
other. 
35 Acastos, 25-6. 
36 GG, 73. The Sovereignty also values courage and humility, SG, 93. The two senses of 'love' arc 
rcspcctivcly at work in the interpersonal discussion of D and M on the one hand, and the discussion 
of Platonic love of the Good, which is more intrapersonal, concerned with the constitution of the 
scif, Sovereignty, 16-23 99-101. 
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alternative to Kantian respect and duty. 37 (In the context of art, Murdoch connects 
'realistic vision! with 'compassion! and with justice. )3' These are valued and, in a 
broader sense, they are 'loving' emotions. They are favoured orientations of the self 
and their differences can be explored andfinessed. We might formulate the distinction 
in terms of a Kantian metaphor: respect is an emotion that preserves distance while 
personal love involves a desire for proximity, for being closer; compassion involves 
something more like an identification with the suffering of an other . 
39 To this Kantian 
metaphor of distance it is sometimes objected that love involves keeping one's 
distance, and this is true enough, but such an exile is self-enforced and difficult, it may 
negate actual proximity but not the desire for it. (The objection flows out of a failure 
to differentiate between desire and intention . )40 
We can see how in-tune this metaphor of distance is with Murdoch's way of 
thinking when we reflect that her concept of love is a privileged one precisely because 
it involves a desire for proximity. The pilgrim loves the Good (perfection), and 
desires to move closer to it. What underpins and allows such emotional parity as there 
is between personal love, respect and compassion, what places them all on the same 
level as loving attitudes towards the other, is an erotic model of the self in which we 
are on a pilgrimage towards the good, our desire is channelled by these emotions and 
sometimes by emotions of a much baser sort. 
By relating love to moral pilgrimage Murdoch uses 'love' in a second and 
broader sense. (I am tempted to write of love-I and love-2, it strikes me as a clearer 
but unMurdochian way of putting the matter. ) Love in this broader sense is 
37 Kant claims in the Groundwork that acting from sympathy may be laudable but lacks 
specifically-moral worth. Schopenhaucr's On the Basis ofAforality champions a more sympathetic, 
compassionate response to the other and is highly regarded in the earlier sections of the Metaphysics 
(Chapters 3 and 5, esp. 63-5 for compassion). This balances out the interest in duty in later chapters 
(10-12 and 17). 
38 SG, 85; Acastos, 28. 
39 Although Blum is keen to promote Schopenhauerian compassion, and it is favoured in WCil's 
Notebooks, compassion is a bad candidate for an exemplary Murdochian cmotion when it is 
understood in Schopenhaucrian terms: it undermines not only the self-other asymnictry, but any 
sclf-othcr barrier- 'the bad (that is, uncompassionate) man everywhere feels a thick Partition between 
himself and cvcrything outside ... the good character, on the other 
hand, lives in an external world 
that is homogeneous with his own true being. the others are not a non-ego for him, but an "I once 
more". ' Schopenhaucr, RV, 211-2. 
40 A good example of this in A Fairly Honourable Defeat, is the relationship between Hilda and her 
son Peter. She keeps her distance but still longs (desircs) to be close. Desire for proximity is not the 
same as having the intention to bring it about. 
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sometimes referred to as 'eros' in Murdochs texts. However, there is no rigorous 
division of labour between the two terms. Her preference in the philosophical texts 
(and less so in the novels) is (confusingly) to use love' in both senses. In the (already 
Platonic) Sovereignty, 'eroe is avoided in favour of 'love', but from 7he Fire and the 
Sun onwards into the Metaphysics, it appears with greater frequenCy. 41 Ambiguities 
apart, the broader sense of love as eros is used to contextualize all emotional 
experience, including interpersonal love, the experience of which may be much more 
intermittent. We are continuously erotic beings, irrespective of whether we are in love 
or not. Love in this second sense, is not one more orientation of the self, as eros, love 
is a metaphor for that which is oriented, i. e. a fundamental metaphor for the 
constitution of the self 
This is where Murdoch is at her most Freudian. She is, as Velleman notes, 
critical of Freud, but what Velleman omits to point out is that while she is critical of 
his egocentric therapeutic proposals she does not attack, but rather embraces, a 
42 
variant of the Freudian hydraulic metaphor of libido. Unable to reduce human 
complexity to neurophysiology, Freud introduced the metaphor of a more or less 
fixed quantity of intentional desire that could be cathected (channelled) this way or 
that. Because the quantity is fixed, it is subject to a principle of displacement. 43 Desire 
for one object supplants desire for another. For Murdoch, such desire is a more or 
less fixed quantity, but varies qualitatively depending upon its objects. The desire 
which is directed towards some part of a woman! s body is not qualitatively the same 
as the desire that is directed towards the Christian God. Murdoch thinks that it makes 
sense to say that Good 'purifies the desire which seeks it' and that Desire for what is 
corrupt and worthless, the degradation of love, its metamorphosis into ambition, 
vanity, cruelty, greed, jealousy, hatred, or the parched demoralising deserts of its 
absence, arc phenomena oflen experienced and readily recognised' [M. 496-7]. Love, 
in the sense of eros is metamorphosed into this emotion or that; it is channelled, 
41 She makes three attempts to provide a general account of eros in the Metaphysics: at the end of 
Chapter I (pages 21-25); at the end of Chapter II (pages 342-6) and in the brief tail-cnding Chapter 
17 (pages 494-7). 
42 Vclleman (1999), 249, n. 34. claims that his rejection of Freudian love because it is conative is 'an 
attempt to make clear and explicit what is implicit in Murdocws brief allusions to him'. 
43 Freud's early Projectfor a Scientific Psyrhology even uses a terminology of attention. At the time 
of Weil's writings, but not MurdocWs earliest texts, this text was unpublished. It should also be noted 
that libido in Freud is only fixed at distinct stages of sexual development, between which it alters. 
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moved, deployed in various (good and bad) ways. 'As in Freud, 'cure' lies in the 
redeployment of energy. ' [M. 24]. 
Under the influence of Simone Weil, who is responsible for this promiscuous 
association of Freud and Plato, Murdoch treats the hydraulic metaphor as an 
appropriate way of representing what we are. Emotions are all forms of eros, 
channelled this way or that. 44 Although the concept of eros is clearly ancestral to 
libido, I am far from endorsing this Weilian-influenced reading of Plato. The 
hydraulic metaphor is conspicuous in the Republic 485d-e (cited in Yhe Fire and the 
Sun) 'we know that whenever any man's desires flow in full current towards any one 
object, like a stream that has had a channel dug for it, towards all other objects they 
flow the more feebly; and at Phae&-us 25 1E where the soul of the lover 'channels the 
stream of desire into herself as through an irrigation trench, releasing the pent-up 
waters. '45 However, Freud's discussion of libido owes a good deal to the idea of 
modelling human consciousness upon 19th century dynamics. It is, in a sense, a 
psychodynamic model, a modem conception of energy rather than merely a flowing 
current. As such, assimilating libido and eros seems somewhat ahistorical. The idea 
of a sexualised erotic stream also seems to play a more consistent role in Freud and 
Murdoch than it does in Plato. In both it is troubling. We may be inclined to reflect 
that surely people are not really like that? 
IV. Eros and the Self 
Considered from a Murdochian point of view, there are also two conspicuous 
problems with the metaphor of energy flows: the energy part and the flow part. 
Firstly, dynamics is a branch of mechanics and Murdoch is trying to account for a 
human freedom that contrasts with mechanical response. This metaphor seems to 
promote a very mechanical view of persons. Murdoch tackles this problem directly 
not by ignoring the disadvantages but by suggesting that the advantages outweigh 
them. 'Eros is sexual energy as spiritual energy. Freud's libido is also a concept of the 
enerSy of the Seele or Psjche which can make or mar the life of the individual. Our 
life problem is one of the transformation of energy. Here too there is a contrast 
44 WciI (1952), 280. 
45 1 have used the translation of this passage given in Nussbaum (1996), 30. It conveys the relevant 
nuances. 
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between the Platonic religious concept and its quasi-scientific modem version ... Some 
modem views of freedom, aware perhaps of an anti-personal deterministic use of the 
idea of fundamental energy, emphasize discontinuity ... The moral life in the Platonic 
understanding of it is a slow shift of attachments wherein looking (concentrating, 
attending, attentive discipline) is a source of divine (purified) energy' [M. 24-5]. 
Against the problematic deterministic overtones of energy, we have to set its 
advantageous overtones of continuity and the idea of 'shifting attachments', i. e. the 
real and familiar experience that we all have of displacement. "'Eros" is the 
continuous operation of spiritual energy, desire, intellect, love' [M. 496]. 
Her second problem with the metaphor relates to the gradualism of personal 
change. The imagery of a fluid energy may generate a misleading impression of the 
ease of personal transformation or misrepresent emotional responses as in some way 
voluntary. Hence, Murdoch builds in what I will call a principle of inertia. The 
terminology is not her own, but I think it makes sense of her position and its sources, 
particularly Weil and Sartre who deploy metaphors whose content is, I believed, 
carried over into Murdochian eros. In Being andNothingness Sartre argues that even 
our tastes (whether we like oysters or a particular style of dress) represents 
(expresses) our choice of being. Our fascinated dislike for the viscous reveals the 
character of our self-conscious freedom as continually under threat of becoming 
bogged down, trapped or engulfed by the sticky thickness of the world. The viscous 
(visqueux) as Murdoch opts to favourably translate the term 'represents in itself a 
dawning triumph of the solid over the liquid' or 'a threatening mode of being that 
must be avoided', it is 'the invisible suction of the past' a gradualist constraint upon 
freedom, 'its fluidity exists in slow motioW. 46 Sartre is also, albeit rather vaguely 
interested in comparing viscosity and a conception of the eroticized self as constituted 
by Freudian libido. It is the kind of conception to which he contrasts fluid 'choice of 
47 being' 
. 
Sartrean self-consciousness is subject to a danger of collapsing into viscosity, 
46 Sartrc, EN, 607,611,610,607 respectively. Rucl Barnes translates visqucux more pejoratively 
as 'slimy'. Hou-m-cr, this mill not do for Murdoch, she likes the imagery of viscosity, Sartre, Chapter 
I and AL 154. 
47 Sartrc makes a passing contrast between viscosity and the William James metaphor of the 'stream 
of consciousness*, but this is a metaphor that Sartrc xNas never very happy with, preferring to treat 
consciousness as a nothing, hcncc free. (An approach mith deep roots in the tradition of Augustine: 
God is omnipotcnt he does not share his power, hcnoc man! s freedom to create evil is not real power, 
but negativity, an ability only to undo. ) 
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a condition at oddswith the recognition of freedoM. 48 If consciousness is viscous, it 
will be subject to a principle of inertia, and this is a view of the self that Sartre 
believes we should avoid. Roquentin in his novel La Nausie feels bogged down in 
Bouville (mud-town) where it is difficult to generate real movement. 49 He must 
escape. For Murdoch, such an escape would amount to a flight from the human 
condition. Our erotic configuration changes only slowly and with much effort. 
The same imagery of being bogged down in the mud reappears in Murdoch's 
The Bell. (The forging of a new bell is a long-standing literary image of personal 
change. ) In this novel the bell of the title, the voice of love (the vox amor) is stuck in 
a river bed and must be raised or else it will be replaced by an entirely new bell. At 
this point the Sartrean metaphor of being bogged down joins to a Weilian one of a 
necessary struggle against gravity. (Morally, we have a tendency to fall downwards. ) 
What results from this multiply-layered picturing of personal change as subject to 
inertiaý is deeply ambiguous, it involves speculations that, as Murdoch remarks, may 
live near to the edge of nonsense' [M. 344]. Near to the edge, but not quite over it. 
(The danger of 'a kind of nonsense! is taken to be the price of 'trying really hard to get 
a glimpse of an idea!. )50 Sudden change, except where it is the cumulative result of 
long-standing effort, is ruled out by Murdoch. We are not free in the radical, 
existentialist (romantic) sense. The complex fabric of our being (another and rather 
different metaphor) can be rewoven only piecemeal and slowly. (Like NeuratWs ship 
that must be rebuilt at sea. ) Perhaps we are in danger here of introducing too many 
metaphors, but this too foflows Murdoch's own overlaying of metaphors which 
intimate an underlying position that is pulled together not by any explicit statement 
that escapes from metaphor but only by the metaphor of eros itself A reconfiguration 
of the self is a reconfiguration. of eros. (Later we will encounter it as an ascent. ) What 
Murdoch relies upon is the reader's ability to make enough sense of eros to go on. 
What we are, on the Murdochian account, is largely conative, a system of 
pre-existent desire, subject to transformational constraints. It may be shifted towards 
48 qlcrc is no inertia in consciousness!, Sartrc, EN, 61. 
49 Strictly speaking, Sartrc reserves the term 'incrtia! for solids, the 'in itself and not the viscous, 
m hich only threatens the 'for itself with entrapment and reduction to solidity. I am using the term to 
suggest that change is constrained or encounters resistance, that it takes place 'in slow motion'. 
50 A castos, 25. 
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or away from objects but exists independently of and prior to them. 51 If John did not 
meet and fall in love with Mary, his eros would be directed in some other way and 
towards some other object or objects. Episodic, intermittent and transitory emotions 
such as respect, compassion and personal love as well as those of ambition, vanity, 
cruelty, greed and jealousy are to be understood as contextualized by the 
continuously erotic character of our being. As such, they must be seen as conative as 
well as cognitive. Without being more precise than Murdoch's texts allow, I think we 
can safely say that a Murdochian emotional experience will have affective, cognitive 
and conative dimensions. Emotions direct, channel or help to shift, desire. As such 
they are ways of seeing or (if they involve 'effort') they are forms of attention that 
alter (improve) our ways of seeing. This strongly conative aspect of Murdochian love 
as eros, downplayed or denied, in Kantian-inclined compatibilist readings (and that of 
the incompatibilist Blum). It is at the heart of Murdoch's Platonic view of 
inwardness. 52 let us call it Eros. Art comes from the deep soul where a great force 
lives, and this force is sex and love and desire - desire for power, desire for 
possession, sexual desire, desire for beauty, desire for knowledge, desire for God - 
what makes us good, or bad - and without this force there is no art, and no science 
either, and no - no man- without Eros man is a ghost. But with Eros he can be - either 
a demon or - Socrates. 
53 
The self is identified with this system of desire and with its more idiosyncratic 
(contingent) channelling and directing network of concepts and images. Eros is 
present within all humans but it is configured in unique ways. Morality is not, as in 
Kant, about negating desire, it concerns (to borrow a phrase from Nussbaum) a 
therapy of desire, or (back with Murdoch) 'a progressive redemption of desire', a 
matter of its gradual reorientation away from the fantasy-generating ego and towards 
what is other [M. 25]. 'What I have called Eros pictures probably a greater part of 
what we think of as "the moral life"; that is, most of our moral problems involve an 
orientation of our energy and our appetites' [M. 497]. 
51 This emphasis upon desire places Murdoch close to a good deal of 'continental' philosophy. 
52 Velleman (1999) is most emphatic about this. It is at the core of his attack on Freud and what he 
sees as analytic accounts of love which repeat his assumptions by making love property-dependent. It 
is also the position of Bagnoli (1999). 
53 Acastos, 53. 
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. 
However, even if we allow that a form of (particularity regarding) respect is 
one among other favoured 'loving' ways of channelling Murdochian eros, there is still 
another, more abstract and impersonal kind of respect that her approach leaves room 
for. (The kind that her earlier texts are so dismissive about. ) Whereas the Sovereignty 
argues for the primacy of love over this kind of abstract, impersonal respect, the 
Metaphysics, as a safeguard against the dangers of private erotic failure, reintroduces 
a secondary and clearly Kantian tier of morality that consists of public duties (as 
requirements to act in ways that may go against preformed inclinations or desires) 
and axioms (inflexible rules about what is to be done and not to be done). " A 
different kind of respect, more akin to the Groundwork's impersonal respect (for the 
moral law) may be located here, albeit in tension with the system of erotic motivation. 
This kind of respect goes against our inclinations. 
Murdoch writes of the occasional need for efforts of 'will' rather than 
gradualist 'attentioW. 55 Only the latter is in line with our core, direct desires. This way 
of separating attention from will and eros from duty does create problems about how 
the two levels of morality are then to be related. (They are certainly not to be 
understood as competing standards. Duty may compete only with actual inclination, 
not with the Good. ) It also gives more detailed content to the earlier charge that 
some Kantian-influenced approaches tend to reduce selffiood down to a pinpoint of 
will. The content of this charge now becomes one of eliminating desire (and not just 
emotion) from the concept of self In spite of Kant's conception of the moral struggle 
as an inner struggle, and in spite of the emotional status of respect, he identifies the 
truest self with a capacity for freedom that operates at the expense of desire. The 
Kantian approach does tend to sideline what she views as the basic stuff of the self 
Murdochian inwardness need not be intense or dramatic but it must be desirous, 
conative, erotic. At the core of her conception of love is a Platonic eroticization of 
the self. The core problems of Murdochian love are consequently those of Platonic 
eros and its uneasy relationship with her other commitments. 
54 This tagging on of an account of pubic duty, resulting in a two-level morality (private pilgrimage 
and public duty) is a standard move for croticized mystical theories. It differs from standard analytic 
two-ticred moralities typified by R-M. Harc's Moral Thinking, in prioritising the personal, 
spiritualizcd level rather than deflating it through a justification in terms of a more basic 
univcrsalizeable level of moral reasoning. 
55 See Metaphysics Chapters 10,12 and 17 for duty and axioms. MurdocWs exemplar for the scope 
of duty and axioms is the field of politics (Chapter 12). 
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Chapter 8: Moral Progress as an Ascent of Eros 
Murdoch is hostile towards our tendency to be wrapped up in ourselves. An 
example of this is her criticism of the Kantian sublime. Although it involves a moment 
of humility in the face of what is other and unimaginably great, attention is 
subsequently directed back to the (fragile, defiant) self Murdoch holds that in the 
sublime (and more generally in the Romantic attitude towards nature) an apparent 
fascination with what is other conceals an ultimately egocentric preoccupation. ' She 
cannot afford for her own account of love to operate in the same way. I will suggest 
that it does. 
1. The Ascent of Eros 
Murdoch advocates a moral 'pilgrimage' that is a reworking of the Platonic idea 
of an ascent of eros. Such an ascent is a progressive improvement in the orientation 
and character of love. Although Murdoch's concept of love includes something akin 
to Kantian respect for the other it is the Platonic idea of a progressive redemption (a 
purification) of desire that sits at its heart. 'What I have called Eros pictures probably 
a greater part of what we think of as "the moral life"; that is, most of our moral 
problems involve an orientation of our energy and our appetites! [M. 497]. For 
Murdoch, to love is to desire. This makes sexual attraction a better exemplar of love 
2 than maternal care. When appropriately disciplined and directed, this desire provides 
the impetus for moral-cognitive improvement. In Plato, this improvement is depicted 
as a forward movement out of the darkness and into the light (in the Cave metaphor 
of the Republic). Elsewhere it is an upwards movement: in the Symposium, we are 
trying to ascend a ladder of love and to reach ultimate beauty; in the Phaedrus we are 
trying to regrow our atrophied wings so that we can fly up towards the form of the 
Good. We advance or ascend in pursuit of what we lack, in pursuit of a 
metaphorically lost completeness, and ultimately (if sometimes unwittingly) in pursuit 
of perfection. 3 
1 See above, Chapter 4 on Romanticism. 
2 As a result of this, feminist appropriations of Murdochian love which draw upon the exemplar of 
maternal nurturing, especially Ruddick (1980), have to be treatcd with caution. 
3 This deficiency model whereby we love something that we lack is first set out in the Lysis in the 
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The orientation of the imagery varies but in each case advance is not 
cumulative. As we move onwards or upwards, less adequate objects of desire are left 
behind and seen as the limited realities that they are. In the Symposium, we begin with 
desire for beauty in another's body and move on to recognition of beauty in their 
character. This turns out to be no different from beauty in the character of others in 
general and leads us on to a more impersonal conception of beauty that is to be 
appreciated in nature and scholarship. Finally, we ascend to love for beauty as such, 
for the form of the beautiful which sits at the top of a hierarchy of love objects. Love 
is a trickster in the sense that we are duped into pursuing this distant -and perhaps 
initially unappealing- goal by a successive shifting of the goalposts. A final shift 
occurs between the Symposium and the Phaedrus where beauty is recognized to be 
only an accessible introduction to the ineffable and even higher love object, the Good 
itself. 
The Phaedrus relates moral ascent directly to the Platonic three-part soul. We 
are desirous, divided selves, like a charioteer and two horses each with their own idea 
of where it is best to go. What we desire depends upon which part of our soul is in 
charge. Plato occasionally suggests that the struggle is for control over a limited 
supply of eros which flows towards this at the expense of that. Eros, in this sense, is 
akin (and ancestral) to the hydraulic metaphor of libido in Freud. Both Plato and 
Freud recognize the continuity between sexual desire and more abstract, 
intellectualized desires. But whereas Freudian libido has its proper home in the 
bargain basement of the soul, eros is an upwardly mobile principle, initially discernible 
in its more sexual manifestations but rising out of, and above, them. It is a human 
striving to return to perfection. As erotic beings, we are always going home. 
Now consider Murdoch. She has no fixed tripartite division of inwardness but 
she does try to restore the concept of love to favour, a move which she begins in the 
mid-1950s and which culminates in an unambiguous commitment to erotic ascent in 
'The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts' (1967). Its final pages paraphrase 
the Platonic metaphor. 'Good is the magnetic centre towards which love naturally 
moves. False love moves to false good. False love embraces false death. When true 
good is loved, even impurely or by accident, the quality of the love is automatically 
context of philia as familial love. The Platonic versus Socratic status of the Lysis is disputed and 
Murdoch avoids reference to it. Eros in the Symposium and Phaedrus nevertheless continues to 
presuppose ontological lack (endeia). 
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refined, and when the soul turns towards Good the highest part of the soul is 
enlivened. Love is the tension between the imperfect soul and the magnetic perfection 
which is conceived of as lying beyond it., 4 From the start, there is a clear 
Freudian-influence in this reading of eros, with particular emphasis placed upon the 
theme of displacement or transference. The reading is open to support by appeal to 
Neoplatonic mystics such as John of the Cross who also draws upon Plato via 
Plotinus and shares much the same idea, 'it is not possible to direct your eyes towards 
one thing without withdrawing them from another'. 5 We love this at the expense of 
that; we love self at the expense of others or others at the expense of self and we do 
so because of the finite supply of love (care, concern, eros) that we have at our 
6 disposal. As an energy metaphor eros may seem a little contrived and must not be 
overextended to the point where it appears other than metaphorical (as a piece of 
primitive pseudo-science) but the phenomenon it tries to capture, the personal 
experience of displacement, is entirely familiar. The metaphor, however problematic, 
is related to a real process. 
Although 'The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts' marks Murdoch's 
open commitment to a form of Platonism, it avoids the use of eros and refers instead 
to 'energy. As the concluding essay of the Sovereignty it is set within a context that is 
already heavily metaphorical and Murdoch is initially more than a little defensive 
about her experimental way of writing, appealing repeatedly to the claim that 
metaphors are fundamental modes of understanding and that without them we have 
conceptual loss. Metaphors are seen as being morally charged and the attempt to do 
away with them is taken to be an extension of the (flawed) separation of facts from 
values. Not only does the text deploy the recurring metaphor of (a) 'energy': with the 
psyche described as a 'powerful energy system; 7 it also uses three other important 
metaphors: (b) 'reorientation' away from self, " which is necessary to (c) pierce the 
'veil' or 'cloud' that surrounds self and cuts us off ftom reality; 9 and thereby (d) 
4 SG, 100. 
5 St. John of the Cross, Ascent ofMount Carmel, BU, Ch. 22. line 2. 
6 For an example of the finitude of eros see FS, 38. This Freudian reading of Plato follows Simone 
Weil, reorientation of love is 'transference', Weil (1951) 122-3. 
7 SG, 76,8 1. 
8 SG, 90. 
9 SG, 77,82,86,9 1. 
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improve (purify) our quality of consciousness in a process sporadically referred to as 
'unselfing!. 10 (This Weilian term has caught the imagination of Murdoch readers and I 
will treat it as singularly appropriate even though Murdoch is sparing in its use. ) 
Within this network of moray-charged metaphors, the concepts of love and 
Good 'play different roles'. The concept of 'Good' unifies the virtues by setting a 
single goal that love drives us to pursue. " 'Good is the magnetic centre towards 
which love naturally moves. 12 (Love of the right sort. ) Murdoch tries to work with 
and to make sense of this Platonic-derrived claim that we are akin to a system of eros 
that is misdirected, turned towards the wrong sorts of objects. Beauty is taken to 
provide an accessible clue to remedying our misdirection, it clears the mind by 
providing a way out of selfish fantasy. (The central character in Ae Bell, Dora 
Greenfield, stands before the Gainsboroughs in the National Gallery and clears her 
mind. ) Art 'to use Platonic language, inspires love in the highest part of the soul , . 
13 
Art, or indeed any fechne or skill, is taken to be inseparable from the recognition that 
results are earned by virtuous effort directed towards what is other. 
The exemplary virtue which Murdoch repeatedly appeals to in both 'The 
Sovereignty of Good Over other Concepts' and in the subsequent essay 'On "God" 
and "Good"', is humility, a recognition of our own unimportance that is truly 
courageous. 14 We make ourselves less magnetic, less engrossing and this constitutes 
and/or assists in the redirection of eros. The ultimate form of humility is acceptance 
of mortality. Metaphors apart, there is an unnecessary ambiguity here. Murdoch's 
formulations and metaphors, particularly the borrowing of the veil or cloud imagery 
from a certain well known work of English mysticism, strongly suggest that her target 
is the general one of egocentricity rather than the more limited problem of seylishness 
but she does not separate the two and this is a potential source of confusion. For the 
sake of clarity I will take it that Murdoch is primarily concerned with egocentricity, 
with the fat relentless ego. 15 This can be seen in her directional metaphors and 
10 SG, 82. 
11 Again, the unity of the virtues is Platonic, and associated particularly with the Protagoras. 
12 SG, 100. 
13 FS, 83. 
14 In the Phaedo and the Laches Socrates exemplifies true courage, In the Laches and Protagoras 
courage is knowledge. For problems in MurdocWs view of humility see the Afterward below. 
15 For the difference between egocentricity and selfishness, see Chapter 2 above. 
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formulations. 'The direction of attention should properly be outward, away from the 
self ; 16 'Love of Russian leads me away from myself; 17 the task is to 'forget oneself; 
'The difficulty is to keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it 
from returning surreptitiously to the self; 18 what is needed is not the fight kind of 
attention to self, but 'reorientatiolY; 19 'The self, the place where we live, is a place of 
20 illusion. Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself. Contemplation 
of Good is recommended as tan attempt to look right away from self towards a 
distant transcendent perfection!. 21 The recurring image here is one of looking 
outwards towards what lies beyond or outside the cloud of egocentric unknowing. 
This is not just a matter of curtailing one particular form of egocentricity, that class of 
egocentric modes of attention that we might call selfish. It is about curtailing 
egocentricity as such. 
Although drawing upon mystical and Neoplatonic traditions, Murdoch breaks 
decisively, %Nith a key mystical theme, that one must turn away from the world in order 
to create a void that is ready to receive God. (Allachment to what is worldly is to be 
broken before we will be able to connect up with the divine. ) Consider John of the 
Cross, 'he who loves something else along with God undoubtedly makes something 
little of God for he weighs in the balance with God something that is far distant from 
God'. 22 There is 'darkness' which is 'attachment' to things, and there is 'light', which is 
God, and these are contraries. 23 The mystical turn to God begins with a turn inwards 
to a knowledge of one's own 'parched' state. 24 Once the things of the world are 
removed from view, the void in one's life (Plato's ontological elideia or lack) can be 
seen more clearly or experienced more purely. Such a turn inwards, even if it is 
prelirifinary to something else -and even if this something else is Good and not God- 
is rejected by Murdoch. 'The withdrawal into self, which much mysticism evidently 
16 GG, 58. 
17 SG, 87. 
18 SG, 89. 
19 SG, 90. 
20 SG, 9 1. 
21 SG, 99. 
22 St. John of the Cross, Ascent ofMount Carmel, Bk. 1, Ch. 5. line 4. 
23 St. John of the Cross, Ascent ofMount Carmel, BV_ 1, Ch. 4. line 2. 
24 St. John of the Cross, The Dark Night of the Soul, BIL 1, Ch. 12, line 2. 
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involves, may be an ultimate deification of egoism. ' Yet, in line with respect for the 
tradition, this is something that she qualifies, 'So must all "genuine" mystics return to 
the world, serve others, exhibit virtues? Not necessarily. Yet forgetting the world may 
be more spiritually dangerous than returning to it' [M. 70]. Her point is not to deny 
that some mystics make it out of egocentricity, but rather to emphasise that their way 
out is not her way out. For Murdoch, it is precisely the just loving gaze directed 
towards the things and others of the world that is our escape route from our default, 
and at times intractable, preoccupation with self 
11. Two Kinds of Perfectionism 
in spite of MurdocWs emphasis upon attention to what is other, Martha 
Nussbaum has levelled (rather than set out in detail) the charge that 'Murdoch is so 
preoccupied with the goings-on of the inner world that she seems almost to have 
forgotten about the difference that action can make; and the resulting obsession with 
one's own states looks strangely like egoism, in a world in which a forthright 
commitment to action can make the difference to people who are suffering, no matter 
whether the agents' intentions are pure. 01 will contend that a version of this charge 
is well-founded. 26 
My argument here will be the following: (i) if a Murdochian ascent of eros 
involves us in a preoccupation with self then it is egocentric; and (ii) a Murdochian 
ascent of eros does involve us in such a preoccupation. I will focus upon the second 
of these claims, however there is a possible challenge to the first that needs briefly to 
be dealt with. Suppose we were to say that preoccupation with self as such is not a 
problem for Murdoch, that what matters is her promotion of the right kind of 
preoccupation with self or preoccupation with self as an initial step towards 
something else. (Something of a higher moral level. ) My response to such a claim is 
that this is not the way in which Murdoch's metaphors are set up. They are always 
25 Nussbaum (2001). Martha Nussbaum habitually writes about Murdoch as a critic of egocent)jcily 
and not just seýflshness. She advances the charge of evading vulnerability in both her substantial 
review of Peter Conradi's Murdoch biography and in Nussbaum (1996) 41-2. 
26 What I have in mind is a charge levelled by Vlastos (1973) against Plato but modified for 
MurdocWs Platonism, the charge that the primary erotic focus is not ultimately upon the other. 
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urging us to begin by directing our concern towards what is other, 'The direction of 
attention should properly be outward, away from the self. " 
It might be replied that these are only metaphors, but here we need to take 
account of Murdoch's attitude towards metaphors. They are not mere ornamentation, 
they are (at least in some cases) to be treated as irreducible modes of understanding. 
If Murdoch is going to allow that there is a legitimate form of preoccupation with self 
then she is not entitled to use metaphors which point in an entirely different direction. 
An outward, worldly orientation is part of the distinctiveness of Murdoch's 
standpoint, not only when compared to self-attending viewpoints such as 
existentialism, but also when compared to her principle influences such as Plato and 
mysticism and related approaches towards morality. Unlike the mystics, she opposes 
an initial turn inwards; unlike Plato, she does not formulate courage as a way to 
protect the self from the harm of cowardice; unlike Weilian-influenced 
Wittgensteinians, such as Gaita and Dilman, she is deeply hostile towards guilt as a 
self-attending emotion; and unlike all of these traditions, she is reticent about any 
deliberate pursuit of self-knowledge. Murdoch continually urges us to reorient our 
attention outwards and I will take it that she means what she says. 
We are to attend to what is other, and to do so with the aspiration of attaining 
perfect clarity of moral vision. To this end, Murdoch adopts art as an analogue 
(sometimes an instance) of morals. While she is interested in the artwork itself, 
particularly (but not exclusively) Renaissance art, and especially Titian! s allegorical 
works, it is the standpoint of the artist and the viewer which provides her analogue of 
the struggle for exemplary moral vision: 'virtues as well as talents are required of the 
artiSV. 28 What she has in mind is the patient, but emotionally engaged, loving, 
discernment of what is other, 'great art teaches us how real things can be looked at 
and loved without being seized and used, without being appropriated into the greedy 
organism of the self .. selfish concerns vanish, nothing exists except the things which 
are seen' . 
29 This is a Murdochian point which Martha Nussbaum endorses and has 
developed, perhaps more lucidly, in relation to the novel. The moral significance of 
the novel (archetypally of the 19th century realist novel) does not reduce down to the 
27 GG, 58. 
28SG, 84. 
29 GG, 64. 
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philosophical content of the narrative (the way that it deals with this or that moral 
issue e. g. the way that Hard Times deals with utilitarianism). What is morally 
exemplary is the way that the good author and the good reader take the time and 
make the effort to understand the characters. If we were to do the same in everyday 
life perhaps fewer people would get hurt. 'O 
Be that as it may, there is something missing here in all this emphasis upon 
what is other. I will try to set out just what is missing by drawing a distinction 
between two sorts of perfectionism both of which are operative in MurdocHs texts. 
Suppose that I am an artist. I try to paint a portrait in the realistic manner that 
Murdoch admires most (like Titian, Bronzino or even Gainsborough). I Jay on the oil 
and scrape it away by ' 
turns. The result never seems quite right. I try and try to be 
faithful to what I see, even though I am aware of the limits of my talent and the 
seductive power of personal fantasy (the desire to be clever or fashionable, the 
temptation to produce a work that panders to the moral weakness of the client). I am 
aware of certain dangers but try not to focus on them and I may be successful enough 
for someone to remark that I am caught up in the art work and in its fidelity to the 
person being represented. Although falling short, I aim for a perfectly just 
representation of what I see. 31 This is a perfectionism of sorts. I will call it 
object-centred perfectionism where the object in question is taken to be someone or 
something else. I have no problem with this kind of perfectionism. (Quite the 
contrary. ) 
Now consider what I am like when I merely want to be a perfect artist. 
Suppose I aim to fulfil my old teacher's instruction to reach my full potential and be 
the best of them all. I recall him looking over my shoulder and mumbling, 'be ye 
therefore perfect'. If I am an artist of this sort then my labours are spent in an effort to 
move closer to some ideal standard of artistry. (An ideal that may itself be understood 
vaguely or with some precision, for the present purpose it does not matter which. ) 
What I produce along the way may be good or bad, it may be faithful to what there is 
30 Nussbaum (1990) and more generally her Love's Knowledge which is more ready to acknowledge 
the philosophical status of novels than Murdoch is. Nussbaum also adopts hostile stance towards 
situating the effort of attention within a context of fallcnncss and perfectionism. This is particularly 
evident in her approach towards Samuel Beckett. 
31 1 will set aside Murdoch's problematic treatment of this as the hallmark of the best sort of art even 
though there appear to be plausible countercxamples. Picasso did not, in any straightforward sense, 
look upon his women with a just and loving gaze. 
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or it may be self-indulgent. What matters is that my efforts are geared towards 
personal transformation. it is almost as if I am the true art work. Perhaps the world is 
better for having artists of this second sort in it. This may or may not be the case. 
Either way, I will call this person-centred perfectionism and remark that it has a 
redemptive emphasis. There is an obvious sense in which this second sort of 
perfectionism involves a preoccupation with self I view this kind of perfectionism as 
problematic. 
Which of these two perfectionisms is the more Murdochian? In one respect 
Murdoch is advancing the first sort: we are to attend and try to attain perfect vision 
of what is other. But what we are in danger of doing here is being misled into a 
decontextualisation of attention, a removal of individual episodic efforts to discern 
from the continuous, ongoing moral life of someone engaging in a project of 
unselfing. 32 to see this, consider Murdoch's example of D and M. A mother-in-law M 
combats her petty desires for possession (her jealousy) by looking for the goodness in 
her daughter-in-law and finds that there is a great deal of it. If Murdoch's M is only an 
object-centred perfectionist then matters end there. If, on the other hand, she is trying 
to unself, she must keep up or repeat the effort in other contexts and as part of a 
larger process of redeeming her desires, shifting them steadily upwards from their 
normal, base starting point. While there is a strong component of object-centred 
perfectionism in the Murdochian account, it fits into a context that is set by the 
broader life-project of a person-centred perfectionism. 
Insofar as a conscious process of unselfing is undertaken, we may say that M 
will have to cultivate, or make various efforts in line with, a second-order desire for 
an ideal, redeemed, configuration of her first-order desires. (Again, the understanding 
of what constitutes an ideal configuration may shift and improve as M makes 
progress. ) Such a Murdochian pilgrim will have a clear preoccupation with their own 
moral rectitude. Raimond Gaita suggests that for Plato 'the form of the Good is not 
an object of pursuit but that in the light of which we and our pursuits are judged'. 33 
By contrast, Murdoch is much more deeply rooted in the mystical tradition of seeking 
a unity of likenesses, i. e. of in some sense becoming akin to perfection. In Plotinus 
32 Blum (1988) risks such a decontextualisation of Murdochian attention by classifying her moral 
exemplar as saintly, but more of a 'respondee than a pursuer of an 'ideal'. He stresses Murdoch's 
cognitive side at the expense of her emphasis on desire. 
33 Gaita (1991), 202. 
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and John of the Cross we look to God and his image is imprinted on our eye, (where 
34 
eros is the eye of the desirer). For Murdoch, as for the mystic, the Good is not only 
a perfect illumination, it is something that we (metaphorically) move closer to in the 
sense of becoming more like it or embodying it to a greater degree. According to 
Murdoch 'For all our frailty the command 'be perfect' has sense for us'. 35 That is to 
say, our lifelong project is one of person-centred perfectionism and it involves a 
second-order desire for an ideal configuration of our eros. 
Here, it might be objected that a second-order desire for an ideal personal 
configuration creates no problems . 
36 Perhaps we might hold that it is only first-order 
desires which are problematic when directed towards the self This is a specialised 
version of the 'right kind of preoccupation with self' objection criticised above. Like 
the latter, it is a view which is difficult to associate with Murdoch or to read into her 
texts. Consider what proximity to perfection involves. Insofar as we have perfect 
clarity of vision the confusions, messy uncertainties, and moral ambiguities of 
ordinary human life will have been overcome. But it is precisely a desire for such a 
condition which Murdoch holds to be partly responsible for puritanism, for our 
attempted shortcuts out of everyday contingent messiness. The puritan mistakes both 
the difficulty of the task and character of the final condition. (Simone Weil, for a 
similar reason treated the past as epistemically privileged, our thought about the 
future is much less constrained by a sense of reality, 'To come out of the cave, to be 
detached, means to cease to make the future our objective. t)37 For an example of 
Murdoch's own awareness of the dangers of a desire for personal perfection we can 
look at her growing reservations about the clerical life. Her wise Abbess in Yhe Bell 
(1958) was an unseen, somewhat hazy but eminent presence. By the time of Henry 
and Cato (1976), the advanced pilgrim who lived a clerical life was in danger of living 
a lie, in danger, that is, of a world-denying escapism. A blanket Murdochian 
absolution of second-order desire for personal perfection does not look at all likely. 
34 Plotinus, Enneads, 114 5,2-3. 
35 SG, 90. 
36 Given the unity of the virtues, it may make more sense to speak of a single second-order desire 
rather than a cluster of them (one for each of the separate virtues and the configuration of desire that 
they involve). 
37 Wcil (1963), 19; Cockburn (1997b), 328. 
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Alternatively, it tnight be objected that the existence of saints and heroes (good 
people but not perfect ones) shows that whatever the difficulties of a second-order 
desire for personal perfection, they are not insuperable. I certainly would not want to 
claim that there are no saints or heroes, that such people simply do not exist or that 
they must necessarily be at fault for a covert, difficult-to-detect smugness. 'The 
contingently existing saint who, if we were ever fortunate enough to meet him or her, 
might stand to us in the guise of a demonstration (to show it can be done), might be 
some quiet unpretentious worker, a schoolteacher or a mother, or better still an aunt. 
Mothers have many egoistic satisfactions and much power. In the activity of such 
workers egoism has disappeared unobtrusively into the service of others. The egoism 
of the good artist or craftsman is "burnt up" in the product' [M. 429]. 
If there are such people then surely there is a way to become one of them. 
Perhaps so, but the existence of a way does not by itself establish that it has to be 
Murdoch's way. Moreover, the claim that such people exist is less problematic than 
the claim that there is any sort of deliberate way to become like them. What runs 
deep within Murdoch's position is this problematic assumption, that saintliness, if not 
the actual attainment of perfection, may be a workable project. What is problematic 
about this assumption is that some projects which take realisable conditions as their 
goals turn out to be self-defeating. The insomniac who tries to sleep without 
medication will be familiar with this; as will the dedicated pursuer of happiness (which 
often comes unsought if it comes at all); another example is the Buddhist who desires 
to extinguish all desire (a paradox which has helped to shape the Zen tradition). 38 An 
appeal to the existence of good people does not at all show us how they got there, it 
does not 'show it can be done' where it is Murdochian unselfing or indeed any sort of 
deliberate project. Perhaps unintentional sainthood is the only sort there is. This does 
not exclude the possibility of trying to become saintly and then getting caught up in 
something else (such as the problems of others) and in the process inadvertently 
achieving one's earlier goal. Indeed, I am inclined to think of this as a more plausible 
account of a real process, one where an initial preoccupation with self really is 
'burned up' in a concern for others. However, this would not be a conscious 
Murdochian moral ascent but something quite different. 
38 For self-defeating desires see Oster (1985). 
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111. Personal Redemption and the Needs of the Other 
A more problematic response can be framed along the lines of the claim that 
person-centred perfectionism is 'burned up' in or cannot be prised apart from 
successive episodes of concern for what is other. Against this, I want to stress the 
separability of the two and to do so by beginning with a scenario drawn from the 
Faust legend. What would be so very wrong with Faust selling his soul into 
damnation, not for personal adventure but to save his town from the plague? Why 
should he think that his virtue was more important than the needs of others? Perhaps 
he might hold back from such a deal but only because of a lingering doubt about the 
devil holding up his end of the bargain, and doing so in the manner intended. If the 
devil could be relied upon to play the part of a gentleman, an abandonment of Faust's 
soul might be a justifiable, even admirable, form of extreme self-sacrifice, a loving 
abandonment of self for the sake of others. 
In such an extremely hypothetical case, the redemptive project of 
person-centred perfectionism appears to conflict with a concern for the needs of 
others. The extremity of the example may allow a Murdochian to point out that no 
such deal is ever really on offer, that life is not like that. Perhaps, in practice, 
person-centred perfectionism really is in some sense 'burned up' or 'swallowed up' in 
our care for the other. Murdoch seems to place a great deal of trust (or faith) in the 
availability of an unselfing that really is other-centred. Against this, I will set out two 
considerations which strongly suggest that her trust is misplaced: (1) an argument 
from self-knowledge to show that the pilgrim will require much more attention to self 
than Murdoch is prepared to admit; and (2) an attempt to attend to Murdoch's 
mystical commitment as an aspect of her writing which shows the separateness of 
person-centred perfectionism from any ulterior motive of concern with the other. 
(1) The argument from self-knowledge. An ongoing, if gradual, ascent of eros will 
require a systematic (or at least ongoing) pursuit of self-knowledge of a sort that 
Murdoch rules out as inappropriately self-directed and liable to result in fantasy. Her 
reasons for adopting such a standpoint in relation to self-knowledge are partly 
historic. In her early controversy with Stuart Hampshire the latter advanced the view 
that some immediate choices are Oust as Murdoch contended) void or predictable. 
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Focusing upon immediate, moment to moment, choices as the core of freedom was 
therefore quite wrong. But for Hampshire this did not point towards any general 
qualification of the r6le of choice. He remained committed to making sense of 
freedom in terms of choice and argued that such void instances meant that freedom 
required a second-order choice to put oneself into, or to avoid, situations where one 
was almost certainly bound to act in a predictable way. This in turn required 
self-knowledge about dispositions and tendencies. Murdoch could have opted to 
emphasise the element of continuity here with religious thought. There is a similarity 
to the theme of avoiding the occasions of sin. Or she might have pointed to the 
problematic nature of making sense of this avoidance as a higher-level choice rather 
than action in line with moral vision. Instead she opted to undermine Hampshire's 
account of freedom by fell swoop, by denying the self-knowledge that it required. Its 
religious precedent was set aside and its similarities to Freudian therapeutic 
introspection were highlighted. 39 
Such Murdochian scepticism about self-knowledge simply will not do because 
Murdochian ascent is set against universalisability. The right thing to do in any 
situation will not be the same for everyone, not even if we take the right thing to do 
as whatever some idealised virtuous agent might do. Pursuing perfection does not 
mean that we should all go around trying to imitate Christ unless we are, in relevant 
respects Christ-like (and this may be taken as a rare condition). Along with other 
critiques of universalisability, Murdoch accepts that morality is, in the terms of Rush 
Rhees and Raimond Gaita, much more personal than that. 40 What she has not taken 
into account is that once this position has been adopted, deciding what to do ceases 
to be viewed as matter of impersonal discernment. The focus is no longer on what is 
to be done, but on what am I to do where answering the latter is a form of finding 
something out about oneself It involves finding out what is permissible or best where 
this will depend upon what my moral level (character) is like and where my strengths 
and weaknesses lie. Murdochs plausible and gradualist requirement that we do not 
39 Hampshire (1975); and for a direct confrontation between Murdoch and Hampshire see PB. The 
dispute is covered in Kckes (1995), 152-158 and Backus (1986), Chapter 5, and O'Connor (1996), 
Chapter 2. 
40 Rhecs (1969), 95-6; Gaita (1991), 105-7. 
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try to leap suddenly (romantically) into goodness, but act at or close to our moral 
level, generates an unavoidable requirement for a good deal of self-knowledge. 41 
1 will take this argument to be inconclusive but nevertheless useful in showing 
that the Murdochian pilgrim is required to engage in much more attention to self than 
she is prepared to admit. Murdochian pilgrimage or ascent cannot be exhausted by 
concern for what is other. It systematically generates a need for attention to where 
one's own weaknesses and strengths lie. And what is at stake here is not just 
unavoidable day-to-day care of the self that may be seen as a duty if we are to be of 
any use to others but rather what might be called serious introspective concern. The 
argument is inconclusive because it shows Murdoch to be inconsistent in a weak 
sense. It is weak because it may be resolved by abandoning her problematic 
opposition to a systematic, or at least continuous, pursuit of self-knowledge and this 
can be done without undue violence to the overall fabric of her approach. (It can be 
bracketed-off in precisely the way that her approach towards mortality cannot 
because the latter is bound up with humility and virtue. ) Recognition that we stand in 
a unique relation to events is not tantamount to egocentricity in any sense that I 
would want to criticise. (It is about the self, but about the self in relation to others. ) 
Here, it does not matter to me whether we say she did not really mean that or 
provide some other rationalisation. Either way, a concession may be made and 
plausible grounds for the concession can be given. It can be pointed out that an 
approach towards self-knowledge can be set out precisely in terms of the Murdochian 
concept of attention: that what I attend to is what really matters to me. Suppose I 
claim to love my wife more than anything else in the world, yet I spend all my spare 
time at the betting shop trying to figure out the form of the horses. By recognising by 
pattern of attention I will recognise that my love is weaker than I have imagined and 
claimed. What is at issue here is not just the amount of attention but also its 
character. A parent who attends perhaps just as much to one child as to another may 
leam something important about themselves by considering do I always look for 
promise in one child and fault in another? We may leam something about what 
really matters to us, and how it matters, what we really desire hence what we are 
41 Such self-knowledge is implied in Murdoch's case of D and M in the Sovereignty where part of 
M's reason for attending in order to improve her moral vision of D is awareness of her own jealousy. 




really like, by considering the direction and character of our attention. We may 
apply this to Murdoch herself to see that she is much more concerned about erotic 
redemption than public duty or axioms as component parts of the moral life. 
(2) Attention to mystical commitment. Let us now direct our attention to 
MurdocWs mystical commitment. A selling point of Murdochian morality is its 
emphasis upon responsiveness to the other. We may be inclined Q am inclined) to 
think that this is an important part of what a workable morality must be like. It must 
involve a desire to respond to the other and to their needs. Moreover, it ought to do 
so in non-instrumental terms, i. e. it must involve something like a Kantian-type 
commitment to be moral without reward. We must be like Kant's shopkeeper in the 
Groundwork, someone who is honest, but not because of a calculation that it pays to 
be honest. By stressing that morality involves being good 'for nothing' Murdoch 
meets this requirement and thereby helps to ward off the charge of mere 
acquisitiveness or selfishness. 43 However, this Murdochian'for nothingness' cuts both 
ways. Being good is not 'for self but neither is it 'for the other. Someone marooned 
on a remote island far from regular shipping lines might still engage in the 
Murdochian project, they might still try to think justly about the past and attempt to 
combat self-pity and dangerous fantasies of hostility towards the civilisation and the 
others from whom they are now cut off For Murdoch, moral vision is not to be 
valued only in terms of the beneficial actions that it may lead to, nor is eros or desire 
to be conceived of as reducing down to various disposition to behave. The pursuit of 
an ideal, purified, redeemed configuration of one's desires (to which the pursuit of the 
Good largely reduces under conditions of demythologisation) is ultimately to be 
carried outfor its own sake. 
That is to say, the second-order desire which we are to cultivate, the desire for 
an improved (even ideal) configuration of our first-order desires, is to be unmotivated 
in the sense that it is not a desire that we have for some ulterior reason. To 
understand what such an unmotivated (purified) desire looks like we may fall back 
upon the example that Murdoch provides i. e. our love of beauty: Tlato, who tells us 
42 Bowden (1998) points towards such a use of attention in what she sees as a non-Murdochian 
manner, as a key to self-knowledge. She contends that this is more akin to Nussbaunf s use of the 
concept. Blum (199 1) also expresses reservations about Murdoch's attitude towards self-knowledge. 
43 Murdoch notes the version of the charge in Schopenhauer rather than Nygren, e. g. M. 67. 
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that beauty is the only spiritual thing which we love immediately by nature, treats the 
beautiful as an introductory section of the good. o44 The crux of the matter is that the 
pilgrim's desire for the ideal 'purification! of his or her' desires, is not to be lost in, 
exhausted by, or subordinated to a desire for anything else at all, not even something 
admirable or laudable. Murdochian morality is not premised upon an ultimate pay-off 
for anyone, it needs no basement full of silk stockings and spiritual goods that will see 
others right at the end of the day. 
It is this mystical commitment to the 'for nothingness' of being good that leads 
Murdoch to return time and again to art as an analogue (and sometimes an instance) 
of morality. Just as in art, morality too is 'for nothing'. 'These arts, especially literature 
and painting, show us the peculiar sense in which the concept of virtue is tied on to 
the human condition. They show us the absolute pointlessness of virtue while 
exhibiting its supreme importance; the enjoyment of art is a training in the love of 
virtue. The pointlessness of art is not the pointlessness of a game; it is the 
45 pointlessness of human life itself. This pointlessness is structured into the 
Metaphysics. Rather than the normal mystical progression of awakening, purgation, 
illumination, void, and unitive life, Murdoch progresses towards a final substantive 
chapter on the void. There is no final rewarding resolution. 'There is nothing that 
cannot be broken or taken from us. Ultimately we are nothing' [M. 501]. 
Morality is not for the sake of the other, any more than art is for the sake of the 
client (athough in various cases it happens to serve their needs). 'A genuine 
mysteriousness attaches to the idea of goodness and the Good. This is a mystery with 
several aspects. The indefinability of Good is connected with the unsystematic and 
inexhaustible variety of the world and the pointlessness of virtue ... 
A genuine sense of 
mortality enables us to see virtue as the only thing of worth. o46 Whatever positive or 
practical effects it happens to have, we are to become personally virtuous for virtue's 
sake, good for goodness' sake. (Both formulations are sanctioned by Murdoclfs 
shifting between 'virtue' and 'good' as that which is 'for nothing'. ) The lifelong 
Murdochian moral project of person-centred perfectionism does not reduce down to, 
and is not swallowed-up, or burned up, in a concern for the other. 
44 IP, 40. 
45 SG, 84. 
46 SG, 96. 
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IV. The Consequences of Murdochian Perfectionism 
As something of a rearguard defence a Murdochian might ask what does the 
'for nothingness' of Murdochian morality matter if, in practice, the outcome of having 
and cultivating a second-order desire for personal perfection happens to be concern 
for others on lots of separate, particular occasions? It is not clear, to me at least, that 
a Murdochian will be entitled to make this move. It is too instrumentalist or 
consequentialist, or otherwise too much in the Wittgensteinian tradition of looking at 
the use or role of moral theory to decide what ultimately matters about it. However 
sympathetically we might look upon such a move, it would go against Murdoch's own 
rejection of a focus upon action and consequence as instances of a dangerous 
behaviouristic drift in moral theory. (Problematic though this claim is, it features 
centrally in 'The Idea of Perfection! ) For a Murdochian to say now that outcomes are 
what ultimately matters would seem rather disingenuous. 
My concern here is not to reply to a legitimate Murdochian response, but to an 
assumption which may generate sympathy for one of the more problematic features of 
Murdoch's project. And Murdoch herself may invite this by calling as she does for a 
peculiarly practical mysticism, in the guise of 'unesoteric mysticism', 'true mysticism' 
and even 'natural mysticism! which may make it seem that a practical attitude is 
precisely what is on offer. 47 1 am disinclined to charge her with any inconsistency over 
this emphasis upon the practical. Ascent towards an unmotivated desire for virtue 
(goodness) for its own sake may have to begin with a different sort of desire for 
something that we can more readily understand (such as the needs of others) before 
being led on to higher and better things. (In the same way that a child might learn 
chess for the sake of praise and the pleasure of crushing the opponent, but then come 
to love the game itself) Furthermore, it is one thing to say that the Murdochian 
cannot ultimately appeal to the beneficial consequences or the public cash value of her 
morality, and quite another to deny that her approach can be consistently relied upon 
to have such consequences. (Perhaps they come consistently but unsought. ) 
47 SG, 90; 99; STV, 242. This is the way Peter Conradi reads her mysticism in his preface to E&M, as 
close to utilitarianism. Against this, Murdoch frequently rejects the idea that she is presenting an 'as 
if morality of fictions whose meaning is to be sought only in their usefulness. 
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Against such a rearguard attempt to show the other-centred cash value of 
Murdoch's person-centred perfectionism (in what I take to be distinctly 
non-Murdochian terms). I want to point out that the demands of redemption and 
those of care for the other are not the same. There are familiar and ordinary contexts 
in which they are at odds with each other, i. e. situations where a Faustian dilemma of 
the sort outlined above is operative. Here, I will look first to an extreme context and 
then to more everyday situations. Let us suppose that two individuals, C and N are 
unfortunate enough to be inmates of a concentration camp. C spends his time trying 
to see others justly. Even in these most extreme of circumstances he is still 
preoccupied with resisting his 'fat relentless ego'. By contrast, N is aware of all 
manner of personal flaws. He has perhaps read something like a Murdoch text and 
can see that a good point is being made yet he values others enough to sacrifice his 
personal virtue for their good. In order to help others, he assists in preparation for a 
breakout. To do this he must, at all costs, stay alive, even if his motives for doing so 
turn out to be mixed (who would not be tempted by thoughts of revenge or survival 
at the expense of others? ) and even if it involves getting his hands dirty. He may have 
to become a Kapo and survive by making himself useful, participating in the sorting 
process, directing one person to the huts and another to the gas chambers, using 
blackmail and even pimping in return for favours. Security threats may have to be 
dealt with. 
What I am writing about here is a circumstance that is not covered by 
Murdoch's idea of performing distasteful duties which go against the grain of 
character or which allow a role for directly utilitarian considerations which, unlike 
48 
efforts of attention, do not really impinge upon character. Quite apart from not 
being a public duty (we would not consider others at fault for failing to act in this 
way) it does not concern an area of moral importance that exists alongside the 
reconfiguration of character and the desires that in large measure constitute it. N not 
only has to act against various existing desires, he will also have to try and reshape his 
character, to attend single-mindedly in ways that involve, or are liable to promote, 
particular forms of moral blindness. He must allow himself to become hardened to the 
48 Metaphysics Chapter 10 and Chapter 17 cover the concept of duty. it requires occasional cfforts 
of will rather than ongoing attention, primarily concerns the public sphere, and as such, it is not 
considered to conflict %ith the favoured direction of inner development. 
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humanity of others, both victims whose sufferings must not overwhelm him, and, 
more obviously, the guards whose lives he must not hesitate to take if and when the 
time comes. This process need not be romanticised, it may be seen as thoroughly 
unpleasant in the sense that it may make him unfit for life outside of the camps. 
Whereas C engages in a figurative death of the self and sacrifices everything but his 
moral virtue, N is prepared to sacrifice even this. Like the roguish and dishonest 
Oskar Schindler, he must have the right kind of character for the particular 
circumstances that he faces rather than timeless virtues which may be cultivated just 
anywhere. Someone with more abstract scruples will have less chance of saving 
lives. 49 
Perhaps it might be charged that this scenario is too extreme, that it takes us 
out of everyday concerns (at the risk of blunting our sense of what is right and 
wrong). There is a passage in the Metaphysics which does seem to touch upon a 
dilemma which suggests something close to this. 'It has in this century been the fate of 
so many to be confronted with totally ruthless unshakeable evil and to have to choose 
between degrees of compromise and an absolute opposition which will tear mind and 
body to tatters, ruin the lives of friends and family, and perhaps never even be heard 
of or known to he an example to others' [M. 120]. Here, if the implication is that the 
best course is not to make Faustian compromises, the charge of preoccupation with 
personal rectitude hits home. However, the exceptional nature of such circumstances 
seems to be presupposed. Instead, I want to stress the continuity between my 
example of C and N and everyday life. Extreme though the scenario is, it is a genuine 
kind of lived experience and is set in a context chosen by Murdoch precisely because 
of its characteristic (if extreme) features. It poses a dilemma that anyone with a 
concern for their own moral rectitude will face in less dramatic ways. 
For example, I might hold that political involvement can bring worthwhile 
change and improve people's lives while also holding that successful political activism 
leads to a desire for political office and that this leads to personal corruption (which 
need not negate the public good that is done). Similar considerations apply to 
becoming a carer: a sacrifice of self that may predictably lead to frustration, 
49 Blum (1988) draws attention to the biographical Schindler as a moral hero whereas he sees I Murdoch as more conccrned with moral saints. This is true in a sense, but I would claim that 
Murdoch's commitment to courage as an aspect of humility shows that she is concerned, as she notes 
in passing, with 'hcro-saints', At 120. 
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short-temper and feelings of deep hostility and resentment towards the other (and to 
their instrumental perception of oneself as there only for their sake). We might 
equally think of subjecting oneself to the stresses and strains of nursing or teaching 
without adequate resources or support, or about other familiar and 
emotionally-draining tasks that are sometimes perceptively referred to as 
'soul-destroying'. We may also think here of tasks and sacrifices which go with 
parenting and keeping a family together through hard times. " Murdoch abandons 
unselfish mothers as moral exemplars on the grounds that they have 'many egoistic 
satisfactions' [M. 429]. Perhaps so, but they become what they are in the (often 
soul-destroying) process of nurturing and caring for others. "at is above their 
moral level here, and often, is not carrying some project through, but doing so 
without moral harm to self One may lack the erotic resources, the time and energy, 
to take care of the other while also taking care of one's own character formation. And 
once the strictures against self-knowledge have been relaxed this will pose a 
conscious dilemma. 
When faced with these everyday dilemmas, is it better to sacrifice (or at least 
risk) one's own character in pursuit of the good of others, or is this a sacrifice too far 
or in the wrong direction? If one desires to be virtuous and also to care for the other 
(and I am inclined to think that we ought to desire both) then this problem will not be 
occasional but continuously in play. Here, I am saying nothing that is altogether new. 
The monastic and mystical traditions in their cautionary attitude towards worldly 
attachments, have always been aware not just of occasional dramatic temptations but 
of a continuous (and for such traditions insidious) pressure which ordinary life exerts 
upon concern for personal spiritual well-being. There are ongoing and recurring 
situations where focusing primarily upon one's own personal erotic ascent as the 
greater part of the moral life will have to be at the expense of responding to the needs 
of the other. (This is perhaps more obvious in the case of immediate needs. ) The 
preoccupation with self which is involved in person-centred perfectionism is neither 
'swallowed up' in concern for the other nor can it be relied upon to consistently 
benefit the other. Any benefits to the other will be contingent upon what sort of 
50 With the exception of a couple of rather stereotyped bohemians in Nuns and Soldiers, the sort of 
friction with the world which involves financial hardship is absent from Murdocws novels as well as 
her philosophical texts. Problems arc always conceived of at a more spiritual level. 
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situation one happens to be in. Such preoccupation may be of consistent and reliable 
use to others only if subjected to some other constraint (perhaps of a utilitarian sort) 
which dictates when personal character transformation is to be given priority for the 
sake of long-term good, and when it is to be not just subordinated to but sacrificed in 
the interests of others and their needs. (Whether long-term or immediate. ) However, 
such a constraint is in line with a very different moral approach from the mystical 'for 
nothing' project which Murdoch outlines. 
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Chapter 9: Modes of Suffering 
Iris Murdoch is concerned about the dangers of suffering as a route back into 
egocentricity. Here, I will explore her view of these dangers in the light of her 
advocacy of an ascent of eros. What I want to highlight, initially, is the tension within 
her writings on suffering, the apparent conflict between their force and tone: a 
hostility towards suffering is combined with an invitation to punitive unselfing. 1 My 
contention is that this simultaneous embracing and castigation of suffering requires a 
differentiation to be made between modes of suffering such that we are invited only 
to embrace the right kind. This in turn requires a criterion to separate out the 
endorsed mode(s) from the bad ones. Murdoch's account of the significance of death, 
her thanatology, responds to this problem. It is not a morbid preoccupation, it has 
real work to do. In what follows, Section I will show that unselfing does indeed 
involve suffering; Section II reconstructs Murdoch's account of what is problematic 
about suffering; and Section III advances the contentions that (a) Murdoch's 
commitment to a form of suffering avoids Martha Nussbaum's charge that Platonism 
promotes invulnerability; and (b) her need for the above criterion places her 
orientation towards death at the heart of her outlook. 
1. Unselfing Involves Suffering 
Murdoch lacks any clear-cut commitment to personal contentment and certain 
forms of contentment, such as the ordinary 'bourgeois' sort, are definitely ruled out. 2 
The 'quest for happiness and the promotion of happiness' do make a sudden 
appearance at the end of the Metaphysics [M. 497]. And they are, perhaps, 
presupposed in the novels (Peter Conradi writes that they contain a 'pleasure 
principle') but she does not try to theorize about it directly, except as a desideratum 
pursued by the state? This makes it difficult to see where contentment fits into the life 
of the Murdochian pilgrim. Unlike Plato, she has no fundamental level of personal 
1 For the dangers of passing on suffering, M. 104. 
2 See above, Chapter 3. 
3 Metaphysics, Chapter 12. The suggestion in (Conradi, 2001a) 71,79,85,88,92-3 that a'pleasure 
principle' is also present in the philosophical ethic is not given any textual support. 
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reward for being moral, and holds out no promise of morally-refined pleasures. 4 
Murdochian morality may also be similar to virtue ethics in focusing upon character 
formation but its telos is not the 'good life' but rather an impersonal 'Good' that 
cannot ultimately be attained. 5 We are to be good 'for nothing'6 Contentment is not 
explicitly ruled out, but neither is it given any place or r6le. 
Were Murdoch to hold that life can be separated into moral and 
strictly-personal portions (the sometime position of Bernard Williams) then happiness 
might be pursued privately in the non-moral sphere. 7 But it is Murdoch's 
understanding of the significance of the blurring of the fact-value distinction that the 
domain of the moral is unbounded. (She is not alone in this, William James thought 
pretty much the same thing. Once the rigid dichotomy of facts and values is 
abandoned, ethics is not to be left 'in a small comer by itself but concerns 'the general 
relations of the objective and the subjective in experience'. )8 If Murdoch is right about 
the significance of the collapse of this rigid dichotomy, then we are, in Cora 
Diamond's words 'perpetually moralists', less generously, she is described by Mark 
Platts as holding an 'empire-building' view of morality, one that knows no bounds. ' In 
her own words, 'The area of morals, and ergo of moral philosophy, can now be seen, 
not as a hole-and-comer matter of debts and promises, but as covering the whole of 
our mode of living and the quality of our relations with the world'. 10 Happiness 
cannot be legitimately pursued in a private, non-moral sphere because no such sphere 
exists. 
The harshness of this position, the inescapabity that disturbs Platts, can be 
mitigated in two ways. Firstly, Peter Conradi (independently of Williams but playing 
upon the same theme of limitation and bounding) claims that Murdoch's ethic is not 
4 Annas (1999). 
5 For the distinction between Murdochian and virtue ethics see Hall (1990) and McLean (2000). 
6 For example, GG. 69. 
7 Williams (1981). This bipartite division is subsequently modified in Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, where ethical sits alongside the private and the moral. For simplicity I use the earlier 
division. 
8 Quoted in Putnam (2002), 135,178. 
9 Diamond (1996), Platts (1991), 148, and genemlly 146-8. For a comparison between Murdoch and 
Williams see Blum (1996). I-fis primary concern is however with the contrast between Murdoch and 
Nagcl. 
10 SG, 95. 
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to be suddenly adopted. Her moral gradualism requires that we do not act above our 
moral level. Consequently, everyday egocentricity and its pleasures are only to be 
displaced slowly and with caution. Meanwhile, there are still to be cakes and ale. The 
exacting ethic is to be tempered by the life-affirming hedonism of the novels. 
Secondly, we are presumably required (as a public responsibility) to keep ourselves 
ticking over so that we can be of service to others. These two points support a 
purely instrumental r6le for care of the self that may extend to a degree of hedonism. 
What they do not do is make contentment into a goal of pilgrimage. Murdoch is 
indifferent to contentmentfor its own sake. 
On a stronger note, I contend that her 'unselfing' involves suffering. Henry 
Jansen, who includes a chapter on Murdoch in his study of suffering and comedy, 
states that for Murdoch 'If any good emerges from suffering, it does so irrespective of 
the suffering and is not tied to it in any direct way'. " There is an important sense in 
which this overgeneralizes Murdoch! s hostility towards suffering. There is a clear 
Aeschylean theme of wisdom bought by pain that runs through both sorts of texts. To 
support this claim, I will appeal to her imagery and exemplars. Her novelistic imagery 
leans upon the great allegorical and erotic paintings of Titian's maturity (and through 
these Ovid's Metamorphoses) so different from the regular Christian symbolism of 
madormas, adorations, annunciations and passions. Yet Titian's allegorical works 
present scenes of transformation through suffering. Callista's pregnancy is exposed 
and she is cruelly cast out from Diana's entourage only to become a constellation; 
Actaeon stumbles across Diana and companions bathing, is transformed into a stag 
and is then brutally hunted down. Suffering and transfiannation go hand in hand. This 
influence upon Murdoch, and her general preference for a non-Christian symbolism of 
suffering, is most marked in her recurring novelistic image of Marsyas, the satyr who 
challenged Apollo to a musical contest, lost and was flayed. Marsyas wanted to 
compete with the gods, but instead his transformation into something purer (a stream) 
proceeded by a much harder path. He learns the hard way. Moral metamorphosis is 
likened to aftWing of the self. This is a tale that works its way into the Symposium 
(215b-e) where Socrates is likened to Marsyas without a musical instrument, 
equipped only with bewitching words. But it is later in the pages of Ovid that 
Marsyas utters the haunting cry why do you fear me from myseY7 12 The would-be 
11 Jansen (2001), 7 1. 
12 Ovid, Metamorphoses, VI, 385. Murdoch is particularly influenced by Edgar Wind! s, Pagan 
Mysteries in the Renaissance, (London, 1958), Ch M for Marsyas. For some Ovidian influences on 
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pilgrims of Murdoch's novels are like Marsyas in the sense that they underestimate the 
rigours of moral transformation. Partly this is due to the tricksterish nature of eros, 
love directs us first to something attainable and only later do we realise the enormity 
of the task. That is why MurdocVs novelistic pilgrims so often come unstuck. The 
imagery of unselfing in the novels is punitive but such imagery is not ancillary to 
understanding, it is a fundamental mode of understanding. 
In the philosophical texts, the project of unselfing is similarly placed within 
the context of pilgrimage and ascesis. The Aeschylean formulation that wisdom is 
bought by pain is given directly in the Acastos dialogue, Art and Eros. 13 As 
Antonaccio points out, such ascesis need not be collapsed into Christian asceticism. 
(We might think that in the latter, suffering assumes too much of an autonomous 
significance. ) It might, in any case be objected that figurative suffering need not 
betoken actual suffering. 14 To back up my claim that it does, without assimilating 
unselfing to specifically-Christian asceticism, I will appeal to Murdoch's 
approximations to the good person in both the philosophical texts and the novels. To 
take this route, I must clear away an initial problem. The character of Murdoch's 
truly good person will partake of the ineffability of the good. For Margaret Scanlan, 
Murdoch's consequent 'failure to provide a positive model for behaviour' leaves her 
with a deeply ambiguous attitude towards the character of the good person and the 
presence of suffering in their life. 15 This may be so, perhaps a truly good person 
would be neither representable nor suffering, but lesser mortals who still have to 
'unself are representable, are represented in MurdocWs texts, and do suffer. 
Consider the novels. In Vie Bell and Nuns and Soldiers we have nuns and 
ex-nuns; in Henry and Cato we have a priest who leaves the Church; and in A Tairly 
Honourahle Defeat, a Christ-figure (appropriately named Tallis). Here an uneasy 
association is maintained between the best available life and Christian asceticism with 
its inner suffering and dark night of the soul. These characters approximate to what 
Murdoch see Dipple (1982) 108ff, and for a comparison between Murdochian pilgrimage and 
Ovidian metamorphosis Dipple (1996) 145-7. 
13 Life is characterized as a pilgrimage in the opening paragraphs of 7he Fire and the Sun. The 
pathei mathoslwisdom taught through suffering that the chorus of the Agamemnon tell us of is 
recited in A castos, 64. 
14 Maria Antonaccio (1998), 69-70. 
15 Scanlan (1977), 85. 
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Murdoch once called mystical heroes in contrast with existentialist ones. 16 The heroic 
mystic is 'an anxious man trying to discipline or purge or diminish himself and his 
'chief temptation' is 'masochism'. 17 The strictly secular counterparts of the 
philosophical texts take us beyond the imagery of Christian asceticism and include the 
good concentration camp inmate; the humble man who is somewhat akin to, perhaps 
most-likely-to-become, but still-not-actually, the good man; and 'inarticulate, 
unselfish mothers of large families'. 18 (A view that is later qualified in the 
Metaphysics: 'Mothers have many egoistic satisfactions and much power. The aunt 
may be the selfless unrewarded doer of good' [M. 429]. ) The admirable characteristics 
of 'The contingently existing saint who, if ever we were fortunate enough to meet him 
or her, might stand to us in the guise of a demonstration! are to be systematically 
cultivated by the good pilgrim. They 'show it can be done' [M. 429]. (Not the 
attainment of perfection but of progress. ) 
What this range of exemplars exemplify is a willingness to sacrifice self for 
others. However, this is to formulate the matter in terms of agency rather than vision. 
To maintain the primacy of vision, I will take it that the good person must be 
prepared to make sacrifices not just to help the other, but also to see them truthfully. 
The shift from mothers to maiden aunts involves a move toward individuals who will 
see children in less proprietorial terms. (They will be less prone to fantasize that their 
own frustrated ambitions may still be realized by proxy. ) Such self sacrifice may, 
however, come in different forms. Unnson drew an interesting contrast between 
saints and heroes which turned largely upon the taking of risk by the latter. 19 Blum 
has suggested a further strengthening of Urmson's formulation of this distinction by 
drawing two contrasts: firstly, in point of timescale, heroism may occupy only a 
portion of someone's life (like Oskar Schindler) whereas saintliness is less 
time-specific; secondly, saintliness involves general virtues that are not situation 
specific whereas the hero may have the right characteristics for only this situation 
(again Schindler was able to work his way around elite nazi circles because he was no 
16 She does not draw any clear contrast of the sort that Urmson (1957) makes between heroes and 
saints, such that the former risk dangers that the latter need not. 
17 FM, 227. 
18 GG, 51-2. 
19 Urmson (1957). 
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saint, he had the right character for the job). Blum plausibly suggests that Murdoch's 
good, humble people are closer to what is meant when we refer to saints rather than 
heroes. 20 
Although she tends (in the Metaphysics if not in the earlier writings) to 
conform to this classification of the good person she does not draw any consistent 
distinction here. At one point she writes of 'a small number of hero-saints of our time' 
[M. 120]. Her libretto, Yhe One Alone is similarly about a hero who sacrifices their life 
'for nothing!, privately, without an audience (or at least without one internal to the 
plot, the reader provides an audience of sortS). 21 The saints and heroes distinction is 
not one that Murdoch abides by but it does help in the formulation of a particular 
kind of possibility: that the Murdochian pilgrim might be willing to make sacrifices 
yet never actually be called upon to do so? Might they be more like the hero than the 
saint in facing risk rather than definite loss? I am inclined to think that the answer to 
this must be 'no'. If we view egocentricity as deeply entrenched. 'The exercise of 
overcoming one's self, ' Murdoch writes, 'is indeed exhilarating. It is also, if we 
o22 perform it properly which we hardly ever do, painfiil. This is the lesson of Marsyas 
all over again, we underestimate the rigours of moral transformation. The self is not 
calmly set aside, it is flayed away. 
The good person will accept suffering in order to truthfully perceive and aid 
others, and insofar as they are purposefully unselfing, they may resemble the religious 
ascetic in their gradualist progression through spiritual crisis, dark night of the soul, 
the experience of doubt, loss and void in the course of a discipline that subjects them 
to extreme emotional stress, tearing them away from consoling, self-protective 
imagery. In the terms set by Urmson and Blum, MurdocWs pilgrim is more saintly 
than heroic and their experience more akin to the mystic than to the man of action, a 
similarity that raises concerns about elitism that she tries to head-off. The experience 
of void, more often situated within the experiential range of the mystic, is opened up 
to everyone and not to be evaded. Void is, for the pilgrim, a necessary experience 
that involves "'clean' pain" [M. 500]. There is a kind of affliction that is variously 
described by Murdoch as 'a purified suffering' [M. 109]; 'Real deathly suffering' 
20 Blum (1988). 
21 7he One Alone was printed up in 1995 but broadcast on BBC Radio 3 in 1987. 
22 Sub. G, 216. 
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[M. 130]; 'deathly pain! [M. 139]; and'absolute (deathly) pain! which contrasts with'the 
kind which can be managed, made part of a story, turned into art' [M. 131]. I am 
trying to draw out the content of such suffering. 
A final, if somewhat prefabricated objection to the necessity of such suffering 
may be anticipated. Although, even its somewhat frivolous tone already removes us 
from the realm of real affliction with which Murdoch is concerned. The objection 
goes as follows. Plato's ring of Qyges offered instant invisibility, what if we had a pill 
that offered instant unselfing? Let us imagine that we have a tablet called Decreation, 
which circumvents the suffering involved in regular unselfing. (It might even taste 
rather sweet. ) We would then have the option of popping some Ds' and stepping 
through the door to clear moral perception. What such a picture requires is that the 
ultimate goal of heing good has no necessary causal conditions. But this is precisely 
what Murdoch is not in a position to endorse if she is to remain a moral gradualist. 
Gradualism implies the necessity of a causal process that is not sudden. The use of 
Decreation tablets, even if they were not ruled out on other grounds (as an 
impossible flight of fancy) and even if they did provide transformation without tears, 
would not provide a specifically-Murdochian form of unselfing but something else 
instead. (What is perhaps more interesting here is the way in which the door imagery 
from Huxley and William Blake, the image of an immediate point of access, illustrates 
the way in which imagery can push us to think in this way or that. ) 
11. Murdoch's Critique of Sado-masochistic Suffering 
At the same time as advocating unselfing, Murdoch develops a critique of 'our 
ubiquitous (romantic) sado-masochism! [M. 121 ]. Even 'puritanism has its own strong 
magic, its own form of degeneration into a sexually charged romanticism! [129]. 
Protestantism and 'popular Romantic theology have made something of a cult of 
suffering' [M. 132-3]. They have tapped into 'the system to which the technical name 
of sado-masochism has been given. It is the peculiar subtlety of this system that, while 
constantly leading attention and energy back into the self, it can produce, almost all 
the way as it were to the summit, plausible imitations of what is good'. 23 
Sado-masochism provides a shadowy simulacrurn of unselfing. It is unselfing 
23 GG. 66. For the concept of sado-masochism in Murdoch see especially Metaphysics Chapter 5. 
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romanticized. In spite of the importance of this claim, Murdoch is characteristically 
unsystematic in her development of this important concept, experimenting instead 
with various ideas from Freud and Sartre in the novels before downloading her results 
into the elliptical formulations of the philosophical texts. A brief contrast with their 
influential views may be useful. 
According to Freud, children enter a latency phase of development during 
which, libido is sublimated into affection. Overt sexual desire then re-emerges with 
the onset of puberty. If such overt desire integrates successfully with continuing 
affection then the result is normal romantic love with its attendant delusions. Where 
affection and sexual desire fail to integrate, love objects become dangerously 
separated out into madonnas, with whom one is sexually impotent, and whores who 
sexually excite but degrade and are to be degraded. 24 This Freudian scenario, a 
treatment of the sacred/profane division of love objects whose pedigree stretches 
back through Titian and Plato, is the predicament into which the central character of 
Murdoch's Ae Sacred and Profane Love Machine has fallen. 25 He is a psychoanalyst 
who finds that his discipline provides a story for his situation but no solution to it. 
(Psychoanalysis is impotent, hence part of the problem. ) Sado-masochistic tendencies 
are, however, generally present in Murdoch's novels, that is to say, present in the 
absence of any such classic Freudian pathology. Notwithstanding her debt to his 
treatment of the sacred/profane division, Treud was not, I think, particularly 
perspicacious about sado-masochism, he was too much of an all-male grandee to 
appreciate this phenomenon' [M. 133]. Freud treats sado-masochism as a special 
developmental failure, Murdoch treats it as the norm. 
In this respect, she stands closer to the Sartrean view that "'normal" sexuality 
is commonly designated as "sado-masochiStiC"'. 26 The impossible but quite general 
human aspiration to be absolutely free yet reassuringly determinate is bound up with 
sado-masochism. In Being and Nothingness attitudes towards the Other are divided 
into indifference (a form of interpersonal blindness) and love or desire (which involve 
24 For this contrast of sacred and profane love in Freud and its rclation to the speech of Pausanias in 
The Symposium, see Santas (1988). 
25 The title of 'Sacred and Profane Love' is a later addition to one of Titian's works depicting two 
women, eros and a flagellation scene. There is ambiguity about which of the two women (the naked 
or sumptuously clad) is profane or whether there are two different women here at all. 
26 Sartrcý EN, 404. 
189 
us in a sado-masochistic cycle). Our sadism is traced to sexual desire for fusion with 
the Other under conditions of absolute dominance. We want to be master. Our desire 
is not just to absorb the Other but to dominate their freedom. This cannot be effected 
and so we opt for a reverse attempt at total identification: I don! t absorb them, they 
absorb me. Masochism, ' writes Sartre, 'is characterised as a species of vertigo, 
vertigo not before a precipice of rock and earth but before the abyss of the Other's 
27 subjectivity'. However, Sartre is quite clear that while we bow down before the 
Other, masochistic fascination takes the self as its real object. It is ultimately a form 
of fascination with 'myself as object'. 28 (In this respect it is akin to the sublime. ) 'Even 
the masochist who pays a woman to whip him is treating her as an instrument and by 
, 29 this very fact posits himself in transcendence in relation to her. 
These themes are prominent in Murdoch novels of the early-to-mid 1960s, 
which makes them contemporaneous with the earlier of the Sovereignty essays. The 
submission scene in A Severed Head (1961) follows the Sartrean (and Hegelian) 
dialectic of master and slave. Martin Lynch-Gibbon, unmanned by the submissive loss 
of his wife, prostrates himself before the dark, sword-wielding power figure Honor. 
She promptly looses interest and tells him to get up. Dominating a thing is 
uninteresting, don-dnating another subjectivity is what counts. This theme recurs. The 
sexually alluring Lesley Rimmer in An Unofj(ficial Rose (1962) attaches conditions to 
her affections. It is not merely Randall's submission that she wants but his 
ruthlessness. Submission is demanded but it is power that excites. In The Unicorn 
(1963), a male servant ceremoniously (and not for the first time) kneels to place 
high-heeled shoes on the feet of his mistress. The shoes are otherwise unworn, they 
are not used for walking but only for this ceremony. The servant loves, but will never 
have his mistress. That privilege is reserved for a despised power-figure. Submission 
is demanded but power excites. The last figure of this overtly sadomasochistic type is 
Millie in Murdoch's much-criticized and rarely cited historical novel 7he Red and the 
Green (1965). She loves only where she is mistreated, she is attracted only by 
unconstrained ruthless freedom and she has a fondness for passing on her suffering. 
27 Sartre, EN, 378. 
28 Sartre EN, 378 
29 Sartre EN, 379. 
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Murdoch's subsequent novelistic fascination is with the daemonic and the 
Miltonesque buts this continues to provide scope for sadomasochistic motifs that are 
reminiscent of the Sartrean account. There are slapping scenes in both Me Time of 
the Angels (1966) and A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970). However, the Sartrean 
emphasis upon choice and voluntary submission precludes any straightforward 
Murdochian appropriation. 30 (The impossible Murdochian aspiration for perfection 
and the morality of self-abnegation before the Good as love object also look 
suspiciously masochistic if we stick to strictly Sartrean terms. ) Murdoch's 
sado-masochistic theme, even by the time of its early peak in 7he Unicorn, is already 
integrated not with choice but with vision and this is symbolized by the occurrence of 
submission and absorption scenes at a place called Gaze Castle. Three key points of 
contrast between Sartre and Murdoch are worthy of note. Firstly, Sartre separates 
sado-masochism out from the interpersonal blindness of indifference whereas a 
Murdochian account must understand it specifically in relation to such blindness. (To 
vision and not to choice. ) Secondly, both are agreed that masochism is implicated in 
the direction of attention towards the self This drama is played out within a single 
consciousness. Thirdly, both are in agreement that sado-masochism is normal, and not 
(as in Freud) a specialized form of deviance. Hence, it is not necessarily connected to 
any particular fetish, prohibition or taboo. 
Although the influence of Sartre is there, Murdoch initially brings her ideas on 
sado-masochism together by relating them not to Sartre but to Simone Weil's 
appropriation of the Homeric concept of &Trj. What &TT1 conveniently introduces is 
an association between evil, moral blindness, and cyclical suffering. In the Iliad, 
Achilles is in a state of &Tri, blinded to the reality of others by his rage. " Yet in 
passing on his suffering he ensures that it will return to him. (What goes around 
comes around. ) He is in a condition of both entrapment and culpability, Achilles is 
complicit in his own destruction. 32 This concept Of &TTJ is deployed in The Unicorn 
30 Backus (1986) Chapter 8 sticks very close to Sartre in setting out Murdocifs 'sadomasochistic 
system' as it appears in Yhe Unicorn. 
31 When Murdoch read Weil, she was already wcll-vcrsed in the concept, having attended Eduard 
Frankael's celebrated seminar on Aeschylus. The connection can be detected in one of her strongest 
poems 'Agamemnon Class 193 9' uith its line Trightened men kill by remote control', in A Year of 
Birds. Unlike Weil, Frankael's study of the Agamemnon places emphasis upon an element of choice 
in &Til. 
32 For a classic account of 6-M by another of Murdoch! s lecturers at Oxford, see E. R-Dodds, 77ze 
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by the Platonist Max, 'At6 is the name of the almost automatic transfer of suffering 
from one being to another. Power is a form of At6. The victims of power, and any 
power has its victims, are themselves infected. They have to pass it on, to use the 
power on others. This is evil. Good is non-powerful. And it is in the Good that At6 is 
finally quenched, when it encounters a pure being who only suffers and does not 
attempt to pass the suffering on!. 33 
I am inclined to think that Max is used to express Simone Weil's view rather 
than Murdoch's. The formulation in terms of power is more reminiscent of Weil than 
it is of any preoccupation that can be found in Murdoch's philosophical texts. What is 
also more Weilian is that Max alludes to the Christ figure who quenches &TTI, who 
Isuffers it in its completeness and destroys it' (Weil). 34 When both Weil and Max 
suggests that there is a (potentially) good mode of suffering (what Weil calls 
affliction) we cannot simply assume that Murdoch reproduces such a distinction. 
Shorn of commitment to this problematic Christian element, the basic structure 
OffiTTI is that of suffering (doom even) that involves or leads to occluded vision and 
thereby results in harin to others. This provides us with an account of the sadistic 
phase or moment of sado-masochism. We hurt others because we dont see them 
correctly. Our own fascinating suffering occludes our vision. Whether we then pass 
suffering on unintentionally or maliciously take pleasure in the misfortunes of others, 
need not affect the basic structure of this sadistic moment. 35 
The masochistic moment, by contrast, may enter when we attempt to embrace 
a bearable suffering in place of an unbearable one. According to the Metaphysics, in 
bereavement, 'Suffering, mercifully, offers a route back into the ego' [M. 130]. It 
becomes an ordeal, a way to refocus attention back upon the travails of the self. 
Metaphorically, bereavement is likened to being in 'another country' upon which we 
ultimately turn our backs. Another, related masochistic experience is guilt. " It is 
often involved in bereavement (if only I had done or said x) but is clearly not 
Greeks and the Irrafional, (Berkeley, 195 1), esp. 7. 
33 77ie Unicorn, 116. 
34 Weil(1970), 153. SccThc Love of God and Affliction, ' in Weil (195 1). 
35 Scanlan (1977), 71, places greater emphasis than I do upon schadenfreude. 
36 M3940 and 50011. For bereavement in the novels see Gertrude's passage from bereavement to 
life-affirming hedonism in Aluns and Soldiers. 
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reducible to it. Attempts to atone in the form of fascinating pain are treated by 
Murdoch as attempts to pay for egocentricity in its own coinage. 37 
The sado-masochistic cycle may now be set out as follows. Fascinating 
suffering leads to occluded vision and (real or perceived) harm to others. In the 
second (masochistic) phase we attempt to cope with suffering (as guilt, etc. ) in a 
manner which reproduces the problem by embracing it, placing ourselves at the centre 
of events (which is just where we want to be). This sado-masochistic cycle has a 
structural similarity to unselfing where purgative unseying leads to greater clarity of 
vision and to the perceived need for even more unseyling. The dangers of this are 
further complicated because the commonplace sado-masochistic cycle works by 
occluding vision. The ability of the sado-masochistic sufferer to discern which of 
these cycles they are involved in may therefore be impaired. Egocentric suffering 
might, from the inside, look very much like unselfing, it can 'masquerade as a 
p ificationt. 38 un 
111. Vulnerability and Tragedy 
Murdoch's problem is that she cannot allow her critique of sadomasochistic 
suffering to be generalized into a critique of suffering per se. It has to be limited 
enough to allow for the punitive process of unselfing. We can begin to see how she 
creates enough scope for this by drawing out a further contrast, this time with 
Buddhism, an outlook which is genuinely hostile to suffering as such. We may even 
view it as a doctrine and set of practices geared towards the noble truth that there can 
be a comprehensive elimination of suffering. 39 From both standpoints, suffering is 
bound up with desire. But whereas the Buddhist approach is to get rid of the 
suffering by getting rid of the desire, Murdoch urges us to redirect desire and not to 
eliminate it. In the pursuit of the Good, vulnerability to suffering may be a price worth 
paying. The 'cloud' of egocentric fantasy is so powerful because it is 'designed to 
protect the psyche from paie. 40 Its removal is the removal of a form of 
37 See above, the chapter on Tallcnness and Guilt'. 
38 GG. 66. 
39 Peter Conradi is more closely aligned with Buddhism than Murdoch and is guarded in his 
parallels, (Conradi 2001a), xiv, 16-17,86,108; (Conradi 2001b), 544-6. Murdoch only takes an 
indirect stand on Buddhism, via her approach towards Schopenhauer in Metaphysics Chapter 3. 
40 SG, 77. Vclleman! s Murdochian-influcnced account of love may go too far when he writes 'All 
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self-protection, an exposure suffering. This distance from Buddhism works its way 
into the detail of her outlook and particularly her views on justice as set out in the 
Metaphysics. It should be thought of 'primarily as retributive, making even' [M. 493]. 
A 'weakening of the fabric of liberal political thinking occurs when, in relation to 
punishment, the concept of retributive justice is dropped or discredited in favour of 
(of course very important) utilitarian ideas of rehabilitation, of making the culprit 
"better"'. 41 Murdoch is aware that this sets up a distance from Buddhism. In Yhe 
Green Knight (written in parallel with the Metaphysics) the quasi-Buddhist Peter Mir 
inflicts a symbolic retributive wound upon the miscreant Lucas and recognizes this as 
12 a IflaW ftom his own Buddhist standpoint. Retribution is the core of Murdochian 
justice but this does compromise compassion and provides at least one positive role 
for suffering. 
This comparison is not meant as an interesting aside. By placing the avoidance 
of suffering less centrally than Buddhism, Murdoch strengthens her position in the 
face of a charge that we have already encountered Martha Nussbaum levelling against 
PlatoniSM. 4' For Nussbaum, the great lesson of the Greek tragedians was that the 
good life involves goods that are fragile in the sense of being vulnerable to loss. For 
example, Hecuba's domesticated contentment involves loving Priam and her children, 
it depends upon their survival and that of Troy as a whole. It is in the pursuit of the 
good life that we render ourselves liable to the greatest of misfortunes. Such 
misfortunes may even corrupt our character by removing us from the context of a 
supportive community life. In tragedy, as in Buddhism, there is a relation between 
aspiration and suffering. But whereas Buddhism solves the problem by a curtailment 
of desire, Nussbaum suggests that Plato solves it by retaining desires, but only those 
which are oriented towards invulnerable objects (the forms). In this way, moral luck 
is eliminated. 44 The problem with this insulation from harm is that it threatens to 
that is essential to love, in my view, is that it disarms our emotional defences. ' J. David Vellcman, 
(1999), 365. But the low-wIncrability nexus is there in Murdoch. In 7he Red and the Green the 
republican revolutionary Pat Dumay views his love for his younger brother, Cathal, as his 'Achilles 
hecl', a truly dangerous weakness. It is the only thing that comes close to holding him back from his 
romantic participation in the 1916 Rising (The Red and the Green, 117,133,205). 
41 M. 359, see also 103-4,131,3 89,493 for the primacy of retribution. 
42 The Green Knight, 319. 
43 See above, Chapter 8. 
44 Nussbaum (1986) is deeply influenced by Williams' treatment of moral luck. 
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denude the good life of that which makes it good, encouraging instead a dangerous 
and even antisocial, self-sufficiency. (For an example of this we might cite Republic 
387 on the good man: Tar better than ordinary people can he do without others'. ) 
Plato, on Nussbaum's account, strives for an insulated invulnerability. 
Whereas Nussbaum has transferred her argument over to Murdoch only in a 
cursory manner, Michael Weston has tried to do so more systematically. 4, For 
Weston's Murdoch'we are constituted as a desire for the good, which as transcendent 
can only be related to in giving up all projections of good upon the world. A6 In this 
way, 'even the power of death is overcome'. 47 To support this reading, Weston 
appeals to 7he Black Prince, a novel in which Murdoch's mystical sympathies are 
conspicuously on display. By its close, the central character, Bradley Pearson has 
been falsely imprisoned for murder and rapturously released from attachment to finite, 
perishable goods. He tells the reader that the world is 'perhaps ultimately to be 
defined as a place of suffering' in response to which we should 'forswear the fruitless 
anxious pain which binds to present and future our miserable local arc of the great 
wheel of desire'. 48 For Weston, 'this train of thought implies a motivation by fear of 
suffering which would make the "willing for nothing" an illusion. It would be (what 
one may suspect Pearson! s is) a willing for the sake of avoiding suffering'. 49 
And so it would. But is this position Murdoch's, or is she depicting some 
other puritanism gone astray? Weston concedes that this is a real possibility. 50 7he 
Black Prince casts doubt upon Pearsons reliability as a narrator. His wheel imagery is 
Buddhist (and Hindu derived) and his direct preoccupation with suffering is perhaps 
Schopenhauerian rather than Murdochian. This does not necessarily mean that 
Pearson is a faithful practitioner of Buddhist tenets (he probably is not) but it does 
mean that his pronouncements cannot be used in the way that Weston wants, as a 
45 Nussbaurn's review article of Peter Conradi's Murdoch biography in 7he New Republic makes it 
clear that she does hold the vulnerability argument to be applicable to Murdoch (Nussbaum, 200 1). 
A more detailed statement of this is given in Weston (2001), Chapters 5 and 6, 
46 Weston (2001), 76-77. 
47 Weston (2001), 84. 
48 cited in Weston (2001), 81-2. 
49 Weston (2001), 82. 
50 Weston (2001), 83,98. 
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guide to the more obscure arguments of MurdocWs Metaphysics. 51 Notably, his 
suggestion that the power of death 'is overcome' lacks any obvious textual support 
and seems the opposite of Murdoclfs treatment. Murdoch's pilgrim must embrace 
mortality as the ultimate form of vulnerability, the ultimate image of what, at one 
point, Murdoch calls 'purified suffering' [M. 109]. By differentiating herself from 
Buddhism and endorsing a passionate, punitive moral discipline, Murdoch undercuts 
any direct appeal to Nussbaum's argument but she does so at the expense of 
vulnerability to the charge of promoting a peculiar kind of romanticized suffering 
(her own version of the sado-masochistic cycle). She can escape from this only if 
there is some criterion by which her favoured mode of suffering can be set apart from 
the bad sort. It is this requirement which ties her attitude towards death into the main 
body of her work so that it is not an attenuated morbid preoccupation. 
Whatever criterion separates out such good and bad modes of suffering, it 
cannot merely be a distinction between technologies (inner anguish as opposed to 
public whips) since Murdoch does not reduce sado-masochism to a particular 
technology or fetish. She views it as a passionate corruption of vision. A Murdochian 
will therefore need a criterion that respects the primacy of vision and does more than 
simply positing a non-egocentric way of viewing suffering without telling us how 
such a view is at all possible. This is where her discussion of tragedy helps us out. 
'Lear's pain is not romanticized nor is that of Oedipus. The classical Greeks seem to 
have been incapable of romanticism and a fortiori of sentimentality; they also, a 
related point, seem devoid of masochism! [M. 499]. As the good person does not 
romanticize the suffering that they see (their own or that of others) and as the 
spectacle of certain tragedies is of an unromanticized sort, it follows that "a part of 
our understanding of 'the good man' may be thought in terms of a spectator of a 
tragedy" [M. I 10]. With the right spectator, romanticized suffering is neither built into 
the play nor projected onto it. 
But what exactly does he see that most of us, most of the time, do not? Well, 
this depends upon what Murdoch views as necessary to a tragedy. She may spend a 
great deal of time trying to incorporate tragic insights into the novels (continuing the 
hazy conversation at the end of Ae Symposium on the fiision of genres) but the 
51 Uncle Theo in The Nice and the Good, Cousin James in The Sea, The Sea and Peter Mr in 7he 
Green Knight all look like more convincing Buddhists. 
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doubt be said about time but unless we consider it in the moral context of lived 
experience, of how we experience others as valuable (i. e. how we are emotionally or 
erotically engaged), we will go astray. We cannot construct a value-free metaphysic 
of time and then use it to answer questions about morality. (As if metaphysics were a 
guide to morals in the sense of being prior to morals. ) Instead, Murdoch insists that 
morality is deep, it goes all the way down. Having said this, it is characteristic of 
Murdoch's way of writing that she makes this observation about time and then passes 
on. She does not develop the insight in any detail and this may leave her account of 
emotions (such as guilt) which temporalise our experience, dangerously one-sided. 
What the above amounts to is less than a demonstration that Murdoch mccts 
some formal specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral depth but 
perhaps the very idea of such a specification is out of place. It is a more restricted 
case for saying that Murdoch has concerns that are in some respects similar to Gaita! s 
and that she does not fall foul of Gaita's charge. 9 This leaves me with the second task 
of providing an account of why I think that a critique is nevertheless still in order. The 
crux of my case depends upon the absence in Murdoch of a quite different sort of 
depth from the kind explored above, that is to say, depth in analytic detail. Here, I 
draw upon the sense in which we might say that someone explores a question 'in 
depth' or looks several moves deep, and considers all of the appropriate possibilities, 
Quite apart from the absence of contrived, puzzle-type exemplars, what one does not 
find in Murdoch is a standard call and response of argument-reply-rejoinder (possibly 
followed by consideration of objections number I to 5). 
Instead, she often prioritises those aspects of rational persuasion which are not 
about formal argumentative structures, such as getting someone to notice what has 
been overlooked or helping the reader to see things in a different way. 10 (The 
distinction here is not hard and fast. Drawing attention to the shortcomings of a 
particular background picture will affect the assumptions from which we proceed. )" 
Her philosophical style, and the content of her critique of puritanical tidiness, are 
9 Gaita happens to hold that Murdoch falls foul of a quite different problem, not a lack of depth but 
ethical othcr-worldlincss. Gaita (1991), Chapter 12, esp. 216 ff. 
10 This is a feature of Murdoclf s way of proceeding that Cora Diamond treats as related to her 
rejection of rejection of a ridgid fact/value distinction, Diamond (1991), 373-80. 
11 John McDowell is a prominent example of someone who works with a grasp of philosophical 
problems as problems of moral -vision that lead us to plug the wrong sorts of assumptions into our 
arguments. 
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stubbornness of one daughter and the downright treachery of the others. 53 He wants 
to rail against his own imitation tragedy, his trust, their ingratitude. But, as the play 
moves steadily onwards, towards the death-scene, Lear's attention shifts towards 
other people, to their sufferings and their misfortunes. Rescued from unhinged 
raillery against the elements, he unthinkingly gives precedence to the needs of a poor 
mad boy, gesturing for him to go first as they enter the shelter of a hovel. This is the 
turning point. By the end, he would gladly embrace the humblest of lives elsewhere if 
only the death of his dutiful (not just stubborn) daughter could be redeemed. This 
turnaround does not buy-off or redeem death (her death or his own). The mitigation 
of fault does not allow Lear to refuse the call of the ultimate necessity. He must go 
on his short journey into nothing. 
What the truthful viewer of a tragedy cannot escape from, whether they are a 
participant-viewer like Lear, an audience member, or a reader, is the inevitability of 
death. For Murdoch, this is the great lesson of tragedy and the reason why it 
exemplifies a truthful vision of suffering. Orientation towards death is the criterion 
which separates out a truthful approach from a sado-masochistic one. Our punitive 
unselfing must be undergone in the light of an adequate, non-arbitrary orientation 
towards death. What remains for us to question is whether Murdoch has such an 
orientation. 
53 Af. 116 ff. 
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Chapter 10: The Role of Death 
1. Acceptance of Figurative and Real Death 
There is a depth about meditation on the significance of death in Murdoch's novels 
which goes beyond the routine and conventional killing off of characters. They 
attempt to capture those insights which we find in tragedy. Bruno's Dream (1969) 
reworks Tolstoy's Ivan Illych, incomprehension, regret and resigned acceptance in the 
face of mortality; Henry and Cato (1976) solemnly tells the reader that death is 'the 
great teacher; Nuns and Soldiers (1980) opens with the protracted detachment and 
move into incomprehensibility of the head of a courtly group of friends, now in the 
final stages of his terminal illness. The death of characters figures prominently in all 
but two of Murdoch's 26 novels, the exceptions being the first and the last, and both 
of these still manage to end with meditations on the same theme. The penultimate 
paragraph of her final, problematic, novel has a suitably haunting quality, ruminating 
on Death, its closeness ... 
At the end of what is necessary, I have come to a place 
where there is no road'. Mortality has caught up with the character in question, but it 
has never been far away. 
As is usual with Murdoch, novelistic preoccupations are not merely capricious. 
They are prefigured by and go on to influence concerns which emerge in the 
philosophical texts. The Sovereignty of Good closes with an appeal to the importance 
of placing mortality at the centre of our approach towards morals, 'Simone Weil tells 
us that the exposure of the soul to God condemns the selfish part of it not to suffering 
but to death. The humble man perceives the distance between suffering and death. 
And although he is not by definition the good man perhaps he is the kind of man who 
is most likely of all to become good'. ' The selfish part of the soul is condemned to 
death. This sort of claim, familiar from religious contexts, and featuring prominently 
in monastic and mystical literature, introduces the notion of what I will callfigurative 
death. It concerns death as a symbol for the best kind of life. One kills off the old self, 
or the base self, in order to make room for something better. Murdoch's version of 
figurative death takes its lead from the Phaedo where the best sort of life involves a 
1 SG, 101. 
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'purification of the soul', a 'practice of dying'. The term 'unselfing' seems an 
appropriate one to use for this figurative and punitive process. 
As in the Phaedo, Murdoch! s practice of unselfing is to take place against the 
backdrop of the shadow of real death (the event which happens prior to a funeral or 
cremation). I have. argued above, that it is is precisely this which gives Murdoch a 
way of separating out her own prefered form of suffering ('unselfing') from the 
ubiquitous 'romantic' or 'sadomasochistic' suffering that we are drawn towards and 
which Murdoch sees as egocentric. 2 Figurative death is informed by an acceptance of 
real death and it contrasts with modes of suffering which are implicated in an evasion 
,3 of mortality. Talse love moves to false good. False love embraces false death. 
Oddly enough, given the way that Plato links anamnesis with reincarnation, the 
charge is not applied to Plato. Christianity and Romanticism, although both are 
nominally concerned with death, do not get off so lightly. They are complicit in 'our 
tendency to conceal death and chance by the invention of forms. Any story which we 
tell about ourselves consoles us since it imposes pattern upon something which might 
otherwise seem intolerably chancy and incomplete'. 4 Here, there is continuity with 
Plato. His position in the Phaedo is that we should not believe in the afterlife as a 
matter of consolation but as a matter of truth, an accomplishment that Simone Weil 
suspected might be beyond us. 5 Murdoch is more Weilian than Platonic here, in 
treating non-acceptance of finitude as morally corrupting. 
As well as the contrast between real and figurative death, I want to suggest 
that there is a second contrast in Murdoch, with its own Platonic precedent. What I 
am referring to is a contrast between real andfaked-up acceptance of death (of either 
sort). We find this, for example in MurdoclYs treatment of bereavement, of our 
attitude towards the death of the other. At first we attend to the deceased and 
experience the void that their absence has left in our life (perhaps a far greater void 
than we might have anticipated) but gradually we become more fascinated with our 
own suffering predicament. We fill the void up with a concern which is about 
ourselves. We cannot hold on, it is too hard. I am not suggesting that she is the first 
2 See above, Chapter 9. 
3 
SG, 100. 
4 SG, 85. 
5 For the fonncr, see Dilman (1992), Chapter 1; for the latter see Cockburn (1997a). 
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to make such a diagnosis but merely indicating the way in which Murdoch views 
suffering as a mechanism for the occlusion of death. It helps us to evade real death, 
real mortality, and by doing so it ensures that our suffering is only of the 
sadomasochistic or romantic sort. As such, it contrasts with unselfing, which must be 
informed by real death .6 
'Indeed the central image of Christianity lends itself [to] just 
this illegitimate transformation. The Imitalio Christi in the later work of Kierkegaard 
is a distinguished instance of romantic self-indulgence on this theme. Similarly, 
'romanticism tended to transform the idea of death into the idea of suffering. To do 
this is of course an age-old human temptation. ' The romantic image of freedom that 
Murdoch associates with Kant went with 'a taming and beautifying of the idea of 
death, a cult of pseudo-death and pseudo-transience. Death becomes Liebestod, 
painful and exhilarating, or at worst charming and sweetly tearful ... When the 
neo-Kantian Lucifer gets a glimpse of real death and real chance he takes refuge in 
sublime emotions and veils with an image of tortured freedom that which has been 
rightly said to be the proper study of philosophers. 7 
This evasion or concealment is premised upon the idea that 'It is not easy to 
8 
portray death, real death, not fake prettified death'. That is to say, Murdoch agrees 
with a view that is closely associated with Heidegger, the view that there is some 
difficulty involved in encountering our own mortality. According to Heidegger, even 
at the end, our way of thinking about things is still projective, forward looking. Even 
then we cannot, with ease, come to grips with deatWs finality. For a more 
Wittgensteinian formulation of the same problem we might look to Raimond Gaita! s 
treatment of the last moments of Eichmann, his final rhetorical flourish under the 
gallows: I do not believe in God and the afterlife ... long live Germany, long live 
Austria, long live Argentina, I will notforget them. At the last Eichmann slipped into 
the established grooves of funerary prose and seemed to loose sight of the fact that it 
was his funeral, and that for a godless man, such talk of remembering was absurd. 9 
In the versions of the problem given by Heidegger and Murdoch, this kind of 
blinkered non-acceptance is not just a banal, exceptional failure. (Something an 
6 Metaphysics, Chapter 18. 
7 All quotes from SG, 80-1. 
8 SG, 85. 
9 For a discussion of Hannah Arendt's account of Eichmann's death see Gaita (1991), 305-3 11. 
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Eichmann would do but we would not. ) Instead, it is seen as our ordinary, everyday 
condition. For Murdoch it is not everybody, both willful and meek, who is able to see 
beyond suffering and grapple with real mortality. Consider again her comment at the 
end of the Sovereignty, 'The humble man perceives the distance between suffering and 
death. And although he is not by definition the good man perhaps he is the kind of 
man who is most likely of all to become good. '10 Genuine acceptance of real death is 
the exception rather than the rule and it is a life-guiding exception. Figurative death is 
to be practiced in the light of real death. 
Murdoch's early novel Me Bell provides a nice example of evasion not by 
uncharacteristically flawed individuals, but by otherwise decent people. It describes a 
cemetery within the enclosed grounds of Imber Abbey where previous generations of 
nuns lie interred, their graves tended by future inhabitants. The enclosed nuns' vow of 
stability is matched by an attitude towards, and normalization of death that attempts 
to defy the transitoriness of spiritual attachment. In the end divine love goes like 
everything else. This is, of course, a deeply counterintuitive way of looking at matters 
from within the confines of the religious life. Even in death, the nuns will remain part 
of the order. Nobody gets out of the Abbey, not even feet-first. 
To try and make sense of what it is that gives support to the claim that such 
forms of evasion characterise our normal, default, human condition, we may draw a 
further distinction: a distinction between what we might call the problem of 
acceptance (a moral-psychological problem) and the conceptual problem that lies 
behind it. Evasion of acceptance is made all the easier because of our uncertainty 
about death, the difficulty of imagining nothingness, our tendency to think of what it 
would be likefor us to be dead, to forget that death is not an event in life, not even 
the last one. " Murdoch holds that our attempts to think about and to represent death 
are generally flawed but not just as the result of some evasive subterfuge, there is no 
bad faith here. That would imply that genuine recognition was the default condition 
from which we fly, and not an accomplishment. The task is genuinely daunting. 
10 SG, 101. 
11 This paraphrases Wittgcnstein, Tractatus, 6.4311. Familiar Epicurean and Lucretian puzzles 
emerge from the nothingness of being death. Epicurus, 'Letter to Mcnoeccus' in Letters, principal 
Doctrines, and Vatican Sayings (Indianappolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1964), 55. In an odd way Sartrc's 
rqjcction of a Heidcggerian orientation towards death is a variation of the same distraction theme, 
e. g. Sartrc (1992), 33-8. 
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Success is partial and most readily found in some (mystical) forms of religious 
thought and in tragedy. King Lear is particularly favoured because death is not 
present by convention, or as the result of indecision in the face of choice, but by 
necessity. It is made inescapable by the plot. Hence the way that Murdoch's novels try 
to capture both mystical and tragic insights. She may be implying that there is a 
conceptual problem which precludes starting off from an understanding of mortality, 
but I will take it that what primarily concerns her is our failure to carry out the 
attentive work required for acceptance. 
For Murdoch as for Heidegger, concern with acceptance is not a dangerous 
distraction from life, but a requirement for a truthful or authentic orientation towards 
it. However, there are significant differences. Heidegger does not consider death to 
be a suitable image for the best sort of life. Authenticity involves acceptance of death, 
not a living death of any sort (figurative or otherwise). By adopting the position that 
moral progress lies in the direction of a figurative death of the self, Murdoch triggers 
a charge of inappropriateness. Imagery of this sort seems to neglect the particular 
circumstances of those for whom figurative death would be corrosive of the liberal 
moral standards that Murdoch is concerned to defend. I have in mind those who are, 
in some sense victims i. e. the oppressed and downtrodden, the abused and in general 
those who already have low self-esteem of a sort which may facilitate further 
mistreatment. The idea that their primary moral task is one of killing off their own 
baseness is open to a charge of complicity with oppression and mistreatment. 
I am not sure that there is any defensible response to this charge, although even 
this would not, by itself render Murdoch's account philosophically uninteresting or 
rule out 'unselfing for everyone. The closest that she comes to an anticipation and 
response is by allowing that there are faked up imitations of both real and figurative 
death, hence there are modes of self-abnegation and suffering that are clearly to be 
avoided. I will assume that these include 'lacking a will of one's own' or otherwise 
abandoning one's own desires in favour of those of another irrespective of the merits 
of the desires in question. 
Further differences between Murdoch and Heidegger are instructive. Heidegger 
is sceptical about how much we can learn from consideration of either near-death 
experiences or the death of others (e. g. bereavement). He does not fetishize the final 
moments as a special sort of limiting experience. Murdoch is less reserved. She 
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identifies these as moments when a deeper understanding of death is (briefly) open to 
us. However (at least in the novels) she has a foot in both camps. The insight fades 
and is lost if it is not deepened and consolidated (which it rarely is). Bereavement 
brings us close to the truth but we recover from both our sense of void and from 
truthfulness. Be that as it may, coming to grips with the reality of death is subject to a 
standard Murdochian commitment to the gradualism of personal change. The work 
cannot all be done for us by a sudden revelatory experience. For Heidegger, 
preoccupation with near-death experience and with the death of others may distract 
us from the mortality which is constantly part of our being, the being-towards-death 
and towards a death that is eigentlich (ownmost). Although Murdoch agrees that the 
fact of death stretches the length of life, I can find no indication that she shares the 
possessive aspect of Heidegger's preoccupation with mortality. Death is not an 
unusual form of personal real estate, something that may be taken up and owned. " 
Finally, because death in Heidegger is eigenflich (ownmost) it directs our attention 
towards ourselves. This is diametrically opposed to Murdoch's approach. She holds 
that death orientation should undermine our concern with self and direct our attention 
towards others. 
11. Mortality and the Unimportance of Self 
For Murdoch, real death is the great teacher and what it teaches is the 
unimportance of self 'The acceptance of death is an acceptance of our own 
nothingness which is an automatic spur to our concern with what is not ourselves'. 
13 
Sometimes this transference of concern is supposed to take place via the concept of 
the Good and through the pursuit of virtue, 'A genuine sense of mortality enables us 
to see virtue as the only thing of worth'. 
14 The same position of personal redemption 
surfaces in the novels and is best known through the near death experience of the 
central character of The Unicom (1963). 'Effingham had never confronted death. The 
confrontation brought with it a new quietness and a new terror. The dark bog seemed 
12 This way of spcaldng is, however, attributed by Murdoch to the demonic figure of Julius in her 
1970 novel A Fairly Honourable Defeat. He insists that Tallis' father, who has not been informed of 
his cancer, ought to own his death just as he has owned his life. Julius always has a point, but his 
way of putting it is characteristically astray. 
13 SG, 100. 
14 SG, 96. 
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empty now, utterly empty, as if, because of the great mystery which was about to be 
enacted, the little wicked gods had withdrawn ... Why had Effingham never realised 
that this [death] was the only fact that mattered, perhaps the only fact there was. If 
one realized this one could have lived one's life in the light ... 
And indeed he could have 
known this for the fact of death stretches the length of life. Since he was mortal he 
was nothing and since he was nothing all that was not himself was filled to the brim 
with being. '15 
Again, in Bruno's Dream (1969), published after the last of the Sovereignty 
essays, the same view of death orientation is set out. Poor old Bruno reflects with 
regret and remorse at his end. 'One sees now how pointless it all was, all the things 
one chased after, all the things one wanted. And if there is something that matters 
now at the end it must be the only thing that matters ... Was 
it only in the presence of 
death that one could see so clearly what love ought to be like? If only the knowledge 
which he had now, this absolute nothing-else-matters, could somehow go backwards 
and purify the selfish loves and straighten out the muddles. But it could not. '16 There 
is a danger here that Murdoch might collapse into a secularised orison, a flight of 
fancy in which the death experience becomes a personal last judgement. A 
Heideggerian charge of granting disproportionate significance to the final moments of 
life might kick in. (As if these moments outweighed all others, as if it would be 
worthwhile to live miserably in order to die well. ) 
This limiting-experience view of death is something to which Murdochian 
sources such as Simone Weil and Julian of Norwich sometimes do succumb. We 
might think of Weil's comment that 'I always believed that the instant of death is the 
centre and object of life. I used to think that, for those who live as they should, it is 
the instant when, for an infinitesimal fraction of time, pure truth, naked, certain and 
eternal enters the soul. I may say that I never desired any other good for myself'. " 
This in turn echoes Dame Julian who prayed for and was granted an affliction that 
would take her to the point of death (but not of course beyond). This arbitrary 
fetishization of the final moments as revelatory is something that is not obviously 
Murdochian. Murdoch is using near death experience to illuminate life and our failure 
15 The Unicorn, 166-7. 
16 Bruno's Dream, 187-8. 
17 W61 (1951), 16. 
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to value others in appropriate ways. She is not granting such experiences an 
autonomous si0ficance as something apart from the mortality that is always with us. 
Her point seems to be just what the Sovereignty asserts, that a truthful acceptance of 
mortality involves an acceptance of our own nothingness, i. e. some form of radical 
devaluation of self and that this sense of the pilgrim's personal unimportance is a spur 
to their concern with others. 
There are, however, two obvious problems here. The first concerns the idea 
that mortality in any way ought to erode our sense of our lives as important. That it 
does is an idea with a long pedigree. Forgetfulness of mortality is the second and 
overlooked gift that Aeschylus allows Prometheus to give to mankind, so that the 
struggles of mere broloi, mere creatures of a day, might seem important. However, 
there is nothing about longevity as such that implies importance. Even a strict 
utilitarian might find difficulty with the suggestion that (all other things being equal) 
the life of someone who lives to be 90 is three times as important as that of someone 
who only lives to be 30. Although life expectancy is factored into some clinical 
decisions about suitability for organ transplants (where we are desperately looking for 
any criterion to help us decide) it is not factored into judicial decisions about the 
gravity of murder. We are no less culpable for killing those whose existence might 
otherwise have been brief (Debate about at least some instances of euthanasia would 
otherwise be trivial. ) Durability is not the hallmark of moral worth. Even infinite 
durability would fail in this regard. It seems rather irrelevant to attributions of value. 18 
To make sense of why Murdoch thinks that a grasp of finitude, an aspect of 
what she calls the 'contingency' of the self, will impact upon the attribution of value, 
we need to grasp a broader feature of her moral psychology. It is nominally Platonic 
but defacto much more Freudian and libidinal. She suggests that we should think of 
desire (for which we may read care, concern, love of whatever sort) in terms of a 
personal economy. There is a limited amount of it to go around. Self-directed concern 
exists at the expense of concern for the other. This is our default condition and it is 
one which is characterised by a sense of our own importance or indispensability. The 
realisation that we are merely contingent, accidentally and temporarily present is a 
shock to the system. By undermining our egocentric sense of our own 
indispensability, death frees up our erotic resources and opens us up to concern for 
18 Wittgcnstcin, Tractatus, 6.4312. 
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the other. This sort of account may be unappealing to anyone who holds that the 
hydraulic metaphor of eros is deeply misleading in all contexts or at least disturbingly 
mechanical. In Murdoch's defence I will suggest that whatever the flaws and limits of 
the metaphor, it does seem to be what we draw upon when we think of the real and 
undertheorized phenomenon of displacement. 
I am comfortable with this concession to Murdoch's use of the metaphor 
because there is a more fundamental problem in her account. Even if we were to 
allow that something like displacement of concern from self to other can occur, a 
second problem now kicks in. If my mortality devalues me, then your mortality ought 
to devalue you. Murdoch's self/other asymmetry cannot plausibly be underpinned by 
appeal to a common mortality, something that is shared rather than unevenly 
distributed. The very idea that mortality devalues others not only runs against the 
whole tone of Murdoch's thought, it is also radically at odds with our experience of 
the loss of others. In bereavement we have that you don't know what you've got till its 
gone experience of the loss of that which was sometimes or often taken for granted. 
We do not ordinarily regret having wasted our time in concern for someone whose 
mortality has now been realised. Bereavement is a mode of valuing, an experience of 
real loss, one that is often surprising in its depth. Indeed, insofar as we are to follow 
Murdoch and bring tragedy into the picture, a great deal of the plot of works such as 
Lear turn on just this ability to see what matters when it is too late to do anything 
about it. The real deathly suffering ofLear, the suffering that he cannot move beyond, 
comes not on the heath amid the wind and the rain but when he looses his dutiful 
daughter and tries to see movement in the stilled lips he had previously cursed. If our 
experience of the mortality of others, that shocking upheaval of our thoughts in the 
midst of loss, makes us more sensitive to their value then why should our own 
personal mortality make us feel any less important? As far as mortality is concerned, 
we seem to be down on all fours with each other. 
What follows will be an examination of ways in which a Murdochian might 
make a stand against this problem. I will look firstly (and briefly) at the option of 
bracketing-off her position on the significance of mortality and then (in more detail) 
at the various possible ways in which it might be defended. My claim will be that none 
of these defences is successful, that MurdocWs position is an arbitrary imposition of 
significance on our mortality. Rather than figurative death being distinguished from 
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other forins of suffering by virtue of the way it is informed and shaped by the 
encounter with real death, the direction of fit is quite the opposite. Murdoch's idea of 
figurative death is dictating the significance that the pilgrim must overlay on top of 
the encounter with the real thing. 
111. Bracketing-off Murdoch's Thanatology 
It is noteworthy that with occasional exceptions (such as Elizabeth Dipple's 
study Workfor the Spirit and an article by Pamela Hall drawing a contrast with virtue 
ethics) Murdoch's preoccupation with mortality and death raises hardly a stir in the 
secondary literature. Maria Antonaccio is characteristic in this respect. Her study of 
Murdoch, Picturing the Human, may have considerable strengths but its treatment of 
'unselfing' as a figurative death (or'extinctiorf) of the self is brief in the extreme. The 
preoccupation with death is effectively bracketed-out of consideration. 19 In line with 
this approach, we may be inclined to think of Murdoch's concern with death as 
(perhaps excessive) imagery for personal transformation, i. e. not about real death at 
all. 
Against this, I want to point out two things. Firstly, the demandingness of the 
Good requires us to see personal transformation not as rewarding but 'for nothing' 
and as involving an abandonment of much that we currently desire. 'The absolute 
demand remains. As Simone Weil puts it, exposure to God condemns the evil in 
ourselves not to suffering but to death: a saying worth reflecting upon in relation to a 
psychology which explores the pleasures of suffering' [M. 506-71. The deeply 
unconsoling image of death seems not excessive, but a singularly appropriate one for 
a demanding process. (Murdoch is forever condemning anything that consoles, in a 
way that is vaguely reminiscent of F. R-Leavis' view that all sentimentality is sinful. ) 
Secondly, Murdoch makes it quite clear that figurative death is not all that she is 
concerned with. She attends also to the significance of 'Real death! [M. 118] and the 
way in which it can inform the figurative death of personal redemptive 
transformation. Again, this is part of the reason why she views tragedy as so 
insightful. (The largest single chapter in the Metaphysics is on this topic. ) She 
privileges tragedy as an art form precisely because it succeeds where other imagery 
19 Antonaccio (2000), 14 1. 
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fails. It is mortality-disclosing, 'human life is chancy and incomplete. It is the role of 
tragedy, and also of comedy, and of painting to show us suffering without a thrill and 
death without a consolation. Or if there is any consolation it is the austere consolation 
of a beauty which teaches that nothing in life is of any value except the attempt to be 
virtuous... All is vanity. The only thing which is of real importance is the ability to see 
it all clearly and respond to it jUStlyt. 20 
These are dark and austere thoughts, but they are Murodoch's thoughts and not 
any misappropriation of a cheerful, upbeat approach towards morality. I am inclined 
to take it that this disturbing focus upon the significance of our mortality is one of 
Murdoch's great strengths and not at all a weakness. Along with Heidegger, a cluster 
of Wittgensteinians and Simone Weil, Murdoch has consistently advocated an (at 
times unpopular) position that I am more than ready to accept: an account of the 
human condition must follow the tradition of tragedy in placing mortality at its core. 
We are mortal beings in a sense that is even more fundamental than that in which we 
are rational beings. There is a sense in which we may loose rationality but not 
mortality. An absence of such an emphasis may weaken a moral philosophy. For 
example, virtue ethics, has a number of similarities to Murdoch's approach but it lacks 
her emphasis upon the relation between mortality and virtue. For Murdoch, humility 
in the face of the former is bound up with courage of the best sort. 
Alternatively, this emphasis on mortality may be put down to a particularly 
bleak turn of mind that emerges perhaps under the influence of too much Christianity 
and Titian . 
21 But if we felt inclined to go along with this negative assessment and 
view Murdoch's preoccupation with mortality as a quirk, an intractable problem 
remains: Murdoch's thanatology plays a definite r6le within her account of morality. It 
provides a criterion by which different modes of suffering may be separated out. The 
punitive pilgrimage of 'unselfingý is carried out in the light of an acceptance of real 
mortality; faked up imitations of moral progress, romantic or sadomasochistic modes 
of suffering are such, in part, because they cover over the reality of death, they pursue 
what Murdoch at one point calls 'fake death! [M. 12 1] and by virtue of doing so they 
20 SG, 85. 
21 Hannah Arendt and more recently, Grace Jantzcn imply something of this sort, suggesting that we 
should look to creative freedom, natality and not mortality as a fundamental guide. 
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are able to sustain our fascination with ourselves, even in hardship and in the 
extremity of suffering. " 
For Murdoch, it is precisely the realisation of our unimportance (our 
nothingness) that goes with acceptance of mortality which breaks egocentric 
preoccupation and prevents suffering from turning into personal romantic drama. A 
consistent Murdochian could not bracket-off her thanatology without reassigning its 
r6le elsewhere. And to do this would require rewriting Murdoch in conformity with 
the kind of evasion of death that is precisely what she warns us against. It would not 
be a matter of setting aside some of her views, but of going diametrically against 
them. 
IV. Embracing Murdoch's Thanatology 
If we accept the indispensability of MurdoclYs thanatology then its central problem 
emerges: if the pilgrim is to see themselves as unimportant by virlue of their 
mortality, then all other things being equal the mortality of others should make the 
pilgrim see them in just the same way. Here, I will consider the options which are 
available to defuse this problem. Firstly, a defender of Murdoch might assert that, 
contrary to appearances, that she is not advocating an arbitrary valuational 
asymmetry. Secondly, a defender of Murdoch might accept that there is, and hold that 
there ought to be, such a valuational asymmetry. 
(a) Denial of valuational asymmetry 
Let us suppose that, in line with her long-standing liberal commitment to the 
individual, Murdoch holds that the pilgrim, having good moral vision, should see that 
all humans are of value, including themselves. Perhaps Murdoch only neglects the 
pilgrim's own moral standing rather than abandoning it. Perhaps the failure to attend 
to it in her own texts need not lead us to take the 'nothingness' of the pilgrim at face 
value. (This is a reading which Lawrence Blum in fact seems to adopt, albeit he does 
so without dealing directly with her comments on humility in the face of death. )23 
22 In Henry and Cato, 337, Murdoch's mystical hcro Brendan Craddock remarks that 'Christ cheated 
death by suffering instead, avimv that is at least consistent with her assessment in the philosophical 
texts and with her simultaneous repulsion and attraction to Christianity. ) 
23 Blum (1986), 29 makes a version of this claim. 
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This approach would make a great deal of sense. Surely the pilgrim must see 
various hostile actions against themselves as transgressions not only from the other's 
point of view but from their own? A pilgrim in a concentration camp would, I will 
take it, see their own treatment as a moral failure on the part of the guards. In line 
with this, the pilgrim must, in the face of their own mortality, see their own 
importance (value) not as annihilated, but as, at most, diminished. I can accept this 
without any great difficulty and accept that a certain routine attention to self would 
be due, in line with this. However, unless there remains a valuational asymmetry of 
some sort, the reason for the comparatively comprehensive redirection of attention to 
the other will be removed. They must still see that value lies primarily with the other 
and not with self An asymmetry of love and attention requires an asymmetry in the 
perception of value. 
Against this, it might be suggested that no valuational asymmetry is required 
24 because no humans are of value (neither self nor the other). As in the former case, 
one might, just about, find the odd quote that could support this position, for 
example, Ultimately we are nothing. A reminder of our mortality, a recognition of 
contingency, must at least make us humble. Are we not closer to the deep mystery of 
being humanT [M. 501] Set against this, there is Murdoch's liberal commitment, and 
the comments it inspires such as 'The central concept of morality is "the individual" 
thought of as knowable by love'. 25 It has been a basic assumption of this thesis that 
MurdocWs work emerges out of a liberal tradition of seeing if not persons, then at 
least the other as unique and valuable. If neither the pilgrim nor the other is seen in 
this way then why should the pilgrim love and attend to anyone? Perhaps they might, 
instead, become preoccupied with Good as the locus of all value. (A position which 
seems to imply a strong separation of Good from persons, something which Murdoch 
does not obviously defend. ) 
Given that, for Murdoch we are (in some sense) to love the other, the 
suggestion that neither self nor the other are of value would require us to hold that a 
dualism of loving and valuing is present in Murdoch, such that our love of the other is 
independent of the discernment of any value that they might happen to embody or 
have. Loving would be one thing and valuing something else. Oddly enough, while 




others are clearly to be loved and attended to in Murdoch, there is a lack of bald 
statements to the effect that (irrespective of their particular merits) others possess 
something called value, or that they have some property that has value. That is to say, 
strange though I find this suggestion, there is nothing obvious to rule it out on direct 
textual grounds. A reading which relied upon some such dualism of loving and 
valuing might even be given support by reflecting upon the strong agapaic 
component of MurdocWs account of love. Q am also committed to accepting this 
possibility because I have defended a compatibilist reading of Murdochian love such 
that is contains both eros and agape. )26 In the classic account of agape given by 
Nygren, agape is taken to be a love of what lacks any value. In this way, God's 
agapaic love for mankind can be seen as entirely gratuitous and not as a constrained 
response, owed because of what we are. Perhaps the agapaic component of 
Murdochian love is like that, a love directed towards what lacks value. 
What gets lost in such a suggestion is how and why we are to love the 
individual on the Christian-derived agapaic model. It is basic to such an approach 
that we ought to model our love on God's love for us. (Hence love is, among other 
things, desexualized. We do not have anything that a perfect being could lack and 
desire. ) But the point is not just that we should love in the same manner because that 
is the best way to love. It is also that we should love what God loves. Rather in the 
way that if David falls in love with Jane, but is kept far from her, he may find himself 
wanting to read the same books and watch the same films as a way of loving her. 
That is to say, God's love of his creation confers a proxy value upon what is 
otherwise valueless. And this is why agapaic love of the other is taken to be an 
indirect form of the love of God. We love what he loves and has created. Agapaic 
love ultimately is a love of what is imperfect but it is not groundless. It remains 
grounded in an account of what is of ultimate value. Hence an agapaic component in 
Murdochian love provides no automatic reason for suspecting that loving and valuing 
fall apart in the way suggested. And since Murdoch holds that there is no God to 
confer a proxy value, this will strip away the normal grounds for agapaic love unless 
we are to concede that others stand in no need of a proxy value because although 
they may be imperfect, they are still to be seen as (intrinsically) of value. 
26 Sce abovc, Chaptcr 6. 
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Of course, one might say that a dualism of loving and valuing in Murdoch 
might have nothing to do with the way that the agapaic component of Murdochian 
love operates. Against such an objection I want to make three points. Firstly, 
Murdoch does not exactly say that others have intrinsic value or that they are the 
bearers of some property that has value, but this may be read as part of her attempt to 
avoid giving the impression that moral realism requires us to posit strange properties 
rather than to think of truthful vision as value-laden. (And the latter terminology is 
one that she is not shy about using. ) Secondly, making sense of her texts in this way is 
more obviously consistent with her liberal commitment. Thirdly, to read Murdoch as 
denuding all humans of value is to adopt an illiberal reading with no obvious pay off 
in relation to the current problem. Once loving and valuing are separated, the 
pilgrim's discernment of their own lack of value will no longer impede self-love. The 
pilgrim who sees themselves as 'nothing' would not find their self-love undercut if 
loving does not involve valuing. 
That other humans are to be valued is, I would suggest, the overriding 
impression that is given by MurdocWs texts and by the liberal commitment which is 
basic to them. What is far less clear is just what it is about these or any humans that is 
to be valued. Here, I want to point out that while my remarks on this may, if 
accepted, strengthen the paradoxical nature of Murdoch's position, no part of my 
argument actually depends upon the comments that follow. One of the problems 
involved in pinning down just what she values in other humans is that Murdoch does 
not, after the manner of Kant, explicitly identify some feature, part or particular 
characteristic as the locus of value. Maria Antonaccio leans towards a reading that is 
in line with the Kantian approach by emphasising our human capacity for freedom and 
there is something to be said for this suggestion. Murdoch does have a discourse of 
positive freedom even if she is more concerned with humility than dignity. 27 Another 
possibility would be to look in a straight Kantian manner towards our status as 
rational beings. Although Murdoch is hostile to the Kantian view of humans as agents 
and rational choosers, she is more ambiguous about the emphasis upon rationality as 
28 such. 
27 This is one of the principal themes of Antonaccio (2000). 
28 For example, SG. 80 notes the emphasis on the rational in Kant, which might be read as 
connecting up with earlier comments at the start of the Sovereignty to treat the focus on the rational 
individual as somewhat n-dsplaccd. 
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Nevertheless it is not obvious to me that either of these are what Murdoch 
ultimately finds valuable in humans. If I am right about this, it is a strength and not a 
weakness of her approach. Were she to value humans qua rational beings or free 
beings she would walk into a number of standard problems associated with the 
absence of the relevant feature in newborns, foeti, individuals with impaired mental 
abilities and corpses i. e. cases in which rationality and/or freedom are absent, limited 
or otherwise impaired. Some biological humans do not obviously have what Kantians 
treat as valuable and worthy of respect. Corpses certainly do not, yet we do not eat 
the dead (not even strangers) and this is part of the everyday moral standpoint of 
caring for (loving, valuing) others that Murdoch is keen to develop. 29 There is 
something callous about the abandonment of those who loose their faculties even 
though we can make sense of an element of truth in the claim that they are no longer 
in every seiLw the same person. There is something about Kantian approaches which 
are seriously out of step with the way in which we actually (and ought to) respond to 
the reality of others. 
Here I am inclined to think that the most that I can do is to offer some general 
considerations that might make a particular understanding of Murdoch plausible. To 
this end, I will suggest that we consider what attitude a Murdochian would adopt 
towards a computer if they believed (mistakenly) that it really could think, but only 
about mathematics. We might also allow them to believe that it is capable of doing so 
more efficiently or less cfficiently i. e. that something like freedom and effort might be 
ascribed. I suggest that we think here of a computer rather than a human with limited 
mental competences because in the latter case the Murdochian's attitude might be 
influenced (coloured) by the thought that something has gone wrong. With a 
computer we encounter something that was never intended or destined for anything 
else. I am inclined to think that a Murdochian who held that such a machine could 
think would still not seriously consider valuing it in the way that they would value a 
human. 
What would be conspicuously absent in the case of the thinking computer 
would be a passionate engagement with life, deep emotional tensions of the sort that 
are bound up with suffering and with mortal existence. (The kinds of problem with 
which tragedy deals so movingly. ) Ascription of this kind of personal depth seems to 
29 Diamond (1991) 319 ff. 
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me to be basic to our sense of what is to be valued and that it is in just this way that 
Murdoch thinks of other humans. My argument at this point is doubly inconclusive 
because it is open to the objection that a Murdochian might never allow that a 
computer could think, and someone who made this point might well be right. (There 
seems something odd about speaking of the localised ability to think through 
mathematical problems itt the way that we do outside of anything like a human form 
of life. ) 
Be that as it may, my concern here is only to make room for valuing in a way 
that depends upon something other than an appeal to the intrinsic worth of freedom 
or rationality. I am suggesting that Murdochian awareness of others is what we might 
30 
call, at the expense of a little awkwardness of terminology, 'passionate awareness'. 
Others are passionate mortals and not just rational or free agents and the significance 
that we attach to them before and after they are capable of rational responses is 
bound up with the narrative that is to be told about them qua passionate mortal 
beings. Although, as Gaita points out in defence of much the same standpoint, 
freedom and rationality are prerequisites for having this kind of passionate human life, 
it is a leap to say that it is b ,y virtue oVthese special characteristics 
that humans are 
ordinarily valued. 31 (Similarly, there is a sense in which it is by virtue of having blood 
in their veins that humans are able to live as they do, but it is not the blood itself that 
is ultimately important. ) This would provide a way to vindicate one of her key 
philosophical intuitions: that an account of morality must place mortality in a central 
position, even if her claim about what mortality shows the pilgrim is not itself 
defensible. 
(b) Acceptance of valuational asymmetry 
Let us consider, now, what happens if it is accepted that Murdoch does indeed 
advance a valuational asymmetry of the sort that her comments on death seem to 
imply, especially those at the end of the Sovereignty and in a number of closely 
30 For an example of this we n-tight think of Weil's account of the Achillcs-Priarn confrontation at 
the end of her 11had essay [WciI (1987)]. Achilles encounters Priam as resolutely mortal, like his 
own father even, and is (for once) movcd by the sorrows of one who is completely other. This 
episode may help to make some scnse of Weil's curious instruction to think always of others as if 
they were dead, as more than a %i-ay of cpistcmically privileging our thought about the past. For the 
latter see Cockburn (1997b), 324 ff. 
31 Gaita (1991), Chaptcr 3. 
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associated novelistic encounters with death. Here, the paradoxical nature of such an 
asymmetry is strengthened if one accepts the above considerations about how, and as 
what, we value others. If a human is not seen as devalued when seen as a suffering 
mortal, then it becomes a mystery as to why a Murdochian pilgrim would or should 
think that their own mortality makes them nothing. Why are they not also to be 
valued as mortal? Again, our common mortality seems to be the wrong kind of 
characteristic to set up a self/other asymmetry. What it may, nevertheless, do is to 
shatter certain illusions that the pilgrim is liable to have about themselves but lack 
about others. In which case, the effect of reflection on mortality will be levelling, the 
pilgrim will be led into a sense of their own ordinariness, and this is humility of a 
quite different sort. 
Against this, it might be feared that by resisting Murdoch's self/other 
asymmetry I am in some way trying to return to an endorsement of universalisability 
in our reactions, and this surely would be wrong. I have accepted that here has to be 
something very personal in our moral responses. (And that this is bound up with the 
way that moral problems, unlike technical problems, cannot be passed over to others, ) 
But here, I am not at all suggesting that the right response to mortality is some 
uniform standard of correct deportment, as if it were best to slot into the fixed 
channels of good precedent and to try and die with decorum, like Hume, Seneca or 
(better still) Socrates. There is something disturbing about the idea that the right way 
to face death is to in any sense mimetic. (This may plausibly be called inauthentic, 
allowing one's being to collapse into a preassigned role. ) An undertaker who has a 
certain routine for funeral preparations ought not to lapse into the routine when he 
prepares for his own funeral. A man facing execution cannot be entirely truthful if he 
gives a speech like Eichmann beneath the scaffold, one which sounds like a funerary 
oration for someone else. But if we are not to respond in some uniform manner in the 
face of death then why not opt for an asymmetry of the sort that Murdoch proposes? 
Here, I want to say that Murdoch's approach may well be a rejection of 
universalisability, but it is not the only way of rejecting it. We might alternatively do 
so by emphasising the importance of facing up to the personal significance of 
mortality and by pointing out that this need not be based upon the idea that we are 
more or less valuable than others. It might just as easily be based upon an awareness 
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that there is a sense in which nobody else (irrespective of their value) can perform this 
task for us. 
Against this it might be argued that, yes, the Murdochian way is not the only 
way in which we can reject universalisability, but it is the best way given that it is in 
line with some feature of our everyday psychology. I will take it that if this were true, 
it would be an important defence. There is a great deal to be said for Murdoch's 
position that morality has to be gradualist in the sense of abiding by the constraints of 
everyday psychology rather than pursuing a priori principles which take no account 
of what humans are like. We cannot leap out of our everyday humanity and ought not 
to give the impression that we can. There is however, an interesting ordinary 
asymmetry set out by David Cockburn (and drawing upon Wittgenstein! s account of 
pain) which might conceivably be drawn upon Jo support Murdoch. 32 What I want to 
argue is that while a real asymmetry is identified, it does not give Murdoch's position 
any support. 
Suppose that I stand at the door of my cabin and see a little girl in a red hood, 
with her back to me being attacked quite brutally by a wolf in the woods. I am 
convinced that she is my granddaughter and my concern about her pain is shaped and 
influenced by this belief But when she turns around I see that she is some other, and 
quite different little girl. I will still be concerned, but the character of my concern will 
alter and perhaps diminish. (I may even feel guilty about having a sense of relief. ) Our 
concern about the pain suffered by others is affected by the unique story that is to be 
told about who they are. Similarly with our concern about their mortality. If the girl 
dies my concern will depend upon whether or not I believe that she really is my 
granddaughter. If she lies there on the ground swaddled in her cloak, I may be 
assailed by doubts, perhaps I was right about her in the first place. By contrast, 
thought about my own pain and death are not indexed to a unique individual in the 
same way. If I return to my cabin and in my state of distraction I bum my hand on the 
stove, I will be just as concerned about the pain that is here, just as eager to get rid of 
it, even if I happen to have some major rethink about who I really am. Similarly with 
death. I am in the habit of avoiding juggernauts and articulated lorries that advance 
towards me at speed, and would probably still do so even if, standing in front of one, 
I suddenly realised that I am an amnesiac with a quite different identity from the one I 
32 Cockbum (1990), 164 ff. 
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assumed this morning. By contrast, my willingness to leap in front of any such vehicle 
to save another would depend heavily upon just who that other happened to be. In at 
least some contexts, my attitude towards my own pain and mortality is not like my 
attitude towards the pains and mortality of others. 
The example here is of a particular 'puzzling' sort whose legitimacy might be 
challenged on the grounds of leading us to think about life circumstances by appeal to 
circumstances that we are never in. And perhaps there are better ways of setting out 
the intuition concerned, but I want to say that the example at least draws out an 
intuition rather than covering intuitions over. The intuition in question is moreover 
drawn out as a possible support for MurdocWs position. It can also be seen in other, 
more realistic contexts. (Below I will cite a concentration camp case that is perhaps 
more in keeping with Murdoch's philosophical style. ) 
Cockburn sees the asymmetry as a bad thing involving a form of self-blindness. 
I-Es suggestion is that our (third-person) attitude towards the mortality of others is a 
better model for a truthful orientation to death than our default (first-person) attitude 
towards our own mortality. 33 It might, however, be argued that Murdochs approach 
could be rooted in just this asymmetry, as an extension of this ordinary (for Cockburn 
problematic) way of thinking. I will accept that this is a real asymmetry in our way of 
thinking, subject to a qualification: the forgetting of self is not absolutely the case, 
but a matter of degree and varies from context to context. Some pains are quite 
different from others in the way that they promote a concern with, or fear for, our 
own identity. Napoleon no doubt suffered greatly in defeat, but a public thrashing 
with a belt would have struck at his sense of his own dignity. Some pains and ways of 
suffering matter to us in the way that they do because they strike at our view of who 
we are and how others ought to behave towards us. Similarly with the case of death. 
If I believe that I am the last of the mohicans then my death will assume a significance 
that I am tempted to call tragic. (Although not in Murdoch's narrower, specialised 
sense. ) If I find out that there is a thriving community of mohawks just over the hill, 
my attitude towards my own death will be altered. 
Having said this, my point is not at all to deny the asymmetry highlighted by 
Cockburn but simply to qualify it and having done so to suggest that it will not do the 
right sort of work for a Murdochian. My reasons for making this claim are as follows. 
33 This yields an interesting contrast between Cockburn's Wittgensteinian approach and Hcideggcr. 
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The forgetting of self, the self-blindness which Cockburn identifies draws just as 
easily from thought about our own pains as it does from our thought about death and 
this is a distinctly urA4urdochian approach because (i) it makes thought about the 
latter dispensable rather than the fundamental form of self-forgetting; and (ii) 
Murdoch's critique of suffering as bound up a default human sadomasochism, is 
precisely concerned with the way in which it (normally) tends not to produce 
self-blindness but to direct our attention to self Our default approach in 11of that of 
self forgetting. Forgetfulness of self requires a great deal of work. 
Of course, here it might be objected that the right kind of suffering, what 
Murdoch at one point calls 'absolute (deathly) pain' although exceptional rather than 
the norm, might escape these problems [M. 13 1 ]. But even if we were to accept this, it 
is not in every sense that our thought in such situations of experiencing pain and 
encountering death is forgetful of self It is a form of self-blindness in the limited 
sense that when I suffer pain in certain contexts, and in a certain way, I am not 
concerned with myself qua individual with a unique history (such that my concern 
might vanish or radically alter if I became aware that I am not who I believed myself 
to be). But I am still concerned with myself even if concerned in a way that fails to do 
justice to my uniqueness. And such concern with self is precisely what Murdoch is 
suspicious about in the case of our suffering. ) Concern is kept here and not displaced 
towards the other. Hence, in this everyday feature of our psychology, self is not 
forgotten in any sense that would support a Murdochian position. 
As an extension of this theme it may be pointed out that the asymmetry 
Cockburn highlights shows the way in which an awareness of others is bound up not 
with self-forgetting, but with our awareness of self Take the following case from 
Viktor Frankl's memoir on life in a concentration camp. FrankI details those (few) 
occasions on which his training as a psychotherapist may have been of help to others. 
On two separate but similar occasions he encountered prisoner who were 
contemplating suicide, but was able to talk them around by drawing out some of 
those considerations which, in the midst of their suffering, they had lost sight of, 'for 
the one it was his child whom he adored and who was waiting for him in a foreign 
country. For the other it was a thing, not a person. This man was a scientist and had 
written a series of books which still needed to be finished. His work could not be 
done by anyone else, any more than another person could ever take the place of the 
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father in his child's affections'. This looks plausibly like grasping the personal nature 
of the encounter with mortality. 'When the impossibility of replacing a person is 
realized, it allows the responsibility which a man has for his existence and its 
continuance to appear in all its magnitude. 34 What is important here is not, of course, 
the accuracy of Frankl's account but rather a certain kind of reflection upon it 
whereby we affirm that yes, this is a good and truthful way of looking at matters. 
What is striking about the example, at least in the case of the father, is the way in 
which he overcomes the temptation of suicide by thinking of another, very much in 
line with Murdoch's insight about how the problems of others can break our dark 
cyclical thoughts. However, what is involved is not just a direction of attention away 
from self, but rather a more relational way of thinking of himself, as rooted in a 
shared past, as bound up with others who are cherished and who may be harmed by 
his own death. What is involved is also not ownmost in the private property sense of 
being something that may be cast away without consideration to others. 
V. Murdochian Commitment 
Where this leaves us is in the following position. Murdoch needs her account of 
the significance of mortality to hold together in order to separate out romantic 
suffering from her own, favoured mode of suffering ('unselfing'). The latter is to be 
conducted in the light of an awareness and acceptance of mortality. Murdoch's 
approach towards the significance of mortality cannot therefore be bracketed off. Ilut 
it also cannot be successfully defended against the charge that it is an arbitrary (and 
counterintuitive) imposition of the ideal of figurative death upon real death rather 
than a conducting of the former in the light of the latter. Here, we might still be 
inclined to say one of two things. Firstly, that arbitrariness in this sense can be 
tolerated by Murdoch. That, in spite of criticising others for imposing their own 
significant form on the reality of death, she is perhaps criticising them only for 
imposing the wrong sort of significant form. I have assumed that Murdoch's account 
cannot be so arbitrary but perhaps this is an assumption too far. I do, however, want 
34 Frankl (1964), 79-90. Frankl is very much in the tradition of cmphasising the projective, forward 
looldrig character of our being, but also treats such projection as a way of taldrig up the individual's 
historicity. 
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to suggest that an acceptance of such arbitrariness must alter our understanding of 
Murdoch's philosophical significance. 
Perhaps, behind all the circumlocution, she is offering us her own deeply 
counterintuitivejust so story. In this context it should be noted that although even the 
most counterintuitive tale might have morally usefully consequences, Murdoch has 
always rejected a reading of her texts in an instrumental or 'as if manner. She has 
always defended the view that she is trying to be truthful, and not providing a story 
which is not itself true but useful in the generation of other truths. Commenting on 
the status of the Sovereignty of Good she remarks that 'This is not a sort of 
pragmatism or a philosophy of "as ifit. 35 If there are cognitive gains to be made 
through moral commitment, they will only be available through genuine commitment 
to the truth of a morality in its own fight. In line with this, Murdochian death 
orientation cannot be merely an as if standpoint. Understood not just in terms of 
some instrumental value, but as (in itself) truthful MurdocWs attitude towards 
mortality may be regarded as a form of mystical commitment. There is a sense in 
which it falls off the edge of rational discourse. I use the term 'mystical' in this 
context, not by way of dismissive criticism, but by way of classifying Murdoch in 
terms that she, from time to time, endorses, although stressing its practical value. 36 1 
am suggesting that we treat her claims to be presenting a form of practical mysticism 
with absolute seriousness and as more than an 'as if tale. This would help to explain a 
good deal about her willingness to bypass problems without giving them any detailed 
treatment. Mysticism involves a commitment to the view that because ultimate truth 
is both ineffable and pertains to what is most real, no matter what problems there are 
in one's way of making sense of the world, as long as they are encountered on the 
fight path, they can, in principle, be resolved at some future stage of progress, even 
where such progress happens to be defacto blocked. What one needs to do is to hold 
on and continue along the same lines, endure and tolerate the difficulties, persevere in 
spite of them. 
To suggest that Murdoch is a mystic of sorts goes further than pointing out the 
various mystical influences upon her work such as Neoplatonism of the sort 
35 GG, 73. 
36 Murdoch's appeals to 'mysticism. it would be no great charge to suggest that Murdoch is the 
latest, perhaps the last of the great English mystics. (EnglisW being used broadly here given 
Murdoch's birth in Dublin. ) 
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associated with psuedo-Dionysius and with St John of the Cross. These are influences 
which any plausible moral psychology might draw upon without itself being mystical. 
For example, there is something to be said for the view that radical personal change is 
not won without its moment of crisis, its dark night of the soul. My suggestion is that 
Murdoch goes further. She begins by trying to secularise a religious idea of morality 
(to vindicate Good in the place of God) but, over time, she drifts into something that 
is itself more religious or (a term she is more comfortable with) 'spiritual' [M. 495]. 
Towards the end of the Metaphysics she remarks that 'in the continuity which (as I 
see it) exists between morality and religion, we might feel that we had crossed the 
border' [M. 506]. I will agree, with the proviso that Murdoch sees mysticism as 
constituting the core, the essential truth of religion. 'Mystics differ in style and 
doctrinal content, yet seem to have much in common. Here one is inclined to say (I 
am inclined to say) that the fundamental nature of religion is mystical' [M. 69-70]. 
Similarly, 'There is a "moral unconscious". This is how morality leads naturally into 
mysticism and has a natural bond with religion. (By religion I mean a religious 
attitude and form of life, not a literalistic adherence to a particular dogma. )' [U. 301]. 
The mystic succeeds in getting beyond the iconography of creed and sect and makes a 
deeper sense of it all. 'I would say (persuasive definition) that a mystic is a good 
person whose knowledge of the divine and practice of the selfless life has transcended 
the level of idols and imag& [M. 73]. 
What Murdoch sets out is not, ultimately, to be defended in strictly 
philosophical terms. At some point, a different and altogether more mystical 
commitment enters her work. While she would no doubt disagree with a great deal 
that I have argued (disputing matters of emphasis, suggesting that I treat as 
unavoidable what are only moral dangers or temptations, and so on) it is less clear 
that she would disagree on this point. Murdoch (the whole Murdoch and not a 
pruned-back simulacrum) can only be seen as defensible by someone who shares her 
mystical commitment and is willing to disregard the problems as secondary. I need 
hardly point out that I do not share this commitment and if it is seen as a precondition 
for holding that Murdoch is consistent then it seems to me that the price is just too 
high. 
Alternatively, and secondly, we might be inclined to defend the apparent 
arbitrariness of the way that Murdoch imposes a special significance on the reality of 
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death by saying that there must be something more to her position, something that the 
above approach of breaking down the options in a broadly (but not too) analytic 
manner just does not grasp. (Perhaps the veryform of this type of enquiry occludes 
something. )37 And here I am perfectly willing to concede that there is not only 
something more, but much more to her position. There is, for example, the insightful 
realisation that an account of morality has to place mortality at its heart, and there are 
insights that may be (ought to be) gleaned from her understanding of bereavement 
38 and the experience of loss or void. However, asserting that there must be something 
more does not, by itself, show that this extra deep something does anything to resolve 
the problem in hand. It is every bit as plausible to claim that the something more to be 
found in Murdoch is not a deeper level at which inconsistencies are resolved and 
arbitrariness removed, but a level at which Murdoch relies upon a mystical 
commitment to viewing the world in a particular, problematic and austere way. 
37 See Chapter I for Murdoch's reservations of this sort. 
38 For example, there is an important difference between the gradual refocusing of attention towards 
one's own suffering in genuine bereavement (and which Murdoch describes as a filling up of the 
void), and the shallow or false emotion involved in great outpourings of public grief and where the 
deceased celebrity has never been the true focus of attention, but rather the desire is to be part of the 
emotional throng. (Here we may think of the cases of Princess Diana and, perhaps, John Paul ii. ) 
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Afterward 
The bulk of this thesis has been devoted to a critical examination of 
Murdochian morality with a view to providing grounds for the charge that Murdoch 
falls foul of what she criticises. The reading of Murdoch which has been developed is 
an inclusive one. Troublesome conunitments have not been pared away, particularly 
those associated with her religiosity and admiration for the mystics (although I have 
appealed to the latter cautiously, and in the case of her approach towards mortality, 
only when other options have failed). The end result is not intended to show that 
Murdoch may be debunked and set aside. It may, instead, be treated as a 
propaedeutic to the appropriation of a great deal that is of value in her writings, 
without the much more problematic expectation that what is of value can be 
appropriated in a consistently Murdochian manner. On the whole, my position has 
been that although it is instructive and illuminating, Murdoch's approach towards 
morality does not hold together. 
To close, I will set aside my scepticism about her consistency in order to end 
on a different sort of problem concerning the status of her approach as a practical 
guide to morals. This is a different sort of problem that flows from the kind of reading 
of Murdoch that I have set out. Given that her predilection for the imagery of the 
quasi-religious and mystical pilgrim is not mere ornamentation, I am inclined to 
wonder about just how available it could possibly be beyond the narrow confines of 
some moral elite. Similar considerations follow from the way in which ordinary 
contentment is downgraded in the course of the moral pilgrim! s progress. ' Partly to 
avoid any sense of final closure in my treatment of Murdoch, I will keep this question 
of availability open and try only to draw out a tension that it helps to generate, a 
tension which involves her combinations of moral hierarchy with anti-elitism, and 
moral vision with humility. 
Part of what motivates the death theme in Murdoch is a very traditional 
concern to deflate all sorts of human pretensions. 2 As such it is part of her rejection 
of elitism, the same preoccupation that is at work when she opens the Sovereignty by 
describing it as a 'movement of return! towards 'the consideration of simple and 
1 See above, Chapter 3. 
2 This traditional levelling role of death imagery is detailed in Bakhtin (1984). 
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obvious facts'? It is concerned with saving the kind of belief that the practice of 
morality may need, and that in our everyday lives we cannot get away from, the belief 
that some things really are bad, and that others are good. 'The virtuous peasant 
knows, and I believe he will go on knowing, in spite of the removal or modification of 
the theological apparatus, although what he knows he might be at a loss to say. '4 For 
Murdoch, what we find difficult to explain is a goodness that 'is perhaps most 
convincingly met with in simple people - inarticulate, unselfish mothers of large 
5 families'. Elsewhere, the emphasis shifts to (presumably maiden) aunts. The exemplar 
changes but the point remains much the same. There is an appeal here to everyday 
human decency lived at our common level of humanity. (An appeal which generates a 
similarity, but perhaps nothing more, between Murdoch and the sort of intuitionism 
which appeals to strange moral properties rather than appealing to the continuous 
value-ladenness of consciousness. 
Others, and here the list of malefactors is topped by existentialists and 
structuralists, are charged with threatening to corrupt our idea of morality. In their 
texts, 'The atmosphere is invigorating and tends to produce self-satisfaction in the 
reader, who feels himself to be a member of the elite. 7 Against such elitist delusions 
Murdoch appeals to death as the great teacher, it is the final guarantor of the 
unimportance of elitist pretensions. 'Ultimately we are nothing. A reminder of our 
mortality, a recognition of contingency, must at least make us humble. Are we not 
then closer to the deep mystery of being humanT [M. 501] What jars here is not 
simply the problems that her attitude towards mortality generate, it is also the very 
idea of joining this deflationary or anti-elitist strand of her thought together with a 
Platonic discourse of moral ascent which (Murdoch accepts) presupposes a 
hierarchical system of standards. 'In effect Kant's moral view is optimistic and 
democratic. Plato's is pessimistic and aristocratic, in the sense that he offers a vision 
of what is highest, but also of the distance which separates us from it. Kant's view is 
3 IP, 1. 
4 GG, 72. 
5 GG, 52. 
6 For an attempt to classify Murdoch as an intuitionist, see Feargus Kerr (1997). For differences 
between Murdoch and Moore, see Antonaccio (2000), 116-123. 
7 GG, 49. 
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horizontal, Plato's is vertical. Kant's man plods along a level road, alternately failing 
and succeeding, continually nagged by conscience. We easily identify VAth this 
individual. Plato has no similar figure. When goodness is so difficult, there seems less 
point in saying that every man is potentially good, though the Cave myth may imply 
it. ' [M. 178]. 
Murdoch may soft-pedal a little on the subject of Plato's views on slavery, 
treating it as an image of moral guidance, but even when she does so it is through an 
acceptance of the hierarchical element in Plato's thought [M. 386-9]. 'Plato is less 
democratic than Anselm, who thought that anyone could conceive of God' [M. 400]. 
Similarly, 'In general Plato was an austere moral thinker. Few could rise high. The 
"gravity" of sin compels us' [M. 402]. Finally, she appeals to Plato's 'hierarchy of 
subjects' wherein 'each subject has the object he deserves' [M. 454; 167; and to 
strengthen the overtones of culpability Acastos 89 and 99]. In Murdoch, culpability 
for our being, even for its default back-of-the-Cave condition, is endorsed. But she 
makes sense of culpability against the background assumption that we could be 
otherwise and better. Culpability for being in Murdoch has a normative point, it 
directs us towards the possibility of, and need for, improvement. This allows us to 
make sense of MurdocWs comment about that a moral egalitarianism is implied by the 
Cave myth in spite of its strong hierarchical overtones. (It is the enlightened few who 
return to the Cave in order to guide others. ) 
The point, I take it, is that Murdoch is rejecting the idea that her approach 
towards morals is a special way, something restricted to the enlightened few or the 
moral elite. But she is doing so at the same time as endorsing moral hierarchy, 'if 
morality is essentially connected with change and progress, we cannot be as 
democratic about it as some philosophers would like to think'. " Sometimes she 
appeals to unselfish mothers or aunts, and at others to 'Christ, Socrates, certain 
saints'. 9 (Exemplars which do not look at all similar. ) Here, I will follow Murdoch in 
assuming that it makes sense to speak of hierarchy without elitism. For Murdoch, the 
latter seems to imply not only hierarchy but rigidity or exclusivity, a lack of 
opportunity for moral mobility. 10 In so far as her position is democratic or egalitarian, 
8 IP, 28. 
9 GG, 5 1. 
10 'As for the dlitc of mystics, I would say no to the term "dlite", 'GG. 72. 
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it presupposes not equality of condition but something closer to equality of 
opportunity. (With due allowances made for the fortuitous particularity of 
circumstance. ) 
What I want to suggest is that, even given this distinction between elitism and 
hierarchy, there is still a tension between Murdoch's Platonic moral hierarchy and the 
real (general) availability of unselfing. What we are being asked to accept is that the 
ordinary, unexceptional moral being is to be guided by (and presumably taught, or 
brought up, to live in line with) a morality that is not only quasi-religious, but 
contains some ultimate level of mystical commitment. If this were at all plausible (and 
I am by no means certain that it is, at least in the kind of world where we happen to 
five) I still want to suggest that it will generate a problem when it comes to making 
sense of what occurs higher up the moral ladder, at the level of the advanced pilgrim, 
the'mystical herowhose virtue is'liumility, or one of those 'hero-saints' she mentions 
in the Metaphysics. " Insofar as we make the customary distinction between the hero 
(a risk-taker with situation-specific virtues) and the saint (a more patient endurer with 
general virtue), the Murdochian ideal is perhaps more saintly than heroic, but given 
that courage is involved I will take it that her pilgrim combines an element of both, 
i. e. her own reference to 'hero-saints' is not misleading. Indeed the saintly person 
should probably see when heroic risk or sacrifice is called for and when it is an 
attempt at personal exultation. 
Let us now situate such an admirably humble figure within a Platonic hierarchy. 
Like all good Platonists, Murdoch holds to the view that we are drawn towards the 
Good and that love (of some sort) shows us the way. We learn to love what is good. 
Less mystically, we steadily develop moral competence. We may, for juridical 
purposes, start out from an assumption that we are all on a common moral level, 
however, this is a rule of thumb and does not presuppose actual equivalence. (John 
Kekes rather nicely suggests that the presumption of equivalent moral compentence is 
akin to the presumption of innocence until shown otherwise. )12 Here, it might be 
objected that the hierarchical element is not all that great, given that Murdoch 
presupposes only differing moral competences. We might accordingly imagine that 
there is some great heap of competences or virtues of different sorts and that they are 
11 EM, 227; Afetaphysics, 120. 
12 Kekes (1995), Chaptcr 4. 
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distributed in such a way that I have one bundle of competences and you have 
another bundle, and that some components of our bundles might be the same while 
others might differ or conflict. (A view that is close to Blum's position. )13 
The problem with this approach is that Murdoch endorses the Platonic view of 
the unity of the virtues, they are not modular and discrete (certainly not conflicting). 
To have one is to have others. This is a plausible enough view to take. We would not 
want to speak of Adolf Eichmann's 'diligence' and 'industry' except, perhaps, in some 
ironic contexts. And we would not want to do so because his was not a virtuous life 
with admirable goals. Virtues improve us but the personal characteristics in question 
made Eichmann a worse person. In the absence of any morally worthwhile goal or 
activity we might say that he was 'systematic', or 'efficient' but not 'industrious' or 
'diligent'. The point is that virtues presuppose each other. Because she adheres to this 
view, Murdoch's position is not just that I have some competences and that you have 
other and different ones, but that some people have far more moral competence than 
others. It is in the recognition of this that we cannot be as democratic as we would 
like. This is also not a position that I am inclined to dispute, it may strike some 
readers as far too undemocratic but it may strike others as the sheerest common 
sense. 
Our problem now is that the humble, advanced pilgrim will love an ideal that 
happens to be best realised in themselves. To get around the danger that the humility 
of such a person might be a form of false humility, involving a desire to have (or to be 
seen to have) all these accomplishments and humility too, Murdoch is pushed into the 
suggestion that he must go beyond even Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith whose moral 
exemplariness is invisible only to others. 'A saint described is a saint romanticised. 
Nor must a saint romanticise himself. So saints must be invisible both to others and to 
themselves. ' [M. 126]. This is not a new position, Luther once remarked that true 
humility never knows that it is humble. However, it takes us far beyond her 
previously stated strictures against the pursuit of self-knowledge, and, in general, to 
anything like therapeutic introspection. Self-knowledge is no longer gained only 
incidentally, in passing, now seems to be positively avoided. But if the advanced 
13 Blum (1991), Section IV claims that we are not sensitive to particulars per se, moral vision is not 
a unified capacity. This goes beyond Murdoch's rejection of anything like a specialised faculty of the 
classic intuitionist sort (a moral sense) and goes against the claim that the various perceptual 
sensitivities involved in the -virtues form any sort of close-knit unity. 
228 
pilgrim is stipulated to be blind to themselves in order to see others as more loveable, 
two things follow. Firstly, they will be subject to an illusion that cuts across the 
discernment of actual differences in moral level. Secondly, the connection between 
moral progress and the improvement of moral vision is severed, or at least comes 
under strain. Only if humility were equated (as it might plausibly be) with the just 
discernment of one's moral level and limits, would the close connection between 
moral vision and moral progress remain intact. But in such a case, the good pilgrim 
would have a sense of their own accomplishments as well as their limits. (And, I 
would suggest, a commensurately strong sense of self worth. )" 
There is an important sense in which our attributions of humility ordinarily 
presuppose accomplishment. When someone who is a murderer, thief and cheat 
remarks Y am a murder, thief and cheat' their free acceptance of failings seems to 
betoken either remorse or a lack of resistance to being flawed. If they said these 
things remorsefully we might, at best, call them penitent. It is only in the context of 
moral accomplishments that an attribution of humility becomes appropriate. In other 
words, humility is a complex moral achievement, a virtue that presupposes other 
virtues. Indeed, it is Murdoch's own view that it is precisely the advanced pilgrim who 
is humble. When a moral pilgrim, who has such accomplishments, confronts their 
mortality and nevertheless feels that others with fewer accomplishments are far more 
worthy of love than they, this looks suspiciously like a misplaced sense of 
worthlessness, either a case of false humility or poor moral vision. (A confusion about 
real moral standing. ) 
Here, it might be objected that there really are those who are humble and yet 
saintly, and this is not something that I am at all inclined to dispute. I suggest only 
that it is difficult to make sense of them in Murdochian terms. Moral saints and 
heroes see that what they are obliged to do is not at all something that applies to 
others. They have a special sense of moral necessity, obligation (or duty) where 
others would not be inclined to say that any such requirement obligation (or duty) 
exists. 15 The imperfection with which their tasks are fulfilled may generate a humbling 
14 A position, perhaps closer to Aristotle, NE, Book 4 and to the account of humility in the Summa 
7heotogiae. 
15 Urmson (1957), 202-4. Urmson's point is that there arc entirely familiar moral reasons for action 
which go beyond our shared public sense of duty, a view that Murdoch is in sympathy with. 
Urmson's approach (minus his utilitarianism) is extended in Blum (1988) but in rclation to more 
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sense of failure but it is not failure where others have also failed. Others are not 
culpable in the same way because they are not confronted with the same tasks. While 
others praised him, Saint Francis reproached himself for having previously failed to 
preach to the birds, he did not reproach others for this same fault. On the more heroic 
than saintly side, Oskar Schindler is plausibly represented as having reproached 
himself for not saving more people, yet he tried to excuse others for their complicity. 
There may well be a certain kind of elitism in this way of seeing matters, in the heroic 
or saint's-eye view of a moral project which differs significantly from that of the 
generality. But it does at least leave room for a humility that does not also devalue 
the efforts of others. It leaves this room precisely because the task of the saint or hero 
is not something that others are failing at to an even greater degree. (The baker who 
is diligent and does not adulterate the bread is performing his allotted task, and so too 
is the labourer whose plough is sped if not by God at least by appropriate ell'ort, yet 
those who have some higher calling may fail in their allotted role, hence humility may 
be more appropriate in their case. ) 
Murdoch's manner of opposing elitism allows her no room to make such 
allowances for a moral division of labour, 'the "machinery of salvation" (if it exists) is 
essentially the same for all. '16 It might, however, be objected that it leaves room for 
different moral levels within the same overall project, and that the humility of the 
advanced pilgrim may be made sense of in this manner, as relying only upon a 
rejection of universalisability rather than requiring any separation of the advanced 
pilgrims moral project from that of the generality. An analogy can be drawn with the 
situation of having two climbers ascending the same mountain and even by the same 
route, but by using different sorts of techniques. Humility might involve awareness of 
a moral level that is unattained and which others simply do not see or perhaps it might 
involve a failure to live up to one's own (comparatively high) moral level. Both of 
these seem (to me at least) plausible grounds for an advanced pilgrim to feel humble 
in ways that might not be appropriate for ordinary pilgrims. But each case will require 
a built-in awareness of accomplishment which seems to cut across Murdoch's 
conception of humility. The latter seems too strong, if not exactly 'monkish' then at 
least dependent upon humility as conceived in the rule of enclosed religious orders 
mundane cxampIcs of moral action. 
16 GG, 72. 
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whose conception of themselves was not at all that of ordinary pilgrims. If such 
awareness of accomplishment is ruled out then not only is moral vision seriously 
compromised, but it is not obvious that the special sort of humility required of the 
advanced pilgrim gets off the ground. (What we run up against here is perhaps 
another example of something that Blum was the first to note. The Murdochian 
pilgrim needs far more self-knowledge than she is prepared to allow. 1) 
My overall point here is only to draw out a tension. Murdoews Platonism pulls 
her towards a hierarchical viewpoint which her opposition to elitism then pushes her 
to qualify by appealing to humility as a key virtue and by generalising the project of 
unselfing so that it is the appropriate moral project for all. But in doing so the 
connection between moral progress and the improvement of moral vision is placed 
under considerable strain because of the self-blindness that the advanced, saintly, 
pilgrim must have about their own comparative accomplishments and merits. This 
tension might, like others, be resolved by a mystical appeal to the view that the 
advanced pilgrim cannot see their own merits, or cannot do so in any way which 
would promote a sense of self-worth, but nonetheless their vision remains not a 
flawed vision in the service of other truths, but already truthful in some deeper (and 
perhaps ineffable) manner. While not denying that this is an option, I am inclined to 
think it an unattractive one. It runs the danger of making mystical appeals do too 
much of the work, (and thereby restricting the sense in which Murdoch is 
philosophically interesting). It also reinforces the Murdochian dependence upon an 
argument that is never made, an argument for the general availability of a 
quasi-mystical conception of morality. (Rather than one which is prepared only to 
incorporate insights from the mystics. ) Murdochian morality aspires to be not only 
liveable for some but available to all and the more it falls back upon its own appeal to 
the mystical, the less plausible this claim will be. 
17 Blum (1991) gives an account of moral perception which fuses themes from Murdoch and 
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